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THE BOOK OF THE COVENANT

By JULIAN MORGENSTERN, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio

I

INTRODUCTION

THE basic problem in the critical study of the Book of the Covenant is altogether different from that attendant upon our investigation of the Kenite Document. Here it is the problem of the determination of the various strata of a document, which, it is manifest almost on the surface, is composite, and of the historic and religious significance of these various strata and of the composite document as a whole.

The hypotheses which have been advanced regarding the literary history of the Book of the Covenant cover a wide range indeed, though by no means as extensive as in the case of the Kenite Document. There is a practical unanimity of opinion among Biblical scholars that the Book of the Covenant is a part of the Elohist Code; but not all are clear as to whether they regard it as an integral part of this Code, or as an older piece of writing incorporated by editorial processes into E. The hypothesis most generally accepted is that developed by Baentsch,¹ that the Book of the Covenant is pre-prophetic in character, and was compiled in the Northern Kingdom towards the end of the 9th or in the early part of the 8th century B.C., and was later incorporated editorially into E. He contends, and undoubtedly correctly, that the cultural background of the laws of C is not at all that of the desert and of the age of Moses, but is rather that of the Northern Kingdom and of an age when the agricultural life and the social and religious institutions had already experienced a considerable development. Moreover, Baentsch recognizes that those laws which parallel the laws of K are, in the main

¹ *Das Bundesbuch*, 1892, and *Handkommentar zu Exodus, Leviticus und Numeri*, 1903.

at least, later than and dependent upon their K parallels. This fact, too, precludes an all too early date.

On the other hand, a judgment in extreme opposition to this is offered by Eerdmans.² He holds that the Book of the Covenant is a literary unit and the product of the Mosaic age. His arguments are almost entirely negative in character, i. e. he regards the evidence cited by Baentsch and others for a later date and for composition in the Northern Kingdom as invalid, or at least as of little or no significance, and maintains that the religious, social and cultural background of C could be quite as much that of the age of Moses as of a later time. He offers little or no positive evidence, however, to establish his contention that C is the actual product of the age of Moses.

Two interesting variations of the generally accepted hypothesis of Baentsch and others have been advanced. Kuenen³ suggested, that the Book of the Covenant does not stand in its original position, that actually it represents Moses' last revelation of law to Israel just before his death, and must have stood originally where Deuteronomy stands now, and that it was removed from this, its first and logical place, and inserted in its present position by Deuteronomic writers or editors who coveted its original position for their own code. It is indeed a daring and suggestive hypothesis, and the standing of its author as a Biblical scholar, as well as certain significant statements in the early chapters of Deuteronomy, which we shall have to consider in detail in the proper place, entitle this hypothesis to at least respectful consideration. Quite interesting, although advanced haltingly and entirely as a hypothesis unsupported by direct evidence, is the suggestion of Carpenter⁴ that the Book of the Covenant, with its laws of various kinds, ought to be correlated with the different laws which, according to Ex. 18. 16, Moses communicated to Israel at the Tent of Meeting. Paralleling this hypothesis

² *Alttestamentliche Studien*, III, 121-131.

³ Cited by Carpenter and Harford, *The Composition of the Hexateuch*, 208 f. I have not been able to locate the original of this citation.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 209.

somewhat is that of Reuss,⁵ that the Book of the Covenant is the product of the Southern Kingdom and of the reign of Jehosaphat. He bases his hypothesis upon a literal acceptance of the tradition recorded in II Chron. 17. 7—9 and 19. 5 ff. as historical, and an altogether gratuitous identification of the "Book of the Law of Yahwe" of 17. 9 with the Book of the Covenant. In similar manner, and with equal lack of evidence, Stade⁶ maintains that the Book of the Covenant was compiled in the Southern Kingdom, but during the reign of Manasseh, and therefore preceded by but a few years the Deuteronomic Code, which is, in turn, partly dependent upon it.

Furthermore, since Baentsch's important monograph appeared,⁷ Biblical scholars, with apparently the single outstanding exception of Eerdmans, have agreed that the Book of the Covenant is not a literary unit, but is composed of two distinct strata, the one consisting of the "words" (רברים), Ex. 20. 23—26; 22. 27—30, and 23. 10—19, coupled with a brief narrative setting in 24. 3—8, and the other consisting of the remaining laws of this Book, designated by the general title "judgments" (משפטים), and contained in 21. 1—22. 26 and 23. 1—9. However, not all the laws of this latter group are actually "judgments"; rather, the original group of "judgments" has been supplemented by a considerable number of other laws, some of them of a peculiar and quite distinctive form, and in large part Deuteronomic in content and spirit and of editorial character.

In the article which immediately precedes this in this series of studies,⁸ we have had occasion to discuss in detail the close relationship between the laws of the Kenite Document and their parallels in the Book of the Covenant. We have concluded that in the main the K version of these laws is the older, and in its present wording is closer to the original version of these laws than is the version in C. We have con-

⁵ *Die Geschichte der Heiligen Schrift des Alten Testaments*, 231—234.

⁶ *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, I, 635—638.

⁷ *Das Bundesbuch*, 1892.

⁸ "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 1—138.

cluded, moreover, that the Kenite Document was composed in the Southern Kingdom in 899 B.C., under Kenite or Rechabite influence, and constituted the literary basis or program of the religious reformation in the fifteenth year of Asa. We have likewise concluded that the Kenite Document, or at least the laws thereof, its most essential part, were transmitted to the Northern Kingdom by Jonadab ben Rechab fifty-seven years later, were modified somewhat to adapt them to the more advanced economic and cultural conditions obtaining there at that time, and constituted the basis of the religious portion of the reformation and political revolution sponsored by Elisha, Jehu and Jonadab ben Rechab in 842 B.C. This conclusion implies, of course, that the Book of the Covenant is not a literary unit, that only those laws, the "words," unmistakable in form and content, which parallel or are manifestly of the same class as the laws of K, and also, of course, the narrative setting, are integral in this document, and that all the remaining laws are secondary and insertions into the main document. This article will endeavor to present further evidence in support of these conclusions and also to develop these conclusions further along lines of far-reaching significance for the study of Israel's history, and particularly of its religious, social and economic evolution.

As with our study of the Kenite Document, it will be well to begin our analysis of the Book of the Covenant with a detailed consideration of its narrative setting, before we undertake the analysis of its laws.

II

EXODUS 24. 3-8

Scholars have long recognized that Ex. 23. 20-33 have no relation whatsoever to C, but are partly Elohist and partly Deuteronomist. 24. 1-2 and 9-11 are unmistakably J. Moreover vv. 9-11 are obviously the direct continuation of vv. 1-2; vv. 3-8, which have no manifest connection either with what precedes or what follows, disturb this continuity.

The relation of vv. 3–8, however, to the Book of the Covenant is almost self-evident. These verses tell of a covenant entered into between Yahwe and Israel upon the basis of a body of דברים, “words,” impliedly just spoken by Yahwe to Moses, and now in turn communicated by Moses to Israel. Israel, hearing these words, by formal declaration accepts them and obligates itself to keep them. Then through the performance of the proper blood-rite an everlasting, binding covenant is solemnized between the Deity and the people.

It is clear at a glance that this narrative parallels in practically every essential detail the account of the solemnization of the covenant which, we have seen, must have stood once in K, and of which a fragment is preserved in Ex. 34.27f.⁹ This fragment there tells how, at Yahwe’s bidding, Moses writes down the “words” which Yahwe had just spoken to him, and which he was, in turn, to communicate to Israel, and of which this written document was to be the permanent record. As we have seen, the remainder of the K account of the actual solemnization of the covenant has been lost, or, more likely, has been purposely suppressed by the J editors, who incorporated K into their document.

The narrative in Ex. 24.3–8 parallels this narrative of K exactly. This is in itself cogent proof, on the one hand, that these verses belong to C, and, on the other hand, of the close relationship existing between K and C, at least in the latter’s original form.

Careful examination of these verses reveals one disturbing element, viz. v. 3. This verse tells that Moses came and recited to the people all the “words” of Yahwe and all the “judgments,” and the people, hearing these, answered promptly and unanimously, “All the ‘words’ which Yahwe hath spoken, we will do.” It is clear that the several statements of this verse are out of place here; they come too soon in the narrative, and, moreover, are repeated later, and with greater exactness in their proper place in the narrative. Thus, for example, the first statement, that Moses came to the people, manifestly from the place of Yahwe’s revelation of the laws

⁹ Cf. “The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch,” *HUCA*, IV (1927), 95 ff.

to him, comes too soon. For v. 4 tells that Moses wrote down all the "words" of Yahwe, and this was impliedly at Yahwe's bidding and in His presence, just as the parallel narrative in Ex. 34. 27 f. tells. Furthermore, v. 7 tells in the proper place in the narrative, that after having made all necessary preparations for the formal solemnization of the covenant, Moses read the laws to the people from the book or scroll in which he had inscribed them. And there, too, and likewise in its proper place in the narrative, we are told that the people formally accepted the covenant with the words, "All that Yahwe hath spoken we will do and we will obey." Clearly v. 7 b is the original of that which is anticipated and repeated unduly and in improper place in v. 3 b.

One further and very significant discrepancy exists between v. 3 and the remainder of the narrative. V. 3 tells that Moses recites to the people not only the "words" of Yahwe but also the "judgments." It is self-evident that משפטים is used here in a technical sense, and refers to that particular group of laws beginning in 21. 2, and designated specifically in 21. 1 by this term. This is further and very convincing evidence that 24. 3-8 must be correlated with the laws of C, and not with any other body of laws, as, for example, the Ten Commandments in 20. 2-17, as has been not infrequently maintained. But it is significant that outside of this one passage, the remainder of the narrative makes reference only to the "words," and is completely silent with regard to the "judgments," even in places where there was quite as much reason to mention the "judgments" along with the "words" as in v. 3 a. Thus v. 4 states explicitly that Moses wrote down the "words," but is silent as to the "judgments," and v. 7 a implies that it is the written record of the "words," which constitutes the "Book of the Covenant." And even more significant, v. 8 says explicitly that Yahwe makes the covenant with Israel upon the basis of "all these 'words,'" and makes no mention of the "judgments" whatsoever.¹⁰

¹⁰ Significantly enough, even v. 3 b mentions only the "words" as the actual basis of the covenant, and, despite the specific reference thereto in 3 a, is entirely silent as to the "judgments."

But one conclusion can be drawn from all this evidence, viz. that v. 3 is not original here, but is editorial, and was inserted here for some specific purpose, which seemingly has to do with that particular group of laws designated technically as the "judgments." What this purpose may have been we shall determine later. Moreover, it is clear that with v. 3 omitted, vv. 4-8 offer a narrative complete in all essential details, and with unity more pronounced than with v. 3 retained.

In vv. 4-8 it is possible, and in fact quite probable, that v. 4 b, telling of the erection of the twelve stone pillars to correspond to the twelve tribes of Israel, is a gloss. Not that it is out of harmony with the rest of the narrative or with the religious principles and institutions obtaining at the time of the composition of the Book of the Covenant, but solely because these twelve stone pillars play no rôle at all in the narrative. Originally, as we know from abundant evidence, sacred stone pillars served in early Semitic religion as the abodes of local deities or spirits or else, in later stages of religious evolution, as the symbols of deities. These deities were, of course, largely, if not entirely non-Yahwistic in character. But in this portion of the C narrative the altar alone is the symbol of Yahwe. Upon it the sacrifices are offered as a matter of course, and likewise upon it Moses pours one half of the blood of the covenant, while the other half is sprinkled upon the people. And since Yahwe and the people are the two contracting parties in this covenant, upon whom, according to the implied customary ritual of blood covenant, the blood of the covenant-sacrifice was poured, and since one half of the blood was sprinkled upon the people and the other half upon the altar, it follows that the altar here, and it alone, was regarded as the concrete symbol of Yahwe. Manifestly, therefore, there is no essential rôle in the narrative for the twelve pillars. Moreover, since the covenant is explicitly established with all Israel as one people, there is not the slightest reason or excuse for representing the people in any way as a federation of twelve tribes, twelve subordinate units. These considerations make it extremely probable that v. 4 b is not a part of the original C narrative.

But unquestionably this gloss was inserted here at a comparatively early date. For it is inconceivable that such a reference to twelve sacred stone pillars set up alongside of an altar of Yahwe, and in connection with the solemnization of a religious ceremony of such basic significance in the religion of Israel, should have been made later than Deuteronomy.¹¹ The gloss is unquestionably pre-Deuteronomic, and must therefore be assigned in all likelihood to those Elohist editors who, as we shall see, incorporated the Book of the Covenant into their document. This conclusion suggests a ready and simple explanation of this insertion. The classic Elohist account of the solemnization of a covenant between Yahwe and Israel is found in Josh. 24. There there is no mention of altar, sacrifice or sprinkling of covenant-blood. But there, as here, Joshua writes down the words or terms of the covenant in the "Book of the Law of God"¹² and then sets up a great stone. That this was a sacred stone may be inferred from the fact, recorded in v. 26, that it stood in the sanctuary¹³ of Yahwe. This stone is represented by the Elohist authors of this passage as the eternal sign or witness of the covenant just entered into by Yahwe and Israel. Quite similarly these same Elohist writers tell that the twelve stones, which, at Joshua's command, the people take up from the temporarily dry bed of the Jordan, and set up at Gilgal on the western bank of the river, were to symbolize the twelve tribes of Israel, and to serve as a constant sign of the miracle wrought by Yahwe in their behalf.¹⁴

Undoubtedly the Elohist editors of the Book of the Covenant must have missed in this account of the solemnization of the covenant one element which to them seemed all important, the sacred stone pillar or pillars, which were to be unto Israel the eternal witnesses of their covenant with

¹¹ Cf. Deut. 16. 22.

¹² It is rather surprising that Reuss did not correlate this "Book of the Law of God," instead of the Book of the Covenant, with the "Book of the Law of Yahwe" of II Chron. 17. 9.

¹³ במקדש, literally, "in the sacred precincts"; cf. the Arabic *ḥimā*, and Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*², index under *ḥimā*.

¹⁴ Josh. 4. 3, 9, 20.

Yahwe. Accordingly they inserted a reference to such pillars at what seemed to them the logical place, and just as in connection with the Gilgal episode, so here too they made these pillars twelve in number to conform to the twelve tribes of Israel. Recognizing Ex. 24.4 b as the work of RE, and therefore omitting it from the main narrative, we find that this narrative now reads with perfect completeness and smoothness.¹⁵

A few facts in this narrative of interest and of some significance for this study may be pointed out. Moses is here the chief, or rather, the sole functionary. Yahwe has already communicated the "words" to him; he now writes them down, and then reads them to the people from his written record. He is therefore the intermediary between Yahwe and Israel. There are no priests as yet, nor is the offering of sacrifices as yet the function of priests. Instead the youths of Israel offer the sacrifices, but Moses alone functions in the covenant-ceremony proper. The sacrifice consists of bullocks, certainly not the standard sacrifice of a people dwelling, even though temporarily, in the desert. Cows and bullocks are rather uncommon domestic animals in the desert, owing to their need of comparatively frequent watering. Camels, sheep and goats are instead the regular domestic animals of the desert, and those regularly offered as sacrifice. On the other hand, bullocks, because of their size and correspondingly large value, represent the highest type of sacrifice among Semitic agricultural peoples. In the Biblical ritual they play just this rôle. Manifestly, therefore, the point of view in these verses is that of the settled, agricultural life of Palestine, rather than that of the desert and of the age of Moses.

It is not without significance too that Moses first sprinkles half of the blood upon the altar, then reads the "words" to the people and hears their formal acceptance of the covenant,

¹⁵ Perhaps, too, these twelve pillars, corresponding to the traditional twelve tribes, serve an additional purpose, to represent, in accordance with basic prophetic doctrine, that Yahwe was the God of all Israel, and not merely of either the Northern or the Southern Kingdom alone, and that His covenant was with entire Israel, and not only with a part thereof.

and only then sprinkles the other half of the blood upon them. One might at first expect that the blood would be sprinkled upon both altar and people at the same time. But a moment's thought makes the reason for the procedure here clear. As we have seen, the altar here is the concrete and visible symbol of Yahwe. It is Yahwe who has, impliedly at least, proposed, and who therefore need make no further declaration of His readiness to enter into the covenant. Accordingly, the covenant-blood can be sprinkled upon the altar immediately, and the people understand the full implication of this rite. But the "words," which as yet the people have not heard, must first be read to them by Moses, and must be formally accepted by them before the covenant-blood can be sprinkled upon them. But even before the people have actually heard the "words," they have been made to realize, by the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar, that Yahwe, on His part, is ready to enter into covenant with them, and that the matter therefore awaits only their affirmation.

Manifestly, too, the narrative is not altogether complete. Its conclusion has been lost; but this we can easily supply. For unquestionably, in accordance with the principles of early Semitic religious practice, the animals here sacrificed not only provided the blood for the covenant-ceremony, but likewise constituted a covenant-sacrifice, participated in by the people as the guests of the Deity. In fact just this is implied in the designation of these sacrifices in v. 5 as *z'ebahim šelamim*. This sacrificial meal constituted an additional rite of solemnization of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel, supplementing the sprinkling of the blood.

Finally, it should be noted that the "words" are here inscribed, not upon stone tablets, but upon a scroll. This is in significant contrast to the parallel statement, in Ex. 34. 27 f., that at Yahwe's command Moses inscribed the "words" of the covenant, according to K, upon two tablets. But, as we have suggested,¹⁶ it is quite probable that the reference

¹⁶ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 97.

to the two stone tablets there is editorial; and in such case it would be equally probable that the original K narrative told, or at least understood, that, just as here, the "words" there were likewise written by Moses upon a scroll.

The obvious relation to and dependence upon the Kenite Document of the Book of the Covenant raise the important question whether the latter did not have originally a larger narrative setting than merely Ex. 24. 4-8. We have seen that the original Kenite code of laws was embedded in a narrative setting of considerable extent, which must have told of the early life of Moses, his flight from Egypt and marriage into the Kenite tribe; of his first contact with Yahwe and the charge laid upon him to go back to Egypt and bring his brethren out from there to the sacred mountain in the desert where Yahwe was dwelling; of Moses' fulfillment of this charge, of Yahwe's command to him to lead the people away from there, of the revelation of the divine name and of the "words," of the solemnization of the covenant upon the basis of these "words," of the erection of the "tent of meeting" and the institution of revelation by means of the oracle; of the visit of Moses' brother-in-law and the appointment of the judges at his suggestion, of Moses' plea to his brother-in-law to be Israel's guide through the desert and of Hobab's finally yielding to this plea; of the brief journey of the people through the desert and their approach to, conquest of and settlement in the extreme southern part of Palestine. Without this narrative the K account of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel would have been incomplete and not altogether comprehensible.

Now it is quite probable that the Book of the Covenant may have contained originally a similar, and even parallel narrative introduction and conclusion. For here too the account of the solemnization alone is quite as incomplete and incomprehensible without the appropriate narrative setting, recounting the events leading up to the solemnization of the covenant, and the incidents following upon this, whereby Yahwe fulfilled His part of the covenant. The very abruptness with which the "words" in Ex. 20. 23 begin, and the

fact that, as we have seen,¹⁷ the first "word" has been suppressed in favor of the editorial v. 22, and the additional fact that, again as we have seen,¹⁸ the revelation of a code of "words" designed to be the basis of a covenant between a deity and a people which had, impliedly, not known nor worshiped him before, necessitated a statement, brief though it may have been, of the actual name of the deity, in order that the people might thereafter worship him specifically by name, make it quite certain that the Book of the Covenant must have possessed originally a narrative setting of some extent, even though this may not have equalled in range of content the original narrative setting of the Kenite Document. Unfortunately, however, the entire narrative introduction of C has apparently been suppressed by the Elohist editors in favor of their own narrative.¹⁹

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 31 f.

¹⁹ It is, of course, not impossible, nor even improbable, that some small fragments of the original narrative introduction of the Book of the Covenant may be preserved in the early chapters of Exodus, just as, as we have seen (*ibid.*, 51-54, 119-135), was the case with K. We would expect to find such fragments of the C narrative in passages ordinarily assigned to E. It is by no means impossible that the nucleus of Ex. 3. 1-15 (cf. my "The Elohist Narrative in Exodus 3. 1-15," *AJSL*, XXXVII [1921], 242-262), may come from C, although, if so, it has probably been considerably reworked by Elohist editors. There is nothing in the present text to forbid this hypothesis, although, it must be admitted, there is likewise little direct evidence in support of it. Indirectly, however, a number of significant details in that narrative favor this hypothesis. Certainly the conception of Yahwe dwelling in the מִקְדָּשׁ upon the sacred mountain, is very old, and parallels appropriately the K conception of Yahwe dwelling upon the sacred mountain with the cave of revelation thereon. This ancient, local conception of Deity would be more natural and appropriate in the older Book of the Covenant than in the younger Elohist Code. Furthermore, the representation of the Deity of this mountain as the God of Moses' הָאֵלֹהִים, as we have had to emend the אֱלֹהִים of v. 6 and the אֱלֹהִים of v. 15, conforms exactly to the conception of the Deity which we have found characteristic of K. The same conclusion holds true of the designation here of the people merely as the בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, and not yet as Yahwe's people; for, as we have seen, this was likewise the procedure in K, and not until the covenant had been solemnized, could Israel be rightfully designated as "Yahwe's people." Moreover, understanding that the C narrative, like that of K, was anticipating the coming of Israel, after its deliverance from Egypt, to the sacred mountain in the desert and the establish-

Unquestionably the Book of the Covenant must have contained originally an account of Israel's coming to the sacred place and of the events leading immediately to the revelation of the "words" and the solemnization of the covenant. For in the light of the manifest parallelism of C with K, it is impossible to conceive that C could have told of the revelation of the "words" and the solemnization of the covenant without some appropriate motivation. But what that may have been, and whether it paralleled in any way the account which must once have stood in K, viz. the original form of the golden calf story,²⁰ it is impossible to tell, although this is by no means impossible or improbable.

We have seen, too, that the K narrative told of Israel's journey from the sacred mountain of Yahwe under the leadership of Moses and with the guidance of Moses' brother-in-law, Hobab, until they entered, conquered and settled down in southern Palestine. Presumably therefore the C narrative must have contained some parallel *motif* of divinely appointed guidance of Israel through the desert. And here expectation is not disappointed. The Pentateuch records five different, contradictory and mutually exclusive accounts of

ing of the covenant there between it and Yahwe, the statement of v. 12b becomes much more intelligible, viz. that when Moses should have brought the people out from Egypt they would worship Yahwe at this mountain. Nor is it entirely out of possible accord with the narrative introduction of C that Yahwe should have revealed His real name to Moses at this, His first contact with him, rather than later, as in K, just before the actual solemnization of the covenant.

This evidence is, of course, too indirect and insufficient to posit absolutely that the nucleus of the narrative of Ex. 3. 1-15 was drawn from C, but it does suffice to make the hypothesis attractive.

Not improbably, too, certain elements of the plague narrative may have been drawn from the original introduction to C, but if so, it is hardly possible to identify them, for they would seem to be rather elements of the narrative itself, than of the present literary form thereof. Nor is it possible to assign any portion of Ex. 19 or 20. 1-21 to C. We must therefore conclude that by far the greater part, if not actually all of the original introduction of C has been suppressed by the Elohist editors in favor of their own narrative, or if not this, then that it has been lost in some other way. But that there was originally a narrative introduction to C similar to that of K, though not necessarily of the same extent, we need not hesitate to believe.

²⁰ Cf. "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 106 ff.

the way in which Israel was guided through the desert.²¹ Four of these five accounts have been assigned to specific sources on the ground of abundant and convincing evidence. The account of the guidance by Hobab has been assigned to K, that by the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night to J, that by the angel or messenger of Yahwe to E, and that by the *kebod Yahwe* to P. But one account remains unassigned, as yet, viz. the account in Num. 10. 33 b.

III

NUMBERS 10. 33 b

This half-verse says that "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe was journeying on a three days stretch in advance of Israel in order to spy out a resting-place for them." The half-verse is appended to the K account of the selection of Hobab as Israel's guide. Manifestly it not only has nothing to do with this narrative, but is absolutely contradictory to it. If Israel was guided by Hobab, there was no need nor possibility of its being guided by the ark; and *vice versa*, if it was guided by the ark, there was no need nor possibility of Hobab's guidance. Manifestly the two accounts must come from different sources. And this consideration suggests too that this little narrative of Israel's guidance by the ark must come from some source entirely independent of not only K, but also of J, E and P. What source can this be? Either we must posit some source, or at least some tradition, entirely independent of K, J, E or P, and also of C, or we must attempt to correlate this fragmentary narrative with C.²² Certainly the latter seems the more reasonable procedure; and, as we shall see, it has much evidence in its favor.

²¹ Cf. my "Biblical Theophanies," *ZA*, XXV (1912), 139-193 and XXVIII (1915), 15-60; also my "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 41 f.

²² It is, of course, needless to discuss the possibility of assigning this narrative to D, the only remaining document of the Hexateuch, since, as is generally recognized, D has no independent account of the Exodus and the wilderness wanderings, but is dependent entirely upon the traditions of the older sources, particularly E.

In its present connection v. 33 b seems to be harmonized with the K account of Hobab's guidance, immediately preceding, by the insertion of the words, *דרך שלשת ימים*. These words seem to imply in this connection that Hobab was Israel's actual and immediate guide, ever present with it and pointing out the way it must go, while the ark kept a three days journey in advance of the host of Israel, in order to search out for it a resting-place, presumably in this connection the nightly camping-place. For if the actual guide of Israel was Hobab, then it must have been he and no other person or agency, such as the ark, who determined and brought Israel to its final goal. Therefore in this connection *מנוחה* could not designate the final goal of its journeying, and could accordingly mean only the nightly camping-place.²³

But a moment's thought shows the incongruity of this idea. What sense could there be in having the ark journey on three days in advance of the host of Israel, even for the purpose of fixing the nightly camping-places? It was one of the necessary functions of the guide to determine before the beginning of the day's march, just where the people would encamp at night. Moreover, with the ark constantly three

²³ Just this is the reinterpretation of this passage which Deut. 1. 33 gives, when it says that Yahwe was going before Israel along the way through the desert in order to spy out for it a place where it might encamp. For unquestionably the use of the word *לחור* here, as well as the general connection, indicate a dependence of this passage upon Num. 10. 33 b. Manifestly the Deuteronomist did not read *דרך שלשת ימים* in his version of Num. 10. 33 b, for otherwise he could not have told that Yahwe journeyed on immediately ahead of Israel to spy out its nightly camping-place. Manifestly too, he deliberately suppressed all reference to the ark, and substituted for it Yahwe Himself. His reason for this we shall learn later.

Quite obviously the association of the ark with Israel's *מנוחה*, the goal of its journeying through the desert and the land of its permanent sojourn, with Yahwe dwelling in its midst in the Temple, is reflected in Ps. 132. 8, *קוֹמֵה יְהוָה בֵּית מְנוּחָה לְאֶרְצוֹ*, and in I Chron. 28. 2, where the Temple is called *בֵּית מְנוּחָה לְאֶרְצוֹ* *אֲתָה וְאֶרְצוֹ עוֹד*. In both these passages, and also in Ps. 132. 14, *מְנוּחָה* means a permanent dwelling-place, and not a place of temporary sojourn, such as a nightly camping-place would be. Unquestionably these three passages, so obviously dependent upon Num. 10. 33 b, likewise did not read *דרך שלשת ימים* there, and accordingly interpreted *מְנוּחָה* in this verse, just as we have done, as the permanent goal of Israel's journey through the desert, the land promised to it by Yahwe.

days in advance of Israel, how could its connection and means of communication with Israel be maintained? And finally, if the entire journey from the Mountain of Yahwe to the goal of Israel's journeying in southern Palestine, according to the K narrative, was one of but three days, then certainly there was no place for the ark three days in advance of Israel's host; for it would have been at the very goal of the journey even before Israel had set out, and there would have been no need for it to travel on further, as the term נִסַּע implies. Quite certainly the words דֶּרֶךְ שְׁלֹשָׁת יָמִים have no place here, and are a very disturbing insertion into the original text.²⁴ Either they are the unintentional result of dittography resulting from the rereading of the same words in the first half of the verse, or they are a harmonistic insertion, designed to soften somewhat the otherwise absolute contradiction existing between v. 33 b and the narrative of Hobab's guidance immediately preceding it.

For with these words omitted this contradiction becomes much more absolute and glaring. The half-verse now states explicitly that the ark of the covenant of Yahwe was journeying on before Israel in order to search out for it a resting-place, i. e. the final goal of its journeying. How long this journeying and this manner of guidance endured, is not stated nor implied in any way. Nor is there the slightest implication of where this goal lay, whether in southern Palestine or farther to the north or east, or whether the approach of Israel to its final home in Palestine was through the south, as in the K narrative, or through the country to the east of the Jordan. Only one thing this verse does imply, and this very positively, that Israel journeyed on steadily under the guidance of the ark until it reached the final goal of its journeying. This tradition knows absolutely nothing of an interrupted journey and of a forty years sojourn and wandering in the desert, but only of a direct, unbroken journey from the place of revelation and solemnization of the covenant to the final destination, the land which, this half-verse implies, Yahwe must have promised to them. In other words, this

²⁴ So practically all modern commentators.

half-verse too tells, or at least implies, that Yahwe immediately and without the slightest delay fulfilled His part of His covenant with Israel. In this it agrees completely with the K narrative, and disagrees with the younger J and E narrative of the forty years of wandering in the wilderness.

Here a question of extreme significance for this study must be answered: how was it possible for an object such as the ark actually was, to guide the people by determining the road which they must follow through the trackless desert, until they reached their goal? To this question v. 33 b gives no answer whatsoever other than to imply that this was, of course, divine guidance, that in other words, there was some direct relationship between Yahwe and the ark and between this guidance by the ark and the fulfillment of Yahwe's covenant-obligation to Israel. More than this, however, this little half-verse does not tell.

Fortunately, however, one passage in the Bible sheds abundant light upon this question. It is the narrative in I Sam. 4-6 of the capture of the ark by the Philistines and of its experiences while in their possession, or rather of their experiences with it. A number of calamities which befell them just while the ark was among them raised the suspicion in the minds of the Philistines that, even though they had captured the ark, it was by no means as impotent as they had inferred, but was still a powerful deity, or in some way associated with a powerful deity, who could work his hostile will upon them even while in their midst in their very land. The continued presence of such a powerful and hostile deity among them was dangerous, and might, if too long protracted, threaten even their complete annihilation. It behooved them to rid themselves of the ark as speedily as possible, provided, of course, that it was really the powerful and hostile god that they suspected. But of this they were not altogether certain. After all, misfortunes similar to these had befallen them before, although seemingly not simultaneously, and not under just such conditions. It might be chance and no more, and the ark therefore might have no connection whatsoever with these calamities and their

coincidence. In such case it would be folly to lose for no reason whatever a trophy of victory so precious as the ark of Israel. Accordingly the Philistines resolved very naturally to put the ark to a test to determine whether it was in truth a deity, as they suspected, and, of course, the one who had brought these calamities upon them, or whether it was a mere inanimate and therefore powerless object, which could in no wise be responsible for their misfortune.

What was the test? They put the ark in a new wagon, drawn by cows which had never before been yoked. For if the ark was truly a powerful deity, it must be treated with all honor. For this same reason they gave it proper tribute, which they put in the wagon alongside of the ark. Thereupon they let the wagon, with the ark upon it and the cows pulling it, go and watched carefully to see which road it would take; for the test which they proposed was this, if the ark would take the road leading up to Beth Shemesh, i. e. back into the land of Israel, they would know that it was truly a god, indeed a powerful deity, who had brought all these calamities upon them, and of whom therefore they would be well rid. But if it did not take this road, but remained, no matter by what other road the cows might go, in the land of the Philistines, they would know that it was no deity at all, but only an inanimate object, which had no relation whatever to their misfortunes; and since it would still be in their own land, it would be easy for them to regain, or rather to keep possession of it. This was the test.

Now on the surface this test seems to have been just a mere matter of chance which road the cows would take. There were two or more roads leading away from Ekron, or whichever Philistine city was the last abiding-place of the ark, one of which led up to Beth Shemesh, and the other or others led in various directions through the Philistine country. The chances therefore were even, or two to one, or perhaps more, according to the number of roads leading through Philistia, that the cows would remain in Philistine country and the ark be pronounced an irresponsible, inanimate object. Such seems on the surface to have been the character of the test.

But just this was what the test was not. It was not a matter of chance at all. It should be noted first that these cows had never been yoked before, i.e. had never been trained to pull a wagon. Ordinarily, therefore, in this their first experience under the yoke, they would in all likelihood not pull together, but rather pulling unevenly and oftentimes against each other, the wagon would not move or would be pulled hither and thither without getting anywhere, certainly not as far as Beth Shemesh. In the second place, as v. 7 states explicitly, they were cows which had recently given birth and were now suckling their calves. The calves were shut up at home, so that they could not follow their mothers. The natural instinct of the cows, therefore, would have been to turn right around and go back to their calves. Manifestly the Philistines designedly made it as difficult as possible for the ark to reach Beth Shemesh. But, as v. 12 states in significant detail, the cows took the straight road along the highway to Beth Shemesh, lowing as they went along, but turning neither to the right nor to the left, until they came to the Israelite village. Now the lowing of the cows, mentioned explicitly, is significant. They were, of course, lowing for their young, presumably in answer to the lowing of the latter to them. It implies that their strong instinct was to turn around and go back to their calves, and that they would have done this, had they been able. But some power or force made this impossible for them, and drove them unerringly and irresistibly along the road which it had chosen. And it reached its appointed goal despite all these obstacles which the Philistines had purposely put in its way. This irresistible power or force was the ark, or emanated from the ark. The test proposed and executed by the Philistines therefore was the ability of the ark to select for itself a specified road leading to a fixed goal, and, in the face of their inexperience and natural unwillingness, to drive the cows pulling the wagon upon which it rested along this road of its own choosing until it should reach its goal. And seeing the final outcome of the test, which they had themselves proposed, the Philistines were satisfied that this ark was indeed the cause

of all their misfortunes, and were happy to be thus rid of this powerful and dangerous deity.

Here then is a specific case, recorded in the Bible, and unquestionably of great antiquity, of the ark selecting the road it wanted to go, and driving its bearers, or whatever means of locomotion may have been employed, irresistibly along this road.²⁵

Now exactly some such procedure as this is implied in Num. 10. 33 b. However, since cows or oxen are domestic animals comparatively rare in the desert, and since likewise transportation by means of wagons is rendered difficult, if not practically impossible, by the character of the desert terrain, we must picture the ark as carried along upon the shoulders of bearers properly qualified for that task. But it was not these bearers nor their leader who determined the direction which the ark should take, but it was the ark itself, or the power resident within the ark, which discharged this function.²⁶ These facts, and, as we shall establish, the

²⁵ Interesting reminiscences of this tradition are preserved in the Midrash and show that the Rabbis of old had a strong feeling for the original meaning of the narrative of I Sam. 6. *Bammidbar Rabba* XXI, 12 tells that when the Philistines were about to put the ark in the wagon, it raised itself up and set itself upon the wagon. And IV, 19 tells that the ark was able of old to carry its carriers as well as itself, that, in other words, it could drive its carriers along the road which it wished to go.

²⁶ This concept is by no means uncommon in Semitic religious practice and folk-lore. According to Macrobius (*Saturnalia*, I, 23, 10) "the Syrians used to worship the sun, under the name of Jove, whom they called Δία Ἡλίου-πολίτην, with most elaborate ceremonies in the city known as Heliopolis... For an image of the Heliopolitan god was carried about in a litter, just as the images of the gods are borne in the celebration of the Circensian games, and many nobles of the province, with shaven heads and having practiced chastity for a long time, would carry it, and would be borne along by the divine spirit, not by their own volition but just as if the god was driving his bearers."

In quite the same manner, according to Lucian (*De Dea Syria*, 36 f. [ed. Jacobitz, 358]) the image of Apollo at Hierapolis would drive its priestly bearers backward and forward, hither and thither, and by the direction in which it would drive them it would foretell future events. It would likewise at times lift itself from off their shoulders and rise into the air and remain suspended there for some time entirely of its own accord.

In modern Semitic folk-practice similar powers are frequently ascribed to the corpses of saints or other holy persons, especially while being borne to their

manifestly important rôle which the ark played in the narrative of the Book of the Covenant, compel us to consider the history of the ark in full detail.

last resting-places. Thus Klunzinger relates (*Upper Egypt, Its People and Products*, 393), "The body of such saints, when on its way to its last resting-place, has such a mysterious power on those that carry the bier that they can do nothing of themselves, but are compelled to follow a certain route, and bury the saint in whatever spot he may choose. An old negro slave in Kosseir, well-known for his long, harmless, pious life, having died towards evening, would not, on any account, have himself buried the same evening, and the bearers, in spite of all their shouting of *la ilah ill Allah*, could not bring the corpse to the graveyard. It remained, therefore, all night in the house (though the people do not like to keep a corpse a night), watched by a multitude of people praying. Next morning also it could not be buried for a long time; the blessed dead compelled the bearers to go through all the streets of the town, till at last, on the recommendation of the more enlightened governor, the higher officials carried the bier to the grave; even the Turkish soldiers could not accomplish it. The whole town was in uproar. The Mohammedans say the angels exercise this coercive power, the Christians believe it is the devil. Deceit or practical joking is not always to be surmised in such cases; on the occasion just mentioned almost the whole male population tried what they could do, and among them many staid and serious men. It is the firm belief of these people that the deceased saint or the angels cause the pressure, and then they feel it too. Even in Cairo such occurrences are common as well as in the other parts of the country. Among the ancient Egyptians also the processions of the images of their deities did not direct themselves at pleasure, but by divine inspiration."

Another instance of this same belief and practice, recorded by Lane (*An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, 479 [edition of 1890]) illustrates well the supposed power of the corpse to resist being carried elsewhere than whither it wishes to go, as well as the manifestly modern belief that it is possible to deceive the corpse, if this be advisable. "Very often, it is said, a welee impels the bearers of his corpse to a particular spot... The following anecdote, describing an ingenious mode of puzzling a dead saint in a case of this kind, was related to me by one of my friends... Some men were lately bearing the corpse of a welee to a tomb prepared for it in the great cemetery on the north of the metropolis; but, on arriving at the gate called Báb en-Nasr, which leads to this cemetery, they found themselves unable to proceed farther from the cause above mentioned. 'It seems,' said one of the bearers, 'that the sheykh is determined not to be buried in the cemetery of Báb en-Nasr: and what shall we do?' They were all much perplexed: but being as obstinate as the saint himself, they did not immediately yield to his caprice. Retreating a few paces, and then advancing with a quick step, they thought, by such an impetus, to force the corpse through the gateway; but their efforts were unsuccessful; and the same experiment they repeated in vain several times. They then placed the bier on the ground to rest and consult; and one of them, beckoning away his comrades to a distance beyond the hearing of the dead saint, said to them, 'Let us take up

IV

THE ARK OF YAHWE

In recent years this subject has been repeatedly investigated by eminent Biblical scholars, and the conclusions reached by them have been presented in a number of notable monographs.²⁷ In general each monograph demonstrates satisfactorily the shortcomings and inadequacies of all previously presented hypotheses with regard to the origin, history and the bier again, and turn it round quickly several times till the sheykh becomes giddy; he then will not know in what direction we are going, and we may take him easily through the gate.' This they did; the saint was puzzled as they expected; and quietly buried in the place which he had so striven to avoid."

Commenting upon a similar instance in modern Palestinian folk-lore, Canaan ("Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, VII [1927], 24, note 5) says, "In many cases the first miracle performed by a *weli* after his death is in the way his body behaves while carried for burial. It may get so heavy that those carrying the coffin (*sukliye*) have to stop and put down their load. On other occasions it becomes very light or even ... may fly from their shoulders." (Cf. also Canaan, "Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, IV [1924], 52.) This is precisely the same procedure as that of the afore-mentioned statue of Apollo at Hierapolis.

An especially interesting and significant instance of this particular superstition is cited by Certeux and Carney (*L'Algérie Traditionnelle*, 110); "Before dying Sidi Mohammed ben Alya had indicated his tomb, at the spot called Rerizem-el-Hotob. But the camel, which carried his corpse in a kind of palanquin, ambled in the direction of Temad, without either cries or blows being able to turn it from its course. Piously, therefore, a new decision of the marabout was assumed, and he was buried at Temad."

Other instances of this superstition are cited by Kelly (*Syria and the Holy Land*, 20) and Jaussen (*Costumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, 105). That it was not merely corpses that were thought to possess this power, but that it might be inherent in any holy object, may be inferred from a tradition recorded by Dapper (*Asia*, I, 30b, edition of 1681) that on one occasion at Damascus oxen were unable to move a wagon containing holy earth, impliedly because it was contrary to the will of the saint or holy power associated with that earth. (Cf. also Snouck-Hurgronje, *Mekka*, II, 65.)

²⁷ The most important of these monographs which have appeared during the present century are Dibelius, *Die Lade Jahves* (1906); Gunkel, "Die Lade Jahves ein Thronszitz," *ZMR*, 1906; Sevensma, *De Ark Gods*, 1908 (not accessible to me); Arnold, *Ephod and Ark* (1917); Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, XXXVII (1917-1918), 209-245; Gressmann, *Die Lade Jahves*, 1920; Budde, "Ephod und Lade," *ZAW*, XXXIX (1922), 1-42; Torczyner, "Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," in *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 219-297.

character of the ark and its contents and related objects, and then proceeds to advance a more or less new hypothesis, the weaknesses of which in turn are exposed with equally cogent arguments by the monograph next appearing. All these monographs deal, as a matter of course, with practically the same Biblical evidence, although quite naturally they stress the importance of different points, and thus arrive at their divergent conclusions. Each hypothesis, it is generally admitted, has some measure of truth; and yet not one has been found altogether convincing and acceptable. This is apparently due to one fundamental fallacy underlying the argument and conclusions of most, if not all of these scholars. It is that almost unconsciously they take it for granted that the ark was exactly the same thing, or was conceived of in exactly the same manner, throughout its entire history, at the end thereof as at the beginning, and that therefore the conclusions to be drawn with regard to it from the picture of the ark, with its two cherubim and other equipment, in the Priestly Code and other late, post-exilic writings, have quite the same significance for the history of the ark and its origins as has the evidence of the earliest records of the ark in Biblical literature. Particularly Dibelius, Gressmann and Torczyner have been led far astray by their failure to guard themselves sufficiently against this fallacy.

One fact of far-reaching significance must be kept carefully in mind here, viz. that in all likelihood the ark had disappeared by the time of the Babylonian Exile, and was therefore not present in the second Temple. This is to be inferred from the fact that in his detailed plan for the rebuilt Temple Ezekiel makes no provision whatsoever for the ark or for a place for it.²⁸ Even more significant is the explicit statement of Jer. 3. 16, generally recognized by Biblical scholars as a passage of post-exilic composition inserted into its present position, "It shall be when ye shall have multiplied and become fruitful in the land, that in those days—it is the

²⁸ So far as I can determine, Volz (*Die biblischen Altertümer*, 11 f.) was the first to call attention to the significance of Ezekiel's lack of provision for the ark in his plan of the rebuilt Temple.

oracle of Yahwe—the people shall say no more, ‘the ark of the covenant of Yahwe,’ nor shall it come into their thought, nor shall they remember it, nor shall they miss it, nor shall they make another.”²⁹ Such an utterance would be altogether impossible were the ark, or even an ark, a substitute for the original ark, extant in the Temple. Furthermore I Mac. 1. 21–23 tells that when Antiochus invaded Jerusalem he carried away from the Temple “the golden altar, and the candlestick for the light and all its accessories, and the table of the shewbread, and the cups, and the bowls, and the golden censers, and the veil, and the crowns, and the golden adornment on the façade of the Temple, and he scaled it off. Moreover, he took the silver, and the gold, and the choice vessels; he took also the hidden treasures which he found.”^{29a} Manifestly Antiochus carried off every object of value upon which he could lay his hand, penetrating for this purpose as far as the very holy of holies. He even carried off the veil which separated this from the body of the Temple. Golden objects seem to have excited his cupidity especially. It is therefore extremely significant that in this long list of the holiest utensils in the Temple cult, the ark, which, according to the tradition of the Priestly Code, was covered with the golden *kapporet*, is not mentioned, particularly since, with the removal of the veil, it would have been exposed to view. There can be only one conclusion from this, viz. that Antiochus found no ark in the Temple. Significantly too, despite the explicit legislation for the ark in the Pentateuch, the Rabbis of old were apparently aware that the ark was not present in the second Temple.³⁰ This evidence seems to be cumulative and conclusive.

²⁹ For a quite different translation of this important and oft-cited passage, cf. Arnold, *op. cit.*, 73, and Budde’s criticism thereof, *op. cit.*, 19 ff.

^{29a} Cf. also II Mac. 5 15 f. and Josephus, *Antiquities*, XII, 5, 3.

³⁰ Cf. Lauterbach, “A Significant Controversy between the Sadducees and the Pharisees,” *HUCA*, IV (1927), 184 and the references to Rabbinic literature cited by him there. This tradition that the ark originally stood upon the sacred stone, As-Sakhra, in the Temple of Solomon, that it had, in fact, been placed there by Joshua at Moses’ command, and that it remained there until God became angry at Israel, and the Temple, i.e. undoubtedly the first Temple, was destroyed, whereupon the ark disappeared, passed over to Islam, and is recorded by As-Suyuti (cf. the translation of Reynolds, 108 and 118).

And other considerations of far-reaching significance for the history of the ark corroborate this conclusion. We may be sure that the ark was not present in the second Temple not merely because it had disappeared after the destruction of the first Temple, presumably having been carried away to Babylon as a trophy of victory, but for another reason as well, because, apparently, even before the destruction of the first Temple the ark had lost much of its original significance and had fallen somewhat into disrepute. For certainly, if the ark had continued to enjoy uninterruptedly the reputation which it enjoyed unquestionably as late as the time of David, and which is again attributed to it both in the Priestly Code and in the account of the dedication of Solomon's Temple in I Ki. 8, it goes without saying that Ezekiel must have made some provision for it in his plan of the rebuilt Temple, or have taken some cognizance of it, or at least of its absence. Instead he ignored it in the most off-hand manner, quite as if to him the ark were something of no importance whatsoever, of which he did not even think, when he made his plans for the rebuilt Temple.

This too is the undeniable implication of Deut. 1. 33 and 42. For, as we have seen, v. 33 is directly dependent upon Num. 10. 33 b, and the reference to the ark and its leadership of Israel there has obviously been purposely suppressed here. This is the case also in v. 42. For this verse is, in turn, dependent upon Num. 14. 42 and 44. This latter verse says explicitly that when Israel sought to enter Palestine from the south, in the battle with the native inhabitants of the land the ark of the covenant of Yahwe and Moses did not move from the camp; they were therefore not present in the actual battle, and this, it is implied, and in fact actually stated in v. 42, was the reason for Israel's defeat. It is significant that in v. 44 the ark is mentioned first and Moses second, quite as if, what is undoubtedly the actual implication, the ark was the initiating force and Moses were but the secondary, dependent and attendant functionary. In other words, the ark is represented here as playing exactly the same rôle as in I Sam. 4-6, while Moses plays the rôle of attendant priest,

just as do the sons of Eli in I Sam. 4. Just because of this specific rôle which the ark plays in v. 44, Moses is represented in v. 42 as warning Israel not to engage in battle, for Yahwe will not be present with them, and therefore they are sure to lose the battle; the presence of the ark in the army of Israel is synonymous with the presence of Yahwe there, and is the sure guarantee of victory, precisely as is implied in I Sam. 4. But in Deut. 1. 42 all mention of the ark is scrupulously suppressed, and only the colorless statement is left, that Yahwe will not be present with Israel in the battle, a statement which is, of course, the same as that of Num. 14. 42, but lacks entirely the amplifying and concrete statement of Num. 14. 44.^{30a}

Undoubtedly the suppression of all reference to the ark by the author of Deut. 1 was not accidental, but was conscious and motivated by some definite reason. It is obvious that for the author of Deut. 1, who certainly lived and wrote in the early post-exilic period, i. e. in the early period of the second Temple, the ark did not enjoy the same reputation nor play the same rôle as it did in the early period of Israel's history, at least up to the time of David. Nay more, to him the ark must have been more than an object of indifferent significance; he must have had some strong and positive objection to it, for otherwise he would not have been so scrupulous in suppressing all reference to it. To him it must have seemed an object which did not accord at all with the pure, uncontaminated worship of Yahwe as he understood and interpreted it. Manifestly he put it in the same category as he put Hobab or Jethro and the "tent of meeting" and the oracle of Yahwe associated with it in the Kenite Document, all reference to which in the original narrative in Ex. 18, as we have seen,³¹ he likewise suppressed in vv. 9-18 of this same chapter. Clearly he regarded the ark of the covenant of Yahwe, just as he regarded "the tent of meeting" and the oracle of Yahwe connected with it and the rôle of Hobab in relation thereto, as not of true and proper Yahwistic

^{30a} Note also that according to Deut. 23. 15, likewise a post-exilic passage, Yahwe is present in the military camp of Israel, but, very significantly, here too His presence is not symbolized by the ark.

³¹ "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 133, note 121.

origin. He must have looked upon them all as non-Yahwistic, and therefore as idolatrous, or at least as semi-idolatrous, in origin and character. This conception of them, and this alone, would account adequately for his manifestly purposed suppression of all reference to them. We can easily understand why he should have looked upon the "tent of meeting" and its oracle and upon Hobab's connection with them as non-Yahwistic; it was because of their Kenite, and to him therefore non-Israelite origin. Manifestly to him only that could be specifically Yahwistic which was distinctively Israelitish and of independent, unqualified Mosaic origin. But why should he have put the ark, specifically designated as "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe," in the same category? This question is, obviously, of great moment for this study. The answer will be given in due time.

It is clear from all this evidence that at a certain period in Israel's history the ark lost very much of its original significance and reputation, and came to be looked upon with little or no regard, at least by a considerable and influential group of Israel's religious thinkers and spokesmen. It is clear too that this decline in the reputation of the ark must have begun in the pre-exilic period, for otherwise Ezekiel would not have ignored it completely, nor would the author of Deut. 1, in the early post-exilic period, have suppressed all reference to it, nor the author of Jer. 3. 16, apparently, judging by the content of his message, a contemporary of, or else, at the latest, living but shortly after Zechariah, have pictured the ark as not present in the second Temple nor as being needed or desired there. This process of decline in the reputation of the ark, due probably to a growing conviction that it was not of true Yahwistic origin, must have begun during the period before the exile. Just when and how this conviction arose, we shall endeavor to determine.

Certainly the oldest Biblical references to the ark³² agree absolutely in representing it as discharging two specific functions, that of choosing the way which it wished to go,

³² Num. 10. 33b, 35-36; 14. 44; Jud. 20. 27b (perhaps a late, harmonistic gloss); I Sam. 46; II Sam. 6. 1-20; 11. 11; 15. 24-29.

and that of going into battle with the army of Israel and giving it victory over its enemies. Even II Sam. 15. 24-29 seems to imply that Zadok brought the ark from Jerusalem in order that it might accompany David upon his flight and thus assure him of ultimate victory over his rebellious son.³³ These two important functions the ark was able to discharge, all the evidence indicates, because of a positive divine power resident in it. And all these earliest sources agree in identifying this divine power with Yahwe. Of this more later.

The next Biblical reference to the ark in point of time, seemingly, is Deut. 10. 1-5. This passage is generally recognized as not an integral part of the original Deuteronomistic Code, but as belonging to the secondary introduction thereto; it was therefore in all likelihood composed either during the exile or, what is more probable, in the early post-exilic period.³⁴ The passage represents Moses as making, at Yahwe's explicit command, a wooden ark or box, in which the second set of stone tablets with the ten commandments inscribed upon them, were to be deposited. This command Moses carried out punctiliously. It is certain, however, that this narrative is not original with this Deuteronomistic writer, but was borrowed by him, perhaps with some characteristic modification, from a JE original. This fact is generally recognized by Biblical scholars. However, our present Biblical text contains no statement whatsoever of the original of this narrative. The usual claim of Biblical scholars is that this original account of the making of the ark by Moses must have stood in Ex. 33 immediately following v. 6, and that the ornaments of the people there mentioned must have provided the material from which the ark was made, or at least with which it was finished and decorated.³⁵ This hypothesis is plausible;

³³ Cf. Budde's very apposite discussion of the rôle of the ark in this passage; *op. cit.*, 24 f.

³⁴ This passage is unquestionably, as is generally recognized by Biblical scholars, not the work of the same Deuteronomistic writer as the author of Deut. 1. Manifestly these two writers had different and even contradictory conceptions of and attitudes toward the ark.

³⁵ Cf. Gressmann, *op. cit.*, 22 ff.

certainly it has more to commend it than the parallel hypothesis that the "tent of meeting" was made from these ornaments.³⁶

Actually the content of the narrative in Deut. 10. 1-5 seems to imply that the original narrative of the making of the ark by Moses, upon which it is dependent, stood rather in connection with Ex. 34. 1-5. For it tells of Yahwe's command to Moses to make the ark only in connection with and following the command to prepare the second set of stone tablets. Accordingly Moses makes the ark at the same time that he prepares the second tablets; he then ascends the mountain; Yahwe writes the ten commandments upon the second set of tablets and gives them back to Moses; Moses then returns to the camp and deposits the tablets in the ark, precisely as Yahwe had commanded him.³⁷ Just this must

³⁶ Cf. "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 119f.

³⁷ Deut. 10. 5 is of particular interest in this connection. It is self-apparent that the last words of the sentence, *בְּאֵשׁ צִנִּי יָהוָה*, modify *וַיִּשֶׁם*, and not *וַיְהִי שֵׁם*, immediately preceding. These two words therefore disturb the connection and are manifestly a late insertion into the text. But they must have been inserted for some particular purpose. They can be translated only, "and they are there," and not at all "and they were there," for this last would have no meaning whatsoever. But translated "and they are there," they can have only one specific meaning and purpose. They serve as a direct and positive affirmation, almost, it would seem, in the face of a doubt or question, that the tablets of the Ten Commandments were still present in the ark in the days, not merely of the original Deuteronomic author of this verse, but also of the late glossator who inserted these words here. These words, therefore, constitute an affirmation both that there was, supposedly, an ark in the Temple in the days of this glossator, and that, as he believed implicitly, the two tablets were still deposited in it. This is, of course, the point of view of the late Priestly writers. This points to quite a late date for this gloss.

This same conclusion holds true with I Ki. 8. 8b. There the words *וַיְהִי שֵׁם עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה* are manifestly a very late gloss, expressing the strong belief of the glossator, and intended also to convince his readers, that the staves of the ark, and therefore, of course, the ark itself were present in the innermost part of the Temple, even though they could not be seen by the people at large, or, for that matter, by any one other than the high-priest, when he entered the holy of holies once a year, on Yom Kippur. But again the fact that this glossator too seems to have felt compelled to insist in this manner that the ark was still present in the Temple in his day, even though it could not be seen, indicates that he must have had to contend with a prevalent and persistent doubt of this, a doubt founded in all likelihood upon actual fact.

have been the full content of the narrative of which Ex. 34. 1-5 was the introduction, and of which these five verses alone survive. The remainder must have been suppressed either by the J2 editors who incorporated a portion of the Kenite Document, as we have seen, with the J narrative at just this particular point, although for what reason they should have felt obliged to suppress this statement it is difficult to imagine. Or, perhaps more probably, it may have been suppressed by later Priestly editors in favor of their own, quite different account of the making of the ark and of the occasion for it and the purpose which it was to serve.

But while it is almost certain that the author of Deut. 10. 1-5 must have found the JE narrative of the making of the ark linked with Ex. 34. 1-5, it is by no means impossible that it may have been connected originally with Ex. 33. 6 also. For, as we have said, the ornaments here mentioned could not possibly have been used for the making of the "tent of meeting," but they may well have been employed in the making of the ark. Moreover, as we have shown,³⁸ Ex. 33. 7-11, or rather the Kenite nucleus of this passage, originally stood in the Kenite Document in the position which is now occupied by the secondary narrative of Moses with the shining face, in 34. 29 ff., and was transposed from this position and amplified into its present form by late J2 editors. Manifestly therefore the account of the making of the "tent of meeting" could have had no primary connection with the incident recorded in 33. 6.

But equally 33. 5 b-6 has no connection whatsoever with, and even contradicts absolutely the statement of v. 4, that the people did not put on their ornaments. Nor have vv. 5 b-6 any apparent connection with vv. 1-3, nor with the main content of Ex. 32. In fact they seem to parallel, and therefore to contradict, the narrative of Ex. 32. For 32. 2-3 tells that the people had already stripped of their ornaments and that out of them Aaron had made the golden calf. Seemingly 33. 5 b-6 stands by itself without any apparent connection with anything that precedes or anything

³⁸ "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 121 ff.

that follows. And yet these verses obviously imply that out of the ornaments which the people stripped off Moses did make something. Moreover, not only 33. 7-11, but also, as we have seen,³⁹ vv. 12-23 were inserted into their present position by the J2 editors who incorporated fragments of the Kenite Document with J. Consequently before this incorporation Ex. 33. 5b-6 probably stood in immediate juxtaposition to 34. 1-5, with its original account of the making of the ark; or perhaps better, since, as we have seen, 33. 5b-6 has no immediate connection with either the J or E narratives, strata of which are present in Ex. 32 and 33. 1b-4, 33. 5b-6 may have been connected with an account of the making of the ark, which was originally not related at all to the narrative in 34. 1-5, and which came only through editorial processes to have connection with this narrative.

The import of all this is self-apparent. As is recognized by almost all modern Biblical scholars, Ex. 35. 1-Num. 10. 28 are the work of Priestly writers and are therefore late. Consequently in the pre-exilic period Num. 10. 29 must have followed immediately upon Ex. 34. 35. Therefore the reference to the ark in Num. 10. 33b followed in the pre-exilic form of the Hexateuch almost immediately after Ex. 33. 5b-6. In Num. 10. 33b the ark appears very abruptly and even startlingly. It is inconceivable that this mention of the ark should not have been preceded by some account of its making by Moses. And if, as we contend, and as we shall endeavor to demonstrate conclusively, Num. 10. 33b was originally a part of the Book of the Covenant, then it would follow that the Book of the Covenant must have contained likewise an account of the making of the ark, and that accordingly Ex. 33. 5b-6, which has no apparent connection with anything that precedes it immediately, or with either the J or E codes proper, was likewise originally a part of C.^{39a}

Nay more, since the Book of the Covenant tells of the covenant established between Yahwe and Israel on the basis of a little code of "words," which were written by Moses

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5 ff.

^{39a} In v. 6 the last two words, מִדֵּי דָוִיב, must be then the work of RE.

upon a scroll, and since this scroll was manifestly of primary importance as the concrete record and witness of this covenant, and therefore was presumably to be preserved most carefully, it is but natural to assume that the Book of the Covenant told of the making of the ark by Moses primarily to be the place of deposit of the sacred scroll of the covenant. This would mean, in turn, that the earliest form of the tradition that the ark was the depository of the sacred record of the covenant—"words," whether inscribed upon a scroll or upon stones, was contained in C, that it was C which first made of the old ark the *אֲרוֹן בְּרִית יְהוָה*, "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe," and that the later accounts of J, E, D and P developed out of this original. In such case then it would follow that to the authors of C the ark discharged two independent, and not easily reconcilable functions; on the one hand, it was the depository of the scroll of the covenant; on the other hand, it was, through the divine power resident in it, the guide of Israel through the desert. Manifestly this latter represents the older conception of the power and function of the ark, while the former is a conception new, secondary, and likewise original with C. Impliedly it represents a modification by the authors of C of the older conception of the ark, the beginning of that process of reinterpretation of the character and functions of the ark and of its eventual decline in reputation and regard, the culmination of which we have found in Ezekiel's silence with regard to the ark, in the suppression of all reference to it in Deut. 1. 33 and 42 and in the judgment pronounced upon it in Jer. 3. 16.

But it is equally certain that the late post-exilic period witnessed a significant revival of the prestige of the ark and of the rôle which it played in the religious theory and practice of Israel. For in the Priestly Code the ark is represented as the most holy object, the very center of Israel's religious life.⁴⁰ And the question naturally arises, why this revival? Moreover, since, as we have seen, the evidence is quite conclusive that there was no ark in the

⁴⁰ Ex. 25. 10-22.

second Temple, at least not in the century more or less immediately following its erection in the early post-exilic period, it follows that the Priestly writers probably had no direct and authentic knowledge of the original ark and its appearance. Undoubtedly they had valuable traditions which guided them in their plan of reconstruction of the ark, and these traditions must have fixed for them its general shape and character. But in the two hundred years, more or less, that must have intervened between the actual disappearance of the ark and the oldest Priestly account of it, even the most reliable traditions had doubtless become somewhat vague, and ample room was left therefore for considerable exercise of the imagination on the part of Priestly writers and for modification of old traditions with regard to the form and function of the ark in order to conform to and further Priestly purpose in thus reviving the institution and prestige of the ark.

Now in the Priestly Code the ark discharges two distinct functions, each absolutely unrelated to the other, but also equally unrelated to the significant functions which the ark was believed to discharge in the earliest period of its history. On the one hand the ark is still the receptacle for the two stone tablets upon which the Ten Commandments are inscribed. And on the other hand, the ark is now the throne of Yahwe, upon which He sits in divine solitude and majesty in the holy of holies, having taken up His permanent residence in Israel's midst; and there He meets with Israel, or rather with Israel's divinely appointed representative, the high-priest, on the one occasion in the year when the latter was permitted to enter into the divine presence. Seemingly this representation of the ark as the divine throne is something new and original with the Priestly Code, and does not accord at all with the earlier conceptions of the ark. Certainly the ark is not depicted as the divine throne or seat of Yahwe in a single authentic passage earlier than the Priestly Code or writings dependent upon this. There is therefore not the slightest ground for regarding this conception of the ark as of any great antiquity and historicity.

Moreover, it is clear that actually this conception of the ark as the throne of Yahwe is the only significant rôle which it plays in the scheme of the Priestly Code, and that its other role, as the receptacle of the tablets of the Decalogue, is of no practical significance whatever in this scheme, and is but a concession to or survival from older tradition.⁴¹

⁴¹ In the Priestly Code the most general name for the ark is ארון העדות, "the ark of testimony." This name is, of course, derived from the traditional presence of the two tablets with the Ten Commandments upon them in the ark. The tablets themselves are called לוחות העדות, "the tablets of testimony" (Ex. 31. 18; 32. 15; 34. 29), while the Ten Commandments inscribed upon them are designated as "the testimony," העדות (Ex. 25. 16, 21). The same term likewise designates both the ark and its contents (Ex. 16. 34; 30. 36; Num. 17. 19, 25). Consequently, because of the presence of the ark, with the stone tablets inside, in the sanctuary, the latter is called repeatedly either משכן העדות (Ex. 38. 21; Num. 1. 50, 53; 10. 11) or אהל העדות (Num. 9. 15; 17. 22, 23; 18. 2; II Chron. 26. 6), and the veil before the ark, separating the holy of holies from the rest of the tabernacle, is called פריכת העדות, "the veil of testimony" (Lev. 24. 3). The term עדות in these various combinations is found only in P or in Biblical writings later than P and composed under Priestly influence (cf., for example, Ps. 19. 8, where עדות is used in parallelism with תורה). It implies, of course, that the ark, or, more exactly, the two tablets present in the ark, upon which the Ten Commandments, the basis of Yahwe's covenant with Israel, were inscribed, were to bear testimony, testimony, of course, to the eternal covenant which Yahwe had established with Israel, or at least to the character of Yahwe's peculiar relations with Israel.

But while the term עדות, used either independently or in these various combinations, is found only in P, and with such frequency that it follows that the idea which it conveys must be basic in P, none the less it is certain, on the one hand, that the idea itself is not original in P, and, on the other hand, that in P it is used in an altogether conventional sense, and that the P writers had no adequate understanding of its true implication. For, were the ark, or rather the stone tablets within the ark, to serve as testimony of Yahwe's relations with Israel, it would follow that they must have been exhibited to Israel on occasion, either at some regular moment or moments during the year, or else whenever the need warranted. In just this manner the hairs from the beard of the prophet, kept in a silver case in the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem, are exhibited on each recurring 27th of Ramâdân, the traditional *lêlatu-l-Qadr* (Canaan, "Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, IV [1924], 82, note 1). But just such exhibit of the tablets of testimony is not only forbidden by the Priestly conception of and attitude toward them, but likewise it was in all likelihood made impossible by a practical consideration.

For to the Priestly theologians the ark and its contents were sacrosanct. They stood in the holy of holies, which could never be entered by a lay

V

THE THREE PERIODS IN THE HISTORY OF THE ARK

This evidence establishes firmly that there were three distinct periods in the history of the ark and of the functions

Israelite, nor even by an ordinary priest or Levite, but only by the high-priest, and that only once a year, and only when he was enveloped in an artificial cloud of incense, prescribed purposely in order that he might not see too much during his very brief sojourn within the holy of holies (cf. Lauterbach, "A Significant Controversy between the Sadducees and the Pharisees," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 173-205). In other words, although the ark and its contents were to serve as testimony unto Israel, they never were and never could be exhibited to Israel in order to discharge this function. And in the second place, even had this function been permissible, it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not altogether impossible, because of the presence of the golden *kapporet* upon the ark. It is true that nowhere is it stated that the opening of the ark was from above, and not from one of its sides, nor is there any direct evidence pointing to a definite answer to this question. Yet on the one hand, the presence of the staves, by which the ark was carried, would seem to preclude the possibility of the opening of the ark being in at least its two long sides, and on the other hand, the association in the detailed description of the ark in Ex. 25. 10-22 of the depositing of the two tablets of testimony in the ark and the placing of the *kapporet* on top of the ark seems to imply that the tablets were deposited in the ark through an opening in the top, and not on the side, and that immediately after the tablets had been thus deposited, the *kapporet* was placed upon this opening as a cover. This, too, is the implication of the statement in Ex. 40. 3 that the *kapporet* covered, or stopped up the opening (כָּסָה; cf. Torczyner, *op. cit.*, 239-247) of the ark. It is likewise implied in the etymological significance of the term *kapporet*; for whether "to cover" (and thereby at the same time "to conceal") be a primary or a secondary meaning of the stem כָּסָה (*ibid.*, 246 and Gesenius-Buhl, 359), unquestionably the fundamental meaning of *kapporet* was "covering"; and this meaning it could have best if conceived of, not merely as resting upon, but as actually filling up the opening in the top of the ark through which the contents had been inserted. But in such case the tablets of testimony within the ark could have been exhibited to the people, and thereby alone have discharged their function as testimony of the covenant, only if the heavy golden *kapporet* were removed. And not only would this have been a difficult procedure, but it would have been wholly incompatible with the dominant conception of the Priestly Code, that the *kapporet* was the seat of Yahwe, where He sat permanently enthroned in the midst of Israel.

It is clear, therefore, that the Priestly writers, despite the frequency of their use of the term, employed כָּסָה only in a conventional sense, and with little understanding of or feeling for its literal meaning. Manifestly the conception of the Ten Commandments as the testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel was not original with them, but must have been borrowed by them from some older source or tradition.

which it was thought to discharge. In the period before the composition of the Book of the Covenant the ark was conceived of as leading Israel upon the march and selecting the way which it should go and of going into battle with the armies of Israel and giving it victory over its enemies. These functions it was thought to discharge because of a certain divine power resident in it. The presence of this divine power in the ark caused it to be popularly regarded as a deity, or perhaps better, as containing a deity, or if not this,

In all likelihood they coined the term עֲדוֹת, for the ending ית probably points to late, Aramaic influence in the formation of the word. The natural forerunner of the term in classical Hebrew was, in all likelihood, עָדָה, or in the plural, as generally used, עֲדוֹת. This word is used by Deuteronomistic writers (Deut. 4. 45; 6. 17, 20) as one of the common terms for law, although it does not refer to the Ten Commandments specifically. In Ps. 132. 12, however, it is coordinated with בְּרִית. Etymologically the term עֲדָה or עֲדוֹת represents the laws as the testimony or testimonies of Yahwe's relations with Israel. And while it is true that Deuteronomy does not apply this term specifically to the Decalogue, none the less it is difficult to conceive of the origin of the term other than in relation to the Ten Commandments regarded as the primary testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. That this idea is characteristically Deuteronomistic is proved by the injunction of Deut. 31. 26, that the Levitical priests shall deposit the "book of the law," i.e. Deuteronomy, represented as the legislation secondary to and supplementing the primary legislation of the Ten Commandments (cf. Deut. 4. 1-13 with 14 ff.) beside the ark as a witness unto Israel. Manifestly therefore to these Deuteronomistic writers the ark itself was primarily the place of deposit of the basic testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. Accordingly Deuteronomistic writers likewise represented Samuel as depositing the book or scroll, in which he had recorded for Israel the plan of royal government sanctioned by Yahwe, "before Yahwe," i.e. unquestionably before the ark (I Sam. 10. 25; for לפני יהוה in Deuteronomistic writings equivalent to "before the ark," cf. Josh. 4. 13; 6. 8), forgetful of the fact that, according to the older tradition, the ark was at this time no longer in Samuel's custody. This motif Priestly writers seem to have borrowed from their Deuteronomistic forerunners, when they represented various sacred objects as deposited beside the ark; cf. Ex. 16. 34; Num. 17. 19, 25.

Furthermore, it is altogether probable that the JE original of the Deuteronomistic narrative of Moses' making the ark and depositing the two tablets in it, also conceived of the tablets as deposited there, not merely for safe-keeping, but that they might serve as permanent witness of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. And it is quite probable that this was the conception even of C, that in it too the Book of the Covenant was represented as deposited in the ark, not only for safekeeping, but also to serve as a witness of Yahwe's covenant with Israel, made upon the basis of the "words" contained in the Book.

then at least as a kind of tribal or national fetish or cult-object.

In the period beginning apparently with the composition of the Book of the Covenant and continuing through that of secondary strata of the Book of Deuteronomy, the ark came to be regarded generally as the depository of the record of the laws basic to Yahwe's covenant with Israel, whether written down in the scroll of the Book of the Covenant, or inscribed upon the two tablets of stone of J, E, D and P. Moreover, as we have seen, toward the end of this period, the real, historical ark had not only disappeared in all likelihood, but it had also forfeited so much of its earlier reputation for power and sanctity that its absence was not even looked upon with regret.

And finally, in the third period of its history, the period represented by the Priestly Code, and not even by the earlier strata thereof, the Holiness and Torah strata, but rather by the later strata, the Grundschrift, so-called, and secondary strata of this, the ark, although traditionally and conventionally still thought of as the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, was none the less now regarded primarily as the throne of Yahwe, upon which, in the holy of holies, He sat permanently enthroned in the midst of Israel.

Manifestly these three conceptions of the ark and its functions have little or nothing in common, but represent three distinct developments more or less exclusive of and antagonistic to each other. These three conceptions of the ark and its functions go hand in hand with three different stages in the evolution of the conception of Yahwe in Israel. Unquestionably these different and evolving conceptions of the ark and its functions were the offshoots of just this changing and evolving conception of Yahwe.

A

THE SECOND PERIOD

As we have said, the second period in the history of the ark began apparently with the composition of the Book

of the Covenant. Certainly as late as the reign of David the ark was still popularly regarded in its old light, was still thought to go into battle with the armies of Israel and give them victory. For this reason the ark is represented in II Sam. 11. 11 as accompanying Joab and the army in the siege of Rabbat Ammon,⁴² and for the same reason, as we have seen, Zadok and Ebiathar brought out the ark to accompany David upon his flight before Absalom.⁴³ How long this old conception of the ark and its functions may have continued to hold sway in popular thought, it is impossible to determine for lack of evidence bearing upon the rôle of the ark in the period intervening between the reign of David and the composition of the Book of the Covenant.⁴⁴

During this period, however, the conception of Yahwe and His worship by Israel underwent serious and far-reaching modification. The Temple at Jerusalem was erected, to serve as the national sanctuary of Yahwe, now conceived of as

⁴² Cf. Budde's very pertinent discussion of this passage (*op. cit.*, 21 ff.) in refutation of Arnold's interpretation of it.

⁴³ II Sam. 15. 24 ff. Cf. also Budde's discussion of this passage (*op. cit.*, 24 ff.), again in refutation of Arnold.

⁴⁴ An inference with regard to this question may perhaps be drawn from a comparison of Num. 14. 42 and 44 with Deut. 1. 42 ff. In the former account of Israel's battle with the native inhabitants of southern Palestine, the ark, symbolizing the presence of Yahwe, does not go into battle with Israel's army, and in consequence Israel is defeated. But, as we have already seen, this entire *motif* has been suppressed in the Deuteronomic version of this incident, and the ark is not mentioned. Since Num. 14. 40 ff. is unquestionably J, we may perhaps infer that J at least preserved a lively reminiscence of the function of the ark as the symbol of Yahwe's presence and the guarantor of victory in battle, but that by Deuteronomic times this had either been forgotten completely or else, as we have suggested, a conscious attempt was made to root out this tradition of the ark from the religious belief of the people. Certainly the rôle played by the ark in the narratives of the crossing of the Jordan and the conquest of Jericho, in Josh. 3, 4 and 6, is a late and artificial reminiscence of the old conception of the ark as the divine power which indicated the road which Israel should take, on this occasion through the hitherto concealed and therefore entirely unknown bed of the Jordan (cf. 3. 4), and which likewise gave Israel victory in battle. These passages are all the work of late Deuteronomic and Priestly redactors (cf. Steuernagel's analysis of these chapters in his *Commentary*, in the Nowack *Handkommentar* series). They have therefore no independent value whatever for the determination of the history of the ark.

Israel's national god. We have seen⁴⁵ that the religious reformation in the reign of Asa was, in all likelihood, directed in part against the Temple at Jerusalem, still a comparatively recent institution in 899 B.C., and, in opposition to the Temple, aimed to revive the old "tent of meeting," intimately associated with the early religious history of Moses, the tribe of Judah and the Kenites, as the only proper and divinely appointed place and medium of worship of Yahwe by Israel. In this respect, of course, the reformation failed and the Temple at Jerusalem continued to be looked upon as the center of true Yahwe worship in Israel.

But that the Temple at Jerusalem was regarded at this time as the actual residence of Yahwe, is open to serious question. Certainly Elijah, at about 870 B.C., did not look upon the Temple in this light, but, in full accord with the principles which animated the reformation of Asa, a generation before his time, he thought of Yahwe as still dwelling upon the mountain in the desert, where those tribes which had escaped from Egypt under the leadership of Moses had first come into contact and entered into covenant with Him. It is obviously a matter of prime importance for the study of the history of the ark to determine just when the concept did arise that Yahwe had taken up His sole and permanent residence in the Temple.

At first glance the question seems simple of answer. Amos 1. 2 represents Yahwe as roaring from Zion and sending forth His voice from Jerusalem. The authenticity of this verse has been doubted by some scholars, but upon altogether uncertain grounds. Certainly the verse conceives of the Temple at Jerusalem as Yahwe's abiding-place. Is. 8. 18 b is even more explicit, for it speaks of Yahwe as "He who dwells upon Mt. Zion." The authenticity of this phrase too has been questioned by some scholars, but again their argument is inconclusive. And it is admitted by all that the contrast between the waters of Siloah and the Euphrates, i. e. between Yahwe and Assyria as the objects of Israel's faith and reliance, would be entirely without point, did it not imply a direct relationship

⁴⁵ "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 123 ff.

between Yahwe and the Pool of Siloah, just below the Temple Mount, such a relationship as the sojourn of Yahwe in the Temple would suggest. This is probably the implication of Is. 28. 16 also. Likewise in Is. 1. 12 appearing before Yahwe in the Temple and treading down His courts, unquestionably imply the residence of Yahwe in the Temple at Jerusalem, provided of course that, as seems to be the case, the prophet has in mind only the Temple at Jerusalem, and not local shrines as well. Apparently too the popular expression. "Is not Yahwe in our midst?" in Mic. 3. 11, implies His residence in the Temple at Jerusalem; and this seems to be confirmed by the designation of Zion as "the mountain of the house" in the next verse.

But this seems to exhaust the list of passages in pre-Jeremian prophetic literature which point directly to the residence of Yahwe in the Temple at Jerusalem.⁴⁶ And it is

⁴⁶ I Ki. 8. 12f. might be cited as an exception to this statement, and particularly in the fuller form of the verses as emended according to LXX. It is usually contended by scholars that these verses are very old, the fragment of an ancient poem. Unquestionably in comparison with the setting, partly Deuteronomic and partly Priestly, in which these two verses occur, they are old. The fact too that, as the LXX version states, the poem, of which these verses are a fragment, was included originally in an old collection of poems, either a so-called "Book of Song," as the LXX text reads, or, as has been suggested by scholars, the Book of Yashar, points to a certain relative antiquity for the poem. But that the poem was actually of very great antiquity, and particularly that it actually goes back to Solomon, is doubtful. In the fuller form of the verses, as emended according to LXX, a contrast is drawn between Yahwe and the sun. Yahwe has set the sun in the heaven, but He Himself has chosen to dwell in darkness. This last, of course, refers to the concept that Yahwe dwelt within the *dēbir* of the Temple. The contrast between Yahwe and the sun is indeed strange and significant. Why it should have been made, and particularly at the time of the erection of the Temple, or even shortly thereafter, it is difficult to imagine. Yahwe is here represented as the lord and creator of the sun; the sun is His agent or instrument. Such a concept is not only not early, but it has a decidedly theological ring. We shall see shortly that as the result of natural, syncretistic processes, after the settlement of Israel in Palestine, Yahwe was gradually invested with the attributes of a solar deity, but that, beginning with the Deuteronomic reformation, a systematic attempt was made to divest Him of all solar attributes, and with this, of course, to represent Him as a truly universal deity, therefore the creator and lord of the sun as well as of all other phenomena of the universe. These verses smack so

difficult indeed to avoid the impression that this list is singularly small and inconclusive. For had the idea that Yahwe actually dwelt solely and permanently in the Temple been firmly rooted in the belief of the people in the days of Amos, Hosea and particularly Isaiah, there would have been innumerable occasions to refer to it explicitly. Consequently the manifest paucity of these references raises a serious doubt with regard to the degree to which this idea had at this time spread and taken deep root in the belief and practice of the people.

And this doubt is confirmed by a number of very serious considerations. Is. 29. 3 pictures Yahwe as camping about Jerusalem and besieging it; and only with difficulty can this picture be made to conform to the idea of Yahwe dwelling permanently within the Temple. Is. 31. 4 is even more explicit and significant in this regard, for it describes Yahwe as descending to wage war against Mount Zion. Necessarily we must ask, descending from where? And to this question Mic. 1. 2, 3, 12 furnish the clear answer; Yahwe comes forth from His heavenly temple or palace and descends upon the earth, so that the mountains melt beneath Him and the valleys are cleft asunder; and with Him evil descends against the gate of Jerusalem. This too seems to be the implication of Hos. 5. 14, that Yahwe will desert Israel and Judah and return to His place, i. e., presumably, heaven. Moreover, with significant frequency and regularity the J code represents Yahwe as coming down to earth to establish contact with mortals, whether it be to observe the Tower of Babel and to scatter the people and confound their speech,⁴⁷ or to confer with Moses in the sight of all the people.⁴⁸ Manifestly the implication here is that Yahwe dwells in heaven and descends

strongly of this Deuteronomic theology that it is practically impossible to ascribe an earlier origin to them. They apply perfectly to the second Temple and its dedication, but not at all to the first Temple. We can not therefore interpret these two verses as indicative of an early, pre-Deuteronomic belief that Yahwe actually resided in the Temple at Jerusalem.

⁴⁷ Gen. 11. 5, 7; cf. Gen. 18. 21; Ex. 3. 8.

⁴⁸ Ex. 19. 11, 18, 20; 33. 9; 34. 5; Num. 11. 25; 12. 5; LXX to Deut.

only occasionally to commune with mortals, and especially with Israel, either to reveal His law and will unto them or to visit His wrath upon them.

Here then we have two apparently contradictory and mutually exclusive concepts of Yahwe's dwelling-place, both seemingly current in the same period, and both even finding forceful expression in the utterances of the same two prophets, Isaiah and Micah. Is it possible that these two conflicting concepts were satisfactorily harmonized in the belief of the people; in other words, could the people have conceived of Yahwe at one and the same time as dwelling in heaven and likewise in the Temple at Jerusalem in their very midst? Is. 6 suggests the answer, and in a manner of utmost significance for this study.

This stirring vision represents the young prophet as beholding Yahwe seated upon a lofty throne in the Temple,⁴⁹ surrounded by a number of attendant angels, or winged, divine creatures. It is not immediately clear whether the narrative implies that Yahwe dwells permanently in the Temple, though ordinarily invisible to mortals, and only on this one particular occasion permits Himself to be seen by the young prophet, or whether it implies that Yahwe had just entered the Temple when the prophet beheld Him. The former is the traditional and almost universally accepted interpretation. In fact the latter seems not to have occurred to any one. Yet a moment's thought shows that the picture here of Yahwe in the Temple is not at all that which is general in Biblical literature. Yahwe sits enthroned here apparently not in the innermost recesses of the Temple, in the *debir* or the "holy of holies," in solitary grandeur, but out in the body of the Temple, so that the train of His robe fills the entire Temple.

Moreover, the reference to the quaking threshold seems to imply that Yahwe had just passed over it through the door of the Temple; therefore the threshold still quakes; for

⁴⁹ For a full and clear discussion of the question whether Isaiah saw Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem or in the heavenly temple, as Jewish tradition and also a few modern commentators would have it, and convincing proof that it was the Temple at Jerusalem, cf. Gray, *Isaiah*, I, 105f. (*International Critical Commentary* series).

the passage can scarcely mean that the threshold quaked permanently because Yahwe dwelt within the Temple. Manifestly the picture here implies one of two things, either that Yahwe had just come forth into the body of the Temple from the "holy of holies" in the innermost part of the Temple, in which He resided permanently, or that He had just entered the Temple from without, coming in over the threshold, which quaked at His majestic passing; in this latter case coming down, of course, from heaven where He was thought to have His true and permanent abode. There can not be the least doubt as to which of these two implications is correct. Nowhere in Biblical literature or in ancient Jewish tradition do we find the slightest trace of a belief that Yahwe ever came forth from the "holy of holies" to take His place in the body of the Temple. But we have had a number of references in Biblical writings of this very period speaking of Yahwe's descent from heaven. And the J code in particular tells explicitly of Yahwe's descent from heaven either on the top of Mt. Sinai, to reveal the Decalogue, or at the very door of the tabernacle to commune with Moses. Unquestionably the implication of this narrative is that Yahwe has just descended from heaven, accompanied by His train of heavenly attendants, and has just entered the Temple through the open gate, so that the threshold is still quaking at the moment when the prophet beholds Yahwe.

And if this interpretation of this interesting narrative be correct, it suggests the answer to our question as to how it was possible to conceive of Yahwe as dwelling in heaven and on occasion descending therefrom, yet at the same time being present in the Temple at Jerusalem in such manner that the people could believe that Yahwe was in their midst, that Amos could speak of Yahwe as roaring from Zion and sending forth His voice from Jerusalem, and that Isaiah could personify Yahwe as the waters of Siloah. It seems to imply that Yahwe's true dwelling-place was in heaven, but that upon some regular annual occasion He descended therefrom and entered the Temple and there He sat enthroned for a time surrounded by His heavenly host. And besides this He could, upon

special occasions, descend from heaven, either to commune with His people through His chosen servants or to visit His divine wrath upon them. What could have been the regular, annual occasion of Yahwe's descent from heaven and entrance into the Temple?

The chapter apparently gives not the slightest indication of the particular occasion of this vision. The natural and customary inference is that it was upon no particular occasion, but merely a chance occurrence that the young Isaiah, happening in the most ordinary manner to be in the Temple, beheld this august vision. Yet it is self-evident that the entire incident has more point and force if it is thought to have happened upon a certain particular occasion, an occasion directly related in some way to the content of the vision and its import to the youthful prophet, rather than if it had happened at a chance, insignificant moment.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ It is self-evident that I Ki. 22. 19ff. presents a close parallel to Is. 6. In both the prophet sees a vision of Yahwe enthroned and attended by heavenly beings. And in both passages a message comes to the prophet from the Deity, designed to bring about the destruction of the object against whom the vision is directed, in the one case Ahab, the king, in the other case the entire nation of Israel. This parallelism is so close and striking that it is impossible to escape the conclusion of direct dependence of the one upon the other. Nor can there be any question that Is. 6 is the original and I Ki. 22. 19ff. the dependent vision. This would imply, of course, that I Ki. 22. 19ff. being dependent upon Is. 6, must be later than 740 B.C., and in all likelihood later by not a few years; accordingly it must be secondary in I Ki. 22, as quite a number of authoritative Biblical scholars have maintained (cf. Kittel, *Commentary*, in Nowack's *Handkommentar* series, 174). This conclusion is corroborated by one consideration of much importance for this study. Does I Ki. 22. 19ff., like Is. 6, envision Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem or in heaven? Unquestionably the latter. For, on the one hand, it would have been altogether incongruous for an official, professional prophet of the Northern Kingdom during the reign of Ahab to have envisioned Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem. Moreover, a moment's thought shows that this is no real vision, actually beheld by the prophet with ordinary sight, as that in Is. 6 undoubtedly was, but instead it is either a literary, fictitious vision, or, at the most, a psychical vision, something which the prophet saw, or believed that he saw, not with his physical, but only with his mind's eye, as it were. This is proved by the preceding vision in v. 17, where the prophet also sees, and this certainly only in a psychical state, all Israel leaderless and scattered. From this it is clear that the dependence of I Ki. 22. 19ff. upon Is. 6, while real, is so only in external

In a very interesting passage the Talmud⁵¹ records the surprising fact that the Temple at Jerusalem was so located and built that on the two annual equinoctial days the first rays of the rising sun would shine directly through the eastern gate. Considerable evidence, to be gathered from a great variety of sources, shows that this eastern gate was kept fast closed all through the year, but was opened on these two particular days for just this especial purpose. The entrance of these first rays of the rising sun upon the two equinoctial days through the eastern gate and directly into the very heart of the Temple, was thought to symbolize the coming of Yahwe and His presence within the Temple, at least on those days. For this reason the day of the fall equinox was celebrated in ancient Israel as the New Year's Day. It was accordingly the day when Yahwe was thought to sit in the midst of His heavenly court and administer justice and decide the destinies of Israel, and perhaps of other nations also, for the ensuing year.

It was the coming of the first rays of the rising sun on the mornings of the two equinoctial days, and especially of the fall equinox, that was known as the coming of the *kebod Yahwe*, "the glory of Yahwe." Ezek. 43. 2 ff. gives the most concrete picture of this. On the New Year's Day the prophet sees in his vision the *kebod Yahwe*, or as he calls it there, the *kebod 'elohe Yisra'el*, coming from the east, with a sound like the noise of mighty waters, and as it comes along the earth is lit up by its radiance.⁵² He sees

circumstances in the framework of the vision, and not at all in its inner concepts and content. This consideration likewise makes it certain that Yahwe is here envisioned enthroned, not in the Temple at Jerusalem, as in Is. 6, but in heaven. This is, of course, a concept frequently alluded to in late Biblical passages, such as Is. 66. 1; Job. 2. 1. This fact too corroborates the conclusion that I Ki. 22. 19 ff. is late.

⁵¹ Jer. Erubin, V, 22 c.

⁵² מכבוד. For כבוד = "radiance," cf. Is. 10. 16 f., where כבוד stands, on the one hand, in parallelism with אור ישראל, and on the other hand, in contrast with יקר כבוד אש; Zech. 2. 9, where Yahwe declares that He will be a wall of fire (חומת אש) round about the city (of course in order to protect it against danger from without) and radiance (כבוד) within (i.e. shining benignantly and without harm upon its inhabitants); Is. 60. 1 ff., "Arise, shine, for thy light (i.e. Yahwe)

it approach the Temple and enter by the eastern gate and take up its permanent residence within the Temple. There-
 is come, and the *kēbod Yahwe* has risen (like the sun, זרחה) upon thee. Behold, darkness covereth the earth, and deep darkness the nations; but upon thee doth Yahwe rise (like the sun, זרחה), and His radiance (or His *kabod*, i.e. the *kēbod Yahwe*, which amounts to the same thing) is revealed (or hath revealed itself) unto thee. And nations shall go toward thy light (i.e. Yahwe), and kings toward thy radiant sunrise" (literally, "toward the radiance or brilliance of thy sunrising"). The parallelism here shows clearly that this is but a poetic equivalent for the *kēbod Yahwe*, i.e. for Yahwe represented by the first rays of the rising sun. Moreover, the background of the picture here is the celebration of the interesting ceremonies of the *simhat bet hašō'ebah*, in connection with the Succoth-festival (cf. Sukkah, V). Until the time of Ezra, and even for a time thereafter, this was the old New Year's Day celebration (cf. my "The Three Calendars of Ancient Israel," *HUCA*, I [1924], 22-58). Unquestionably the sunrise here referred to, correlated with the manifestation of Yahwe's presence, is the sunrise upon the day of the fall equinox, the New Year's Day. Is. 59. 19 likewise correlates the radiance of Yahwe, or the *kēbod Yahwe*, with the east, the place of sunrise, while at the same time, and singularly enough, it correlates the "name of Yahwe," likewise a manifestation of the Deity, with the west. Furthermore, Ex. 16. 10 (belonging to P2, and therefore coming from the late post-exilic period) represents Israel, but recently emerged from Egypt and marching eastward through the desert, looking towards the desert, i.e. of course towards the east, and beholding the *kēbod Yahwe*.

In all these passages כבוד, standing by itself, has unquestionably the meaning "radiance," or else, used in the technical term *kēbod Yahwe*, is obviously associated with the radiance of the first rays of the rising sun upon the day of the fall equinox, the New Year's Day. Consequently in this compound term כבוד could be best and most literally translated "radiance" of Yahwe. Accordingly we must translate Is. 6. 3 (and with it, of course, the dependent passage Ps. 72. 19) "the whole earth is filled with His radiance." Likewise Ps. 57. 6, 12; 108. 6, "Be high above the heavens, O God; over all the earth be Thy radiance"; and Ps. 113. 4, "Exalted above all nations is Yahwe; His radiance is over the heavens." Also in Is. 4. 5 כבוד must either be translated "radiance," or, perhaps better be regarded as a contraction of the fuller expression *kēbod Yahwe*; for here too the background of the picture is the characteristic Priestly representation of the *kēbod Yahwe*, a flaming apparition, visible to Israel at night, but in form subdued, and therefore harmless to the vision, either by the darkness of the night, or, as here, because enveloped in smoke, but during the day enveloped in the cloud, and therefore itself invisible to Israel (cf. Ex. 24. 15-18; 40. 34-38). Perhaps also in Is. 24. 23 כבוד should be translated "radiance," and the picture here be contrasted with that of Ex. 24. 10. Not improbably also in Is. 30. 27 נִקְרַר should be translated "radiant" or "gleaming." The passage is difficult indeed, and neither ancient versions nor modern commentators have been able to make anything satisfactory out of it. For כבוד משאח LXX seems to have read כבוד אטח, וסימורה מאשא אכלא. And since Targum paraphrases the end of the same verse

fore the prophet is charged to see that henceforth the eastern gate is kept closed forever, i. e., never again to be reopened, as formerly, on the two annual equinoctial days. The old ceremony of the opening of the gates for the day, and the solemn closing of them at the end of the day's ceremonies, the prophet very manifestly seeks to abrogate. This is, of course, because he is fully aware of the original idolatrous rites connected with the worship of the sun at this open eastern gate,⁵³ and in order to counteract the impression that they have aught to do with the pure worship of Yahwe. But he has also a second motive in thus prescribing that this eastern gate must be kept closed forever; thereby he symbolizes concretely to the people of Israel that Yahwe is now actually dwelling permanently in their midst, that He is there, in the Temple, no longer merely upon the New Year's Day, but throughout the entire year, at all times, permanently.

But while Ezekiel thus makes extensive use of the idea and ceremonial of the coming of the *kebod Yahwe* into the Temple⁵⁴ at Jerusalem on the New Year's Day, it is by no

we must infer that LXX probably understood כבוד here as meaning "radiancy," like that of a consuming fire. Certainly the "light of the seven days," in v. 26 refers to the illuminations in the Temple and throughout the entire city, and in fact through the whole land of Palestine, during the seven days of the ceremonies of the *simḥat beṭ hašō'ebah*, i. e. the seven days of the Succoth-festival; and v. 29 makes explicit and rather detailed reference to these same ceremonies. Probably therefore, whatever be the actual meaning of v. 27, the background is also that of these same festival rites, with their association with the first rays of the rising sun upon the day of the fall equinox and the consequent coming of the *k'bod Yahwe*. כָּבוֹד here is apparently in parallelism with בָּאֵר, and therefore has been traditionally vocalized as a participle. All this evidence points to the probability of the translation "radiant."

In this connection it is interesting and significant to note that Charlier ("Ein astronomischer Beitrag zur Exegese des Alten Testaments," *ZDMG*, 58 [1904], 392 f.), working upon altogether independent grounds, arrived at the same conclusion that the *k'bod Yahwe* must be correlated with the first rays of the rising sun upon the days of the equinox.

⁵³ Cf. Ezek. 8. 16 ff. and Sukkah, V, 4.

⁵⁴ This entire subject of the *k'bod Yahwe* and its coming into the Temple through the eastern gate on the New Year's Day is one of exceeding importance for the history of the religion of Israel. But, as the few points discussed in note 52 indicate, it is entirely too vast in extent and too complex to be treated here in detail. This must await another occasion.

means original with him. Ezek. 8. 16 ff. proves that this was an old ceremony in the Temple at Jerusalem, probably but loosely coordinated with the worship of Yahwe. What Ezekiel, although perhaps half unconsciously, aimed to do, was, as we have just intimated, to divest the ceremony of its most obvious and objectionable non-Yahwistic elements and give it a proper and legitimate place in the Yahwe-Temple and cult.

The antiquity of the institution is further attested by the realization that it constituted likewise the basis of the picture in Is. 6 and the occasion of the young prophet's vision in the Temple. There too we have Yahwe and His *kebod*, His radiance, filling the entire world. He is seated upon a high throne in the Temple, surrounded by the seraphim, winged, angelic creatures, manifestly the forerunners of the cherubim of Ezekiel. Probably, as the name *serafim* indicates, they were conceived of as fiery beings, shining with a radiance comparable to, but no doubt inferior to, and perhaps emanating by reflection from Yahwe. Here too, just as in all accounts of the manifestation of the *kebod Yahwe*, the sanctuary is filled with smoke, or, what amounts to the same thing, with cloud.⁵⁵ And here too, just as in other accounts, the prophet fears that he must die, for he has beheld Yahwe; and ordinarily for a mortal to gaze upon Yahwe, even in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, meant death.⁵⁶

And what is Yahwe doing here in the Temple on this New Year's Day? Apparently judging the peoples and pronouncing their destinies for the ensuing year. For when, in v. 8, the prophet, his lips purified by the coal from off the altar, is made to hear clearly and to understand the full import of what Yahwe is saying, the words are, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?" i. e. who shall be our agent, to carry out our plan and thus fulfill the destiny of Israel appointed for that year? And what this destiny is, is stated clearly in vv. 9 ff., the complete destruction of the nation and desolation

⁵⁵ Ex. 40. 35; I Ki. 8. 10f.; Is. 4. 5; Ezek. 10. 4.

⁵⁶ Cf. Gen. 32. 31; Ex. 33. 20; Num. 16. 20, 35; Jud. 13. 22; also my "Moses with the Shining Face," *HUCA*, II (1925), 1-27.

of the land. But since, in accordance with the prophetic teaching of the day,^{56a} before Israel might be destroyed by Yahwe it must be warned of its impending doom and summoned to repent, this shall be the mission of the ardent, young devotee. But likewise, since Israel's destiny of doom has been fixed by Yahwe and His divine court, and its destruction is therefore inevitable, the mission of the prophet must be fruitless, even though it be indispensable; accordingly he must speak to a people fat of heart, heavy of ear and sealed of eye, a people therefore which can not repent and return to Yahwe and thus escape its sentence of doom.

Unquestionably the background of this picture represents Yahwe seated in the Temple, in the midst of His divine attendants, holding court upon the New Year's Day and fixing the destiny of Israel for the ensuing year. It is altogether probable that the picture is based, in considerable part at least, upon a Babylonian original, for in Babylonian literature Bel-Marduk is frequently represented as discharging this function upon just this occasion.⁵⁷ Moreover, on this day the Babylonian deities, and particularly Marduk, were thought to enter their temples in solemn procession. Undoubtedly the seraphim here, just as the cherubim of Ezekiel and of post-exilic literature, are largely, although probably not entirely, nor necessarily directly, an outgrowth of Babylonian representations of heavenly beings of secondary rank, the attendants of the gods.⁵⁸

But Is. 6 does not necessarily conceive of Yahwe as actually dwelling within the Temple, and therefore constantly enthroned upon the high seat upon which the prophet beheld Him. Rather in all likelihood, very much like Marduk in the Babylonian New Year's Day ceremonial,⁵⁹ He was conceived of in the time of Isaiah as coming into the Temple only on this one day and only for the purpose of there holding His

^{56a} Cf. Amos 3. 7.

⁵⁷ Cf. Zimmern, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*³, 515; Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, I, 503.

⁵⁸ Cf. note 71, below.

⁵⁹ Cf. Zimmern, *Das babylonische Neujahrsfest*; Langdon, *The Babylonian Epic of Creation*.

divine court and pronouncing the destiny of Israel for the year. It is indeed significant that this passage calls the Temple only by the colorless name, **ההיכל**, a name which also came to Israel from the Babylonians, and that apparently it is not called by the more specific name, **בית יהוה**, "house" or "dwelling-place of Yahwe," in a single authenticated passage earlier than Jeremiah.⁶⁰

In other words, this narrative establishes no more than that Isaiah does see Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem, and this apparently upon the New Year's Day. But this evidence alone is insufficient to determine whether Yahwe was actually regarded by the prophet as residing permanently in the Temple, or as merely having entered there, of course in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, for just that one day, in order to there hold His divine court and fix the destinies of Israel, and perhaps of other nations also, for the new year.

⁶⁰ Unless perhaps in Mic. 3. 12. But there **הבית**, in the term **הבית**, might refer to the royal palace as well as to the Temple. Moreover, of all the eighteen passages in Jeremiah in which the term **בית יהוה** is used, not a single one comes from the period of his prophetic activity preceding the Deuteronomic reformation in 621 B. C. The term is used very rarely in pre-Jeremian writings, and never refers specifically to the Temple at Jerusalem. Scholars are agreed that the term **בית יהוה** in Hos. 8. 1, and probably also in 9. 15, refers to the entire land of Palestine. And in Hos. 9. 4 the expression refers to any sanctuary of Yahwe, and particularly to the Yahwe-sanctuaries of the Northern Kingdom. In II Sam. 12. 20, clause $\alpha\gamma$, in which the term occurs, is manifestly a late, disturbing gloss. In Josh. 6. 24 the term is likewise recognized by all scholars as an anachronism and therefore a gloss. I have shown too ("The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 50) that Ex. 23. 19 and 34. 36, in which the term occurs, are both Deuteronomic. In Jud. 19. 18 the expression is also, in the opinion of all scholars, the result either of incorrect copying or of glossation. Is. 2. 2, 3, 5; 37. 1; 38. 20, 22; Mic. 4. 1 are all generally recognized as late. This leaves I Sam. 1. 24; 3. 15 as the only passages of the entire Bible earlier than Jeremiah in which the expression **בית יהוה** may be authentic. But even here, just as in Hos. 9. 4, it refers, not to the Temple at Jerusalem, but to the sanctuary at Shiloh, likewise in the Northern Kingdom. And inasmuch as 1. 9 and 3. 3 call this same sanctuary, **ההיכל**, the temptation is strong to regard this as the older term, in common use in the pre-Deuteronomic period. Just this is the term employed in Is. 6. 1 to designate the Temple at Jerusalem. Finally, Jer. 7. 4 seems to imply very positively that still in the days of the prophet the popular designation for the Temple at Jerusalem was **היכל יהוה**, as in Is. 6. 1, and not **בית יהוה**.

Certainly a century later, by the time of Jeremiah, the popular belief was that Yahwe dwelt permanently in the Temple. This is indicated not only, as has been intimated, by the designation of the Temple as בית יהוה, "the house of Yahwe," which becomes common from that time on, but also by the emphatic manner in which Deuteronomic writers represent the Temple at Jerusalem as the place which Yahwe had chosen, לשכן שמו שם, "to cause His name to dwell there."

But it is equally certain that this emphatic representation of the Temple as the place where Yahwe's name, i. e. of course, Yahwe Himself, dwells is with these Deuteronomic writers, in part at least, propagandistic, conforming to and enforcing the Deuteronomic program of the destruction of the local shrines throughout the country, with the Jerusalem Temple alone left as the sole place of Yahwe worship, the only place where He might be found. In fact it is difficult to believe that, so long as many sanctuaries existed in the land, all of them, regardless of possible Canaanite origins, looked upon popularly as Yahwe shrines and seats of Yahwe worship, the Temple at Jerusalem should have been generally regarded as the sole, actual abode of Yahwe, the one place where He was thought to dwell permanently. Such a concept could logically have developed only after and as a direct outgrowth of the Deuteronomic program of the destruction of all local sanctuaries other than the Temple at Jerusalem. But with only one sanctuary consecrated to Him, what more natural than that Yahwe should have speedily come to be regarded as actually dwelling permanently in that one sanctuary, in its innermost recesses? This argument is substantiated by the fact which we have already noted, that apparently not until Jeremiah, i. e. not until the Deuteronomic period, does the term בית יהוה, "house of Yahwe," become the regular designation for the Temple at Jerusalem.

This conclusion is borne out also by other considerations, secondary in character, it is true, yet of considerable significance in this connection. Ezekiel, too, unquestionably conceived of Yahwe as dwelling permanently within the Temple, for, in 10. 19 ff. and 11. 22 f. he sees the Deity, in the form

of the *kebod 'elohē Yisra'el*, leaving the Temple, now doomed to destruction, going out through the eastern gate and journeying eastward over the Mount of Olives. Obviously Ezekiel could not have pictured Yahwe leaving the Temple in this manner, if he had not conceived of Him as actually dwelling there permanently. This conclusion is confirmed, as has already been intimated, by the sequel to this picture in chapters 40 ff. where the prophet gives in detail his vision of the rebuilt Temple and of the return therein of the Deity, still in the form of the *kebod 'elohē Yisra'el*, entering through the same eastern gate through which He had departed from the old Temple. The vision then concludes with the charge that this eastern gate must be kept closed forever, not only, manifestly, that no mortal being may thereafter presume to enter by the same gate as that through which the Deity had entered, but also, as we have already suggested, because, so the prophet means to imply, having taken up His permanent abode there, Yahwe will never again forsake His Temple, will never again have occasion to go out through this eastern gate. And dwelling permanently there, the Temple has now become the place of Yahwe's throne and of the resting-place of the soles of His feet.⁶¹

But it is quite certain that even to Ezekiel there is something of novelty about this conception of Yahwe dwelling permanently in the Temple and never again coming in or going out through the eastern gate. For, on the one hand, the prophet is compelled to legislate about the matter, and to prescribe that the eastern gate must henceforth be kept closed forever, i. e. it must never again be opened, in accordance with past custom, upon the two equinoctial days. As has been suggested, through this prescription the prophet aimed to terminate completely an old, important and long practiced ceremony, that of greeting the first rays of the rising sun upon the equinoctial days, and particularly upon the New Year's Day, a ceremony which He recognized as distinctly non-Yahwistic, and which he regarded as particularly abhorrent to Yahwe. And, on the other hand, as 8. 16 shows,

⁶¹ Ezek. 43. 7.

this ceremony was actually practiced in the Temple at Jerusalem down to the actual moment of its destruction in 586 B.C.

But with this ceremony, representing the coming of Yahwe into the Temple with the first rays of the rising sun upon each recurring New Year's Day, persisting to this late date, it is difficult to believe that the conception of Yahwe dwelling permanently in the Temple had as yet taken firm root in the belief of the people by the time of the destruction of the Temple. It would seem rather that during the century or century and a half preceding the destruction of the Temple two partially contradictory ideas were struggling for dominance in the popular belief, the old idea of the annual entrance of Yahwe into the Temple, in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, the first rays of the rising sun, upon the New Year's Day, and the new conception, apparently supported by the prophetic group and the Deuteronomic writers, and strongly enforced by the Deuteronomic reformation and the destruction of the local sanctuaries, that the Temple at Jerusalem was the actual abode of Yahwe, His house or home, where He sat permanently enthroned in the midst of Israel.

The struggle between these two contradictory concepts continued down to the very destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C., however with the younger concept of the Temple as the permanent dwelling-place of Yahwe apparently gaining ground steadily, even though slowly. It was Ezekiel who finally decided the conflict by denouncing the old ceremony as non-Yahwistic, and by legislating that henceforth the eastern gate might never again be opened. Thereby he put an end in a very practical manner to the observance of the old sun-rite. Actually therefore it was not until the second Temple and the post-exilic period that the new concept of the Temple as the sole and permanent residence of Yahwe came to hold undisputed sway.⁶² Haggai and Zechariah were

⁶² However, even in post-Biblical times certain survivals of the old ceremony of the opening and closing of the eastern gate of the Temple, and other rites attendant upon the coming of the *kebod Yahwe* upon the New Year's Day, continued in folk-practice, and even in official religion. I have already pointed out the rôle which the closed eastern gate played in the

apparently the first therefore who, without being troubled by any contradictory and competing idea, could unqualifiedly represent the Temple at Jerusalem as the dwelling-place of

ceremonies of the *simḥat beṭ bašo'ebah* during the Succoth-festival (Sukkah, V, 4). During the Latin Kingdom in Jerusalem (1099-1187 A.D.) on two annual festivals, Palm Sunday and the Festival of the Cross, the eastern gate of the Temple area, the so-called Golden Gate, which had been sealed up during the period of Moslem possession of the city (637-1099), was opened at dawn and closed again at sunset, to remain closed during the entire remainder of the year (on the evidence of John of Würzburg, who visited Jerusalem in 1137). These two festivals are late, Christianized forms of the earlier Canaanite and Israelite equinoctial festivals, and are celebrated still today almost at the exact time of the two equinoxes (cf. my "The Three Calendars of Ancient Israel," *HUCA*, I [1924], 48 f., note 47).

In the Jewish liturgy the closing portion of the ritual for Yom Kippur is known as *Neilah*, "closing," or in its full form, *Nē'ilat Hašā'ar*, "the closing of the gate," and the liturgy for this service contains frequent reference to the closing of the gate at sunset. The origin of this peculiar symbolism has never been adequately determined. But when we remember that not until near the very end of the Biblical period was the institution of the Day of Atonement established (*ibid.*, 22-43), and that until this time the 10th day of the seventh month had been steadily observed as the New Year's Day, the day therefore upon which the eastern gate of the Temple was opened at dawn and closed at sunset, it is clear that the *Neilah*-service of Yom Kippur rests upon a distinct reminiscence of the old, idolatrous rite celebrated upon this day.

Quite obviously too Ps. 24. 7-10 with its apostrophe to the gates to lift themselves up, i.e. of course, to open, so that Yahwe, the "King of Glory," or perhaps better in the light of this study, "the radiant King," i.e. Yahwe coming in the form of the *kē'bod Yahwe*, might enter, finds its explanation in the ceremony of opening the eastern gate of the Temple on the New Year's Day. Quite significantly both LXX and Vulg. have the introductory record, missing in M.T., that this psalm was for Sunday, while Pesh. has the fuller statement, that it was for the first day, i.e. Sunday, when God finished the work of creation. Certainly this last is an elaboration of the original statement of LXX and Vulg. And why this particular psalm should have been designated as for Sunday, and likewise why reference to this fact should be omitted in M.T., is clear when we remember that in the pre-Pharisean form of the Jewish calendar the New Year's Day, as well as all other significant festival days, fell upon Sunday. (Cf. my "The Origin of Maṣsoth and the Maṣsoth-Festival," *AJT*, XXI [1917], 279, and my "Additional Notes on 'The Three Calendars of Ancient Israel,'" *HUCA*, III [1926], 87-100.) This entire subject of the solar ceremonies connected with the eastern gate of the Temple at Jerusalem is obviously or far-reaching importance for the history of Judaism and of Christianity also. But it is likewise of such complexity and magnitude that it will require independent treatment. This study I shall publish at the earliest opportunity.

Yahwe to which He was about to return, still in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*,⁶³ in order to take up His permanent residence there in Israel's midst. Therefore Haggai could compare the Temple as Yahwe's residence with the houses in which the people themselves dwelt.⁶⁴ And Zechariah could represent Yahwe as returning to Jerusalem, to His house, and dwelling there in Israel's midst, where eventually all the nations of the earth would seek and find Him.⁶⁵

This argument, with its important conclusions, is borne out by one further, significant piece of evidence. If, in accordance with the old belief, Yahwe was thought to come into the Temple on the morning of each recurring New Year's Day, the question arises, how was He conceived as coming; how was He transported thither? The presence in the Temple of the horses and chariots of the sun, destroyed by Josiah at the very beginning of the Deuteronomic reformation,⁶⁶ suggests the answer. Certainly these horses and chariots of the sun were present in Yahwe's Temple for no vain purpose nor as mere monuments of the cult of some foreign deity accorded a measure of worship by Israel during this period. These chariots and horses of the sun sprang unquestionably from the cult of some foreign deity, perhaps the Babylonian Shamash or else, and perhaps more probably, some West-Semitic form of the sun-god. But they must have been integrated with the worship of Yahwe in the Temple at Jeru-

⁶³ Cf. Hag. i. 8 and my "On Leviticus 10. 3" in *Oriental Studies Dedicated to Paul Haupt*, 101, note 5.

⁶⁴ I. 4, 9.

⁶⁵ I. 16; 8. 3, 21 ff. Moreover Zechariah apparently conceived of Yahwe as dwelling, during the period between 586 and 516 B.C., during which time the Temple lay in ruins, in a place far to the east (to be inferred from the fact that the chariots coming out from the presence of Yahwe [Zech. 6. 5] go towards the north, the west [reading for אֶל-הָאֲחֵרִים, אֶל-הָאֲחֵרִים, or perhaps, by analogy with the parallel expressions, אֶל אֶרֶץ הָאֲחֵרִים] and the south), behind the two copper mountains. Manifestly this is the place of sunrise. The picture is clearly based upon a Babylonian original, for in Babylonian art the representation of Shamash, the sun-god, coming forth from between two mountains, is extremely common (cf. Ward, *The Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, 87 ff. [illustrations 244-269]; Jastrow, *Bildermappe zur Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 170, 171). These two mountains depicted upon these Babylonian seals were probably conceived of as copper, since burnished copper is universally symbolic of the sun, because of its color and reflective qualities.

⁶⁶ II Ki. 23. 11.

saalem in such manner that they had come to seem a quite essential part of His cult. Now what functions could they have discharged, or what could their symbolism have been in the syncretistic Yahwe-cult in the Temple in that day? There can be little doubt that Yahwe was thought to come from the east and to enter the Temple riding in His chariot, the chariot of the sun, drawn by the horses of the sun.

This picture probably suggested to Ezekiel his very confused and obscure conception of the manner in which the *kebod Yahwe* was carried along, both when it withdrew from the old, doomed Temple and when it approached to enter the new Temple. It would be fruitless to attempt to analyze Ezekiel's picture in detail. It suffices to remember that rabbinic tradition conceived of it as a chariot, or rather as *the* chariot, i. e. of course, the chariot of Yahwe.⁶⁷ And in fact pre-rabbinic, late Biblical tradition identified the cherubim of the ark of the Priestly Code and of later Biblical writings with this chariot, which, it was believed, had stood in the Temple from the day of its erection by Solomon.⁶⁸ Moreover, since Ezekiel speaks of the four wheels,⁶⁹ associated with the four chariots, the chariot or chariots of the sun in the Temple at Jerusalem were probably of the four-wheeled kind.⁷⁰ Mani-

⁶⁷ Cf. Torczyner, "Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50-jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 227 ff.

⁶⁸ I Chron. 28. 18.

⁶⁹ I. 15-21; 10. 9-17.

⁷⁰ Cf. the illustrations in Ward, *op. cit.*, nos. 976-979 (pp. 310 ff.). According to Ward these seal-cylinders are all of Syro-Hittite origin, and with the Syrian or Phoenician element outweighing the Hittite. This fact may well point to some Phoenician, or at least general West-Semitic elements in this worship of Yahwe with the attributes of a solar deity in the Temple at Jerusalem, and especially in this particular detail of the manifestly composite picture of Ezekiel. Significantly enough in no Babylonian seal inscription, so far as I have been able to discover, is the sun-god depicted riding in a chariot. The customary symbol of the sun-god travelling across the heavens is the winged disc of the sun (cf. Ward, *op. cit.*, illustrations 670, 673, 678, 679, 682, 684, 685, 687, 692, 695, 714, 718; Jastrow, *op. cit.*, 49, 50, 51, 56, 216, 217). It is, of course, this Babylonian representation of the winged disc of the sun to which Mal. 3. 20 refers, "Unto you who fear My name, the sun of righteousness shall arise with healing on its wings." (Recent discoveries made in the excavations at Ur and in Drak tend to disprove the above conclusion that four-wheeled chariots were known only to the Western Semites.)

festly therefore, even though Ezekiel conceived of Yahwe as dwelling permanently in the Temple at Jerusalem, and endeavored strenuously to strengthen this concept in the popular imagination and doctrine, and at the same time to root out the old belief in the coming into the Temple of Yahwe, invested with the attributes of a solar deity, in His chariot on the morning of each recurring New Year's Day, nevertheless he could not free even himself entirely from the old symbolism. When compelled to describe the departure of Yahwe from the old Temple, and later His return to the new Temple, he had no alternative but to have recourse to the traditional, popular conception of Yahwe transported in a chariot. But at the same time, though probably inadvertently, he confused his picture not a little by the introduction of various additional, but oftentimes parallel and superfluous elements, most of them seemingly, such as the figures of the cherubim, borrowed, though perhaps not altogether directly, from Babylonian pictography.⁷¹

⁷¹ Cf. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, 55, 57, 63a, 63c; also 31, 32, 35, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63b, 63g, 63h, 64; Ward, *op. cit.*, 42, 1149. It is noteworthy that in Jastrow, 55, 63a and 63c, and also in both illustrations cited from Ward, the figures, which we may well call cherubim, have six wings, two upper wings, that may be regarded as covering the face, two lower wings, which actually do cover the feet and the entire lower part of the body, and two wings standing out from the shoulders, manifestly designed for flying. In the other illustrations cited above, only the first and last pairs of wings are definitely represented in their regular form. The pair of wings covering the lower part of the body has been conventionalized into a decoration or fringe of the skirt hanging from the waist to the feet, but in every case having a decidedly wing-like appearance. Undoubtedly this decoration or fringe is but the conventional substitute for the older and more original third pair of wings. But these cherubim are identical with the seraphim of Is. 6. 2 in this most essential respect of the six wings. This is, in fact, the one, outstanding detail of the appearance of the seraphim which Is. 6. 2 mentions. Unquestionably the figures of the seraphim of Is. 6 were borrowed more or less directly from these Babylonian cherubim, and point to immediate Babylonian influence in the prophet's picture, and with this, of course, in his conception of the manner and purpose of Yahwe's entrance into the Temple on New Year's Day.

On the other hand, as we have already pointed out, Ezekiel's picture of the cherubim and of the *k'bod Yahwe* carried along by them, seems to be a bit more composite and to betray indications not only of Babylonian, but also of West-Semitic, and likewise of Egyptian influence. For unquestionably, as Gressmann has suggested (*Die Lade Jahwes*, 50f.) the eyes in the wheels (Ezek.

This significant fact too points to the conclusion that the conception of Yahwe carried along in a chariot was still extremely lively in Ezekiel's day. But this picture of Yahwe must be linked up with the conception of Him as not yet dwelling permanently and solely in the Temple at Jerusalem, and therefore requiring a vehicle of transportation, in which He would come regularly on the morning of each recurring New Year's Day, coming from the east in the rôle of a solar deity, to exercise judgment in the midst of His heavenly host and to determine the destinies of Israel, and perhaps of other nations also, for the year just beginning.⁷² Just this is the picture of Yahwe in Is. 6.

All this evidence, although secondary in character, is none the less of extreme interest and importance for the history of the religion of Israel. Above all it corroborates our previous conclusion that Isaiah did not yet definitely conceive of the Temple at Jerusalem as the actual, permanent dwelling-place of Yahwe, that this conception, although by no means unheard of before, began to gain ground steadily only with the Deuteronomic reformation at the end of the 7th century B.C., and that it did not become the dominant conception in the religious belief and practice of Israel until the early post-exilic period and the erection of the second Temple. It was Ezekiel apparently, in the latest stages of his prophetic ministry, who contributed most to the final triumph of this youngest concept of Yahwe and of His relation to the Temple at Jerusalem.

The three stages in the development of the conception of Yahwe in ancient Israel, which must be correlated with the three stages in the evolution of the conception of the ark are then, (1) the first stage, in which early, more or less primitive, local or tribal conceptions of Yahwe are gradually coalescing under the influence of evolving national life, and the con-

10. 12) represent an adaptation of the Horus-eye, not infrequently met with in Egyptian pictography.

⁷² In the Babylonian religion Shamash, the sun-god *par excellence*, regularly plays the rôle of the divine judge (Zimmern, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*,³ 368; Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, cf. index, II, 1098), even though it was Marduk, or, in some texts, Nebo, who fixed the destinies upon the New Year's Day (Zimmern, *op. cit.*, 515).

ception of a single, national Yahwe is slowly evolving; (2) the second stage, in which Yahwe, yielding to the syncretizing influence of agricultural environment and culture and its related Baal-worship, and perhaps also to growing Assyro-Babylonian cultural influence, is endowed with various attributes of a solar deity and, associated particularly intimately with the national sanctuary, the Temple at Jerusalem, is conceived of as coming there on each recurrent New Year's Day to administer justice and to fix the destinies of Israel, and with it, in all likelihood, the destinies of all other nations with which Israel had relations;⁷³ (3) the third stage, beginning with the Deuteronomic reformation, when, as the result of prophetic attempts at purification of the religion of Israel of all non-Yahwistic elements, Yahwe is, at least outwardly and superficially, divested of the most obvious and objectionable attributes of a solar deity, and comes now to be regarded as dwelling permanently and solely in the Temple at Jerusalem, enthroned in its innermost recesses, in the midst of His people Israel.

With these three stages in the evolution of the conception of Yahwe in ancient Israel the three stages in the evolution of the conception of the ark and its functions, which we have

⁷³ The thought suggests itself that the conception of the Day of Yahwe sprang, in part at least, out of this celebration of the entrance of Yahwe, in the form of the radiant *kebod Yahwe*, into the Temple at Jerusalem on the New Year's Day in order to hold His divine court and to fix the destinies of Israel and the other nations. The earliest picture of the Day of Yahwe which we have, and in many respects also the most vivid, is that of Amos 5. 18 ff. The context there is rather loose and not a little bit obscure. But assuming the unity of the passage, which is, however, not absolutely certain, the popular belief of the time of Amos seems to have been that the Day of Yahwe was to be a day of festival (so also Sellin, *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch*, vol. XII of his *Kommentar zum Alten Testament* series, 193), a day of sacrifice (so also Zeph. 1. 7 f.) and merry-making, and apparently of carrying the images or symbols of the gods in solemn procession, presumably into the Temple. It was also a day of light and radiance, such as would naturally be associated with the coming of the *kebod Yahwe*. Above all else it was the day of Yahwe's judgment upon and fixing the destinies of Israel and of all nations (vv. 19 and 24; cf. also Is. 2. 4; Mi. 4. 3; Zeph. 3. 8; Joel 4. 1 ff.). All these elements in this conception of the Day of Yahwe find their most simple and natural explanation in the assumption of outgrowth out of the celebration of Yahwe's entrance in the form of the *kebod Yahwe* into the Temple upon the New Year's Day.

noted, go hand in hand. In the first stage Yahwe was conceived of primarily as a local or tribal deity, with the conception slowly expanding and evolving into that of an intertribal, and eventually into that of a national deity. This last conception of Yahwe naturally could eventuate completely only with the actual evolution of the nation itself under David. During this stage we find the ark likewise still conceived of in its most primitive form, as a box containing something, whatever it may have been, thought to be charged with divine power. By virtue of this power, carried into battle against Israel's foes, it could give victory to its people, or in the midst of a foreign, hostile nation it could discomfit its enemies, or once more restored to its own people, it could bring blessing to the inmates of the house in which it stood, or it could select of its own accord the way it wished to go and lead its people in safety along this way through the desert until they eventually arrived at the goal which it had appointed for them.

In the second period, which, we have seen, continued down to the Deuteronomic reformation, and which was actually not completely superseded until the end of the Babylonian exile, the conception of Yahwe underwent various changes and modifications. During this entire period Israel was subjected constantly to strong foreign cultural influences. The result was a steady process of syncretization of Yahwe with various foreign deities, and of His worship with strange cults. Actually this process had begun in the preceding period in the natural fusion of the old, tribal, desert Yahwe with the many Canaanitish Baals. This process had apparently gone on quietly, steadily and largely unconsciously on the part of the people almost from the moment of Israel's settlement in Canaan and adoption of the Canaanitish agricultural life and culture. Apparently certain fundamental elements of the Canaanitish, agricultural, Baal cult, such as the three annual agricultural festivals, Matzoth, Qatsir and Asif, and also the Sabbath, had become so thoroughly integrated in the established Yahwe-worship already in the early period of national existence, following the reign of David, that even the most ardent champions of the supposedly old and pure Yahwe-worship

failed to realize their true, non-Yahwistic origin, and so included due provision for their observance in their first systematic formulation of fundamental and approved Yahwe-worship.⁷⁴

But with the reign of Solomon, with its strongly centralized and efficient system of government, with its developing economic prosperity, increasing commercial activity and expanding contacts and relations with foreign nations and cultures, the conception of Yahwe tended to undergo further modification and syncretization. The national sanctuary at Jerusalem, but recently erected as the central shrine of Israel's national god, became likewise, and almost immediately, the seat of the worship in Israel of various foreign deities. Naturally the cults of these deities, for the most part more developed, elaborate and complex than the still comparatively simple cult of Yahwe, influenced considerably both the worship and also the conception of Yahwe, and tended to introduce into them new, and by no means always logical, consistent and perfectly harmonizable elements and ideas. It was this condition which in large part gave rise to the prophetic group or party, whose basic principle was the championship of the traditional, even though not always actually the historically true, original and simple desert worship of Yahwe. We have seen that the first, organized and systematic attempt of this party to carry out its program was made in the Southern Kingdom in 899 B.C., with the reformation of Asa.⁷⁵ It was directed against the worship of Yahwe in the form of images or idols, fostered by the court party. Apparently it sought even to revive and substitute the old "tent of meeting" of the tribe of Judah for the Temple at Jerusalem. We have seen that this reformation succeeded only in part, that it did apparently counteract successfully the prevalent idol-worship of the day, and did likewise formulate a positive program of orthodox Yahwe-worship. But in its apparent endeavor to substitute the old "tent of meeting" for the new and elaborate Temple it failed completely.

⁷⁴ Cf. "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 63f. and 73-79.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 98-119 and 123-127.

Nor were these prophetic activities, with their steadfast opposition to foreign, non-Yahwistic cults, confined only to the Southern Kingdom, nor did they center only around the Temple at Jerusalem. A bare third of a century after the reformation of Asa in the Southern Kingdom we find Elijah waging the same contest against the worship of the Phoenician Baal in the Northern Kingdom, and his work carried on after his death by his successor, Elisha.

During this period the foreign cultural influences to which both the Northern and the Southern Kingdoms were subjected, were many and varied. The Phoenician influence apparently was the first to make itself felt. It was largely through Phoenician merchants that the commercial activities of the reigns of David and Solomon were fostered, and it was after the model of Phoenician merchant fleets in the Mediterranean that Solomon organized his commercial expeditions to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean countries.⁷⁶ The Temple at Jerusalem was erected by Phoenician architects and artisans, with materials largely brought from Phoenicia, and after the model of Phoenician temples. Small wonder that the reformers in the days of Asa looked upon it more or less askance, and doubted, or even denied, its true Yahwe-character. This Phoenician culture was apparently itself more or less composite, with native elements considerably influenced by Egyptian, Hittite and Assyro-Babylonian cultures and religious concepts and practices. The period of direct and dominant Phoenician cultural influence in Israel, in both the Northern and Southern Kingdoms extended from the reigns of David and Solomon through the reigns of the entire dynasty of Omri. It reached its climax during and after the reign of Ahab under the guidance of the strong-minded and energetic Jezebel. It was this Phoenician cultural influence which was combatted uncompromisingly and largely unsuccessfully by Elijah, and less uncompromisingly but, outwardly at least, more successfully by Elisha. The culmination of the conflict was, of course, the revolution of Elisha and Jehu, with the murder of the entire

⁷⁶ II Ki. 9. 26-28; 10. 22.

house of Ahab and the attendant religious reformation in 842 B.C. The outcome was a nominal, but altogether superficial, and from the political and economic standpoints disastrous, triumph for the champions of the supposedly old and pure Yahwe-worship. Actually, as was to be expected, elements of the superior Phoenician culture had penetrated too deeply into Israelite life and thought, and taken too firm root, to be easily and speedily eradicated.

At just about the time of the Elisha-Jehu revolution and reformation the contact of Israel with Assyria became immediate, and apparently the influence of Assyro-Babylonian culture direct and of steady growth. Unfortunately the period of almost a century following immediately upon this revolution has left few authentic historical records. Not until the prophetic writings near the end of this period do we begin to get a clear picture of the religious, social and economic life of the two kingdoms. Then we find that during this period the cultural life of the people of both Northern and Southern Kingdoms had undergone a very considerable change and taken a decided step forward.

Now for the first time we meet, in Is. 6, the picture of Yahwe with His *kabod*, His radiance, enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem upon the New Year's Day, surrounded by His seraphim, angelic creatures, and holding court and deciding the destinies of Israel and the nations for the ensuing year. This is our earliest record of the concept of Yahwe in the form of the *kebod Yahwe* of later Biblical writings and of the *shechina* of Rabbinic literature and theology; and seemingly in Is. 6 this concept is still somewhat incipient in character. We have seen that many and the most dominant of the elements of this picture have their precedents and parallels in Babylonian theology and literature, and that the picture as a whole, even though not necessarily in all its details, is undoubtedly dependent upon a Babylonian original. We find but few traces of any of the elements of this picture in the records of the belief and practice of earlier periods of Israelite history.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Unless perhaps in the fact that the Temple at Jerusalem, like many of its Phoenician models (as for example the great temple at Hierapolis

Unquestionably it was a concept of Yahwe which had developed during just this period and very largely under the influence of Babylonian religious belief and practice.

As has been said, this picture of Yahwe is predominantly that of a sun-god. Yahwe is here invested with the attributes and is represented as discharging certain of the functions of Babylonian solar deities, particularly Shamash and Marduk. All this had little relationship with the original, simple concept of Yahwe during the desert period of Israel's history or the early sojourn in Palestine. Yahwe had travelled a long road indeed, and undergone a far-reaching and momentous development and transformation in concept and mode of worship since that early, primitive day. Of all this the prophets must have been more or less conscious, even though apparently the great pre-exilic prophets, with Hosea as a possible partial exception, troubled themselves less about these matters apparently than they did about the to them far more significant and serious,

[Lucian, *De Dea Syra*, 29 (ed. Jacobitz, III, 355)]; cf. also Robinson, *Biblical Researches in Palestine and in the Adjacent Regions*, III, 417, 426, 437, 507ff. [the two great temples at Baalbek]; Porter, *Five Years in Damascus*, I, 294; Blau, "Early Christian Archaeology from the Jewish Point of View," *HUCA*, III [1926], 171) faced the east. Some traces may perhaps also be found in the tradition of Elijah's bringing down fire from heaven (I Ki. 18) and in David's bringing up the ark to Jerusalem (II Sam. 6; I Chron. 16); for there is considerable evidence that both of these incidents happened in connection with the celebration of the Asif- or Succoth-festival and the New Year's Day following immediately thereupon. This matter is, however, of such extent and complexity that it must await separate treatment elsewhere. But at the very most all this would indicate only that some elements of the eventual picture of the *kēbod Yahwe* coming into the Temple on the New Year's Day were of Canaanite, Phoenician or West-Semitic origin, and that they had entered, as was but natural, since this was in itself a festival of Canaanite or common West-Semitic origin, into the celebration of the Asif-festival and the New Year's Day already in the days of David, Solomon and Elijah, and were not even discountenanced by the latter prophet. But this does not alter the fact that the particular picture of Yahwe, enveloped in the *kabod* and with the Temple filled with cloud or smoke, sitting as judge and arbiter of the destinies of nations, surrounded by the heavenly court, on the New Year's Day, has its most immediate and striking parallel, and unquestionably in many details also its direct antecedent, in Babylonian theology and literature, and that in this picture, composite as it obviously is, already in the days of Isaiah Babylonian elements seem to have predominated.

inward, spiritual transgressions of the true worship of Yahwe. None the less these facts and conditions must have influenced the program of the prophetic party as a group directly and considerably during this period. Unquestionably it helped to formulate the anti-foreign policy of Isaiah, and it likewise animated the reform movement in the reign of Hezekiah, which culminated in the destruction of the brazen serpent in the Temple.⁷⁸

The eradication of solar elements in the cult of Yahwe in the Temple at Jerusalem was likewise a part of the program of the Deuteronomic reformation, as the reference in II Ki. 23. 11 to the chariots and horses of the sun indicates. And, as we have seen, it was Ezekiel, a more superficial, conventional and formal prophet, with less insight into the inward, spiritual implications of his prophetic mission, who denounced the significant ceremony of the greeting of the rising sun upon the New Year's Day uncompromisingly, and who eventually, finding it too firmly rooted in popular belief and practice to be completely eradicated, sought, and apparently with considerable success, to reinterpret the character of this rite and its underlying concepts and to legitimize it and incorporate it positively into the recognized prophetic conception of Yahwe and His worship. As has been said, the reaction of the Deuteronomic writers and of Ezekiel to the foreign, syncretizing influences

⁷⁸ II Ki. 18. 4. This does not mean necessarily that the brazen serpent was itself the product of this period. A very probable conjecture is that it was originally, precisely like the ark, an old, tribal cult object, which David had deposited in his national sanctuary at Jerusalem for the same reason that he brought the ark thither, to give to the members of all the tribes concrete and ocular proof that Yahwe was now truly a national, and no longer merely a tribal deity, that He was now the summation of all the old tribal gods. Thereby David sought to contribute to the popular regard for the Temple at Jerusalem as the national sanctuary and place of pilgrimage for all the tribes, and thus to strengthen the unity of his nation.

The brazen serpent in the Temple may very profitably be compared with the dove and gazelle images in the Ka'aba in the "days of ignorance" (cf. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*,² 298). Likewise the presence of many idols in the Ka'aba in the period immediately preceding Mohammed, in all likelihood the images or cult-objects of various, old, tribal deities, gave to the Ka'aba the character of an intertribal sanctuary. In this it presents an interesting and significant parallel to David's sanctuary at Jerusalem and his manifest purpose

and the developing conception and representation of Yahwe as a solar deity brought to an end this second period in the evolution of the conception of Yahwe in Israel.

A moment's thought makes it clear that in this rapidly developing conception and representation of Yahwe predominantly as a solar deity during this entire second period there was little room for the ark to play anything of its original rôle, or for that matter any rôle at all. And not this alone, but another important consideration enters here. Whatever may have been the actual motives of David in bringing up the ark to Jerusalem and depositing it in his tent-sanctuary, there can not be the slightest doubt that, deposited there, and subsequently in the more elaborate national sanctuary, the Temple, it necessarily came gradually to lose very much of its old significance. There is not the slightest evidence nor reason to believe that after it had been deposited in the Temple the ark was ever again taken from there and carried into battle in order to give Israel victory over its enemies. Certainly it never again had occasion or opportunity to select the way it wanted to go or to lead Israel upon a long, difficult and uncertain journey. Nor could it have long continued to be regarded as the very seat or container in the Temple of the potent, divine power associated with the being of Yahwe. In the vision of Isaiah the ark plays no rôle whatsoever, and Yahwe is seated, not upon it, but upon a high chair or throne. Nor is the ark mentioned at all, with regard to its place or rôle in the Temple during this period, in any of the writings of this time. Nor can the ark be integrated in any conceivable way with the picture which seems to have been dominant during this period, of Yahwe coming into the Temple in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, the first rays of the

to represent this as intertribal and national in character. Furthermore, the removal of these idols from the Ka'aba, following Mohammed's new preachment, is likewise not without significant parallelism with the reformation of Hezekiah, and even more with the Deuteronomic reformation. And the sparing of the Ka'aba, the sacred stone itself, and the new interpretation and rôle given to it in the ritual of Islam also parallel significantly and illuminatingly the sparing of the ark in these reformations and the new interpretation given to it in the subsequent religion of Israel.

rising sun upon the New Year's Day, and there holding His divine court. And, as we have seen, in his scheme of the rebuilt Temple Ezekiel makes no provision whatsoever for the ark, quite as if it was an object of no particular consequence; in Deut. 1. 33 and 42 reference to the ark is purposely suppressed, just as if it was regarded as not altogether in accord with basic Deuteronomic principles of Yahwe-concept and worship; and Jer. 3. 16 speaks of it as having been an object of considerable religious significance in the popular belief of a former day, but of no real significance at all, and therefore entirely dispensable, in the more advanced, enlightened and true conception of Yahwe and His worship of the day of the author of this passage; in fact the implication of the verse is that the worship of Yahwe is purer and the religion of Israel truer without the ark than with it. Seemingly the authors of Deut. 1. 33 and 42 and of Jer. 3. 16 attributed to the ark much the same non-Yahwistic significance as that which the brazen serpent enjoyed at the time of the reformation of Hezekiah.

Therefore because of the syncretistic conception of Yahwe which developed so rapidly during this period, and the utter incompatibility with it of the old conception of the ark and its functions, one of two things had to happen to the ark; either it had to lose its significance as a sacred object entirely, and suffer a fate identical with that of the brazen serpent in the Temple, viz. prophetic denunciation and destruction, or it had to undergo a process of reinterpretation of far-reaching compass and significance. Actually both fates befell it in the course of time; and not only the ark, but, at an earlier period, the brazen serpent likewise. For unquestionably the tradition of the serpents in the wilderness and of the making of the brazen serpent by Moses, recorded in Num. 21. 6-9, sprang up just because of the presence of the brazen serpent in the Temple from of old, and represented an attempt, even though vain, to justify and legitimize its presence there and thereby to save it from the fate of destruction which eventually overtook it in the reign of Hezekiah.

The ark, too, underwent both experiences of original reinterpretation and eventual disappearance, even though not,

so far as our records indicate, of actual and purposed destruction in some prophetic reformation. The fact that in all probability the ark survived in the Temple so much longer than did the brazen serpent, and apparently became an object only of prophetic disregard and mild disapproval rather than of actual denunciation and destruction, can be best explained by two important considerations, viz. that it underwent a more plausible and positive reinterpretation than the brazen serpent possibly could, and also that it contained no actual image or idol, such as the brazen serpent or the *mifleset* of Maachah were, to which prophetic principles and program could take direct and serious exception. This last consideration offers a potent argument that, whatever the ark may have contained, it was certainly not an image of any kind.⁷⁹

Now what was this process of reinterpretation of the character and functions of the ark during this second period of the evolution of the conception of Yahwe? It came to be regarded as the depository of the traditional two tablets of stone upon which the Ten Commandments were written. We have also seen that this process of reinterpretation seemingly began fairly early in this period, with the composition of the Book of the Covenant. But it is equally clear that this process of reinterpretation must have been rather slow and gradual and could not have taken final shape until the tradition of the Ten Commandments written upon the two stone tablets had definitely evolved. We have seen⁸⁰ that it is not at all certain whether the original Kenite Code contained ten or eight laws or "words." But certainly the nucleus of the Book of the Covenant consisted of ten "words," no more and no less.⁸¹ But, as Ex. 24. 7 states explicitly, the Book of the Covenant represented these as written, not upon two stone tablets, but upon a scroll, in the customary manner of writing. Just when and how this last form of the tradition, viz. that of the two stone tablets, developed and what its probable antecedents may have been, we shall endeavor to determine later.

⁷⁹ Contrary to the insistent, but altogether unproved argument of Gressmann, *Die Lade Jahwes*, 21 ff.

⁸⁰ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 95 ff.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 92-95.

It is apparent too that during this entire period, and even long thereafter, the ark continued to be regarded as the proper place for the deposit of various sacred objects for permanent safe-keeping and for witnessing to the power of Yahwe and to His peculiar solicitude for Israel. But under the influence of the tradition in its final form, that the ark was the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, and that these were objects of incomparable and inviolate sanctity, the principle seems to have evolved that other objects, no matter how sacred their character, might no longer be deposited in, but only alongside of the ark. Therefore Deut. 31. 26 commands that a copy of the Deuteronomic Torah, inscribed upon a scroll, be deposited beside the ark, and Ex. 16. 33 f. and Num. 17. 25, parts of secondary strata of the Priestly Code, make the same provision for the vessel of manna and Aaron's rod.

And with the ark now popularly regarded as containing the Book of the Covenant, or, in the final form of the tradition, the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, it acquired a new and positive significance, entirely unrelated to its original character and function, and with a valid and even dignified place in the prophetic tradition and program. For the prophetic tradition was that Yahwe had not always been Israel's god, but had become so only through adoption, through a covenant entered into between Him and Israel in the desert, after He had delivered Israel from Egypt. As we have seen,⁸² whatever Yahwe's relations to the various tribes of Israel may have been originally, it was primarily the Yahwe of the tribe of Judah who, due to the dominant rôle which this tribe played under the leadership of David in the final establishment of the nation, and which it continued to play thereafter, particularly during the momentous reigns of David and Solomon, that the Yahwe of Judah came to contribute the most essential features to the conception of Yahwe as Israel's god. And, as we have also seen, it was Judah, with the closely associated tribes of Simon and Levi, which had come out of Egypt under the leadership of Moses, and

⁸² *Ibid.*, 135 ff.

at the mountain in the desert had entered into covenant with Yahwe. And not this alone, but as we have also seen, Yahwe had been originally the god of the Kenites, and this tribe or clan had attached itself to the southern group of tribes, and continued until the days of Jeremiah to so live and worship that still even then they were regarded as the true devotees of Yahwe and of His proper worship. It was therefore from Judah, and with a Kenite background, that the idea of the covenant as the basis of the relationship between Yahwe and Israel had entered into prophetic tradition and come to play so important a rôle in the prophetic program.

And as the depository of the scroll, or in the final form of the tradition, the two stone tablets, upon which the laws basic to the covenant, themselves of prophetic origin, were inscribed, the ark naturally became in the eyes of the people of the Northern Kingdom, and even of active and leading spirits in the prophetic party, the symbol of the covenant, the constant reminder of the origin and nature of Yahwe's relations with Israel. As such it served a definite and positive purpose, discharged a distinct, even though a passive function; it was the eternal, ever-present, insistent witness unto Israel of Yahwe's covenant with it. This justified its presence in the Temple, even in the very holy of holies, where tradition, if not actual historic fact, placed it; and this rôle, altogether positive in its relation to Yahwe, and in no way smacking of idolatrous association, undoubtedly saved the ark during this period from the fate of the brazen serpent. It was now no longer merely the ארון יהוה, "the ark of Yahwe"; it had now become truly the ארון ברית יהוה, "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe."⁸³ But as the "ark of the covenant of

⁸³ We find in the Bible three general names for the ark. As is to be expected, they correspond to the three stages in the evolution of the conception of the ark and its functions. In the oldest literary strata of the Bible the ark is regularly designated as ארון יהוה (I Sam. 4. 6; 5. 3, 4; 6. 1 ff.; II Sam. 6. 9 ff.) or ארון האלהים (I Sam. 4. 4 ff.; 5. 2; 14. 18; II Sam. 6. 2 ff.; 15. 24, 25, 29), or occasionally ארון אלהי ישראל (I Sam. 5. 7, 8, 10, 11). Not infrequently in these same passages the fuller and later terms ארון ברית יהוה or ארון הברית are met with, but there is in every case good reason to believe that ברית is here a later insertion (cf. Smith, *Samuel*, in *International Critical Commentary* 33,) and not original. It

Yahwe" it had, of course, lost every trace of its original character as a source of active, divine power, as the container

is clear too that the editors who inserted this term did so in order to make the name of the ark everywhere conform to the later official designation current in their day and conforming to their theology. But it is equally clear that they were not entirely consistent and thorough in this editorial process. When we come, however, to the writings of the Deuteronomic period we find this later designation of the ark used with great frequency and consistency (Deut. 10. 8; 31. 9, 25, 26; Josh. 3 *passim*; 4. 18; 7. 6; 8. 33; Jud. 20. 27b; I Ki. 3. 15; 6. 19; 8. 1 ff.; Jer. 3. 16). Furthermore, we find occasionally in writings of the post-exilic period or in insertions into passages of the older literature, where the term is again manifestly the result of editorial, theological redaction, a third and fuller designation of the ark, although with some variations, ארון ברית יהוה צבאות ישב הכרובים (I Sam. 4. 4; II Sam. 6. 2; I Chron. 13. 6).

It is self-evident that this last designation of the ark could not have developed until the picture had been clearly formulated of Yahwe enthroned in the Temple, above or between the cherubim. But, as we have seen, it was Ezekiel apparently, who first developed this picture. It is true that the seraphim of Is. 6 offered him stimulating antecedents; but these seraphim of Is. 6 are apparently not the bearers nor protectors of the throne of Yahwe, as in Ezekiel's and subsequent pictures, but are rather His attendants and the members of His heavenly court. Outside of Ezekiel the oldest Biblical reference to the cherubim is found in Gen. 3. 24; but even that passage is undoubtedly post-exilic, as the manifest dependence of the doctrine of universalism expressed in the J portions of Gen. 1-11 upon the doctrine of universalism of Deutero-Isaiah, together with other evidence, indicates. There is consequently in the entire Bible not a single, assured pre-Ezekelian, and therefore pre-exilic, reference to cherubim, and least of all to cherubim in association with the ark or the throne of Yahwe in the Temple. This is convincing evidence that the name ארון ברית יהוה צבאות ישב הכרובים is late, and the product of the third period of evolution of the conception of the ark and its functions, when it had come to be regarded primarily as the base of the *kapporet* and Yahwe's seat upon this (refuting Dibelius, *Die Lade Jahves*, 72 ff.; Gressmann, *Die Lade Jahves*, 6 ff.; Torczyner, "Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 239 ff.).

Quite similarly the name ארון הברית is descriptive of the function which the ark was thought to discharge, as we have seen, in the second period of its evolution, as the receptacle of the two tablets of stone upon which, according to the tradition, the Decalogue, the basis of Yahwe's covenant with Israel, was inscribed. (For ברית = the tablets of the Decalogue cf. I Ki. 8. 21.) As the depository of these monuments of and witnesses to this covenant it was naturally designated as "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe." And this designation served an additional and significant purpose; for it tended to refute the old, and now outgrown and rejected, semi-idolatrous idea that the ark was in itself a deity, or else the container of a deity, and to emphasize the new and, at least at first,

of that which was regarded originally either as Yahwe Himself or as that in which Yahwe resided and from which the divine force, which betokened the presence of Yahwe, emanated. As the "ark of the covenant" it was no longer directly associated with the presence of Yahwe, nor did it symbolize this in any way. For, on the one hand, to symbolize the actual presence or being of Yahwe by any image or concrete object, even the ark, would undoubtedly have violated a fundamental prophetic principle. And on the other hand, as we have seen, during this second period Yahwe was apparently not yet definitely looked upon as dwelling solely and permanently in the Temple at Jerusalem, but only as coming there once a year, upon the New Year's Day.

B

THE THIRD PERIOD

In the third period, as we have seen, the conception of Yahwe became radically different. Beginning with the Deuteronomic reformation and the centralization of worship in the one, single sanctuary, the Temple at Jerusalem, gather-

rather controversial idea that the ark contained only these sacred stones and naught else, and was therefore the constant, visible symbol of Yahwe's covenant with Israel.

Finally, what seems to have been the very youngest Biblical designation of the ark, and which is found only in Priestly writings, ארון העדות (cf. above, note 41). It represents a continuation of the conception of the ark current in the second period, as the depository of the two tablets of the Decalogue, the testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. But, as we have seen, the dominant Priestly conception of the ark was as the throne of Yahwe, upon which He sits eternally in the midst of His people Israel. But, as we have seen also, the secondary Priestly conception of the ark, as containing the Decalogue, therefore the "ark of testimony," was purely conventional, and without the slightest reality. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that very late Priestly writers misinterpreted, though whether consciously or not it is impossible to say, the import of the term ארון העדות. For in Ex. 30. 6, 36; Num. 17. 19 העדות, i. e. the ark, is spoken of as the place שם (לך) אעיר לך, "the place where I shall meet with you." The implication of these three passages is that the ark was called ארון העדות or ארון העדות because it was the place where Yahwe met (אעיר) with Israel. That this is, of course, a false etymology does not alter the manifest fact that these late Priestly writers, for all three verses come from secondary strata of the Priestly Code, offered this interpretation of the term העדות in all seriousness. This implies probably that to them the ark had ceased to be regarded as the depository of the two tablets of the Decalogue, and was looked upon solely as the throne of Yahwe.

ing force with Ezekiel and his vision of the rebuilt Temple, and finding its complete expression in post-exilic literature, the belief became dominant that Yahwe had taken up His permanent residence in the Temple, in the midst of Israel.⁸⁴ But dwelling now in a particular place, the limits of which were exactly defined, it was inevitable that the figure of Yahwe be concretized a bit, be given just enough of form and being and tangibility to be actually localized in this spot. This process was not difficult, even though in principle it was not altogether in conformity with prophetic doctrine. Ezekiel had paved the way for it with his picture of the *kebod Yahwe* and by prescribing that the eastern gate of the Temple must be kept tightly closed forever, thereby terminating more or less effectually the old, solar, non-Yahwistic rite of the entrance into the Temple of the first rays of the rising sun upon the New Year's Day. Thereby he symbolized, as has been said, the permanent presence of Yahwe in the Temple in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*. This doctrine gained firm hold upon the imagination of the people, and, as we have seen, even found its place in the announcements of the early post-exilic prophets, Haggai and Zechariah, that when the new Temple should have been completed, as the crowning act of the dedication ceremonies upon the New Year's Day, Yahwe would come in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, and take up His permanent abode in the new Temple.⁸⁵ From this

⁸⁴ Utterances like that of Is. 66. 1, that the heavens are Yahwe's throne and the earth His footstool (cf. also I Ki. 8. 27), manifestly protesting emphatically against the idea that Yahwe should be thought to dwell or to be contained in a Temple, and at the same time reaffirming the doctrine of the absolute universality of Yahwe, His utter incorporeality and the impropriety of attempting to represent Him as confined to one particular abode, serve but to emphasize the generality of the concept of Yahwe actually dwelling in the Temple throughout the postexilic period.

⁸⁵ Hag. 1. 8; Zech. 2. 9. It is also implied in the vision of the trial of Joshua before Yahwe, holding court in the Temple and attended by angels, in Zech. 3, and in the symbolism of the golden candelabrum, in Zech. 4. This matter, however, is complex, and is obviously related to other matters already referred to, which must be reserved for treatment elsewhere. This doctrine of the coming of the *kebod Yahwe* into the Temple on the New Year's Day has likewise been introduced into the account of the dedication of Solomon's Temple, in I Ki. 8. 1-11. This was done by Priestly writers and in quite skillful manner (cf. my "The Three

time on the *kebod Yahwe* was thought to abide steadily in the Temple. But as yet there was not the slightest implication of the association of the *kebod Yahwe* in the Temple with the ark.⁸⁶ In fact we do not meet this association of the ark with the *kebod Yahwe* until the Priestly Code, and, as has been said, not even in the earliest portions of this, the Holiness and Torah sections of P, but only in the later Grundschrift and strata secondary to that.

But in the Grundschrift of the Priestly Code and other writings dependent thereon, Yahwe is regularly represented as sitting enthroned upon the *kapporet* between the cherubim above the ark. At the same time the ark is still the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, now called *לחת העדות*, "the tablets of testimony." Accordingly the ark is likewise designated now as the *ארון העדות*, "the ark of testimony." Manifestly the association of the term *עדות* with the ark is secondary to its association with the tablets. They are the primary testimony, and the ark is called the "ark of testimony" only because the tablets are, according to tradition, deposited in it. Consequently it is clear that the testimony of the tablets is still much the same as what it was during the second period of the evolution of the conception of Yahwe and of the ark, testimony, through the "words"

Calendars of Ancient Israel," *HUCA*, I [1924], 46). In addition to the passages cited there, careful analysis establishes with fair certainty that vv. 6b-11 of this chapter are likewise secondary and altogether Priestly in character. Without these insertions the passage is quite complete, and narrates in simple, concise form the manner in which Solomon and the elders of Israel brought up the ark from where it had been deposited by David, and reverently set it up in the innermost part of the new Temple. But it is only these inserted verses and verse fragments which introduce the picture of the *kebod Yahwe*, with all the attendant circumstances of the cloud filling the Temple and the priests unable to remain therein because of the cloud and the presence of the *kebod Yahwe* therein. Nothing of this stood in the original account of the dedication of the Temple.

⁸⁶ In fact there is good reason for believing that the ark did not yet enter into Zechariah's conception of the Temple and its equipment, and that he regarded the golden candelabrum, referred to in chap. 4, as the symbol of the presence not of the ark but of Yahwe in the Temple. This matter, too, is, however, quite complex, and related to the matters referred to above, reserved for detailed treatment elsewhere.

inscribed upon them, of the covenant which Yahwe had established with Israel when He brought them out of Egypt.

But as we have already shown,⁸⁷ unquestionably this idea is only conventional and practically meaningless in P. For on the one hand, as has been said, unless they were exhibited upon occasion, or at least were capable of being exhibited, and this the presence of the golden *kapporet* upon the ark probably made impossible, the tablets could not really serve as testimony. And on the other hand, the assurance that Yahwe had taken up permanent residence in Israel's midst, and would never depart therefrom, an assurance which obviously accords completely with and sprang out of Jeremiah's message of Yahwe's new, eternal covenant with a purified, regenerated Israel, which dominated unceasingly the belief, hope and speculation of post-exilic Judaism, worked a significant change in the symbolism of the ark. It caused the old idea of the covenant relation existing between Yahwe and Israel, particularly a covenant relation which, as the earlier prophets had proclaimed repeatedly, could and would be abrogated if Israel did not keep faith with Yahwe, to lose much, in fact almost all, of its original force. Consequently there was now little or no need, as there had been in the second period, of a testimony, a constant reminder to the people of their covenant relation with Yahwe. For, on the one hand, with Yahwe now dwelling in their midst they needed no reminder of Him and His covenant; and, on the other hand, they now believed firmly that this covenant must endure forever, even though they themselves might be somewhat remiss in fulfilling the obligations it laid upon them. These considerations too make it quite clear that the entire conception of the "tablets of testimony" and of the "ark of testimony" in P was altogether conventional, had little or no positive significance, and was eventually, as we have shown, either forgotten or else purposely disregarded by late Priestly writers.

Moreover, the extreme anti-anthropomorphism of the Priestly writers caused them considerable embarrassment in this connection. On the one hand, they borrowed the figure

⁸⁷ Above, note 41.

of the *kebod Yahwe* from Ezekiel, but refused to represent it, as Ezekiel had done, in human shape. Instead, in accordance with their theological principles, they sought to reduce the anthropomorphism and heighten the spirituality of the conception as much as possible by representing the *kebod Yahwe* as a fiery apparition, "something like the appearance of fire,"⁸⁸ enveloped in "the cloud." The picture itself is significant, for it seems to betray a reminiscence, no doubt entirely unconscious on the part of these Priestly writers, of the actual association of the *kebod Yahwe* with the flaming appearance of the dawn when the first rays of the rising sun upon the equinoctial, New Year's Day shine forth from the midst of the cloud upon the eastern horizon. But to accommodate this picture to their doctrine that Yahwe had taken up His permanent abode in the Temple in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, these Priestly writers had to localize it, to represent their spiritualized conception of the *kebod Yahwe* as confined by the limits of space within the holy of holies of the Temple, as dwelling exactly there, and in no other place, and also as dwelling there permanently and never departing therefrom.⁸⁹

Furthermore, since they now represented the *kebod Yahwe* as dwelling permanently in the holy of holies, and since ancient tradition, based, of course, upon historical fact, told that the "ark of the covenant of Yahwe" likewise stood in the holy of holies, these Priestly writers had no alternative but to associate the ark of tradition with their figure of the *kebod Yahwe*. And since they could not very well represent the latter as contained within the ark, for this would not have comported at all with their conception of the dignity and spirituality of the *kebod Yahwe*, they could depict this association in only one way, viz. that the *kebod Yahwe* was

⁸⁸ Num. 9. 15; cf. Ex. 24. 17; 40. 38.

⁸⁹ According to Ezekiel 10-11, the departure of the *kebod Yahwe* from the Temple was the sign of the impending destruction of the latter. Similarly the Rabbis of the Tannaitic period and also early Christian writers preserved the tradition that the departure from the second Temple of the *Shechinah*, likewise through the eastern gate, betokened its impending destruction by the Romans; cf. Jer. Yoma, VI, 43 c; Bab. Yoma, 39 b; also the references cited by Lauterbach, *HUCA*, IV (1927), 184, note 10; Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, III, 8.

enthroned upon the ark. In this, of course, they also had Ezekiel's picture of the enthroned *kebod Yahwe* as a model. Obviously in this way and by just these processes of reasoning, largely gradual and unconscious though it may all have been, these Priestly writers arrived at the conception of the ark, strange indeed and far removed from its original nature and traditional functions, as a throne of a deity; and, since the *kebod Yahwe* was purposely and doctrinally regarded as incorporeal and therefore, except upon rare and special occasions, invisible, as an empty throne, or rather, more correctly, as the throne upon which a deity sat, who was invisible to mortals; therefore to mortals it seemed an empty throne.

After all in this process of thus reinterpreting the old ark and representing it as an empty throne these Priestly writers could have experienced no very great difficulty, since this concept was by no means strange to the belief and theology prevalent in their day in the large Semitic world in which Palestine was embedded. For according to Lucian,⁹⁰ in the group of eight chief deities whose thrones and images stood in the great Temple at Hierapolis was the sun-god, represented by an empty throne, i. e. one upon which no image of the deity stood; "for," as Lucian says, "the sun and moon are the only divinities that are not sculptured here. On inquiring the reason, I received for answer: Of the other deities it is permitted to make likenesses, because their figures are not known to all men; but the sun and moon are visible to everyone, accordingly there is no reason for delineating them."⁹¹ Unquestionably this reason for not representing the sun by an image, but only by an empty throne, given by Lucian, does not give the real origin and primary cause of this custom, although it may retain some slight reminiscence thereof. But Lucian's statement does seem to imply that this custom was not confined only to the temple at Hierapolis, but was probably observed in most, if not all, Syrian or West-Semitic temples. There is no reason to believe that the Babylonians had this same scruple about depicting the sun-god. In fact the frequent representations in Babylonian pictography

⁹⁰ *De Dea Syra*, 34 (ed. Jacobitz, 357).

⁹¹ Tooke's translation, II, 456.

of Shamash seated upon a throne, enveloped in what appears to be a radiant garment and with rays of light streaming forth from behind his shoulders,⁹² seem to indicate that the Babylonians regularly depicted both the sun- and the moon-god in this manner. Accordingly it would seem that in their pictures of the *kebod Yahwe* Ezekiel was, more or less consciously, influenced by Babylonian representations of the sun-god, while the Priestly writers were influenced more directly by the West-Semitic practice of representing the sun-god by an empty throne.⁹³

But in this enforced association of their picture of the *kebod Yahwe* in the holy of holies with the ark, these Priestly writers were further embarrassed by ancient tradition. On the one hand, they had to accommodate their picture as best they could to the old tradition that the ark was the depository of the two tablets of stone upon which the Ten Commandments were inscribed. It is clear that these two conceptions of the ark have absolutely nothing in common. The ark conceived of as the depository of anything whatsoever was something altogether different than the ark conceived of as a sacred throne. It is self-apparent that it was only that, on the one hand, tradition had inseparably associated the ark with the holy of holies, and that, on the other hand, Priestly tradition or theology now associated the *kebod Yahwe* with the holy of holies in the same way, which brought about this enforced and entirely unnatural and artificial coupling of the ark and the *kebod Yahwe*. Undoubtedly had it not been for this, these Priestly writers would never have represented

⁹² Cf. the well-known representation of Shamash upon the Hammurapi-stone, and Jastrow, *Bildermappe zur Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 94.

⁹³ Whether in thus symbolizing the presence of the *kebod Yahwe* in the holy of holies by an empty throne, these Priestly writers were to any degree conscious of the solar origin of the *kebod Yahwe*, or whether this representation of the *kebod Yahwe* in the manner in which the sun-god was represented at Hierapolis, and apparently also in other West-Semitic temples was purely accidental, or was rather due to the strong Priestly antipathy to the representation of Yahwe by an image of any kind, it is, of course, impossible to determine. Hartmann (*op. cit.* 233), following Reichel and Dibelius, suggests the possibility of Persian influence here also.

Yahwe as enthroned upon the ark, but would instead have represented Him as seated upon an ordinary throne or chair, just as Ezekiel did before them and the author of Dan. 7. 9 after them.

And on the other hand, as we have seen, tradition had likewise associated the *keḇod Yahwe* in the Temple on the New Year's Day with a group of heavenly attendants, winged creatures, seraphim or cherubim. Originally, it would seem, they constituted Yahwe's heavenly court, with which He took counsel in fixing the destinies of nations, as well as His attendants and messengers. By the time of Ezekiel they had seemingly, in accordance with developing Jewish theological principles, become conventionalized as the mere, impersonal attendants of Yahwe and bearers of His throne. But apparently they were so integrally associated with the established conception of the *keḇod Yahwe* that even the Priestly writers dared not omit them entirely from their picture. However, the extreme and absolute monotheism of these Priestly writers forbade them to conceive of, and much less depict, these cherubim as actual, existent, divine personalities alongside of Yahwe. Accordingly they had but one recourse. Between two to them necessary evils, or rather theological absurdities and impossibilities, they had to choose the less. Accordingly they chose to represent the cherubim, since they could not dispense with them entirely, as conventional figures or images in the holy of holies, either as fixed and inseparable parts of the *kapporet* above the ark,⁹⁴ or as in themselves two figures, part of the fixed equipment of the holy of holies in the Temple, standing upon each side of that room, beneath the wings of which the ark was deposited.⁹⁵ At least the presence of these images in the holy of holies, contrary though it was to fundamental theological principles of these Priestly writers, was, apparently, not quite so contrary and objectionable as the representation of them as existent, heavenly beings, even though of inferior rank, alongside of,

⁹⁴ So in Ex. 25. 18 ff. and throughout the Priestly Code.

⁹⁵ So in I Ki. 6. 23-28; 8. 6 f.

and thus qualifying the absolute unity of Yahwe, would have been.⁹⁶

It is quite clear from all this that these Priestly writers were probably none too happy in their picture of the *kebod Yahwe* in the holy of holies of the Temple at Jerusalem, in its unavoidable and intimate association with the to them basically objectionable, traditional figures of the ark and the cherubim. Unquestionably, had they been able, they would have done away with both ark and cherubim entirely. But tradition, which seemingly strongly colored the popular conception of Yahwe's self-revelation to Israel, and for which too these Priestly writers, with their marked antiquarian instincts, had considerable regard, forbade this. They had to content themselves therefore by reducing the objectionable elements and associations in the picture as much as possible. And this they did by conventionalizing the cherubim and representing them as two images in the holy of holies, in direct association with the ark, and by representing the ark still, though, as we have seen, in unreal and impossible manner, as the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, and likewise, a most unreal and artificial conception, as the base of the empty throne of Yahwe.

But the unreality of this entire procedure and the manifestly basic incompatibility of the ideas involved in this representation of the *kebod Yahwe*, with the ark and the cherubim, with fundamental Priestly theological principles, raise the question as to the historic reality of the Priestly account of the ark and its manufacture. Were these Priestly writers actually acquainted with the historic ark? As we have seen, certain internal Biblical evidence, coming from the period shortly after the erection of the second Temple and antedating the composition of the Grundschrift of the Priestly Code and the secondary strata thereof by approximately a century or more, points to the conclusion

⁹⁶ These Priestly writers felt no doubt that by reducing the four cherubim of Ezekiel, the bearers of the divine throne, to only two, they had lessened somewhat the qualification of Yahwe's absolute unity, implied in this multiplicity of divine figures, even though of inferior rank.

that there was no ark in the second Temple. And, as we have likewise seen, rabbinic tradition is strong that the second Temple contained no ark. In the light of all these facts it is difficult indeed to avoid the conclusion that the picture of the ark which these Priestly writers drew with such elaborate detail, was entirely unhistorical and fanciful, that they had no actual, first-hand knowledge of the historic ark, its appearance, character and functions, and that their picture of it is of little or no value as a source of information as to the original character and purpose of the ark.

C

THE FIRST PERIOD

Accordingly therefore, in our attempts to determine what the ark actually was originally, we are compelled to rely primarily upon the meager evidence furnished by the oldest literary strata of the Bible, supplemented to a certain, slight extent by the information to be gathered from the literature of the second period.

Now the evidence points unmistakably to the conclusion that in the first period of its history the ark was actually looked upon as a deity. Not only by the Philistines was the ark so regarded,⁹⁷ but by Israel also, for it was taken into battle against the Philistines for the express purpose, "that it may come among us and deliver us from the hand of our enemies."⁹⁸ In this function of the ark significant parallels from the practice of other Semitic peoples are not lacking. Ġadîmah, the Laḥmite king at Ĥîrah, used to carry two idols, aḍ-Ḍâribân, (literally, "the two smiters," or, perhaps more exactly and significantly, "the two givers of victory") into battle with him.⁹⁹ Even the Philistines themselves carried the images of their gods with them into battle, and in his great victory over them these images were captured by David.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Cf. I Sam. 4. 6-8 (especially in the LXX version).

⁹⁸ I Sam. 4. 3.

⁹⁹ Osiander, "Studien über die vorislâmische Religion der Araber," *ZDMG*, VII (1853), 501.

¹⁰⁰ II Sam. 5. 21. For additional instances of this practice among the Semites, cf. Gressmann, *Mose und seine Zeit*, 233.

Likewise in its experience of capture by the Philistines and sojourn as a trophy of victory in their land, the ark has significant Semitic parallels. Among the Babylonians and Assyrians and the various peoples with whom they contended, the carrying off of the images of the gods of the vanquished by the victors, was a common occurrence. The classic instance is, of course, the capture of the statue of the Babylonian goddess Nanâ by the Elamites and its recovery by Ašurban-apal sixteen hundred and thirty-five years later and restoration to its old temple at Erech.¹⁰¹ The explanatory statement given by the Assyrian king is significant. It was not that the Elamites had been more powerful than the Babylonians, or that the goddess herself had been weak and unable to protect herself or her people against their enemy, but that she had been enraged against her own people and so had permitted herself to be carried away to a strange land. Even among her enemies, impliedly, just like the ark of Israel, she was still a powerful deity; only, presumably, her blessings were now bestowed upon the people among whom she was dwelling, her former enemies, while her old worshipers, deprived of her presence, and therefore without divine protection and rendered correspondingly weak and helpless, became the ready prey of their foes. Manifestly the capture of the image or cult object of the deity of an enemy, served a double purpose. Not only was it a trophy of victory, but even more, its possession rendered the enemy correspondingly stronger and its old worshipers correspondingly weaker. That similar ideas obtained among the pre-Islamic Arabs may be inferred from a statement of Nuwairî that four Himyarite princes, the sons of As'ad b. 'Amr, undertook an expedition to carry off the sacred black stone, the Ka'aba, in order to set it up in a sanctuary which they contemplated erecting in Šan'â; but they were defeated by the Banu Kinânah.¹⁰² Not improbably the Philistines expected the ark to function in their midst in some such favorable manner, and were therefore doubly distressed when they

¹⁰¹ Rawlinson, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, V, 6, col. VI, 107-128.

¹⁰² Osiander, *op. cit.*, 478.

discovered that its presence among them was inimical to them to an extreme degree. And apparently the presence of the ark in their midst brought blessing to the household of Abinadab and all the inhabitants of Kiryat Yearim,¹⁰³ just as, so we are told explicitly, it brought blessing to the inmates of the house of Obed-Edom, in which it stood likewise.¹⁰⁴

The character of the ark as a divine object is likewise attested significantly by the taboo inherent in it. Even to touch it without warrant, although for the most worthy and devout purpose, entailed death. Uzza died because he had ventured to lay his hand upon it in order to steady it, when it seemed that it might slip from the wagon.¹⁰⁵ And the clan of Yechoniah, of the inhabitants of Beth-Shemesh, suffered the loss of seventy members because they had dared to examine the ark too closely, and perhaps even to look into it, and had thereby violated the taboo associated with it.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ I Sam. 7. 1; II Sam. 6. 3.

¹⁰⁴ II Sam. 6. 12.

¹⁰⁵ II Sam. 6. 6f.

¹⁰⁶ I Sam. 6. 19, emended in accordance with the more correct LXX text.

This passage has never, so far as I can see, been interpreted quite correctly. H. P. Smith (*Samuel; International Critical Commentary* series, 48f.), followed by Budde (*Samuel; in Marti's Hand-Commentar* series, 46) and Gressmann (*Die Lade Jahves*, 19), explains the misfortune of the Bne Yechoniah as brought upon them by Yahwe because they did not rejoice with the rest of the inhabitants of Beth Shemesh when they beheld the ark. But why should they not have rejoiced equally with their fellow-townsmen upon this occasion, unless there was some specific reason for their not doing so? And since the approach of the ark to Beth Shemesh was undoubtedly the first contact of the Bne Yechoniah with it, whatever reason they may have had for not joining in the celebration of their fellow-townsmen could not have arisen before, but must have arisen after this event. Plain common sense therefore indicates that the misfortune which befell them in the loss of seventy of the members of their clan could not have been because they did not rejoice when they beheld the ark, but, just the reverse, this misfortune was itself the cause of their not being able to rejoice along with the other inhabitants of their village.

Now it should be noticed that in v. 13 ראו is followed by the direct object, את הארון, while in v. 19 ראו is followed by the preposition ב, ראו בארון. ראה ב" means "to look at a thing fixedly, to examine it closely" (Gen. 21. 16; 34. 1; Is. 66. 24; Cant. 6. 11; Eccl. 2. 1; 11. 4), then "to take due notice of, to have regard for" (Gen. 29. 32; Num. 11. 15; I Sam. 1. 11; II Sam. 16. 12; Ps. 37. 4; 128. 5). Here it must mean, "they examined it closely," i.e. they handled

Manifestly it was just because it was a deity that the ark could bring blessing to the household, town or nation in which it was dwelling, whether temporarily or permanently, and where it was treated with due regard and proper ceremonial, as well as inflict punishment whenever the proper limits of its taboo were violated. The anticipation of blessing from having the ark with him, based no doubt upon reports which had come to him of the prosperity of the people of Kiryat Yearim, and later of that of Obed-Edom, must have been one of the primary motives actuating David in his purpose to bring the ark up to Jerusalem, just as the fear of the ark, based upon the unhappy fate of Uzza, deterred him for a time from carrying out his plan. It was likewise because the ark was regarded as a deity that it was thought able to give its people victory in battle, to select the way it wished to go and to lead its people along the otherwise unknown way which they had to travel, and bring them in safety to their ultimate goal, which it, or rather the deity associated with it, had promised to them. Presumably, too, the ark could discharge many other functions, of which we have no record, but which were the functions thought to be usually discharged by a deity and to redound to the blessing of its people.

it, for it was no doubt an object of which they had heard frequently in the past, and perhaps had even heard of its marvellous exploits in the land of the Philistines; and now that it had come among them, naturally they sought to satisfy their curiosity and see for themselves just what this ark was. Unaware of the taboo qualities of the ark, they did not hesitate to treat it too familiarly, to handle it unceremonially, and not at all improbably, they even ventured to look inside it to see what might be there. Consequently they suffered the same fate as did Uzza, for venturing to touch the ark. Those who dared to examine the ark too closely, and especially to touch it, died automatically. It was no violation of the taboo of the ark, to look at it, as v. 13 indicates; but it was a violation of the taboo to examine the ark too closely, with all the treatment that this implies. We can well understand therefore, why, as v. 20 states, the people of Beth Shemesh feared to keep the ark in their town, for there could be no telling who would be the next, even though innocent, victim of the violation of the taboo associated with it. We must accordingly translate v. 19, not as do Smith, Budde and Gressmann, "The Bne Yechoniah did not rejoice with the men of Beth Shemesh *when they beheld* the ark," but "*because they examined* the ark."

Moreover, all the evidence indicates that the ark, or the deity of the ark, was identified with Yahwe. The sanctuary at Shiloh, ministered to by a Levitical family, was a Yahwe shrine. The ark was there known apparently as the ארון יהוה, "the ark of Yahwe." And the Philistines themselves, according to tradition, identified the deity of the ark with the god who had brought Israel up from Egypt.¹⁰⁷ The implication too of the tradition recorded in I Sam. 5. 1-5, of the prostration of the image of Dagon before the ark, is likewise that the ark is a divine object or deity of character similar to that of the image of the Philistine deity, but of course of superior power and authority.

Most significant of all perhaps is the legend recorded in I Sam. 3. As is recognized by practically all scholars, this chapter belongs to a literary stratum somewhat later than I Sam. 4-6, and therefore quite naturally it seems to show some evidence of a slightly more advanced theology. None the less Yahwe is here associated with the ark in the most intimate and significant manner. The legend tells that while lying at night in the place in the sanctuary where the ark stood, Samuel hears Yahwe calling to him. Presumably it was in anticipation of some such occurrence that Samuel slept in this spot, no doubt having been assigned to this task by Eli. For the same reason, as we have seen,¹⁰⁸ Ex. 33. 11 tells that while Moses would return to the camp from the "tent of meeting," the youthful Joshua, Moses' apprentice, according to the J tradition, remained always within the tent and never went forth from it. The purpose here, too, was manifestly to receive the oracle. For this could never be anticipated; and whenever Yahwe would choose to speak, some one qualified by technical training must be present to receive the message. So here, the youthful Samuel, likewise the apprentice of Eli, sleeps in the room where the ark is, while Eli, the old priest, sleeps in his

¹⁰⁷ I Sam. 4. 8b. This passage is undoubtedly not original. All the more therefore it indicates that until a time later than the actual composition of the earliest stratum of I Sam. 4-6 the ark itself as a deity was identified with Yahwe.

¹⁰⁸ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 119ff.

accustomed bed, in order that he too might receive the oracle whenever Yahwe should choose to speak.

The presumption is strong, therefore, that the oracle of Yahwe here was associated with the ark, that, in other words, the narrative in its original form implied that Yahwe spoke from out the ark. It is true that v. 10 says explicitly that Yahwe came and took His place and then called the third time to Samuel, implying thereby that Yahwe was not present regularly in this room or portion of the sanctuary, but came thither only for the explicit purpose of calling to Samuel, and furthermore came and went away and then came again, each time that He called to Samuel. This procedure seems hardly natural or plausible. On the basis of v. 10 Smith¹⁰⁹ and Budde¹¹⁰ would emend v. 4 to read, ויִתְּצֵב יְהוָה וִיקְרָא, But it would be more plausible and much simpler to regard ויִתְּצֵב יְהוָה וִיקְרָא in v. 10 as a late, theological insertion, and the original reading, just as in v. 4 and again in v. 6, the simple וִיקְרָא יְהוָה. In fact v. 6 seems to imply that just this was the original reading, rather than that proposed by Smith and Budde. But if this was indeed the original reading,

¹⁰⁹ *Op. cit.*, 25 ff.

¹¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 28. It is likewise easier to account for the insertion of ויִתְּצֵב יְהוָה in v. 10, on the basis of theological motivation, than it would be to account for the reverse procedure of a suppression, whether purposed or not, of an original ויִתְּצֵב יְהוָה וִיקְרָא in vv. 4 and 6. For we can readily understand that a later age, during the second period of the history of the ark, would take exception to the idea of Yahwe dwelling within the ark and speaking from out it. This was too crass and primitive, and smacked too much of the representation of Yahwe or the symbolization of His presence by a concrete, image-like object, to be acceptable to the prophetic theology which dominated this second period. As we have intimated, it must have been just because of the development of this prophetic conception of Yahwe, that the conception of the ark as the receptacle of the two tablets of stone developed. By the insertion of ויִתְּצֵב יְהוָה in v. 10, late glossators imagined that they had corrected the impression originally conveyed by this and vv. 4 and 6, that Yahwe spoke from out the ark. The insertion of these words, they believed, no doubt, implied that Yahwe came from afar, wherever that might be, presumably in heaven, to speak with Samuel. In quite the same way and from the same standpoint the J Code occasionally represents Yahwe as descending from somewhere on high, presumably from heaven (וַיֵּרֶד יְהוָה, Gen. 11. 5; Ex. 19. 20; Num. 11. 25; וַיֵּרֶד יְהוָה, Num. 12. 5; and especially, וַיֵּרֶד יְהוָה וִיתְּצֵב, Ex. 34. 5).

then it and the entire narrative imply beyond all possibility of doubt that Yahwe was actually present all the time in the room in which Samuel was sleeping, and that, just as we have suggested, Samuel was appointed by Eli to sleep in this room regularly, since Eli himself was apparently too old and feeble for this constant and exacting service, to receive the oracle whenever Yahwe would choose to speak. And of course Yahwe could be present in only one particular place or object in this room, viz. the ark, precisely as the explicit mention of the presence of the ark in this room in v. 3 implies. This chapter accordingly furnishes very strong and illuminating proof, not only of the direct association of Yahwe with the ark, but that actually in this first period of its history Yahwe was thought to actually reside within the ark.

Furthermore, the very name ארון, "box, casket" implies as various scholars have remarked, that the ark must have been primarily a container; i. e. in itself it could hardly have been regarded as the deity, as Yahwe, but must rather have contained, or at least have been thought to contain something, which was either regarded as Yahwe Himself, or else, what practically amounts to the same thing, as being the object in which Yahwe was thought to reside. This is confirmed by the established tradition of the second period of the history of the ark, that in it the two stone tablets of the Decalogue were deposited. It is confirmed still further by the interpretation of I Sam. 6. 19 which we have proposed, viz. that the clan of Yechoniah of Beth Shemesh examined the ark closely, and perhaps even looked into it, of course to see what was inside, and therefore were so sorely smitten by Yahwe. Our task therefore is now to determine, if possible, what the actual contents of the ark, so intimately associated with Yahwe, may have been.

In this phase of the question as to the form and nature of the ark, Semitic religious belief and practice offer striking and significant parallels. Sanchuniathon records that Agroueros or Agrotos, apparently, to judge from the names, an agricultural deity, had a wooden statue which was much venerated, and a shrine (or portable temple), drawn about in Phoenicia

by yokes of oxen.¹¹¹ Presumably this last was an object somewhat similar to the ark.

Far more striking in its parallelism with the ark is a peculiar structure which seems to play more or less of the rôle of a cult object among the Ruwala, an important and powerful tribe of the present-day Anazeh group of Bedouin tribes. The description of it, given by Musil,¹¹² is as follows; "The Ruwala have a structure made out of thin wooden boards, decorated with ostrich feathers, which is fastened upon the baggage-saddle of a camel. It is called *abu zhûr al-markab*. Only the Ruwala possess this. No other tribe has anything like it. As they believe, the *abu zhûr* comes from Ruweil (the eponymous ancestor of the Ruwala) and is called *abuz hûr* (*pater aeterni saeculi*) because it is passed on from generation to generation through the ages. *Abu zhûr* is the visible focus ... of all the tribes of the *zana*-Moslems. Whoever has it in his possession is prince of all these tribes, and they are obligated to follow him in battle. Every year a white camel is sacrificed before it, with the words, 'This is thy sacrifice, O Abu Zhûr!', and its blood is sprinkled upon the corner posts of the structure. In this *abu zhûr* Allah takes pleasure in abiding and imparts directions to the tribe through external signs. Ofttimes the ostrich-feathers are supposed to tremble, although there may be no wind. Ofttimes the structure is believed to bow itself unceasingly to the right. This signifies *kudrat min allâh*, 'the power of God.' ... If the camel bearing the *abu zhûr* begins to move, the entire tribe follows it; where the *abu zhûr* lets itself down, there the camp is set up. Whenever the Ruwala are threatened by a powerful enemy and fear defeat (but only then) they bring the *abu zhûr*, and with it at their head they attack the enemy."

The points of similarity and manifest relationship between this strange object and the various Biblical traditions about the ark are almost startling. It too has the power of selecting the road it wishes to take, by driving the camel

¹¹¹ Cf. Cory, *Ancient Fragments*, 9.

¹¹² *Die Kultur*, XI (1910), 8 f., quoted from Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," ZAW, 37 (1917-1918), 220 f.

which bears it irresistibly onwards. It too leads its people through the desert and determines their nightly camping-places by causing the camel bearing it to kneel, implying thereby that there it desires to stop and remain for the night. It too imparts oracles and, in the interest of its tribe, declares future events. It too goes into battle with its people and gives them victory over its and their enemies. And not this alone, for it does not go into every battle, but only into those battles where the danger is urgent and the security of the tribe is greatly imperilled. Just this was the procedure with the ark; for it was not taken into the first battle with the Philistines, where, seemingly, the tribes of Israel felt quite confident of victory. Only after this first defeat, and when the danger impending had become fully apparent, did they fall back upon their last resort, in which, clearly, they had implicit confidence, and bring the ark with them into battle. And, most significant of all these points of contact with the ark, Allah is thought to reside in the *abu zhûr*, if not permanently, then upon occasions when the tribe has need of him and his presence with them, just as, as we have seen, Yahwe too was at first thought to reside in the ark; and every year a sacrifice, and a major sacrifice at that, since it consists of a white camel, is offered to the *abu zhûr*, or to the deity associated with it, and the blood thereof is sprinkled upon the corner-posts of the peculiar object, with the significant words, "This is thy sacrifice, O Abu Zhûr."

And this parallelism becomes still more significant when we realize that Musil failed to grasp the full significance of this peculiar object and the rôle which it played in the life of the tribe, and particularly in its warfare, having been misled somewhat by the popular but incorrect interpretation of the name *abu zhûr*. This was more clearly recognized by Hartmann and Torczyner.¹¹³ The latter scholar quotes a verse,

¹¹³ "Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 265.

recorded by Curtiss,¹¹⁴ as having been communicated to him by a Ruwala-tribesman,

Abu ed-Duhûr will come unfailingly
To help those who put on their equipment for war;
And through him their horses become fear-inspiring.

As Curtiss has pointed out, *abu zhûr*, according to these verses, plays exactly the rôle of a tribal deity, and particularly a deity who gives his tribesmen victory in war. In all likelihood *abu zhûr* was originally the actual name of the tribal deity of the Ruwala, which has, however, under the influence of official Islam, superficial though it be with the Bedouin tribesmen, been half forgotten with the passage of time, and lingers on chiefly, if not entirely, in its association with this peculiar tribal cult- or war-object.

In one other respect Musil's description of this object, based upon the information given to him, was somewhat inexact, in that it was claimed that this was the only object of its kind, and that no other people possessed anything like it. The full name of this object was communicated to Musil as *abu zhûr al-markab*. The consideration given to the very important first half of the name has tended to detract somewhat from the consideration which the second half likewise merits.

Markab connotes in Arabic a vehicle of any kind used for transportation, whether wagon, boat or beast of burden. Burckhardt¹¹⁵ is our authority for the fact that the Bedouin

¹¹⁴ *Ursemitische Religion im Volksleben des heutigen Orients*, XV. Moreover, according to Canaan ("Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, IV [1924], 83), Abu ed-Dhûr is the name of "a rock, situated on the left side of the carriage road from Jerusalem to Jericho, after passing 'ên el-Hôd. This rock has a widespread reputation for the cure of backache. After a patient has rubbed his back against the rock, he places a stone on it. When last I saw this 'father of rocks,' he was loaded with a large heap of stones. He is not assigned at present to any *weli*, and I can not explain its widespread therapeutic use, except by assuming that it may have been once connected in some way with a holy man or object of worship." Doubtless had Canaan been familiar with the *abu zhûr* of the Ruwala, and the evidence pointing to a former tribal deity Abu ed-Duhûr, he would have associated this rock with him.

¹¹⁵ *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahâbys*, 82 f.

tribes of the North Arabian desert actually possess several such objects, or at least did so a century ago. He says, "Some of the Aeneze chiefs use, in time of war, what may perhaps be styled the 'battle banner'; for it is never displayed but in decisive and important actions, where the fall or the loss of it is regarded as a signal of defeat. This standard is of two sorts, one called *merkeb* (مركب, or the 'ship'), consisting in two stands of wood, about six or seven feet high;... These are placed one opposite to the other on a camel's back, so that above there is not more than a span's distance between them; but below they are sufficiently separated for a person to sit in the midst on a saddle, and guide the camel: the upper part of this standard is covered with black ostrich feathers.

"The other sort of banner is called '*otfe* (عطفة); this consists of two side pieces of board, of an oblong square form, about five feet high, ornamented like the other with ostrich feathers. Such is now used by the *Teyar*, the chief of *Woud Aly*... *En Ibsmeyer* and *Ibn Fadhel* have each a *merkeb*. The guide of the camel, that carries either a *merkeb* or an '*otfe*, is never an adult free-born Arab, but a boy, an old woman, or a slave; for it is thought beneath the dignity of a man to sing or howl the cry called زغاريت, with which the guide animates those who accompany the standard to battle. All the horsemen assemble around it; and the principal efforts of both parties are directed against the respective *merkeb* or '*otfe* of the enemy. A captured banner is borne in triumph to the tent of the victorious sheikh."

According to this description of Burckhardt there are two varieties of this peculiar object, one called *merkeb* and the other '*otfe*. Seemingly they differ only in form and outward appearance, but serve exactly the same function. Burckhardt apparently heard nothing from his informers about Allah or any tribal deity residing in this object, nor of its being used for purposes of divination. He heard of only one function which it discharged, viz. that of the tribal banner or palladium in battle, however not used indiscriminately for this purpose, but carried by the tribe only into the most important and decisive engagements. Its presence there was obviously

assumed to ensure victory to its tribe. On the other hand Burckhardt's description adds one significant element, totally lacking in that of Musil, and apparently not heard of by him in connection with the *abu zhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala, viz. that of the rider, whether boy, old woman or slave, in the *merkeb*, whose task was by his cries to spur on the warriors to extreme efforts. Finally, Burckhardt's description establishes with certainty that the *abu zhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala is not, as they claimed, the only object of its kind, but that similar objects are, or at least were quite recently, possessed by other tribes or tribal chieftains.

Still further light is shed upon this strange object, and particularly upon that of the Ruwala, by Wetzstein.¹¹⁶ "Should it develop that they become convinced that victory can not be won except by extreme measures, they have still in the 'Oṭfa a final and in fact a very drastic means of inflaming the battle-spirit. The 'Oṭfa is a lattice-work object, made of strong wood, four-cornered, of greater length than width, and almost oval in shape, which is fastened upon the back of a strong, decorated camel. The older the 'Oṭfa is, the more it possesses the qualifications for serving as the palladium of its people; that of the Ruwala, one of the large 'Anesa-tribes of the Syrian desert, of which I made a drawing in 1860 in the tent of the tribal battle-leader, is said to be hundreds of years old. Before the beginning of the battle an especially handsome and reputable woman or maiden, if possible the one of highest rank within the tribe, adorned as a bride, unveiled, and, what has a peculiarly disturbing effect upon the Arabs, with hair flying loose and neck laid bare, mounts the 'Oṭfa, rides in front of the first battle-line and halts before the elite of the army, the youth of the tribe, in order to direct toward them the Intichâ, i. e. the solemn charge either to win the victory or to die. This consists of the little word *liainêki*, 'for thy two eyes!' Thereupon the 'Oṭfa advances upon the enemy and the battle begins. The greatest slaughter naturally takes place in the neighborhood of the

¹¹⁶ *Verhandlungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie*, X (1878), 389; quoted from Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, 37 (1917-1918), 219f.

‘Oṭfa, towards the capture and defence of which the main efforts of both sides are directed. During the combat the occupant of the ‘Oṭfa, standing erect and turning now here, now there, spurs her fellow-tribesmen on with glance and gesture, with loud challenge and calling individual warriors by name, with praise and blame and the trilling sounds of the *Zagrûta* (the customary cries of joy of the attendants of the bride at weddings). Not infrequently the entire body of male youth has fallen beside the ‘Oṭfa. Likewise it is often captured, a fact which is remembered as a lasting humiliation for many generations. However, the beautiful woman, captured with the ‘Oṭfa, is always treated honorably, and is released for a ransom, but one of very great amount. The ‘Oṭfa remains as the trophy of the victor, if it is not recaptured by an attack upon the enemy’s camp.”

This description of Wetzstein adds some significant information to our knowledge of these peculiar objects. In the first place it confirms the fact that the *abu zhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala is not unique, but that there are, or at least were, among the Bedouin tribes of the Syrian desert other like objects. In the second place it gives further information about the particular object of the Ruwala. Significantly this object, which Musil heard designated by the descriptive title *al-markab*, Wetzstein must have heard called ‘*oṭfe*. This indicates that the two names are apparently used interchangeably, without the distinction between them which Burckhardt recorded. Furthermore, the older an ‘*oṭfe* is, the more respect it enjoys, presumably because it is thought to be therefore more powerful and effective. That of the Ruwala seems to have been regarded as unusually old and therefore to have enjoyed a particular reputation and veneration. According to Wetzstein only a beautiful and highly respected woman occupies the ‘*oṭfe*, whereas according to Burckhardt, this is instead a boy, an old woman or a slave. There is no reason to question the reliability of both accounts. The facts in the case seem to be that the customary occupant of the ‘*oṭfe* is a young woman, who plays the rôle of a battle-maiden, spurring on fellow-tribesmen by her cries, her gestures and glances, and

even not infrequently by shouts of praise or rebuke for this or that individual warrior. Not infrequently, however, this rôle may be filled by an old woman, a boy or a slave; only never an actual warrior. An 'otfe captured in battle, is retained by the captors, so long as possible, as a trophy of victory. But, as is but natural, the conquered tribe makes every possible effort to regain its palladium, and until it succeeds in doing this, it feels itself humiliated and dishonored.

Further information of some significance about the 'otfe of the Ruwala is given by Blunt.¹¹⁷ "The last thing loaded by Ibn Shaalán's people was the *uttfa*, a gigantic camel-hówdah used by the Roála whenever they expect a pitched battle, and then only. It is a huge cage of bamboo covered with ostrich feathers, and probably as old as the date of their first coming from Nejd, for ostriches are not found, I believe, north of Jebel Shammar. A *delúl* carries the *uttfa*, in which a girl is placed, whose business it is to sing during the fight, and encourage the combatants by her words. She needs to be stout-hearted as well as stout-lunged, for the battle generally groups itself round her, in attack and defence. The Roála have a superstitious feeling about her defence, and the enemy a corresponding desire to capture her, for it is a belief that with the loss of the *uttfa* the Roála tribe would perish. Formerly, each large Bedouin tribe had one of these; but now, perhaps from a scarcity of ostrich feathers and the difficulty of renewing them, the *uttfa* and the custom attached to it have disappeared, except among the Roála and, I believe, the Ibn Haddal.¹¹⁸ To-day it was carried empty on the back of a fine she-camel."

This description of the 'otfe of the Ruwala confirms that of Wetzstein, and likewise much of the general description of the 'otfe and *merkab* given by Burckhardt. It also confirms the statement of Wetzstein that the regular occupant of the 'otfe is a maiden of the tribe. Perhaps this was the regular

¹¹⁷ *The Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 351.

¹¹⁸ Lady Blunt adds the note that Palgrave mentions its existence among the Ajman, a tribe east of Jebel Shammar. However, she fails to give the reference for this, and I have not succeeded in locating it in Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia*.

practice among the Ruwala, while among other tribes her place might be taken, at least occasionally, by an old woman, a boy or a slave, as Burckhardt records. The extreme regard and veneration with which the 'otfe is treated is evidenced by the character of the camel which bears it, and also by the fact that when the tribe is about to set out on a journey the 'otfe is the last object packed up. Apparently the loading of the 'otfe upon the back of the particular camel designated to carry it might well serve as the signal for the tribe to set out.

Lady Blunt's description also confirms Wetzstein's statement with regard to the high age of the particular 'otfe of the Ruwala. Apparently Lady Blunt regarded the decoration of ostrich feathers as essential to the 'otfe, for she accounts for the gradual disappearance of this institution from among the various tribes by the assumption that this is because of the difficulty of securing sufficient ostrich feathers to keep the old 'otfes in proper repair and to make new ones. This would accord somewhat with Musil's statement that it was through the waving of these ostrich feathers, particularly when there was no wind, that the deity associated with this particular 'otfe was thought to impart oracular information. But this assumption of Lady Blunt is groundless; for, on the one hand, were it correct, we would expect to find the institution of the 'otfe, with all the peculiar beliefs associated with it, far more general among the Bedouin tribes living to the south of the Syrian desert, where the ostrich is more common;^{118a} and, quite significantly, the 'otfe seems to be almost, if not entirely, unknown in that region. And, on the other hand, we shall have ample evidence that ostrich feathers are not at all essential to certain objects closely related to the 'otfe. The gradual disappearance of the 'otfe from among the Bedouin tribes, has, as we shall see shortly, a simpler, more natural and probable, and also for this study more significant reason.

Additional light is shed upon the nature and function of the 'otfe by Rogers.¹¹⁹ "The sheikhs of the 'Anazy tribes

^{118a} According to Lawrence (*Revolt in the Desert*, 59) the ostrich is plentiful still today in the territory of the Sherarat, in the desert east of Tebuk. (Tebuk is on the railway almost due east of the southernmost point of the Sinaitic Peninsula).

¹¹⁹ In *The Academy* of Mar. 31, 1883, 221f., writing from Cairo.

say that in ancient times every tribe had its 'Atfah, which was regarded as the repository of its valour and honour, and was only made use of on occasions of unusually serious importance. When a tribe went to war with a powerful opponent, the 'Atfah was placed on a strong and handsome camel, and was gaily and gorgeously decorated with ostrich-feathers, carpets, and embroidery work, and was surrounded by a band of warriors selected from among the bravest men of the tribe. In some tribes it was customary for a virgin, the daughter of one of the sheikhs, to take her seat under the canopy, and, by her singing, to incite the men to acts of bravery. Every effort was made and every precaution taken to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy; and, if the men engaged in fighting in another part of the field, or told off for the protection of the flocks or of the tents, perceived that the 'Atfah was in danger, they would leave their occupation, abandoning everything to rally round the mysterious emblem for its protection; for, if lost, the tribe was disgraced, and a new 'Atfah could not be made until after a victory over the enemy who had possessed himself of the original and the recovery of a remnant—be it ever so small a portion—of the old wooden framework. The captured 'Atfah could not be used by the victorious tribe, and it was therefore generally destroyed after capture. This custom accounts for the fact that of all the numerous tribes in the Syrian deserts only two now possess an 'Atfah."

This account is of extreme importance. In the first place it gives further confirmation to the conclusion that the customary, though by no means invariable, occupant of the 'otfe was a maiden. And in the second place it too records that at one time the institution of the 'otfe was quite common among Bedouin tribes, and accounts for its gradual disappearance, not by supposition, as did Lady Blunt, but by a fact of much significance. A new 'otfe could not be made indiscriminately to replace an old one which had been captured or destroyed in battle. The capture of an 'otfe was regarded as such a supreme calamity that the tribe did not hesitate at the most extreme efforts and sacrifices to protect

it. The tribe whose 'otfe had been captured in battle was regarded as, and felt itself disgraced and humiliated. Not until it had regained its old 'otfe through victory in battle, could it hold its head high once more. A new 'otfe could be made only with at least a remnant of the old 'otfe as its nucleus. A captured 'otfe could not be used by its captors. Therefore, in order to forestall all possibility of its former tribe regaining it, or at least a portion of it, from which a new 'otfe might be made, symbolic of the restored power of the now conquered tribe, a captured 'otfe was usually destroyed. The inevitable result of such a practice must have been the gradual disappearance of the 'otfe from among the Bedouin tribes. We can easily understand therefore why during the second half of the 19th century but one or two 'otfes should still be in existence.

But the question arises here, Why, if the old 'otfe were captured, could not a new one be made to replace it, unless at least a fragment of the old 'otfe was used as the nucleus for it? An answer, altogether natural and of deep significance suggests itself. We have seen that, according to Musil's direct account, Allah was believed to reside in the 'otfe, if not permanently, at least occasionally. Moreover, other important evidence links this particular 'otfe of the Ruwala with Abu ed-Duhûr, apparently the old, half-forgotten, eponymous deity of this tribe. It is altogether probable that every ancient 'otfe had similar associations, that it was regarded, in earlier and more primitive stages of its development, as the symbol, or even as the actual container of the tribal deity. In such case, its capture in battle would mean nothing other than this deity's capture by his enemies. It would imply, on the one hand, his own weakness and impotence in comparison with the enemy tribe and its deity; and on the other hand, it would imply that his old tribe was now without divine protection, was therefore in truth weak and humiliated. We can well understand, on the basis of this hypothesis, why a tribe would spare no effort and sacrifice to prevent the capture of its 'otfe, and would even leave its cattle and its tents, of course with the women and children in them, unprotected and at

the mercy of the enemy, in order to protect its 'otfe against capture.

Above all, on the basis of this assumption of an original association of 'otfe and tribal deity, we can understand why a new 'otfe could be made only with a portion, no matter how small, of the old one serving as a nucleus. For the old 'otfe must have been charged in its every part with the spirit or indwelling of a deity. And this could be communicated to the new 'otfe only by contact with the old one, and particularly if a portion of the old 'otfe, charged with this divine essence, were built into the new one.¹²⁰ From this nucleus this divine essence spread until it completely permeated the new 'otfe, and endowed it with a divinity and power equal to, and in fact identical with that of the old 'otfe. Accordingly the complete destruction of an 'otfe by its captors, made it absolutely impossible for its old owners to replace it. It must have meant to them and to their neighbors that they were a tribe entirely without divine protection, that they were therefore weak and impotent, held in light esteem by the surrounding tribes, and themselves dissipated and humiliated. It goes without saying too, just as Rogers states, that a captured 'otfe could not be used by its captors. For, on the one hand, it had been the tribal deity of their enemies, and therefore could not be expected to bestow its divine help and blessing upon its former foes; and on the other hand, of what value would its help and blessing be to its captors, since in comparison with their own tribal deity it had proved of inferior strength and powerless to protect even itself from capture? To its captors it was of no avail whatever, but it might, despite its unquestionable divine nature, be destroyed by them with impunity. From such an impotent deity they had naught to fear.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Cf. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*,² index under *holiness* and *taboo*.

¹²¹ Some such condition as this may account for the otherwise almost inexplicable fact that the tribes which came forth from Egypt adopted the worship of the Yahwe of the mountain in the desert, a deity up to that time apparently worshiped only by the Kenites, and certainly unknown to and not worshiped by them, as all the Biblical traditions, with the single exception of that of J,

The most recent account of the 'otfe¹²² adds nothing to what has already been learned with regard to it; but inasmuch as it confirms a number of important facts, already elucidated, as well as for the sake of completeness, it may be cited here. It deals only with the oft-mentioned 'otfe of the

agree. Not impossibly the conditions which caused these tribes to settle in Egypt, or the misfortunes attendant upon them during their sojourn there, had made them lose faith in the strength and protective power of their former tribal deities. Not improbably they had even lost their old, tribal cult-objects or deity-symbols, comparable in every way, as we shall see shortly, to the present-day 'otfe, and so felt themselves entirely without a god of their own. Moses enheartened them with the message of a new god, who would adopt them as his people and take them under his protection. And when the power of this deity and his good-will towards them were manifested by the discomfiture and humiliation of the Egyptians and their gods, they were convinced of the truth of Moses' message and were ready to enter into covenant relations with this new and unquestionably powerful deity.

Similarly too the tribe of Dan must have been convinced by repeated defeat and the gradual decimation of their once powerful tribe at the hands of their Emorite or Philistine enemies, that their former tribal deity was unable to protect and prosper them. Quite probably too their old tribal cult-object, whatever it may have been, had been captured and destroyed, so that they now felt themselves entirely without a god of their own. At any rate their situation was so precarious that they had to resort to the desperate expedient of forsaking their old, tribal territory and migrating to a new home far to the north. On their way they stole the household idol of Micah, the Ephraimite, and adopted it as their new deity and tribal cult-object (Jud. 17-18). They could have been prompted to this last and altogether unusual and desperate act only if at the moment they actually had no tribal god and cult-object of their own. This extraordinary condition can be explained most satisfactorily by the above assumption of the capture and destruction of their former tribal cult-object, whatever it may have been.

This evidence suffices to prove that Jeremiah was wrong, even as far as Israel was concerned, in the implication of his rhetorical question, "Can a nation change its gods?" (2. 11). For his own day, with its large and powerful nations, each with its own elaborate pantheon, his question may have applied. But for ancient Israel, with its simple, primitive, tribal society, and for other Semitic peoples, dwelling upon the same tribal plane of social organization, the loss of old gods with the capture and destruction of old tribal cult-objects or god-symbols, and the consequent, eventual adoption by them of the worship of new and presumably more powerful deities, was by no means an impossible and unheard of, nor even uncommon procedure.

¹²² Leachman, "A Journey in North-Eastern Arabia," *Geographical Journal*, 37 (1911), 267.

Ruwala. "As a rule the mounted men marched in front, behind them coming the thelul riders, while in the middle of them, on a picked 'thelul' (dromedary) was the 'Mirkab' of the Roalla. This consists of a frame covered with black ostrich feathers, in which a maiden from the sheikh's family rides in battle, exhorting the combatants to deeds of valour. In former times the 'Mirkab' was a familiar sight in Beduin warfare, but

In a very recent work (Seabrook, *Adventures in Arabia*, 85 ff.), published in 1927, after this article was written, the following description of the 'otfe occurs (although the name 'otfe is not used). "Pitched battles still occur occasionally among the prouder Bedouin tribes The time and place are appointed. The opposing forces arrive panoplied, with all their tents and women, and set up their camps in full view of each other. Personal tournaments often precede the battle.

"Instead of a flag or banner, each tribe has for its standard a sort of human oriflamme—an enormous throne fitted to a camel's back, a big, square litter with a canopy, completely covered with ostrich plumes dyed in brilliant colors. On the day of battle this throne is placed on a giant camel, with three or four of the most beautiful marriageable virgins of the tribe, dressed in crimson silks and adorned with all their jewels.

"A small camel boy, perched in front of the throne, guides the beast and they ride backward and forward, on the actual edge of the battle, screaming encouragement to their warriors.

"If a tribe goes down to absolute defeat, these chosen beauties become captive to the conquerors, but are treated with the greatest honor, and are even permitted to choose whom they will marry, though the most beautiful usually becomes a wife in the *hareem* of the sheik.

"..... On the day of the battle between the Sirdieh (a small but daring tribe dwelling east of the Djebel Druse) and Annezy, Gutul rode with three other Sirdieh beauties, and kept screaming to the camel boy to push in closer. At a moment when the battle seemed to be going against her tribe, she leaned forward, seized the bamboo wand from the little camel boy's hand, then knocked him off his precarious perch, and drove the camel forward into the thick of the battle, crying at the top of her lungs the prolonged 'ooo!—ooo!—ooo!—ooo!' with the other girls screeching and clawing at her in terror.

"..... In the midst of the confusion and excitement, the Sirdieh rallied, and won the battle." (For this reference I am indebted to my friend and colleague, Dr. Sheldon H. Blank.)

The author had this account only from a secondary source. It is rather vague in its details and probably should not be pressed too strongly. It seems to depict a modified tradition of the 'otfe, in which the rôle of the battle maiden (cf. below) is emphasized at the expense of the original, independent rôle of the 'otfe itself.

now the Roalla are the only Beduin in possession of one." If this last statement be correct, then it follows that by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the other 'otfe of which Lady Blunt and Rogers spoke as existent in their day, had disappeared, and only this one 'otfe of the Ruwala was left. It is noteworthy too that Leachman speaks of it, just as did Musil at about the same time, as the *merkab*. Neither of them apparently heard it called 'otfe, as the majority of the writers who preceded them did. The latter seems to have been the older and more specific name of this peculiar object, and of the entire class to which it belonged. *Merkab*, "vehicle," seems to be a younger and more general term for this class of objects.

That a young maiden of the tribe was usually the occupant of the 'otfe, just as Wetzstein, Blunt, Rogers and Leachman, state, is clear from something further which Musil has to say.¹²³ "The Şhûr lost their banner, el-bêraḡ, in an unsuccessful battle with Ibn Şa'lân. It was borne by the 'Aṭfa'. 'Aṭfa' means a fully matured maiden who, adorned with her best ornaments, sits upon a good riding-camel, swings the banner and with words and lashes drives the animal into the midst of the enemy. She is surrounded by the chosen men of her tribe, who must defend her; for should she be captured, the battle is lost and the tribe may never again carry with them either 'Aṭfa' or banner."

Here Musil represents the maiden as the bearer of the tribal banner, and seems to have no thought of her connection with the 'otfe. In fact he seems to have no knowledge at all of the 'otfe, and no doubt for this reason he failed to identify the *abu ḡhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala with the 'otfe, as did Wetzstein, Blunt and Leachman. None the less the fact that the maiden who bears the tribal banner is known as the 'atfa' indicates that this tribal banner is probably a comparatively late development among the Bedouin tribes, and that it is primarily a substitute for the older 'otfe, gradually falling into disuse and disappearing, as practically all our authorities agree.

¹²³ *Arabia Petraea*, III, 377.

It indicates also that a maiden, and not an old woman, a boy or a slave, as Burckhardt states, was the customary occupant of the old *'otfe*. Perhaps, too, it is not without significance that the banner of the Şhûr had its own name, *el-bêrak* (literally, "lightning"), just as has the *'otfe* of the Ruwala, *abu zẖûr al-merkab*.

Doughty, too, has a brief but important word about this maiden.¹²⁴ Speaking of the well-clad and highly adorned maidens of the Beny Sâlem, a sub-tribe of the Harb, he says, "It seemed that any one of them might have been an *Atâfa* (or *Ateyfa*)—she that from her saddle frame warbles the battle-note, with a passionate sweetness, which kindles the manly hearts of the young tribesmen (and the Aarab are full of a wild sensibility).—They see her, each one as his spouse, without the veil, and decked as in the day of her marriage!—The *Atâfa* is a sheykh's daughter; but, said Hâmed, she may be another *mez'ûna*: it were infamous to kill an *Atâfa*; yet when shots flee, her camel may fall or run furiously, and the maiden-standard is in peril." From this passage it is clear that the name *'atâfa*, the technical term for the maiden who plays this rôle, is related to the name *'otfe*, and that it has survived among the Harb-Bedouin even though the *'otfe* itself has apparently disappeared, and the maiden has become but an ordinary, even though gayly dressed and adorned, camel-rider, spurring on the young warriors of her tribe to supreme efforts in battle. It indicates that at one time the institution of the *'otfe* was more general among the Arabs than it is at present, and that it is indeed, as Blunt and Rogers say, gradually disappearing. This passage also confirms our previous conclusion that originally the regular occupant of the *'otfe* was a maiden, the battle-maiden of the tribe, and not, as Burckhardt states, an old woman, a boy or a slave. This last, if correct, is probably a degenerate form of the older custom.

Elsewhere¹²⁵ Doughty writes as follows, "I might sometimes see heaving and rolling above all heads of men and cattle

¹²⁴ *Arabia Deserta*, II, 304.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 61.

in the midst of the journeying caravan, the naked frame and posts of the sacred *Mahmal* camel which resembles a bedstead, and is after the fashion of the Beduish woman's camel-litter. It is clothed on high days with a glorious pall of green velvet, the prophet's colour, and the four posts are crowned with glancing knops of silver. I understand from grave elders of the religion, that this litter is the standard of the Haj, in the antique guise of Arabia, and yet remaining among the Beduw; wherein, at any general battle of tribes, there is mounted some beautiful damsel of the sheykhs' daughters, whose generous loud *Alléluias* for her people, in presence of their enemies, inflame her young kinsmen's hearts to leap in that martial dance to a multitude of deaths." The comparison which Doughty makes here between the *mahmal* of the pilgrim-caravan to Mecca and the ancient Bedouin 'otfe is suggestive indeed and leads to significant conclusions.

The *mahmal* is described by Lane as follows;¹²⁶ "It is a square skeleton-frame of wood, with a pyramidal top; and has a covering of black brocade, richly worked with inscriptions and ornamental embroidery in gold, in some parts upon a ground of green or red silk, and bordered with a fringe of silk, with tassels surmounted by silver balls. Its covering is not always made after the same pattern with regard to the decorations; but in every cover that I have seen, I have remarked, on the upper part of the front, a view of the Temple of Mekkeh, worked in gold; and, over it, the Sultán's cypher. It contains nothing; but has two mus-hafs (or copies of the Kur-án), one on a scroll, and the other in the usual form of a little book, and each enclosed in a case of gilt silver, attached, externally, at the top... The five balls with crescents, which ornament the Mahmal, are of gilt silver. The Mahmal is borne by a fine tall camel, which is generally indulged with exemption from every kind of labour during the remainder of its life.

¹²⁶ *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (3rd ed.), 404f.

"It is related that the Sultán Ez-Záhir Beybars, King of Egypt, was the first who sent a Mahmal with the caravan of pilgrims to Mekkeh, in the year of the Flight 670 (A. D. 1272), or 675; but this custom, it is generally said, had its origin a few years before his accession to the throne. Sheger-ed-Durr (commonly called Shegeret-ed-Durr), a beautiful Turkish female slave, who became the favourite wife of the Sultán Es-Sáleh Negm-ed-Deen, and on the death of his son (with whom terminated the dynasty of the house of Eiyoob) caused herself to be acknowledged as Queen of Egypt, performed the pilgrimage in a magnificent 'hódag' (or covered litter), borne by a camel; and for several successive years her empty hódag was sent with the caravan merely for the sake of state. Hence, succeeding princes of Egypt sent, with each year's caravan of pilgrims, a kind of hódag (which received the name of 'Mahmal' or 'Mahmil'), as an emblem of royalty; and the kings of other countries followed their example. The Wahhábees prohibited the Mahmal as an object of vain pomp; it afforded them one reason for intercepting the caravan."

This is the description of the Egyptian *mahmal*. It is clear that Lane has given here, and in authoritative manner, the traditional account of the origin of this peculiar institution current in Cairo in the 19th century. According to this tradition the institution of the *mahmal* is only approximately six hundred and fifty years old. The authenticity of this tradition is strongly questioned by Snouck Hurgronje,¹²⁷ who points out that in addition to this *mahmal* from Cairo, and likewise the one from Damascus, to which Doughty refers, there were in ancient times various other *mahmals*, representing the various parts and lands of the Moslem world and the princes who ruled over them. The *mahmal* from Irak played an important rôle in the history of Mecca in 1320, but forty-nine years after the traditional date of the origin of the Egyptian *mahmal*, and the *mahmal* from Yemen played a similar rôle in 1380; and, as Snouck Hurgronje remarks, this was certainly not the first time that the latter *mahmal* had

¹²⁷ *Mekka*, I, 84 ff.

come to Mecca. In the light of these facts he asks very pertinently how it is possible that all the rival princes of Moslem states should have hit upon exactly the same method of representing themselves in the pilgrimage to Mecca, so very soon after the custom had been instituted by the Egyptian princess. He is therefore inclined to believe that the institution of the *mahmal* must have had some different and more ancient origin. He furthermore cites De Goeje,¹²⁸ who suggests the possibility of some relation between the 'otfe, the *mahmal* and the old Arabic custom of carrying portable shrines upon a journey or into battle. But these portable shrines can scarcely be aught other than the 'otfe of the present-day Bedouin. Snouck Hurgronje likewise cites the custom still observed in Djiddah, the sea-port of Mecca, that in the celebration of their folk-festivals the people of the different quarters of the city make *mahmals*, each quarter having its own festival and each its own *mahmal*, and each trying to outdo its rival quarters in the fabrication of its *mahmal*. These facts are significant. They point to the conclusion that the folk-tradition of the origin of the *mahmal*, cited by Lane, is altogether unauthentic, and evidences no more than that the institution is of such antiquity that its true origin is entirely unknown to the modern Muslim.

Moreover, the facts cited by Lane, that no matter how the details of the external adornment of the Egyptian *mahmal* may vary from year to year, two details are constant, viz. the representations of the Ka'aba, or the Temple at Mecca, and of the two copies of the Koran upon the front side

¹²⁸ *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientales*,² No. 1, 180. De Goeje cites in particular the portable shrine of Mokhtar, mentioned by Tabari (translation Zotenberg, II, 702, 706). Unfortunately this is not accessible to me. However the same object was referred to by Ibn al-Wardy as follows; "In the year 66 of the Hejra, al-Mukhtar ibn 'Ubaid-Allâh ath-thaky went to al-Kûfa to avenge the blood of al-Hussein . . . The al-Mukhtar took unto himself a throne (Kurray [this is probably an error for Kursay]), and proclaimed that it contained a mystery, being to them exactly what the ark was to the children of Israel, and when al-Mukhtar sent the army to attack 'Ubaid-Allah ibn Zayâd, he went out with this throne on a mule, which carried him (or it [undoubtedly the latter]) into battle." (Quoted from Rogers, *op. cit.*)

of the *mahmal*-cover, coupled with the additional fact that, despite the Egyptian tradition that Sheger-ed-Durr occupied the first *mahmal*, none the less all *mahmals* are entirely empty, point to one significant conclusion, viz. that originally the *mahmal*, whatever its earliest name among the Arabs may have been, was the empty litter in which the deity of the tribe or tribes to which it belonged, was thought to ride, while upon the many wanderings of the nomad tribe. Nay more, since the *mahmal* in the present day appears only in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, a difficult and dangerous journey indeed, particularly in ancient, and in fact until quite recent times, the thought suggests itself that originally the *mahmal* was believed to be the actual guide of the pilgrim-caravan through the difficult and dangerous desert; it was thought to be the divine power which selected the road which the caravan must take, in order to arrive in safety at its destination. The peculiar, sacred character of the camel which bears the *mahmal* tends to confirm this hypothesis. And perhaps some slight additional confirmation thereof may even be found in the tradition that it was a woman and a princess at that, who was the first occupant of the Egyptian *mahmal*; for, as we have seen, the regular occupant of the *otfe* was a maiden, and always the noblest maiden of the tribe. Unquestionably there is much probability to De Goeje's proposed correlation of the *mahmal* and the *otfe*.

This conclusion is confirmed by certain additional considerations all pointing to the original conception of the *mahmal* as being of divine character, or at least as possessing divine powers. Lane tells also,¹²⁹ in his description of the ceremonies incidental to the return of the *mahmal* to Cairo, how he joined in the procession and came close to the *mahmal*. "After touching it three times, and kissing my hand, I caught hold of the fringe, and walked by its side. The guardian of the sacred object, who walked behind it, looked very hard at me, and induced me to utter a pious ejaculation, which perhaps prevented his displacing me; or possibly my dress in-

¹²⁹ *Op. cit.*, 406f.

fluenced him; for he only allowed other persons to approach and touch it one by one; and then drove them back. I continued to walk by its side, holding the fringe, nearly to the entrance of the Rumeyleh. On my telling a Muslim friend, to-day, that I had done this, he expressed great astonishment; and said that he had never heard of any one having done so before; and that the Prophet had certainly taken a love for me, or I could not have been allowed: he added, that I had derived an inestimable blessing; and that it would be prudent in me not to tell any others of my Muslim friends of this fact, as it would make them envy me so great a privilege, and perhaps displease them. I can not learn why the Mahmal is esteemed so sacred. Many persons showed an enthusiastic eagerness to touch it; and I heard a soldier exclaim, as it passed him, 'O my Lord! Thou hast denied my performing the pilgrimage!'"

From this account it is not clear whether the soldier's words, "O my Lord!", were addressed to the *mahmal*, or were merely an ejaculation. But from the remainder of the account it is evident that a large measure of sanctity is popularly believed to reside in the *mahmal*, and that he who merely touches or kisses it derives by contact a *baraka* or blessing, a portion of its sacred strength or power; therefore the sacred and taboo character of the camel which carried it upon the journey to and from Meccah and its exemption from work for the remainder of its life. For this reason too the fact that Lane was not only privileged to touch it just once, but to hold fast to the fringe and march alongside of the *mahmal* for a considerable distance, implied that a very large measure of *baraka* had been permitted to pass into him. Of this fact, and also of the additional fact that he, a non-Moslem, had dared to touch the sacred object, his pious Moslem acquaintances may well have been jealous.

Lane's description of the *mahmal* is corroborated in every detail by that of Rogers,¹³⁰ who likewise witnessed the procession incidental to its return from Meccah in 1882 or 1883.

¹³⁰ *Op. cit.*

He writes, "It is a large frame of wood, capable of being carried by a strong camel. When in the procession it is covered with a green veil, richly embroidered with ornaments and inscriptions in gold thread, and with heavy fringes and tassels. It is surmounted by silver-gilt knobs at the top and four corners, and a copy of the Kurân in a silver-gilt case is suspended from the top. Lane states that in his time the covering was black; but certainly for many years past it has been green... The Mahmil contains nothing.

"If one asks the Muslims of Cairo what the Mahmil is intended to represent, they only say that it is in memory of the camel-saddle and canopy in which the Mamluke Queen of Egypt, Shajar ad durr, performed her pilgrimage to Mekka and Medinah in the thirteenth century of our era. On asking whether such a ceremony existed before her time, they reply that they have no records of any previous Mahmil. I have frequently tried to elicit an expression of opinion as to some other origin, but without result. If the Mahmil be simply an emblem of the saddle on which a Queen of Egypt performed her pilgrimage, herself a foreigner and probably a convert to Islamism, not born in the faith, why should the Muslim world venerate it to such an extent? And, again, why does a similar Mahmil start simultaneously from Damascus?"

These questions are indeed apposite. They are practically the same as those raised by Snouck Hurgronje. They find a ready and natural answer in the proposed correlation of the *mahmal* and the 'otfe. And in fact Rogers himself, although, it must be admitted, upon rather superficial grounds and without any real understanding of the full implication of his hypothesis, suggested that there must have been an original relationship, a development from a common source, not only of the *mahmal* and the 'otfe, but also of the ancient ark of Israel.

From all this evidence it is clear that the 'otfe is indeed an ancient institution among the Arabs, that in olden days it was much more common than it is to-day, and that, as a number of the authorities, whom we have cited, have remarked, the institution is gradually disappearing from among the Bedouin tribes, and in fact actually survives to-day in only a

comparatively few tribes, and in these in what is probably a more or less degenerate form. The reason for this gradual disappearance of the *'otfe* is certainly not, as we have already remarked, that which Lady Blunt surmised, viz. the present-day difficulty of obtaining ostrich feathers with which to keep the *'otfes* in proper repair; for ostriches are hardly less plentiful to-day in the Arabian Desert than in ancient times, and had ostrich feathers been essential to the making and functioning of the *'otfe*, they would unquestionably have been used as generally in ancient days in the making of *'otfes* as they seem to be to-day; but this conclusion what little evidence there is does not support. Moreover, the *mahmal*, apparently a variant and highly decorated form of the *'otfe*, has not the slightest suggestion of ostrich feathers in its makeup. Unquestionably the reason for the gradual disappearance of the *'otfe* from among the Bedouin tribes, given by Rogers, viz. the eventual capture and total destruction of almost all the tribal *'otfes* by hostile tribes, and the consequent inability of the original possessors of these captured *'otfes* to replace them, accounts for this circumstance far better.

Undoubtedly too this condition is furthered by a certain development and progress in Bedouin culture, extremely slow and almost imperceptible, it is true, but none the less real. This, coupled with the influence of Islam upon the life and practice of the Bedouin tribes, must have contributed not a little to the gradual disappearance of the *'otfe*. For while it is true that among these tribes the recognition and observance of Islam are more formal and superficial than real, this is true rather of the positive aspects of its observance than of the negative. Negatively Islam has exerted quite a far-reaching influence upon the old nomad life and institutions, in that, partly directly and officially and partly indirectly and unofficially, it has stamped certain ancient beliefs, rites and institutions as out of accord with fundamental Moslem principles, and has thus made for their gradual cessation and disappearance. This procedure is clearly illustrated by the Wahhaby attitude of disapproval of and opposition to the *mahmal*, recorded by Snouck Hurgronje. Not improbably

these Wahhaby rigorists have a suspicion, and perhaps even a faint knowledge, of a non-Islamic origin of the *maḥmal*, remote though this be. This process, which might be illustrated further by the history of the development of every religion, and not least of all by that of ancient Israel, and particularly by the Deuteronomic and early post-Deuteronomic attitude toward the ark, as we have established it, is the most natural and logical reason for the gradual disappearance of the 'otfe.

Now it is significant that, with the single exception of the tradition of Shegger-ed-Durr, and this tradition has little or no historic evidence to validate it, the *maḥmal* always is empty, so far as human occupants are concerned. It is true that, according to Snouck Hurgronje, the various *maḥmals* have appeared at Mecca in historical times, i.e. during the last six hundred and fifty years, as the representatives of the rulers of the chief lands or divisions of the Moslem world; but this is undoubtedly a secondary association, a concession to Islam and a modification of the original, non-Islamic import of the *maḥmal*. Still further concessions to Islam in this connection may be seen, perhaps, in the representation of the temple at Mecca upon the forward face of the cover of the Cairo *maḥmal*, and certainly in the fixing of a copy of the Koran, according to Rogers, or even two copies, one in scroll form and one in book form, according to Lane, on the upper part thereof. This association of *maḥmal* and Koran gave to the former an Islamic association and symbolism which unquestionably it did not possess originally. It assigned a definite and important place in the official worship of Allah to an institution which originally probably had little or no connection with the worship of this deity, unless perhaps in the "days of ignorance" before Mohammed, when it was in all likelihood one of the various, common, tribal symbols of pre-Islamic Arabian deities.

What its particular character and functions may have been in this early period, we can, of course, not determine, except to assume that they were the same as those of all other objects of this class, viz. to give victory to the tribesmen in battle and to guide the tribe upon its journeys through the desert.

A faint trace of this last function seems to have survived in the association of the *maḥmal* with the pilgrimage to Mecca and the attendant journey thither through the desert. But whether this points to a regular gathering at Meccah in pre-Islamic days of the *maḥmals* or *ʿotfes* or *merkabs*, or whatever may have been the official name of these peculiar objects in that remote period, for the celebration of a great, annual festival at the sanctuary there, it is, of course, scarcely possible to determine with certainty. Such a conclusion would, however, be quite probable in case such a festival had more than local significance, and served as the occasion for the gathering of many tribes for purposes of religious celebration. Then what more natural and probable than that each tribe should bring with it, and indeed feel that it had been led thither through the desert, by the symbol of its tribal deity? In the celebration of such a festival there would then have been a considerable gathering at Mecca of *ʿotfes*, *maḥmals*, *merkabs*, and other similar tribal palladia and symbols of tribal deities, such as actually took place there in connection with the celebration of the Hajj in the 13th and 14th centuries A.D. and likewise takes place, although to a much less extent, even in the present day.

Now, as has been said, with the single exception of Shegger-ed-Durr, there is no indication of the presence of a human occupant within the *maḥmal*, nor of the association of any human being with it in any kindred capacity. Nor is there any indication of or room for the presence of a human being, whether maiden or some other person, in the *ʿotfe* while on the march, and particularly while discharging the function of leading the tribe through the desert. The human being, whether maiden or old woman, slave or young boy, was present in the *ʿotfe* only when the latter went into battle, but apparently at no other time. And, as we have seen, participation in battle seems to be, or to have been, but one of the important functions of the *ʿotfe*. The presumption is strong therefore that the presence of a human being in the *ʿotfe*, even during a battle, is not original and primary, but that it is rather secondary, and probably the result of the

fusion of two ancient institutions, both of which apparently underwent considerable modification in the course of time, chiefly because of the growing influence of Islam, and both of which even threatened to disappear completely, as they are, in fact, doing to-day. Such a condition and such an impending fate tend mightily to such fusion and to the consequent acquisition of renewed strength and power of perpetuation for a time of the newly organized institution resulting from the fusion. This fusion, if this assumption be correct, must itself have been of considerable antiquity, as the not inconsiderable mass of evidence thereof, and particularly the development of the technical name, *'atâfa* or *'ateyfa*, recorded by Doughty, indicates.

This institution of the battle-maiden in the practice of warfare among Semitic tribes seems to be of great antiquity, even though the evidence therefor, due to easily comprehensible reasons, is scanty indeed. In addition to the general evidence of the practice among Bedouin tribes, not only in modern, but likewise in ancient days, we have the specific instance of Aisha playing just this rôle at the Battle of the Camel in the year 36 A.H. (656 A.D.).¹³¹ In this battle Aisha rode upon a thoroughbred camel, of unusual value. She was in the thick of the battle, spurring on her warriors to heroic efforts. Seventy men of the Banū Dabba fell about her in the vain attempt to defend her. Her camel was killed in the battle and she was captured by Ali. She was treated by him with every possible consideration and given her complete freedom.¹³² We do not know that the term *'atâfa* was actually applied to Aisha in connection with her rôle in this battle, nor that the camel upon which she rode was caparisoned with an actual *'otfe*. But certainly she did play exactly the rôle of the battle maiden on this occasion; and apparently it was not a novel nor unfamiliar rôle to her or her contemporaries and was governed by definite regulations and principles. It may be inferred too, from the charge to Deborah, in Jud. 5. 12, to recite her song in the battle of the Israelite tribes against their Canaanite foes, that in this battle she too played the rôle of

¹³¹ So Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, 37 (1917-1918), 222.

¹³² Cf. article, "Aisha," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, I, 216f.

the battle-maiden, spurring the warriors of Israel to valorous deeds and to victory against their enemies.¹³³ But if so, then the institution of the battle-maiden must have existed also in ancient Israel.

We can readily understand why this institution should have disappeared regularly at a fairly early stage of the cultural evolution of Semitic peoples and have left but little trace in their literatures. For it is self-apparent that this institution is intimately bound up with and adapted only to early, tribal methods of warfare. So soon as Semitic peoples advanced beyond primitive tribal organization and form of government and methods of warfare, and developed an inter-tribal, and eventual monarchical, system of government and new methods of systematic warfare by well-organized and disciplined armies, the old institution of the battle-maiden was bound to disappear. And since this phase of cultural evolution as a rule went hand in hand with, or perhaps even preceded somewhat, the development of the art of writing and the free production of literature, it follows naturally that in Semitic literature references to the institution of the battle-maiden are comparatively few and obscure. But the evidence which we have gathered, scanty though it undoubtedly is, suffices to establish as probable that in the primitive days of Semitic tribal life and warfare the institution was fairly common, if not quite general. But the evidence also seems to indicate that it was originally an altogether independent institution, which had no primary association of any kind with the *'otfe* or other objects of this class, and that the present connection is due entirely, as we have suggested, to

¹³³ If this assumption be correct, then in both cases of Aisha and Deborah, this rôle was played, not by a maiden, but by a woman well along in years. For Aisha was forty-three years old at the time of the Battle of the Camel; and to have built up the reputation and influence among the tribes which she apparently enjoyed at the time of the Battle of Taanach, Deborah too must have been a woman well advanced in age. This agrees with the statement of Burckhardt that an old woman frequently played the rôle of occupant of the *'otfe* and of battle-maiden. Certainly both Deborah and Aisha were women of highest standing and influence, not only in their own, but even among neighboring and kindred tribes.

the common fate of being outgrown culturally and eventually disappearing, which impended over both, which tended among the Bedouin tribes to fuse them and give them some renewed strength and power of persistence for a time.¹³⁴ But if this inference be correct, it would follow further that originally the *'otfe* or its historic antecedent was always empty, even when going into battle, precisely as the *mahmal* is to-day and the *'otfe* or *merkab* itself also on all occasions except in battle.

Returning now to the *'otfe*, it is clear that the account given by Musil is surprising indeed. For it differs in quite a number of significant details from the specific descriptions of the very same object by Wetzstein and Lady Blunt. There can be no question as to the reliability of Musil's testimony; for on the one hand, he is too careful and authoritative an observer and master of Bedouin life and custom, and too experienced an investigator thereof, to have been misled; and on the other hand, the information given him about the *abu zhûr al-markab* agrees too completely with the facts which we have been able to establish concerning the early form and functions of the forerunners of the present-day *'otfe* and *mahmal*, to be questioned. It is of course strange, and in fact almost inexplicable, that the information which Musil should have been able to gather from the Ruwala about the *abu zhûr al-markab*, from thirty to forty years after both Wetzstein and the Blunts had visited the same tribe, is so different and so much more primitive in certain essential details; but even such a condition is not impossible nor does it give any reason for questioning the correctness of Musil's statement, particularly since it is corroborated by the entirely independent testimony of Curtiss with regard to the significant fact of the name *abu zhûr* or Abu ed-Duhûr.

At any rate Musil's description of this strange object, in contrast to the other accounts which we have quoted, emphasizes the most primitive features of its character and

¹³⁴ It is perhaps of some significance in this connection that Musil heard nothing at all, apparently, of the maiden in connection with the *abu zhûr al-markab*, although both Wetzstein and the Blunts heard of her explicitly in just this connection.

functions. It determines the way through the desert which the tribe must go; it gives the tribe victory in battle; a deity, whether Allah, as Musil was told, or Abu ed-Duhûr, as the name implies, dwells in it, and imparts his will, and thus gives indication of future events, either by the fluttering of the ostrich feathers upon the object, even though there be no wind at the time, or by the object inclining itself to one side; every year a white camel is sacrificed before this object, i. e. of course to the deity resident in or associated with it, and the blood of this sacrifice is sprinkled upon the corner posts thereof.¹³⁵ This is primitive Semitic concept and practice indeed.

But just this description, in almost every detail, applies to the ark of Israel also. It too, according to Biblical tradition, selected the road which Israel was to travel through the desert; it too gave victory in battle; in it too a deity apparently was thought to dwell, and from it to give oracular decisions. And while there is no explicit evidence that in the earliest period of its history sacrifices were actually offered directly to the ark or to the deity thought to dwell in it, and that the blood thereof was sprinkled upon the ark, due entirely to the paucity of the evidence bearing upon the ark coming from this earliest period, it would be altogether reasonable to assume that such sacrifices were actually offered.¹³⁶ And

¹³⁵ Inasmuch as Abu ed-Duhûr seems to be, according to Curtiss, a kind of ancestral deity of the Ruwala, and inasmuch also as the *abu zhûr al-markab* goes into battle and brings victory to the tribe, this sacrifice may be regarded, in part at least, as offered originally to the tribal ancestral deity who gives victory in battle. It may therefore be compared with the sacrifice which the *akîd*, or tribal military leader, offers in the evening preceding an anticipated battle, with the words, "This is thy supper, O our ancestor; help us today!, *hâda 'aşâk jâ ġiddina tufze' lana-l-jowm.*" (Musil, *Arabia Petraea*, III, 382.)

¹³⁶ Not improbably the sacrifices recorded in I Sam. 6. 14 and II Sam. 6. 13, 17 were just such sacrifices, offered directly to the ark, and with the blood even sprinkled upon the ark, although the present text, accommodated to later theology, states explicitly that these sacrifices were offered to Yahwe, or "before Yahwe," literally "into the face of Yahwe." For this last expression as a technical term in the sacrificial parlance of modern Palestine, cf. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion Today*, English edition, Chap. XVI; German edition, Chap. 22.

this assumption' would find strong confirmation in the practice recorded in the Priestly Code, of offering sacrifices before the holy of holies in which the ark was supposed to stand, and of sprinkling the blood thereof upon the veil before the ark, towards Yahwe, i. e. towards the ark itself,¹³⁷ and, in the particularly solemn ceremonies of the Day of Atonement, the ancient New Year's Day, even upon the *kapporet* itself,¹³⁸ the empty golden throne of Yahwe resting, according to Priestly tradition, on top of the ark. Unquestionably at the bottom of this last ceremony lies some ancient New Year's Day rite, the origin of which may well reach back to that early period of Israel's history when sacrifice was actually offered directly to the ark, or to the deity thought to dwell within it, and the blood thereof was sprinkled upon the top or the four corners of the ark. This ceremony would then be practically identical with that practiced to-day by the Ruwala upon the *abu zhûr al-markab*. In the light of these facts there can not be the slightest question that the ancient ark of Israel was originally an object of the same kind and class as the 'otfe and the *mahmal*¹³⁹ of the present-day Arabs, and particularly of the *abu zhûr al-markab*¹⁴⁰ of the Ruwala.

We have seen that a deity was thought to dwell within the ark. The question arises here whether the ark was empty

¹³⁷ Lev. 4. 6, 17.

¹³⁸ Lev. 16. 14f.

¹³⁹ In this connection it is of considerable significance to note that the two copies of the Koran affixed to the upper part of the front face of the *mahmal* parallel in both character and purpose the two tablets of the Decalogue which tradition located in the ark. Both Korans and stone tablets served to give to what was originally an idolatrous or semi-idolatrous cult-object a sanction and a definite, legitimate place in the comparatively advanced worship of the new national deities, Yahwe in the religion of Israel and Allah in Islam. But why *two* stone tablets and *two* copies of the Koran it is difficult to determine. (Cf. note 149.) But the coincidence in the number two is probably not without significance.

¹⁴⁰ Torczyner ("Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 264) correctly correlates the element *al-markab* in the name *abû zhûr al-markab* with, on the one hand, the early function of the ark as a מרכבה or means of transportation of the deity thought to dwell within, and מרכבה associated with the cherubim in I Chron. 28. 18, and, on the other hand, with the Rabbinical tradition which represented Ezekiel's picture of the *kēbod Yahwe* and its method of transportation as המרכבה.

of any concrete object, or whether there was actually something within the ark with which the presence of this deity was associated. The question is difficult indeed, and in fact, because of lack of direct evidence no final and positive answer can be given to it.

One thing seems almost certain, that if the ark did contain some concrete object, this was certainly not an image, as Gressmann claims.¹⁴¹ For the presence of an image or idol or any object of specific shape, would imply its exhibition on particular occasions; and there is not the slightest evidence of any such procedure in connection with the ark in any of the periods of its history. Instead the constant implication is that the deity is always within, and never outside the ark, as the presence of any image or like object fashioned in some particular shape for occasional display, would imply.

Furthermore, on first glance it seems that the ark might well be compared to those vehicles, whether boats or wagons or palanquins, borne by human beings or animals, in which the images of Babylonian and Egyptian deities were carried during their festal processions. And indeed both Gunkel¹⁴² and Gressmann¹⁴³ have made this comparison. Nor can it be denied that in the third period of its history, and even during the transition from the second to the third period, marked by Ezekiel's conception of the enthroned *kebod Yahwe*, the ark did perform, in part at least, the functions of these vehicles of divine transportation. It is true, too, that the ark, likewise during the first period of its history, would seem to have resembled these vehicles, since it, too, was transported hither and thither, into battle or along the road through the desert, and of course in such journeyings, the deity associated with it invariably accompanied it. But this last comparison is more seeming than real. For both the Babylonian and Egyptian objects referred to were vehicles of transportation of the images of the gods and nothing more. They had no immediate and inseparable connection with the deity himself

¹⁴¹ *Die Lade Jahves*, 17 ff.

¹⁴² "Die Lade Jahves ein Thronszitz," *ZMR*, 1906.

¹⁴³ *Op. cit.*

or with the image or object by which he was represented. Only during the few, brief moments of physical transportation of the image in the procession was it in direct contact and association with this vehicle, and at all other times the vehicle had but little, and that only secondary, divine significance. But with the ark it was entirely different. Whatever the contents of the ark may have been, by which the deity was symbolized, or in which he was thought to dwell, it was never removed nor dissociated from the ark, nor was the ark ever opened that it might be exhibited to the public gaze. It remained constantly within the ark, inseparably associated with it, so completely and concretely that the ark itself came in popular thought and speech to be identified with the deity; the ark itself was to all intents and purposes the deity, and to lay unguarded and ritually unfit hand upon the ark was exactly the same in effect as to lay hand upon the sacred object within; it violated the taboo in which that particular deity was enwrapped and entailed death. Only incidentally, therefore, and not at all fundamentally, was the ark, during the first period of its history, in any way similar to these vehicles of sacred transportation of the Babylonian and Egyptian religions. Its relationship to the *'otfe*, particularly in the earliest stages of the development of this object, is manifestly far closer.

What then was the ark; or rather, and more correctly, what could the contents of the ark have been? The most natural assumption is that the ark contained a *betyl* or sacred stone.¹⁴⁴ This conception was, of course, common among the primitive Semites,¹⁴⁵ and the evidence is ample that it was current in ancient Israel, particularly among the northern tribes.¹⁴⁶ This was the most natural and likely object in which

¹⁴⁴ So also Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, I, 457f.; Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie*,¹ 369; Bertholet, *Kulturgeschichte Israels*, 99.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*,² 200ff.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Gen. 28. 20-22, and the name of the sanctuary and city Bethel. Ex. 3. 2ff. records a tradition of undoubtedly great antiquity, that Yahwe dwelt originally in the בֵּית־אל (notice בֵּית־אל, always with the article, i.e. therefore, *the* בֵּית־אל, the well-known בֵּית־אל, well-known, of course, just because Yahwe was thought to dwell in it) upon Mount Horeb in the desert. Since this tradition is found in

a deity who must move or be transported from place to place would be thought to dwell. Such powers could scarcely be ascribed to a primitive deity thought to sojourn in a sacred tree or spring. Such deities are of necessity inseparably bound to one fixed spot, and at that spot they must remain forever localized until eventually their worship is outgrown and the memory of them disappears. But a deity thought to dwell in a sacred stone can well be conceived of as moving or being moved from place to place; and just such a deity was the god of the ark.

Moreover, the dominant tradition of the second period of the history of the ark, as we have seen, was that it contained two sacred stones, sacred it is true, not because a deity was thought to dwell in them, but only because the divinely revealed Decalogue was thought to be inscribed upon them; but sacred none the less. It is true that this tradition might have developed entirely independently of the presence in the original ark of a sacred stone. But, as we have suggested, in all likelihood the tradition of the two tablets of the Decalogue in the ark is secondary, and in its original form the tradition told only of the scroll of the Book of the Covenant within the ark. It would have been far more natural for the tradition to have retained this, its original form, since writing upon a scroll was more simple and general than engraving upon stone tablets.¹⁴⁷ In all likelihood therefore there was some god

the Elohist Code, it is probably of northern, Israelite origin. On first thought, therefore, it would be natural to correlate this tradition with the Ephraimite tradition of the ark and its deity, and to assume that what was in the ark was either this אֱלֹהִים itself or a piece thereof. This would not be at all impossible. But it is hardly probable, since to remove the אֱלֹהִים from the spot where it originally stood would have destroyed its life, and would no doubt have thereby terminated automatically whatever attributes of divinity this אֱלֹהִים was thought to have possessed.

¹⁴⁷ Even upon the famous relief upon the Hammurapi-stone, Shamash, the sun-god, seems to be handing to the king a copy of the laws inscribed upon a scroll. It is difficult to conceive of the object in the sun-god's right hand, outstretched to the king, as aught else. This is all the more noteworthy since just in Babylonia writing upon scrolls was far less common than upon clay bricks, and since, furthermore, this law code of Hammurapi, at least in the copy that has come down to us, was inscribed not upon a scroll but upon a stone monument.

reason for the development of this secondary and less natural form of the tradition, viz. that of the two stone tablets. And the simplest and most probable reason, and in fact the only one that can possibly be conceived of, is that early fact or tradition did know of the presence of a sacred stone in the ark, and that a strong remembrance of this persisted into the second period of the history of the ark. Consequently even after the attempt had been made to supplant the old fact or tradition by the new tradition that the ark contained the scroll of the Book of the Covenant, this new tradition was in time accommodated to the original tradition and so modified as to tell now that the ark did actually contain a sacred stone, or rather two sacred stones, but sacred now, no longer because a deity was thought to dwell in them, but only because the Decalogue was inscribed upon them.¹⁴⁸ In such case the

¹⁴⁸ In this connection it is perhaps of some significance that the form of this tradition apparently current in the Northern Kingdom, since it is recorded in E (Ex. 32. 16), ascribed a larger and more directly divine character to the tablets of the Decalogue than did the form of the tradition apparently current in the Southern Kingdom, since it is recorded in J (Ex. 34. 1 ff.). E told that not only had the Deity revealed the Decalogue to Moses, but He had likewise prepared the tablets and inscribed the ten "words" upon them with His own hands. On the other hand, J told that it was Moses who prepared the tablets, although at Yahwe's command, and that he brought them with him up the mountain, and that Yahwe merely inscribed the Decalogue upon them. It is noteworthy too that D (Deut. 10. 1-4) follows J rather than E in this tradition. This is all the more significant, since ordinarily D follows E in preference to J. This seems to accord with the fact already noted, that the D writers held the ark and its contents in less esteem than did an earlier age and its writers. Perhaps for this reason they placed the stamp of their approval upon the J tradition, because it ascribed somewhat less of sanctity to the two tablets than did the E tradition.

We have already seen that the oldest traditions, those of K and C, knew nothing of the divine character of their scrolls of the "words," but told simply and naturally that Moses wrote these "words" upon a scroll.

In this connection, and for the sake of completeness, mention must be made of the hypothesis that the ark was naught other than the coffin of Joseph in which his bones or mummy were deposited. This hypothesis has been suggested more or less hesitatingly by Loisy, *The Religion of Israel*, 91; Volter, *Ägypten und die Bibel*, 92 f.; Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, XXXVII (1917-1918), 237. According to Biblical and rabbinic tradition the coffin of Joseph was carried by Israel upon the exodus and the journey through the

tradition of the two sacred stone tablets within the ark would point strongly to the conclusion that the original contents of the ark must have been a sacred stone.¹⁴⁹ But since, as we have seen, a deity was thought to dwell within the ark, such a sacred stone within the ark could have been only a betyl, a stone in which a deity was thought to dwell, and naught else.

However, the question of what the ark actually contained is really, because of the insufficiency of the evidence and the uncertainty of the conclusions which may be drawn from them, of secondary importance. The outstanding and indubitable fact is that the ark was thought to contain something, and this something, whatever it was, was either conceived of as the deity himself, or as the object in which the deity was thought to reside permanently. Because of this the ark itself was very naturally identified with the deity thought to dwell in it, and was regarded therefore as an inherently sacred object, endowed with all the qualities of divine function and taboo.

Moreover, the ark was intimately, and apparently, inseparably associated with Shiloh. There was the sanctuary in which the ark stood, and there it, or rather the deity associated with it, was ministered to by the Levitical priestly family of Eli. From this sanctuary at Shiloh the ark was brought down to battle against the Philistines at Eben Haezer. And inasmuch as Shiloh lay in the territory of Ephraim, and was, as I Sam. i clearly indicates, the center of worship of the tribe of Ephraim,

wilderness. It was believed too to possess miraculous powers, such as being able to move of its own accord and even to select the way which it wished to go (cf. *Jewish Encyclopedia*, VII, 251; Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, II, 181 ff.). But outside of these matters there are no significant points of contact between the ark and the coffin of Joseph. And as we have seen, such powers as these are commonly attributed in the Orient to the coffins of saints. It is of course quite natural and probable that some of the details of this tradition were borrowed from the older tradition of the ark.

¹⁴⁹ Or perhaps two sacred stones. For an ingenious but hardly convincing explanation of the reason for two stones, cf. Torczyner, *op. cit.*, 252 f. On the other hand, Proksch (*Das Nordhebräische Sagenbuch — Die Elohim-Quelle*, 374) is inclined to believe that there were no stones at all in the ark.

to which all its members pilgrimed at least once a year to offer their sacrifices and fulfill their vows, it follows that the ark with its contents must have been primarily the cult object of Ephraim.¹⁵⁰ It must have played for this tribe precisely the same rôle which the stolen ephod of Micah played for the tribe of Dan,¹⁵¹ which the ephod which Gideon set up at Ophrah did for Manasseh,¹⁵² which apparently the ephod at Nob, which Ebiathar brought down with him to David, did for Benjamin,¹⁵³ and which presumably other similar objects did for the other northern tribes.¹⁵⁴ As the cult object of Ephraim it was the center of its tribal worship, and was the natural object to go into battle with its tribe and give them victory over their foes. As a tribal cult-object discharging these functions its close relationship to objects like the *abu zhûr al-markab* of the present-day Ruwala is doubly apparent.

In all likelihood, too, at the time of its capture by the Philistines, the ark had come to enjoy a considerable inter-tribal reputation, due to the position of influence and leadership among the northern tribes which Ephraim had acquired. Quite probably the sanctuary at Shiloh was frequented to a considerable extent by members of other kindred tribes belonging to that federation of central and northern tribes, in which Ephraim held the dominant position. In the two battles

¹⁵⁰ So also Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*⁶ 45 f., note; Benzinger, *op. cit.*; Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, I, 72, note 2; Bertholet, *op. cit.*, 100; Proksch, *op. cit.*

¹⁵¹ Jud. 17-18.

¹⁵² Jud. 8. 26 f.

¹⁵³ I Sam. 21. 10; 23. 6, 9.

¹⁵⁴ I have suggested elsewhere ("The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 125, note 119) that the brazen serpent in the Temple at Jerusalem may have been originally a similar cult-object of some tribe, though of just which one it can no longer be determined, and that it was brought up to Jerusalem by David for much the same reason that he brought up the ark thither (cf. above, note 78). As we have likewise seen (*ibid.*, 119 ff.), the tribe of Judah, apparently alone of all the tribes, seems to have had no such cult-object or representation of a tribal deity whatsoever, but had instead originally its "tent of meeting," whither Yahwe was thought to come from His abode upon the sacred mountain in the desert, and there meet with the people, represented by the oracular priest.

of Eben Haezer, it was not merely Ephraim, but all the tribes belonging to this federation, whose warriors were present, and it was because of this common defeat of all these tribes on this occasion that not merely the territory of Ephraim, but that of other tribes as well, and particularly that of Manasseh, the tribe adjacent to and most closely related to Ephraim, was overrun as far north as the Valley of Jezreel and Beth-Shean on the Jordan, and conquered by the Philistines. This federation, which was probably more a loose and tacit association of neighboring tribes, than a definite and systematic organization, had sprung up largely as the result of the common danger faced and the common victory gained by the Israelite tribes over their Canaanite enemies at the Battle of Taanach. Dan apparently had held itself aloof from this federation,¹⁵⁵ and had therefore later to fight its battle alone and unaided against the aggressive Philistines. It was badly defeated in this war and lost much of its man-power. Finally, reduced to a mere six hundred fighting men, it found itself unable to remain in its first place of settlement in Palestine and was compelled to seek a new home far to the north.¹⁵⁶ Benjamin had undoubtedly been one of the tribes participating in the Battle of Taanach,¹⁵⁷ and therefore must have been originally a member of this federation. But it had apparently withdrawn therefrom as the result of civil strife, particularly with Ephraim,¹⁵⁸ and in consequence did not participate in the Battle of Eben Haezer. For this reason its strength remained unimpaired by the outcome of this battle and its territory unconquered by the Philistines. Therefore it was free and ready to take up the contest against the Philistines a half century later, when Samuel, the Ephraimite, succeeded in inspiring Saul the Benjamite with his own zeal for this cause.

But the tribes participating in the Battle of Eben Haezer, Ephraim, Manasseh, and probably also, although perhaps not to quite the same extent, since their danger was not so immediate, Issachar, Zebulon and Naphtali, must have looked upon the ark as their common palladium, and have confidently

¹⁵⁵ Jud. 5. 17.¹⁵⁶ Jud. 17-18.¹⁵⁷ Jud. 5. 14.¹⁵⁸ Jud. 19-21.

expected that its presence in battle would ensure them victory over their hated foes. Accordingly, it would seem, they did not hesitate to stake everything upon this one battle, the second Battle of Eben Haezer, in which the ark was present. Their defeat was overwhelming. These tribes were conquered and their spirits crushed. Their territory now became the prey of the triumphant Philistines. The ark was captured; and even though it did succeed in delivering itself from the Philistines, and did likewise preserve its reputation as a powerful deity and cult-object, never again did it return to its former abode in Shiloh. Eventually it found its way up to the national sanctuary at Jerusalem, where, as we have seen, it came gradually, naturally and inevitably to be conceived in a new light and as discharging a new function, altogether unrelated to those which it had originally been thought to discharge; and in time an altogether new tradition grew up about it. And perhaps, as we have suggested, one of the strong reasons for the lack of spirit and courage on the part of the northern tribes at the time of Saul's rebellion against the Philistines, and their failure to rally to this leader's support, as he had unquestionably expected, was just the absence of the ark, their old palladium and guarantee of victory, from their midst. Without it, they thought no doubt, victory was impossible. So long as the ark was not with them, the Philistine yoke could not be thrown off; rebellion was hopeless.

VI

THE DEITY OF THE ARK

One final question remains to be answered, viz. as to the deity of the ark. There is not the slightest evidence that this deity was ever aught other than Yahwe. The name of no other deity is mentioned in connection with the ark, nor is there the slightest indication of the relationship of any other deity to it. But it is important to realize that all our evidence bearing upon the ark comes from the period following upon the settlement of the tribes of Israel in Palestine, and after

an intertribal consciousness and sense of relationship had attained a considerable development. And with this, of course, went hand in hand the development of the concept of a deity who was more than tribal, who in fact enjoyed, as we have seen, a considerable intertribal regard and worship. With the single exception of the tradition of its leadership of Israel through the desert, our oldest evidence bearing upon the ark comes from near the close of the period of tribal settlement in Palestine, and antedates by but little more than a century the establishment of the nation by David. Therefore, even if Yahwe had not been the original deity of the ark, there had been ample time and opportunity for His worship to have spread among the northern tribes, and to have supplanted, in connection with the ark, the worship, and even the name, of the deity originally associated with it. An almost exact parallel would be found in the manner in which Allah has almost entirely supplanted the original Abu ed-Duhûr of the Ruwala 'otfe; and the tradition was communicated to Musil that Allah sometimes takes his seat in this 'otfe. Only the name, *abû zhûr* has survived, and this apparently in a form changed somewhat from its original sound, and with a popular, new, artificial, etymological explanation of the name.

It is, needless to say, not at all impossible that a similar process may have taken place with the ark; that originally, some deity other than Yahwe, of course the eponymous, ancestral deity of the tribe of Ephraim, may have been associated with it, but that, by the comparatively advanced historical period from which our oldest evidence dates, his association and his worship and even his name had been so completely supplanted by those of Yahwe, the developing intertribal deity, that not even the slightest reminiscence thereof survived, and in consequence we find in all our evidence only the name Yahwe associated with the ark. The fact that at this moment when the ark first appears upon the stage of history, a priestly family of unquestionably Levitical lineage,¹⁵⁹ and therefore

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 451.

devoted champions of Yahwe, is ministering to it, might account to a large extent for the supplanting of such an original deity of the ark by Yahwe.

But while such a hypothesis would be altogether natural and possible, and is undoubtedly even quite plausible, there is on the other hand not the slightest actual evidence in favor of it, or pointing to any conclusion other than that Yahwe was from the very beginning connected with the ark, was the deity thought to reside in it. This would mean, of course, that Yahwe was originally the tribal deity of Ephraim, just as, as we have seen,¹⁶⁰ He was originally the tribal deity of the Kenites, from whom His worship passed, by virtue of the covenant relation established between Him and them, to the southern tribes of Judah, Simon and Levi. But this does not mean at all that the original Yahwe of Ephraim was necessarily the same as the Yahwe of the Kenites. We have seen that the latter was strictly a local deity, intimately and inseparably associated with the mountain in the desert, called therefore in the Kenite document, "the mountain of Yahwe." Not improbably Yahwe was not altogether the proper name of one particular deity. It may well have been at this time the common designation for quite a considerable number of local, tribal or clan deities of this particular class, deities associated with various spots out in the desert, worshiped by different desert clans or tribes, and thought to bestow upon them satisfaction of the basic needs and blessings of nomad life. Such a class of desert, pastoral deities would, of course, differ radically and contrast significantly with the Canaanite, agricultural Be'alim, when once they came into direct contact, after the tribes of Israel had begun to force their way into Palestine. Perhaps in such an assumption of many local and tribal Yahwes we find the best and most natural explanation of the otherwise difficult problem of the parallel names of and traditions about the two sacred mountains in the desert, Sinai and Horeb, as well as the "mountain of Yahwe" of K. Certainly Sinai and Horeb were not originally merely two dif-

¹⁶⁰ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 101 f.

ferent names for one and the same mountain. The conflicting Biblical traditions with regard to the location of the mountain of revelation, as well as the presence of these two names, and the scrupulousness with which they are kept apart by the J and E writers, establish this conclusion. Not impossibly either Sinai or Horeb may be identified with "the mountain of Yahwe" of K, although this is by no means certain. We have accordingly authentic Biblical traditions of at least two, and possibly three, different, sacred mountains in the desert upon which a Yahwe was originally thought to dwell. And this fact may well point to at least two or three original tribal Yahwes, each associated with a different mountain in the desert, undoubtedly conceived of as his original abode.

This entire argument is, it must be admitted, in the main hypothetical. And yet it has much in its favor. For, on the one hand, by whatever names the different tribes, which later, after their entrance into and settlement in Palestine, came to compose the federation, and ultimately the nation of Israel, called their respective tribal deities, it is certain that they conceived of all these deities in much the same manner and as discharging practically identical functions and bestowing upon their respective tribes much the same blessings of protection and pastoral abundance and numerous progeny. For just this reason it was easy for the tribes coming forth from Egypt, and convinced through bitter experience of the impotence of their old tribal deities, to adopt the worship of a new deity, who differed from their former tribal deities only in individuality and in the place where he was thought to dwell, and but little, if at all, in character, function and manner of worship. For the same reason, too, the tribe of Dan, likewise convinced through severe misfortune and tribal calamity of the powerlessness of its former tribal deity, could renounce his worship and in his place take a new deity, undoubtedly one of the same character and class as its former deity, but one presumably more powerful.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ Jud. 17-18.

For such a group or class of desert, pastoral deities there must have been some general name or title to designate the class. This title may well have been Yahwe; and these different Yahwes may have been distinguished from each other, just as were the Be'alim of Palestine, either by subordinate proper names, or, more likely, by coupling the name Yahwe either with the particular spot in the desert where he was thought to have his fixed abode, or with the name of the clan or tribe who were his original worshipers.¹⁶² Thus we would have the Yahwe of Sinai, the Yahwe of Horeb,¹⁶³ the Yahwe of Ephraim, &c.

One additional consideration strengthens the probability of this hypothesis. If it be not correct, and there was instead only one original Yahwe and no more, then He could have been only the Yahwe of "the mountain of Yahwe" of the Kenite document, the Yahwe of the Kenites, whose worship passed from them to the group of tribes who came forth from Egypt and settled in southern Palestine, Judah, Simon and

¹⁶² This last statement is to be understood only in the most general sense. For there is considerable evidence that the tribes of Israel, as we know them in historical times, were in large part a comparatively late development. When the Israelites entered Palestine *beena* marriage still flourished among them to a considerable extent; and under the conditions of *beena* marriage, with relationship traced through the mother and in the direction of the mother's brothers, the basic social unit was not the tribe but the clan, the *mišpaha*. Largely as one of the first effects of contact with superior Canaanite culture, *ba'al* marriage gradually supplanted *beena* marriage; and this fact was one of the chief contributing forces to the eventual development of the tribe as the basic social and political unit in Israel during the early sojourn in Palestine. This in turn brought about the reduction of the clan to a smaller compass and a position of less social and political importance, and the gradual fusion of various original clans, such as Machir, Abi-Ezer, Gilead and the like into new, larger and more powerful tribes, such as Manasseh and Gad. This question I shall discuss in detail elsewhere. But if the clan was the basic social unit in the pre-Canaanite days, then we should speak of clan gods rather than of tribal gods.

¹⁶³ The Yahwe of Horeb would, of course, have been likewise the Yahwe thought to reside in the הרה upon this mountain. This is a most typical and significant instance of the old, pre-Canaanite, desert, local Yahwes. For certainly this Yahwe of the הרה on Mount Horeb could not possibly have been identical with the Yahwe of the sacred mountain with the cave upon it of the K document.

Levi. And, in such case, only from them could the worship of Yahwe have passed to the northern tribes. But we shall see in time,¹⁶⁴ that this southern group of tribes were the very last to enter Palestine, and that their entrance preceded the Battle of Taanach by but a few years.¹⁶⁵ And already in the Song of Deborah we find Yahwe the only Israelite deity mentioned, and mentioned in such manner that there is scarcely room for the assumption that this name was substituted later for the names of other Israelite clan or tribal deities which originally stood there. And it is clear from this ancient Israelite poem that already at this time among these northern tribes Yahwe enjoyed a considerable intertribal reputation. It is futile therefore to suppose that the worship of Yahwe was not original with these northern tribes, and that it must have passed to them from the southern tribes, largely through the mediation of the Levites, playing the rôle of intertribal priests of Yahwe. It is true that the Levites did come at quite an early period, following very shortly upon their settlement in southern Palestine,¹⁶⁶ to play this rôle of intertribal priests of Yahwe. Actually, however, this rôle was facilitated by the fact that Yahwe had evolved quite far as an intertribal deity already when the Levites appeared upon the scene, rather than the reverse, that Yahwe, originally the tribal deity of the Kenites alone, came to be regarded as an intertribal deity largely through the mediation and propaganda of these Levitical priests.

Therefore, while it must be acknowledged that the evidence is altogether insufficient to warrant any absolute assertion, none the less the large preponderance of evidence points to the conclusion that Yahwe was worshiped originally by

¹⁶⁴ In the third of this series of papers, treating of the historical significance of the Kenite Document, to appear in a subsequent volume of this *Annual*.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. the presence of Heber the Kenite in the north at the time of the Battle of Taanach, and the rôle played by his wife, Yael, therein, Jud. 4. 11 ff.; 5. 6, 24 ff.

¹⁶⁶ According to Jud. 18. 30 it was the grandson of Moses who became first the family or clan priest of Micah, and then the tribal priest of Dan. In other words, already the third generation of Levites in Palestine had begun to play the rôle of priests of Yahwe among the different tribes.

northern tribes independently of the late influence of the southern tribes, and especially of the Levites; therefore, instead of there having been one original Yahwe, as is generally assumed by scholars, Yahwe was probably a generic or class name for a group of early, desert, pastoral deities, worshiped by the various desert clans or tribes, the forerunners of the later tribes of Israel. In other words, there were originally, in all probability, numerous Yahwes, associated with different desert localities, and worshiped by different clans or tribes.¹⁶⁷ The worship of these various local, desert, tribal Yahwes was carried to Palestine by the migrating clans or tribes, was considerably modified there by contact with superior Canaanite civilization and Ba'al worship, and gradually coalesced into the conception of an intertribal, and eventually of a national Yahwe.

Accordingly, while positive, final evidence is lacking, and the possibility of a different process of evolution must be admitted, as has been said, the weight of evidence points to the conclusion that the original deity of the ark was a Yahwe, the Yahwe of Ephraim, or whatever the clan forerunners of Ephraim may have been.

And whatever the contents of the ark may have been, a sacred stone in all likelihood, or something else, it probably came from that spot in the desert where this Yahwe had been thought to dwell originally. In this particular object this Yahwe was from the very first believed to reside. Probably in it he had been worshiped by the ancestors of Ephraim; and when they migrated from their original desert home and sought a new and permanent abode in Palestine, they carried the sacred

¹⁶⁷ This hypothesis would also account adequately for the manifest regard for Yahwe as a deity in northern Syria, as evidenced by the names of the king of Hamath, Ilubi'di = Jaubi'di, and the name of the king of Ja'udi, Azrijau. (Cf. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 247f.) The appearance of these names, in which Yahwe is manifestly an element, may be due either to direct Israelite influence, since the monuments upon which they are inscribed date from the 8th century B.C., or they may be due to the settlement in northern Syria at an early date of Aramaean tribes, probably akin to Israel, who had likewise worshiped Yahwe, or a Yahwe, out in the desert, and had carried his worship with them into their new home, precisely as Israel did.

object with them in the ark. Not improbably already out in the desert they had carried this object about with them in the ark upon their seasonal migrations from one encampment and one place of pasturage to another, and had believed that it guided them upon these journeyings and brought them surely and safely to the place where they could find abundance of water and pasturage for their flocks. In all likelihood too they carried this sacred object in the ark with them into battle against their desert foes, and confidently believed that it ensured them victory and abundant booty. Probably to it and its irresistible power they attributed their triumph over their Canaanite predecessors in the land, and particularly such significant achievements as the capture of the fortified city of Bethel.¹⁶⁸ Not impossibly even at the Battle of Taanach it was carried into battle by its tribesmen, and to its presence there the victory of the tribes of Israel over their powerful and feared Canaanite foes may have been attributed. In such case we can the more readily account for the leading rôle which Ephraim played among the northern tribes during the greater part of the remainder of the tribal period and for the developing rôle of intertribal deity which the Yahwe of the ark of Ephraim seemingly came to play during this period.

¹⁶⁸ Jud. 1. 22-26. In v. 22 the statement that when the Joseph-tribes went up to besiege Bethel Yahwe was with them, raises a question of interest and significance for this study. The statement here is not couched in the same manner as its parallel in v. 19, nor has it here apparently the same general significance as there. There it accounts for the unfailing success of Judah's efforts to conquer the southern portion of Palestine by the explanation that Yahwe was with them, i.e. that He prospered their various undertakings. In v. 22, however, the statement *יהוה עם* seems to be somewhat more specific. The question suggests itself therefore, does this refer to the ark? When the Joseph-tribes went up against Bethel, did they take the ark with them, and did they accordingly attribute their capture of this fortified city to the presence of Yahwe, represented by the ark, in their midst? Knowing the rôle which the ark played in the Ephraimite practice of warfare, just this would have been the expected procedure. And in such case this passage would indicate that the ark and its contents were brought by the Joseph-tribes with them into Canaan, and were therefore of desert, and not of Canaanite origin. This is, however, merely a suggestion; for it must be admitted that the exact implication of the words *יהוה עם* is too vague and uncertain to permit resting any absolute conclusion upon them.

And one additional bit of evidence tends to corroborate this general conclusion, furnished by Num. 10. 35 f. It requires but a moment's thought to realize that these two verses have only an incidental and not at all original connection with v. 33 b.¹⁶⁹ That verse speaks of the ark as the divine guide of Israel though the desert. These verses conceive of the ark as going into battle with the hosts of Israel and giving them victory over their enemy. It is true that, as we have seen, both of these tasks were regular functions of the ark during the first period of its history. But in this particular connection there is not the slightest reason for mentioning the latter function. Unquestionably vv. 35 f. are not a part of the original Book of the Covenant, but were appended later, although undoubtedly still at a fairly early date, by some writer or editor who was familiar with them and knew perfectly well of their bearing upon the ark. This is borne out by the connection with v. 33 b provided by this editor in v. 35 a, seeking to make the words of vv. 35 b and 36 apply to the setting forth of the ark upon each successive day's journey upon this march through the desert to the final goal of Israel's migration, rather than to its going forth to and return from battle, as the actual content of the two verses implies. Manifestly the thought of v. 35 a has no connection at all with that of vv. 35 b-36, and serves only to link these two verses with v. 33 b, with which also they have no immediate nor original connection.

But vv. 35 b-36 are in themselves unquestionably of considerable antiquity, in all likelihood older than the actual composition of the Book of the Covenant. It is of little moment for this study whether for the *שיבה* of v. 35 we

¹⁶⁹ V. 34, is, of course, P, and a very late insertion. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Rabbis of old likewise had a strong feeling that Num. 10. 35-36 were not in their proper and logical place; consequently, with their customary dialectic methods, they tried to justify their location here. But R. Ashi, probably more venturesome than the majority of his colleagues, dared to suggest that these verses had stood originally in connection with Num. 1. 52 and 2. 1 ff. and 34, and that the entire passage should have come at the end of Num. 2, but had been broken up and transposed in some unknown manner.

should read שָׁבָה, with practically all modern scholars, and how we should interpret or emend the extremely difficult יהוה רכבות אלפי ישראל.¹⁷⁰ The fact is clear that here too the deity of the ark goes by the name Yahwe, and that he is here more than the mere tribal deity of Ephraim, is instead an intertribal deity, the deity of Israel.¹⁷¹ These two verses, so plainly couched in poetic form, were undoubtedly the battle-cries of these tribes of Israel when going into battle with the ark of Yahwe in their midst, and when returning from battle after the victory had been gained.¹⁷² The first

¹⁷⁰ For an interesting and ingenious, although I can not but feel, a rather far-fetched and untenable interpretation of this passage, cf. Torczyner, *op. cit.*, 223 ff.

¹⁷¹ Israel here probably means primarily the closely related group of central tribes, the so-called Joseph-tribes, Ephraim, Manasseh and Benjamin, who apparently entered Palestine together under the leadership of Joshua, probably about 1350-1300 B.C., coming from the east and crossing the Jordan near Jericho. Whatever the origin of the name Israel may have been, it was probably applied originally to this particular group of clans or tribes, and may even have been borne by them out in the desert, before their entrance into Palestine. From them, due largely to the domination of these tribes, and especially Ephraim, from the time of the Battle of Taanach on, the name probably expanded to cover the entire group of northern tribes, bound together into a loose kind of federation growing out of the common victory gained over a common enemy at this important battle. It was probably to the original nucleus of the Joseph tribes, dwelling in central Palestine, that the name Israel upon the Merneptah inscription (circ. 1230 B.C.) referred (cf. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 222 ff.).

¹⁷² For battle-cries of the modern Bedouin cf. Musil, *Arabia Petraea*, III, 386 ff. These show some slight similarity to Num. 10. 35 b-36; cf. in particular the battle-cry of the Tijâha, *edbaḥo, lâ jemlos*, "Kill him, so that he will not escape!" However, but few, if any, of these Bedouin battle-cries are addressed to a deity, as are Num. 10. 35 b-36. Many of them are semi-meaningless, while some are addressed to the enemy and others are calls to fellow-warriors. Such battle-cries are those of the Terâbîn, *ṣubjân jâ terâbîn, birâke' el-ḥejl*, "Be heroes, O Terabin, in the stabbing of the horses!"; of the Ṛawarne of eṣ-Şâfije, *ṣubjân jâ zorârne*, "Be heroes, O Zorarne!," and of the 'Amârin, *ṣubjân jâ nišâma, ṣubjân jâ ḥâbbîn ar-rîḥ; hejlâ 'alejku biṣ-ṣafar, ṣubjân jâ ḥawârdijje*, "Be brave, O heroes, be brave, you who are swifter than the wind; forward, on to victory, be brave O you warriors!" These last are strikingly similar to the cry of the Philistines before going into the Battle of Eben Haezer, הַחֲזִקוּ וְהִנֵּה אֲנַשִּׁים מִלְּשָׁתִּים, "Be strong, and show yourselves men, O Philistines!" (I Sam. 4. 9a. The remainder of the verse, and the turn given by it to this battle-cry, are in all likelihood not original.)

cry was undoubtedly sounded by the Israelite warriors when going into the Battle of Eben Haezer; because of the unexpected outcome of this battle they had no opportunity to sound the second cry upon this occasion. But if the ark was present at the Battle of Taanach, as there is every reason to suppose, they had then, as well as no doubt upon numerous other occasions, opportunity to sound both cries. Certainly these two cries must have had some history behind them. They could not have come into existence just at the time of, nor even shortly before the capture of the ark by the Philistines. But this consideration points positively to the conclusion that for a considerable time back, perhaps as far back as the Battle of Taanach, or quite probably even earlier than this, the ark must have been the intertribal palladium and Yahwe the intertribal deity at least of that small group of clans or tribes which constituted the original federation known by the name of Israel, viz. the Joseph-tribes, Ephraim, Manasseh (Machir, Abi-Ezer, &c.) and Benjamin.

VII

SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF THE ARK

Summing up all this evidence we must conclude that the ark contained a sacred object in which Yahwe, the tribal deity of Ephraim, was thought to dwell. This object, most probably a sacred stone, had probably stood originally in the desert, perhaps upon a mountain out there. The presence of this deity in this object made this spot sacred, the place of gathering and of simple religious worship by some one clan or tribe, or perhaps some small group of clans or tribes. When this clan or tribe or tribal group migrated from their original desert home, and sought a new and permanent abode in the country west of the Jordan, they carried with them, in its ark, in which perhaps it had already been housed during the desert period, this sacred object with the deity residing in it. They looked upon it as their faithful and unerring guide through the desert, particularly through stretches with which they were

but little familiar. They were accustomed also to carry it with them into battle, at least into decisive battles, and to attribute to its presence and assistance all victories gained in such battles. They likewise looked to it for oracular revelation and decision.

Settled permanently in Palestine the ark was eventually deposited in Shiloh in the territory of the tribe of Ephraim, in a suitable sanctuary, and in time a Levitical family came to function as its priests. Located here this ark served not only as the particular cult-object and palladium of Ephraim, but also at quite an early period it came to enjoy a large inter-tribal reputation and authority, at least among those seemingly related tribes which constituted the federation of Israel. And not improbably it enjoyed a considerable measure of authority and veneration also among those more remotely related tribes, who had apparently entered Palestine at an even earlier period than did these tribes of Israel, but whose fortunes came to be intimately bound up with those of Israel by the common danger threatening all from the original Canaanite inhabitants of the land, and especially by the outcome of the decisive battle of Taanach.

Captured by the Philistines in the Battle of Eben Haezer, the ark remained for a short time in their possession. But, concluding from a series of calamities which befell them during this period that the ark was, despite its capture by them, still a powerful and dangerous deity, they allowed it to depart from their possession and their land, after first submitting it to a decisive test to prove its divinity and its continued power. After an unfortunate experience at Beth Shemesh, the ark came to reside for a period of approximately a century at Kiryath Yearim. Why during this period its original worshipers apparently made no effort to reclaim it, particularly since it had proved its persistent divine nature and power both by its triumph over the Philistines and by the blessings which it undoubtedly brought upon the household of Abinadab, in which it was deposited, and upon all the people of Kiryath Yearim, just as later it brought through its presence similar blessings upon the household of Obed-Edom, it is difficult to imagine.

Seemingly the process would not have been difficult, since Kiryath Yearim lay apparently in the territory of Benjamin, and the Benjamites under Saul had taken up the battle against the Philistines, and were endeavoring to enhearten their northern neighbors and win their support in this war for freedom. It might be expected that the restoration to them of their old palladium would have revived the spirits of these northern tribes and made them valuable allies for Saul. But in all likelihood the people of Kiryath Yearim, experiencing the benefit of the presence of this sacred object in their midst, were unwilling to part with it. And not impossibly too the northern tribes had during this eventful century advanced a bit culturally and outgrown somewhat their former conception of and reverence for the ark. And quite probably too their deep-rooted fear of the Philistines deterred them from bringing back the ark into their midst; for such an act would, of course, have been tantamount to a declaration of rebellion against the Philistines; and this they did not dare.

At any rate the ark remained in Kiryath Yearim until brought up to Jerusalem by David. The probable reasons for this have already been discussed. It was undoubtedly removed by Solomon from David's tent-sanctuary to his more magnificent Temple. That is the last definite information about the ark that the Bible furnishes. Thereafter the ark is an object only of unhistoric tradition and legend, with little foundation on actual fact. This serves to show clearly the development of theological thought in Israel, but in no wise furnishes authentic historic information about the ark itself.

Undoubtedly the ark continued in the Temple down to the destruction by Nebuchadrezzar in 586 B.C., or perhaps only until the first deportation and plundering of the Temple in 597 B.C. During this period, under the influence of developing national Yahwe religion and of advance in theological thought and concept of Yahwe, due to the teachings of the prophets, the ark came to be looked upon more or less askance as, according to old and not completely forgotten tradition, a concrete representation of Yahwe; therefore, in accordance with the principles of the evolving theology, as an idolatrous,

non-Yahwistic object, altogether out of accord with the true, prophetic concept and worship of Him. But it escaped the fate of destruction which would undoubtedly have eventually overtaken it, just as it overtook the brazen serpent, apparently an object of kindred character, and in all likelihood of kindred origin, by undergoing a process of reinterpretation and legitimization. It came gradually to be regarded as the receptacle of a sacred stone, or rather of two sacred stones; but sacred now, not because a deity was thought to reside in them, but only incidentally, because Israel's national Yahwe had inscribed upon them the ten "words" which constituted the fundamental principles of His worship and the basis of His covenant with Israel. Looked upon in this light, the ark was suffered to remain in the Temple at Jerusalem. But apparently its original character was never entirely lost sight of by the prophetic party; and particularly during the last century or so of its sojourn in the Temple it seems to have experienced a gradual diminution in esteem. During the early portion of the post-exilic period, even after the second Temple had been erected, the absence of the ark therefrom was not even deplored, at least by the prophetic party.

But with the ascendancy of the Priestly party in the period following Ezra, and with the composition of the Grundschrift and secondary portions of the Priestly Code, the ark came to enjoy a new regard and greatly increased in significance. It became intimately associated in Priestly tradition with the *kebod Yahwe*, the fiery form, ordinarily enveloped in the cloud, which Yahwe was thought to assume in His immediate contacts with Israel. In addition to maintaining the older tradition of the ark as the receptacle of the two tablets of the Decalogue, now known as the "tablets of testimony," these Priestly theologians and writers now represented it also and primarily as the throne of Yahwe, upon which He was believed to dwell permanently but invisibly, in the holy of holies, in the midst of Israel. Only the high-priest, and he only once a year, and then only under the precaution of all manner of safe-guards and the observance of innumerable taboos, was permitted to enter into Yahwe's presence before

the ark in the holy of holies, and catch a fleeting glimpse of the Holy One upon His sacred throne, the ark. Tradition is silent as to the eventual fate of the ark when the Temple was finally destroyed by the Romans.¹⁷³ Actually, however, both historic evidence and Rabbinic tradition seem to agree that there never was an ark in the second Temple, and that the picture of the Priestly Code is naught but the product of extensive theological speculation coupled with an antiquarian interest in the religious institutions of Israel's past and a desire to reinterpret these to accord with the dominant theology of the late post-exilic period and so give them a legitimate place in Israel's religion.

Such seems to have been the full history of the ark in ancient Israel.

VIII

THE ARK IN THE BOOK OF THE COVENANT

In the light of this history of the ark, as we have reconstructed it, the question naturally arises, why is the ark mentioned at all in the Book of the Covenant; what rôle does it play there, and what purpose does the mention of it serve? The question is difficult to answer with any certainty, since the reference to the ark in C is brief and obscure; yet it is a question of obvious importance, that must at least be considered as fully as possible.

On the basis of carefully considered internal evidence we have reached the conclusion that the nucleus of the Book of the Covenant, i. e. the small narrative setting plus the "words," was composed in the Northern Kingdom in 842 B.C., and constituted the basis of the religious reformation of Elisha, supported by Jehu and the Rechabites, under their leader Jonadab ben Rechab. This conclusion was reached as the result of first fixing the date of the Kenite Document as 899 B.C., its place of composition as the Southern Kingdom, and its purpose to enforce

¹⁷³ According to apocryphal and rabbinical tradition the ark was one of the five sacred objects hidden away by God when the Temple was destroyed and destined to be restored when the Messiah should come and rebuild the Temple. (II Mac. 2. 4-6; Bammidbar rabba, XV, 7; *Jewish Encyclopedia*, II, 105 f.)

the far-reaching religious reformation which in his fifteenth year King Asa, influenced by the prophetic party, which in turn had unmistakably a Kenite or Rechabite background, succeeded in carrying out. This reformation was directed chiefly against the foreign religious and cultural influences which had crept into the life and religious practice of the people, and even into the cult of the Temple at Jerusalem, from the days of David and Solomon onward. It aimed to restore what its champions conceived to have been the true, simple worship of Yahwe, as it had been practiced by the ancestors of the southern tribes, and particularly as it had been, so they thought, revealed by Yahwe to Moses after the exodus from Egypt, and by Moses in turn communicated to Israel. According to their tradition, upon this occasion a covenant had been established between Yahwe and these Israelite tribes, through the mediation of Moses, whereby Israel obligated itself to worship Yahwe alone and in accordance with the fundamental principles of His worship, revealed by Yahwe to Moses in a set of "words," and Yahwe on His part, obligated Himself to bring these tribes to and settle them in a good land, and be with them and prosper them ever thereafter. According to the historical record, this traditional covenant between Yahwe and Israel, made in the desert, was reaffirmed and properly solemnized at Jerusalem in the year 899 B.C., when the people gathered there for the celebration of the festival in the third month, the festival later known as Shabuoth.

Now, as we have seen, the relationship of the "words" of the Book of the Covenant to those of the Kenite Document is so obvious and so close that the conclusion can not be escaped that the former are dependent upon the latter. As the result of a minute comparison of the "words" of K with those of C, and a determination of the relative cultural background of the two sets of "words," we have likewise concluded that the "words" of C, and with them, of course, the original Book of the Covenant, must have been composed in the Northern Kingdom, and, it follows, at a time somewhat later than the date of composition of K. It is clear, moreover, from the determination of the cultural background of C, that it

must have been composed at a time when the Northern Kingdom had experienced a period of economic prosperity and cultural progress, when images of gold and silver were by no means unknown, nor even uncommon, in the ritual practice of the people, and elaborate altars of hewn stones were likewise employed. Such a condition obtained only during the reigns of Ahab and his immediate successors, when Israel not only succeeded in winning for itself a sure and recognized place among the leading states of western Asia, but likewise enjoyed an extended term of comparative peace and quiet, which enabled its citizens to follow their economic pursuits with comparatively little disturbance and interruption, and to experience the resultant material prosperity.

This national prosperity was strengthened and stimulated by Ahab's marriage with Jezebel, the Phoenician princess. This was in strict accord with the established political principles of the time, and in full conformity with the policy which Solomon had followed earlier and seemingly upon a more extensive scale. Jezebel, an ardent devotee of her own ancestral and national deity, brought with her to Israel and to Ahab's court the worship of the Baal of Tyre and also a numerous retinue of personal attendants and religious ministrants. Phoenician influence now began to modify the cultural life of Israel more and more, and the worship of the Baal of Tyre to make steady and rapid headway. Images of this Baal were set up, presumably in various parts of the country, and certainly in the sanctuaries at Samaria and Jezreel. And if the traditions of the Books of Kings are to be accepted, not content with this, Jezebel attempted to make active and aggressive propaganda for the spread of the worship of the Baal of Tyre throughout Israel. In this she encountered the strong opposition of the prophetic party under the leadership, tacit at least, of first Elijah and, after his death, Elisha.

Elijah, a shepherd from east of the Jordan and a firm, uncompromising champion of the old, simple, nomadic or semi-nomadic worship of Yahwe, conceived of Yahwe, as we have seen,¹⁷⁴ as still dwelling out in the desert upon the mountain

¹⁷⁴ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 32 ff.

where, according to the Kenite tradition, Israel first came in contact and entered into covenant with Him after the exodus from Egypt.¹⁷⁵ He opposed the plans of Jezebel unremittingly during his lifetime, but on the whole seemingly with comparatively little practical success. His method was that of bitter, fearless, uncompromising denunciation of the powerful queen and her god. He acted independently and had but little immediate contact and direct cooperation with the professional prophets of his day, for his methods, as well as his prophetic call, were largely different than theirs. But his authority and superior rating as a prophet, called directly and personally by Yahwe, were apparently fully recognized by them. After his death his disciple Elisha seemingly continued his master's methods for a time. Eventually, however, no doubt becoming convinced that no real and practical results were to be achieved by these methods and that the worship of Baal in Israel could never be uprooted in this way, Elisha resorted to different methods, the methods employed by the

¹⁷⁵ It is indeed a strange and significant fact that Elijah, apparently a native of Gilead, should conceive of Yahwe and His dwelling-place in quite the same manner as did the Kenites, dwelling in the extreme southern part of Judah. The suggestion has been advanced by some scholar, whose name and likewise the reference to whose work have escaped me, that Elijah may not have been a native of Gilead, but only a stranger and sojourner there. He bases his argument chiefly upon the statement of I Ki. 17. 1 that Elijah was one of the "sojourners of Gilead" (מְשֻׁבֵּי גִלְעָד), and argues that this points to a non-Gileadite origin for Elijah. In such case, of course, it would be natural to regard Elijah's original home as in the extreme south, in the vicinity of the Kenites. This would account completely for Elijah's ardent championing of Yahwe, and for his believing, along with the Kenites and the prophetic party of the south, that Yahwe still dwelt upon "the mountain of Yahwe" in the desert. If the reading מְשֻׁבֵּי גִלְעָד of I Ki. 17. 1 is original and correct, then this hypothesis is extremely plausible. But it is by no means unlikely that it is a ditto-graphy and misreading of an original מְשֻׁבֵּי הָעֵדֶן (cf. the *Commentaries* of Kittel and Benzinger to the passage). In such case, of course, Elijah must be regarded as a native Gileadite. Then the question as to how Elijah came to hold this view of Yahwe in common with the Kenites would remain unanswered for lack of evidence. His native shepherd life and point of view would account for his conceiving of Yahwe in the old, traditional, semi-nomadic manner, but it would hardly account for his holding to the Kenite-Judahite belief that Yahwe still dwelt upon this particular mountain in the desert.

professional prophets in the Northern Kingdom upon two previous occasions, when the dynasties of Jeroboam I and Baasha were overthrown. Elisha made common cause with the professional prophets and employed one of them as his agent in anointing Jehu as king of Israel. In the revolution which followed the entire house of Ahab was murdered. Jehu became ruler of the Northern Kingdom. And, supported by Jonadab ben Rechab, he gathered under a pretext all the devotees of the Tyrian Baal, undoubtedly members of the court party, the followers of Jezebel, into the sanctuary at Samaria, and there butchered them in cold blood.¹⁷⁶ This act had the unqualified approval, and probably even the cooperation, of Jonadab ben Rechab and no doubt of Elisha also. In this way the worship of the Baal of Tyre was uprooted from Israelite life and practice, and, at least on the surface, the old worship of Yahwe was restored.

Externally this reformation bears a strong resemblance to that of Asa in 899 B.C., fifty-seven years earlier. In both cases a woman, the queen, and then, after her husband's death, the queen-mother, is the leader of the court party, and the chief champion of the worship of foreign, non-Yahwistic deities, and foreign cultural influence. In both cases the opposition is fostered by the prophetic party, unmistakably in contact with and under direct Kenite or Rechabite influence. And in both cases the reformation directs itself externally and concretely to the destruction of images regarded as non-Yahwistic and symbolic of foreign deities.¹⁷⁷ In particular the

¹⁷⁶ II Ki. 10. 15-29.

¹⁷⁷ It is not at all improbable that the reformation of Elisha-Jehu-Jonadab ben Rechab was likewise sealed with a covenant ceremony, similar to that by which the reformation of Asa was sealed, according to II Chron. 15. 12 ff. It is true that II Ki. 10. 15-29 makes no mention of such a covenant; but it is difficult to avoid the impression that the narrative here is incomplete. Certainly the reformation itself, to be thoroughly effective, required not merely the butchery of the worshipers of the Tyrian Baal, but also the formal rejection of the worship of this deity and a declaration of loyalty to Yahwe by Israel; and this would, of course, imply a renewal or reaffirmation of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel. In all likelihood therefore, some such record stood in the original account of this important event. We can well understand, furthermore, why this record should have been suppressed and omitted from

Kenite influence manifest in K and the participation of Jonadab ben Rechab, member of a Kenite clan, in the reformation of Elisha, suggest a direct relationship between the reformation in the Southern Kingdom in 899 B.C. and this reformation in the Northern Kingdom fifty-seven years later. And this suggestion is strongly confirmed by the close and direct dependence of the "words" of the Book of the Covenant upon those of K, which we have established. This evidence suffices to establish with utmost probability that the original Book of the Covenant constituted the basis of the reformation of Elisha-Jehu-Jonadab ben Rechab in 842 B.C., just as the Kenite code of "words" constituted the basis of the reformation of Asa in 899 B.C. It follows therefore with reasonable certainty that the date of composition of the "words" of the Book of the Covenant, together with their narrative setting, must have been 842 B.C.

But then our question, how account for the mention of the ark in the Book of the Covenant? And this question becomes all the more pertinent and striking when we realize that at just this time, in 842 B.C., the ark was no longer in the possession of the northern tribes, nor present anywhere in the Northern Kingdom, but was deposited in the Temple at Jerusalem, and had in fact been there uninterruptedly ever

this passage in II Ki. 10, and why all reference to this event is omitted entirely from Chron. It was, of course, because the later prophets and their followers, the prophetic party of a later day, disapproved most heartily of this wholesale murder of the worshipers of Baal by Jehu and denounced it as a crime incurring the wrath of Yahwe (cf. Hos. 1. 4; 2. 2). With such a prophetic judgment upon this act, later prophetic and priestly writers could not well record, nor even acknowledge, that the event was crowned by the solemnization of a covenant between Yahwe and Israel; hence their complete silence about this covenant ceremony. But if we admit that in all probability this reformation of Elisha-Jehu-Jonadab ben Rechab, with all its hideous details of betrayal, murder and butchery, was climaxed by a solemnization of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel, its parallelism with the reformation of Asa becomes complete in all essential features. And not only this, but its relation to the Book of the Covenant, with its record of the original solemnization of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel in the days of Moses, recorded in Ex. 24. 4-8, of which this last solemnization in 842 B.C. was, so it would naturally be interpreted, merely the renewal or reaffirmation, would become doubly clear.

since the erection of this Temple a century or more before this. And not merely that, but the ark had been gone from the possession of and presence among the northern tribes for approximately two hundred and fifty years, and the knowledge and memory of it must have become extremely weak by 842 B.C. Its mention therefore in this northern document, and the reference to the early function as divine guide through the desert which, as we have seen, ancient tradition ascribed to it, are surprising indeed. There must have been some reason for such reference.

In answer to this question only a conjecture can be offered, due, of course, to total lack of evidence; but a conjecture so natural and fitting as to render it extremely plausible and illuminating. The reformation of 842 B.C. was directed primarily against the worship of the Tyrian Baal in Israel and the image-cult and foreign cultural influence associated with it. It sought to reaffirm and reestablish the old worship of Yahwe as the true, national god of Israel. The concept of Yahwe underlying this reformation was that which had been held and cherished out in the desert in the early, semi-nomadic days, the concept which had been zealously guarded and boldly championed by the Kenites and Rechabites and by Elijah, the shepherd prophet. It was a concept which had been touched and modified, particularly in the agricultural Northern Kingdom, by contact with Canaanitish Baals and the resultant syncretism; yet in it semi-nomadic, desert features still predominated; and it was upon these that the prophetic program laid the main emphasis. Stated generally and as a basic principle, this reformation aimed to root out foreign, Baal-worship from Israel, and to restore the old, native Yahwe-worship, rooted in semi-nomadic life and desert ideas and ideals.

But how symbolize this old, native, desert Yahwe? We have seen¹⁷⁸ that in the reformation of 899 B.C. in the Southern Kingdom Yahwe and His true worship were symbolized by the old "tent of meeting," while the syncretistic worship, with its manifold foreign elements, against which

¹⁷⁸ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 119-127.

this reformation contended, was apparently symbolized by the *mifleset* of Maachah, the queen-mother, and probably also by similar images associated with this syncretistic worship, and perhaps even by the recently erected Temple at Jerusalem in which this worship was centralized. In the reformation of 842 B.C. in the Northern Kingdom the symbol of the false, syncretistic worship, against which the reformation was directed, must have been, of course, the image or images of the Tyrian Baal which Jezebel had set up in the various sanctuaries. What fitting symbol of the old, native, desert Yahwe could there be, which would represent Him fittingly in the eyes of the people of the Northern Kingdom? Certainly it could not be the "tent of meeting," for, on the one hand, as we have seen, this had been the cult-object only of the southern tribes, and differed radically in its original character from the various cult-objects of the northern tribes. And on the other hand, in the one respect of reintroducing the old "tent of meeting," in opposition to the Temple at Jerusalem, the reformation of 899 B.C. had failed; and with this failure the old "tent of meeting" must have forfeited much of its pristine regard and have passed practically into semi-oblivion. Certainly it was no proper and effective symbol of the old Yahwe for the northern tribes.

But what symbol more natural and fitting could there be than the ark? It had been the palladium of the northern tribes during the days of their greatest triumphs in the early period of settlement in Palestine. It had been the cult-object of Ephraim, and eventually too of the other tribes federated with Ephraim. According to firmly rooted tradition, it had led them upon their desert journeyings until they were permanently settled in Palestine, and had gone with them into battle and given them victory over their enemies; it had established them securely in the land and prospered them in all their early undertakings. It was of desert origin and associated with the name and worship of Yahwe from those ancient days. Therefore, contrasted with the Tyrian Baal and his images, it was for the people of the Northern Kingdom the true symbol of Yahwe. And a moment's thought

shows clearly that no other object whatsoever could have played this important rôle in this northern reformation, for no other ancient cult-object had enjoyed the same regard and authority among the northern tribes in the early tribal days.¹⁷⁹

Moreover, the very condition that the ark was no longer in the possession of the northern tribes, but was located in the Temple at Jerusalem, facilitated this process. For, on the one hand, as the result of the absence of the ark from their midst, and the fact that it had been gone for two hundred and fifty years, these northern tribes could have had only a more or less vague, traditional, but no real knowledge of the ark and its actual appearance and its full, original nature and function. Their conception of Yahwe as their national deity had certainly advanced materially during this momentous period, and they could no longer conceive of Him in quite the same primitive manner as did their tribal ancestors. To them there was probably hardly any question of Yahwe, no longer merely a tribal, but now a national deity, actually being in the ark, or of there being in it a sacred stone or some other similar object in which Yahwe was thought to dwell. By this time this belief must have been largely, if not entirely outgrown, and in the minds of the northern tribes, so far as they thought of the ark at all, which was probably very little, it must have come gradually to be regarded as the symbol of Yahwe rather than as Yahwe Himself, or as the container of Yahwe. And on the other hand, the very presence of the ark in the Temple at Jerusalem must have given to it, even in the eyes of the people of the Northern Kingdom, a new sanctity and legitimacy as a symbol of Yahwe, their national god, which it would otherwise not have enjoyed. Even to the leaders of this prophetic movement this fact must have had a deep significance. Had the ark been still merely

¹⁷⁹ Thus, for example, the cult-object of the tribe of Dan was of Palestinian origin (Jud. 17-18), and apparently also the cult-object of Manasseh (Jud. 8. 24-27). Not improbably this was true also of the cult-objects of some of the other northern tribes. In fact the ark is the only ancient, northern, tribal cult-object of which we have any record, which goes back to a pre-Palestinian, desert origin and association with the worship of Yahwe there.

what it had been in the early, pre-Davidic days, they could hardly have sanctioned it, and referred to it in their program of reformation; for it would unquestionably have seemed to them too concrete a representation of Yahwe, differing but little, if at all, from the representation of Him by images, against which they protested so steadily. But the presence of the ark in the Temple at Jerusalem must have completed the process of gradual reinterpretation of it, from its original character as a Yahwe-cult-object to its new character as a Yahwe-symbol, and must have likewise given it, even for these prophetic champions, a certain positive legitimacy and sanctity, which it could otherwise not have acquired.

And so very naturally they revived the memory of the old ark of Yahwe among the northern tribesmen and represented it as the approved symbol of Yahwe, the true, national god of Israel and god of Israel's fathers. Thereby they declared concretely to the citizens of the Northern Kingdom of their own day that this old Yahwe, whose origin was in the desert, was still their true god, and not the new, foreign deity whom Jezebel and her court party had sought to foist upon them. It was Yahwe who had prospered them through all these years and given them victory over their enemies and a proud and leading place among the states of Western Asia. And to Him alone their faith and their worship were due, even as they had covenanted with Him in the ancient, desert days. And this true god of theirs, Yahwe, was to be worshiped in accordance with the simple principles and by the simple rites, theoretically at least, and to a large extent factually also, of desert origin, set forth now in the "words" of the Book of the Covenant. This was their true worship and not the more elaborate worship of Baal in Baal sanctuaries, with their altars of hewn stones, probably with steps leading upon them, with images of gold and silver, with abundant and extensive sacrifices and festivals of a dominantly agricultural, solar character. The program of the reformation of 842 B.C. was decidedly reactionary, just as that of the reformation of 899 B.C. had been. It sought to reintroduce the simple altar of earth in place of the altars of hewn stone, just as the

reformation of 899 B.C. had in all likelihood attempted to reintroduce the old "tent of meeting" in place of the new, elaborate Temple at Jerusalem. And just as that reformation had failed in this one reactionary purpose, so in all likelihood this reformation of 842 B.C. also failed in its effort to reintroduce the simple, earthen altar.¹⁸⁰ The course of cultural progress can not be lightly turned backward.

In this program of reformation the ark had its definite place and served a specific and valuable purpose. But it could not be as the old ark unmodified from its original, primitive character and functions. The presence of the ark in the Temple at Jerusalem required a fitting explanation that would legitimize it and give it a definite place in the program of this reformation. The old traditions of the sanctity and powers of the ark, no doubt rather vague and shadowy by this time, and not altogether free from illegitimate, idolatrous implications, had to be put aside altogether, and a new interpretation of it presented, which would, on the one hand, accord fully with the conception of Yahwe held by these reformers, and, on the other hand, would further their cherished program as much as possible. Unquestionably it was under the force of these conditions that the new tradition developed that the ark was sacred, yes, and sacred because of what it contained; this much survived from the old tradition. But what it contained, so it now came to be told, was merely the record of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel, the scroll of the "words" of the covenant, which Moses had written down at Yahwe's bidding in the old, desert days. Thus, on the one hand, the ark came to have a traditional association with Moses, something which it could hardly have had previous to this,¹⁸¹ and, on the other hand, it now became even more than the symbol of Yahwe Himself; it became the symbol and the constant

¹⁸⁰ Therefore no doubt the secondary, but certainly still quite early, provision of Ex. 20. 25, that if Israel insists upon building stone altars, they must at least not be of hewn stones.

¹⁸¹ Unless perhaps through its Levitical priests, Eli and his sons, probably in some way akin to Moses. The name Pinchas, borne by Eli's son and also by Moses' great-nephew, the grandson of Aaron, according to Priestly tradition, and itself of Egyptian origin, may well support such a conclusion.

reminder to the people of His covenant with Israel; from this time on it was the אֲרוֹן בְּרִית יְהוָה, "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe." Such must have been its official name henceforth. And this very name and its frequent repetition must have had a potent effect in redeeming the ark from all its earlier, traditional, idolatrous implications as a tribal cult-object and concrete representation of Yahwe, and giving it a definite, legitimate place in prophetic tradition and program and in the subsequent evolution of the religion of Israel.

In this way and at this time, in all likelihood, the new, prophetic tradition about the ark and its sacred character arose and supplanted the older and historically more correct tradition. And later, and no doubt still somewhat under the influence of the old tradition of the probable presence of a sacred stone in the ark, the new tradition was further modified slightly, to tell that, not a scroll, containing the "words" of the covenant, was in the ark, but two sacred stones, sacred, however, not because of an inherent sanctity or indwelling of any deity in them, but because the "words" of the covenant were inscribed upon them, and, moreover, inscribed upon them by Yahwe Himself. And, as we have seen, according to the northern Elohist version of this tradition, not only the writing, but even the stones themselves, prepared for writing, were the actual work of Yahwe; their sanctity was therefore absolute. So the new tradition about the ark and its contents developed. Its subsequent history we have already learned. There can be little further question as to the place of the ark in the tradition of the Book of the Covenant and the rôle which it played in the reformation of 842 B.C., of which the Book of the Covenant furnished the program.

Unquestionably the narrative setting of the Book of the Covenant must have once been more extensive than we know it at present. In particular it must have told more about the ark and the depositing in it of the scroll of the "words" by Moses. All this, however, has, for one reason or another, been suppressed by later editors, and only the small fragment of the original narrative setting contained in Ex. 24. 4-8 and

Num. 10. 33 b, and in all likelihood a small nucleus in Ex. 33. 5 b-6, have been preserved.¹⁸² Of this no more can be said at

¹⁸² It would be natural to expect that the narrative portion of the Book of the Covenant would have told something about the carriers of the ark. We have seen above (p. 20) that this must have told or implied that on the desert journey the ark was carried along on the shoulders of men, whom it drove irresistibly in the direction in which it chose to go. Presumably these bearers of the ark were not ordinary persons; they must have been men who stood in some particularly intimate relation to the deity of the ark. Who could they have been?

In answer to this question Deut. 10. 8 gives a significant hint. It tells that "at that time," i.e. at the time when Moses made the ark at Yahwe's command, and deposited the two tablets of the Decalogue in it (With *בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא* in v. 10 cf. the same expression in v. 1. Note also that vv. 6 and 7 are a Priestly gloss inserted into this context, and disturb the obviously original continuity between vv. 1-5 and v. 8.) Yahwe singled out the tribe of Levi to carry the ark. In v. 11 the Deuteronomic version of Yahwe's command to Israel to set out upon its journey through the wilderness is found, following immediately upon the account of the making of the ark and of the appointment of the Levites to carry it. The implication is clear that the Levites were the bearers of the ark upon the journey through the wilderness.

Obviously therefore the Deuteronomic authors of Deut. 10. 1-5, 8-11 must have had before them a narrative which told of these three incidents in connected form. We have had reason to conclude that the original of the narrative of the making of the ark in vv. 1-5, is to be found in Ex. 33. 5b-6, and that these verses stood originally in close juxtaposition to Ex. 34. 1-5 (above pp. 29 ff.). But we find no narrative of the selection of the Levites following this passage. However, in Ex. 32. 26-29, i.e. a passage almost immediately preceding Ex. 33. 5b-6, we find an account of the selection by Yahwe of the Levites, in order to bestow a blessing upon them. This passage is embedded in the narrative of the Golden Calf, but it is recognized by all scholars as a very disturbing element in this narrative, having little apparent connection with and explanation from the Golden Calf story. Unquestionably it is not in its original position in the Biblical narrative.

The passage is extremely difficult of explanation, due to its manifestly fragmentary character. It seems to imply that in Moses' absence the people of Israel had sinned grievously against Yahwe, and that only the Levites had remained faithful to Him. It does not state here wherein the sin of Israel had lain, nor likewise in what respect the Levites had remained faithful. But from Deut. 33. 9 it may be safely inferred that the sin of Israel was faithlessness to its covenant with Yahwe, whereas the Levites alone had kept the covenant. Therefore, Deut. 33. 10 goes on to say, the Levites have the high privilege of functioning as Yahwe's priests. Ex. 32. 26-29 unquestionably carries the same implication, that Israel's sin consisted in disregard of its covenant with Yahwe, but recently made. This motif fits perfectly into the C narrative, and makes it parallel the K narrative in one additional and significant detail.

present. It remains for us to consider now in detail the laws of the present Book of the Covenant, and particularly those laws which, seemingly, supplement the original "words." The "words" themselves we have already considered in sufficient detail, and little more can or need be added to what has been said.¹⁸³

In the light of these considerations we may venture to infer that Ex. 32. 26-29 originally followed 33. 5b-6, and that the Deuteronomic authors of Deut. 10. 1-5, 8-11 found them there, still in their original position, and not yet dislocated to their present place in Ex. 32. In their original position they must have gone on to tell that the blessing which Yahwe bestowed upon these Levites as the reward for their faithfulness to Him and His covenant was the high privilege of carrying the ark, and of standing before Him, of ministering unto Him, and of uttering blessings in His name, as Deut. 10. 8 puts it, or of communicating His judgments and oracles to Israel and of bringing His chief sacrifices upon His altar, as Deut. 33. 10 has it. Just these functions were discharged by the Levitical priests of the ark of Yahwe at Shiloh, Eli and his household. Undoubtedly this is then the family tradition of the house of Eli, accounting for their selection by Yahwe to be His priests and the bearers of His ark, whether upon the journey through the wilderness or into battle with the Philistines or other enemies.

We may therefore conclude that Ex. 32. 26-29 was likewise originally a part of the Book of the Covenant and followed in the C narrative almost immediately after Ex. 33. 5b-6.

The meaning of the passage is, however, still obscure; nor does it seem possible to throw much further light upon it. It is not clear wherein the faithlessness of the people of Israel and their disregard for the newly-made covenant lay. Certainly it had nothing at all to do with the Golden Calf episode, for, as we have seen ("The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 109 ff.), that narrative, in its original form, belonged entirely to the Kenite Document. Perhaps it may be inferred from Deut. 33. 8, that it had to do with a testing of the people in some way by Yahwe, at the place called therefore Massah, in order to prove their faithfulness; and only the Levites withstood the test. But wherein the test consisted and what was the consequent nature of Israel's faithlessness neither Ex. 32. 26-29 nor Deut. 33. 8 nor any of the later Biblical traditions about Massah and Meribah (Ex. 17. 1-7; Num. 20. 7-13) give the slightest hint. Manifestly it resulted in a violation in some way of the newly-made covenant, as the result of which Yahwe punished the offenders at the hands of the faithful Levites, and then commanded the people to leave His sacred mountain and set out upon their journey toward their מנוחה (Num. 10. 33), the land which Yahwe had promised to give them as a part of His l. covenant-obligation to them. On this journey through the wilderness they were led by the ark carried by the Levites. All this must have once constituted the concluding portion of the narrative of the Book of the Covenant.

¹⁸³ "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 54-98.

THE POEMS OF HAGGAI*

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HAGGAI was probably born during the Captivity in Babylon, and came to Jerusalem in one of the smaller groups of returning exiles that followed the first expedition in 537 B.C. The suggestion of Ewald, André, and Cornill, based on 2, 3, that Haggai had seen the former Temple before its destruction in 586 B.C. requires too advanced an age for the poet at the time of his appearance in 520 B.C. There is no evidence that Haggai was a venerable old man in 520 B.C. as Cornill (*Der israelitische Prophetismus*, Lect. 5) says. On the other hand, Havet's statement (*La Modernité des Prophètes*, p. 166) that there was no one left at that time who could have seen the Solomonic Temple, is an exaggeration. It is hardly necessary to add that Havet's assignment of Haggai's poems to the reign of Herod the Great (37-4 B.C.) is impossible (see *op. cit.*, pp. 164. 204; cf. Lagarde, *Mitteil.* 4, 365).

Daiches (OLZ † 11, 277) has found a Babylonian equivalent of the name (cf. first of Critical Notes below). There is more

* The translation and restoration of the Hebrew text which follow are based on the interpretation of the Book of Haggai given in the Old Testament Seminary of the Johns Hopkins University under the direction of the late Professor Paul Haupt. Grateful acknowledgment is here made of the writer's indebtedness to him.

† For the abbreviations and diacritical marks see JBL 29, 112; JSOR 1, 3; AJSL 26, 19. 204 and inside front covers in SBOT. Note also:

André = *Le Prophète Aggée*, Paris, 1895.

Böhme = *Zu Maleachi und Haggai*, in ZAT, 1887.

BuL = Bauer and Leander, *Historische Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache*, Halle, 1918.

CoE = Cornill, *Einleitung in die kanon. Bücher des AT*, 1913.

DB = Hasting's *Dictionary of the Bible*.

EB¹¹ = *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (eleventh edition).

EdJ = E. Meyer, *Entstehung des Judentums*, Halle, 1896.

reason to regard him as a layman who was deeply interested in the political conditions of his time, especially the restoration of the political independence of his people, than as a priest (so Reuss and André) who was concerned only with rebuilding the Temple. The allusions in IV, A to the flesh of sacrificial victims and defilement by contact with a dead body could, of course, be made by any layman (cf. the conclusion of Haupt's paper, *Was Amos a Sheepman?* in JBL 35, 287).

In his article *Ancient Babylonian Parallels to the Prophecies of Haggai* (AJSL 35, 128) Bewer has called attention to the first column of Cyl. A of Gudea (c. 2500) where this ancient priest-king of Lagaš is told by the god Ningirsu in a dream, which is interpreted to him by his divine mother Nina, to rebuild the temple of Ningirsu, which had been ruined by a flood; see Witzel's translation in part 1 of his *Keilinschriftliche Studien* (Leipzig, 1918), p. 98. But careful interpretation of the texts gives the impression that parallels between the Gudean inscription and the poems of Haggai are not striking. Haggai, e.g., expected a period of prosperity and political independence with restoration of the Davidic dynasty, rather than the beginning of the Messianic age with the completion of the Temple in which Jhvh would make his home (AJSL 35, 129ⁱ).

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|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ehrlich | = <i>Ezekiel und die kleinen Propheten</i> (Randglossen z. hebr. Bibel), Leipzig, 1912. |
| G ²⁹ | = Gesenius-Bergsträsser, <i>Hebräische Grammatik</i> (29th edition), Leipzig, 1918. |
| GA | = E. Meyer, <i>Geschichte des Altertums</i> , vol. 3, Stuttgart, 1912. |
| IJG ⁵ | = Wellhausen, <i>Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte</i> (5th edition). |
| JB | = Jewish Bible, 1917. |
| Joel | = Haupt, <i>Joel's Poem on the Locusts</i> , in <i>ÆNIA</i> (1911), 381-399. |
| Klosterman | = <i>Geschichte des Volkes Israel</i> . |
| KS | = <i>Keilinschriftliche Studien</i> , Leipzig, 1918. |
| LSAT | = Delitzsch, <i>Die Lese- und Schreibfehler im AT</i> , Berlin, 1920. |
| Michaelis, J.D. | = <i>Deutsche Übersetzung des AT</i> , Göttingen, 1782. |
| Mitchell | = <i>Haggai and Zechariah</i> , in ICC, New York, 1912. |
| Riessler | = <i>Die kleinen Propheten</i> , Rottenburg, 1911. |
| Rothstein | = <i>Die Genealogie des Königs Jojachin und seiner Nachkommen</i> , 1902. |
| VB | = Jeremias and Winckler, <i>Vorderasiatische Bibliothek</i> , Leipzig, 1907. |
| VG | = Brockelmann, <i>Grundriß der vergleich. Grammatik der semit. Sprachen</i> , 2 vols., Berlin, 1908-1913. |

In the seventeen years that had elapsed between the liberation of the Jews by Cyrus (538 B.C.) and the date of Haggai's appearance (520 B.C.) a succession of bad harvests and poor crops, the levies of passing Persian armies (cf. Wright, *Zech.* 186) as well as heavy taxes within the community during the reconstruction period, and the usual difficulties incident to the re-establishment of the homes and industries of the returned Jews, had greatly impoverished and discouraged them. It was natural, therefore, that the reconstruction of the ruined Temple had not progressed.

The death of Cambyses in 522 B.C. was followed by many insurrections throughout the great Persian empire, and there arose a number of aspirants for the Persian throne. Among these was Darius Hystaspis, who succeeded after three years in establishing himself and quelling all opposition. The dates of the leading events of this period are as follows: On March 11, 522 B.C. began the uprising of Pseudo-Smerdis in Persia. The last date of Cambyses before his death is the 16th of the following month. The assassination of Pseudo-Smerdis and the occupation of the throne by Darius Hystaspis occurred on Sept. 29 of the same year. Darius won his way into Babylon on Dec. 21. During the spring and summer of 521 a number of rebellions in the provinces were put down. Sept. 21, 521 is the first date of Nabû-kûdurrî-uçur's revolt in Babylon. The second revolt was not quelled until 519 (HAV 281; GA 3, 194; JBL 33, 161; 32, 107).

The watchful Haggai in Jerusalem believed that he could see in this universal political confusion, before the final success of Darius was assured, the overthrow of the Persian supremacy. With this expected downfall he saw an opportunity to restore the political independence of Jhvh's people under the leadership of the Davidic scion Zerubbabel. For the success of Zerubbabel's political plans he considered the reconstruction of the Temple necessary (JBL 32, 109; 33, 161; 37, 209. 230; AJP 40, 67; *Mon.* 29, 294).

In spite of the consensus of critical opinion that the book is prose throughout, it can be shown that Haggai's genuine words exhibit a distinct meter. Sievers (*Alttestamentliche Miscellen* 6-10 [BSGW 59], pp. 63-75 [1907]) reconstructs the text after a

metrical scheme' in which the introductory narrative passages are also included. On the other hand, he thinks that there is no strophic arrangement in Haggai's poems. In Augusti-de Wette's AT (1810) 1, 4-11; 2, 3-9. 14^b-19. 21^b-23 were arranged in lines, and in Bunsens' *Bibelwerk* (1860): 1, 2-11; 2, 3-9. 11-19. 21^b-23. There is no metrical arrangement in RV, JB (except 1, 6), Geo. A. Smith's *Twelve Prophets* (1898), Kautzsch's AT³ (1910), Duhm's *Zwölf Propheten* (1910), Orelli's *Kleine Proph.*³ (1908), or Kittel's *Bibl. Hebr.*² (1913). In Baentsch's posthumous translation of Haggai in *Die Schriften des AT* by Gressmann, Gunkel, &c., part 19 (Göttingen, 1912), p. 76, only the first three lines of II (2, 21^b. 22) are regarded as metrical. Similarly in Hitzig's *Prophet. Bücher* (1854) 2, 22 was arranged in five hemistichs. Budde, *Geschichte der althebr. Literatur* (1906), p. 169, gives a translation of 1, 2-11 in hemistichs, but it is not metrical. Mitchell's reconstruction of some lines (on p. 38 of his commentary) is not satisfactory.

The book contains four poems. The one in c. 1 consists of five triplets with 2 plus 2 beats in each line. The poem at the end of c. 2 is a single quatrain with 3 plus 3 beats. The poem in 2, 1-9 is composed of two quatrains and two triplets, all with 2 plus 2 beats. Of the two poems in 2, 10-19, which were probably delivered on the same day, the first has three couplets with 2 plus 2 beats, while the second consists of four couplets with 3 plus 3 beats. The gloss in 1, 5. 6 also contains a quatrain with 2 plus 2 beats. For the combination in the same poem of stanzas with 2 plus 2 beats and stanzas with 3 plus 3 beats see AJSL 20, 163, n. 2; CoE 506; *Cant.* 52, l. 7; BL 101, l. 1. Haupt (JBL 32, 107; 33, 161) has advanced the theory that Zechariah 8, 9-17 and 7, 1-3 plus 8, 18. 19^a plus 7, 4-6 plus 8, 19^b contain two poems of Haggai.

The narrative passages (1, 1. 12. 14; 1, 15 and 2, 20; 2, 1. 2. 10. 11) have been added by another hand. Because of their resemblance to Zech. 1, 1. 7; 7, 1-3; 8, 18; Ezr. 1, 1 and Neh. 1, 1; 2, 1 they may be ascribed to the Chronicler (350 B.C.) to whom the compilation of Ezra and Nehemiah is usually assigned; cf. JBL 40, 119. It is probable that he merely enlarged upon dates that were attached to each poem not long after its

utterance and were thereafter associated with it. Budde (*Althebr. Lit.* 169) thinks that Haggai's poems were edited by a disciple, who also provided the historical introductions, dates, &c., just as Jeremiah's poems were written down by Baruch.

TRANSLATION

I

LET NOT THE TEMPLE LIE IN RUINS!

(Aug. 28, 520 B.C.)

- | | | | |
|-----|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| i | 1, 2 | ^α Thus said Jhvh, ^β
[The time is] not [come]
4 ^γ Is it time for yourselves | These people say,
to build Jhvh's house.
to dwell under ^δ cover? ^ε |
| ii | 7 | ^ζ Consider now, ¹
9 ^a Ye looked for much,
What ye brought home, | how ye have fared: ²
and lo! it is little; ³
I blew upon it <,> ⁴ |
| iii | 9 ^b | Why is that so?
On account of my house, ⁵
While ye are running | says Jhvh Sabaoth.
which lies in ruins, ⁶
for your own houses. ⁷ |
| iv | 10
11 | Therefore { } the heavens
I called a drought { ^ι }
And on the grain, | withheld "their" dew. ^{8δ}
on *land and ^λ mounts, ⁹
and the new wine. ^μ |
| v | 8
13 | Go up to the mountain, ¹⁰
And build the house!
^ξ I ¹³ am with you, | and <cut down> timber, ¹¹
Then I'll show my glory. ^{12ν}
says Jhvh <Sabaoth>. ^ο |

(α) 1, 1 In the second year of King Darius,¹⁴ in the sixth month, on the first day of the month,¹⁵ came Jhvh's word through¹⁶ the prophet¹⁷ Haggai to Zerubbabel^{18 ππ} as follows

(β) 2 Sabaoth, as follows

(γ) 3 Jhvh's word came through the prophet Haggai as follows¹⁹

(δ) 4 your houses (ε) while this house is in ruins²⁰

- (ζ) 1, 5 and now¹ thus said Jhvh Sabaoth:²¹
 Consider now how ye have fared:
 6 Ye have sown much, and brought in little;
 Ye ate, but not [enough];^{pp} ye had clothing, but were not warm;
 And <ye>^{ss} earned wages into a bag full of holes.²²
 (η) 7 thus said Jhvh Sabaoth (θ) 10 and the earth withheld its produce
 (ι) against you (κ) 11 the (λ) on the
 (μ) and on the oil and on <all> that the ground brings forth, on men
 and beasts, and on all handiwork²³ (ν) 8 said Jhvh
 (ξ) 13 Jhvh's messenger, Haggai, said <ττ> to the people as follows
 (ο) 12 Zerubbabel^{υυ} and all the remnant²⁴ of the people hearkened to the
 voice of their God, Jhvh,^{φφ} and the people revered²⁵ Jhvh.
 14 Jhvh stirred up the spirit of Zerubbabel^{xx} and all the remnant of the
 people, so that they went to work²⁶ on the house of their God,
 Jhvh Sabaoth

- (ππ) 1, 1 ben-Shealtiel,²⁷ the governor of Judah, and to the high-priest Joshua²⁸ ben-Jehozadak
 (pp) 6 ye drank, but had not enough (ss) the wage-earner (ττ) 13 in a message of Jhvh²⁹
 (υυ) 12 ben-Shealtiel, <the governor of Judah>, and the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak
 (φφ) that is, <to> the words of the prophet Haggai, which were in accordance with what
 their God, Jhvh, had caused him to deliver <to them>³⁰
 (xx) 14 ben-Shealtiel, the governor of Judah, and the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak

II

ZERUBBABEL IS MY CHOSEN ONE

(Sept. 20, 520 B.C.)¹

- 2, 21 ^{αβ}I am shaking ^γheaven and ^δearth,²
 22 I shall upset the great kingdom's throne,³
 I shall destroy <all> the strength of ^εthe heathen,
 I shall <wreck> their chariots and riders,
 [Subdued] will be horsemen and <footmen>,
 each <falling> by the sword of his brother;⁴
 23 ^ζBut I'll take thee, my servant, Zerubbabel,^{ηθ}
 and place thee as a ring⁵ <on my right hand>.^ι

- (α) 1, 15; 2, 20 On⁶ the twenty-fourth day of the month^{xx7} <came>^{λλ} Jhvh's
 word to⁸ Haggai^{μμ} as follows
 (β) 21 Say to the governor of Judah, Zerubbabel, as follows⁹
 (γ) the (accus.) (δ) the (accus.) (ε) 22 the great kingdom of
 (ζ) 23 at that time, says Jhvh Sabaoth (η) ben-Shealtiel
 (θ) says Jhvh (ι) for thee have I chosen,¹⁰ says Jhvh Sabaoth

- (xx) 1, 15 in the sixth (month) in the second year of King Darius
 (λλ) 2, 20 a second time¹¹ (μμ) on the twenty-fourth of the month

III

BE NOT DISMAYED!

(Oct. 17, 520 B.C.)¹

- A i 2, 3 ^αWho is left among you that saw (with his eyes) [·]
 This house (of God) in its former glory?²
 What do ye see now (in its place)?
 Is not its appearance like naught in your eyes?³
- ii 4 Now take thou courage,⁴ O Zerubbabel!^{βγ}
 And {} all ye people! says Jhvh 'Sabaoth'.
 {Take courage} and work! for I am with you; ^δ ^ε,
 5 My spirit abides among you, fear not!⁵
- B iii 6 ^ζAfter a little I'll shake once more⁶
^ηHeaven and ^θearth and 'sea and *dryland.⁷
 7 I'll 'destroy' ^λthe nations and ⁸treasure(s)⁹ will come in.^μ
- iv 8 Mine is the silver¹⁰ and mine is the gold.^ν
 9 Yea, great will be the^ξ Temple's °glory.^π
 And in this place I'll give¹¹ prosperity.^{ρσ}

-
- (α) 2, 1 In the seventh month, on the twenty-first day of the month,¹²
 2 Jhvh's word came through the prophet Haggai^τ §§ to Zerubbabel^{υυ}
 and to <all> the remnant of the people as follows
- (β) 4 says Jhvh (γ) Take courage, O high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak!
 (δ) says Jhvh Sabaoth
- (ε) 5 the word which I pledged to you when ye came forth from Egypt¹³
 (ζ) 6 for thus said Jhvh Sabaoth (η) the (accus.) (θ) the (accus.)
 (ι) the (accus.) (κ) the (accus.) (λ) 7 all
 (μ) 7 from all the nations, and I shall fill this Temple with glory, said
 Jhvh Sabaoth
- (ν) 8 says Jhvh Sabaoth (ξ) 9 this (ο) future
 (π) 9 above the former, said Jhvh Sabaoth (ρ) says Jhvh Sabaoth
 (σ) <that is, peace of mind and preservation for every one who lays the
 foundations for re-erecting this Temple>¹⁴
-

(τ) 2, 1. 2 as follows: Say
 (υυ) ben-Shealtiel, the governor of Judah, and to the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak

IV

A LITTLE RELIGION IS NOT SUFFICIENT

(Dec. 18, 520 B.C.)¹

- A i 2, 12 ^a If ^u a man should carry holy flesh² in ^β his garment,
And touch with the skirt some^γ bread, or ^δ pottage,
- ii Or ^e wine, or oil, or any kind of food,
Would that become holy?³ ^ε They [will] say, No.
- iii 13 ^η But if ye touch a corpse,⁴ and then any of these,
Would they be unclean?⁵ The priests⁶ [will] say, Yes.⁷
- B iv 14 ^θ So⁸ it is with these people⁹ before me,
declares Jhvh 'Sabaoth'.
And so it is with their handiwork:¹⁰
what they offer there is unclean!
- v 15 Consider now (the time)¹¹
from this day going backward,¹²
Ere stone was joined to stone¹³
in the Temple,* <how did ye fare then?>
- vi 16 Ye would come to a heap¹⁴ of twenty
and <lo!> there were but ten;
When ye came^λ to draw fifty (measures)
<from> a vat,¹⁵ there were but twenty.¹⁶
- vii 18 ^ν The time from the day¹⁶ when was founded
<the> Temple,^ξ now consider!
19 Is the seed-grain yet¹⁷ in the pit?¹⁸
are the grape-vines^ο¹⁹ [yet] unbearing?^π 20

(α) 2, 10 On the twenty-fourth day of the ninth²¹ month²² Jhvh's word
11 came to²² the prophet Haggai as follows: Thus said Jhvh Sabaoth,
Ask the priests²³ for instruction²⁴ as follows

(β) 12 the skirt of (γ) the (δ) the (ε) the
(ζ) the priests [will] answer (η) 13 and Haggai said

- (θ) 2, 14 and Haggai began and said (ι) So it is with this nation and
 (κ) 15 of Jhvh (λ) 16 to the winepress
 (μ) 14, 17 ^{αα}and they were grieved because of their labor^{αα},²⁵ I have smitten
 you with blight, and with mildew, and with hail,^{αα} yet *eye* do
 not come^α to me, says Jhvh²⁶
 (ν) 18 Consider now from this day going backward^{φφ} (ξ) of Jhvh
 (ο) 19 and the figs and the pomegranates and the olive trees
 (π) from this day I will bless²⁷

- (ρρ) 2, 10 in the second year of Darius
 (σσ) 14 ^{αα}because of their acceptance of bribes²⁸
 (ττ) ^{αα}and their hatred of a pleader in court²⁹ (υυ) 17 all your handiwork
 (φφ) 18 from the twenty-fourth day in the ninth month³⁰

EXPLANATORY NOTES

I

(1) Lit. *set your heart on your ways*; AV *consider your ways*. This phrase, however, does not mean, Consider what you are to do in the future, but what you have experienced in the past. St. Jerome (cited by Orelli) says: *Considerate et in memoriam redigite quae feceritis et quae passi sitis*.

(2) The command in v. 8 interrupts the argument in vv. 7. 9 and belongs after v. 11 (Sievers).

(3) Hardship, misfortune, and crop-failure had resulted instead of the fulfillment of the large expectations which the Jews had brought with them from Babylon as portrayed in Pss. 122. 126 (AJSL 11, 80. 134). To the people, existing prospects seemed no better than those of previous years.

(4) *I blew upon it* does not mean *I blew it away* (so AV^M, also J. D. Michaelis, and Orelli; Luther, *ich zerstäube es*) or *I pooh-poohed it*, I despised it, it is insignificant like wind-driven chaff, but *I blasted it*. The poet's intention was not to show Jhvh's contempt for their poor harvests but to emphasize the fact that these were due to His anger. *Blast* denotes not only *blowing*, but also *blight*, curse. Grotius comments, *Ita perire feci sicut perit emissus halitus*. In the story of Aladdin the slave of the lamp breathes upon the vizier's son so that he becomes paralyzed. In ath-Tha'labi's (died A.D. 1038) *Stories of the Prophets* (AJSL 14, 150, l. 3) Job's leprosy is said to have been caused by Satan blowing

into his nostrils' a blast which turned his body white. Marti quotes the Arabian superstition mentioned by Bauer: It is in the highest degree disagreeable to Moslems if any one whistles over a threshing floor heaped with grain. Then comes the devil, they say, in the night and takes part of the harvest.

(5) The people contended that the Temple could not be rebuilt because of the hard times. Haggai asserts that the hard times are due to Jhvh's displeasure because the Temple was allowed to lie in ruins. The poet implies that prosperity will come as soon as indifference to the Temple's condition ceases.

(6) Cf. 2 K 25, 9, 13; 2 Chr. 36, 19. Soon after the Return, the altar of burnt-offering was erected, if it was not already standing when the Jews arrived; but apart from this, little work had been done on the heaps of stone and charred timbers that marked the Temple site (see n. 26).

(7) The Hebrew verb, which means *to run, to hasten*, and in Assyrian, *to succor*, corresponds to our colloquial *to hustle*: ye are active and energetic in the interest of your own houses, but not for my house. Grotius: *vestras res tantum agitis. Deum non curatis, nec ille vos curat.*

(8) During the Palestinian dry season (May to September) nightly sea-breezes, heavily laden with moisture, precipitate it as thick mist on the summer crops of millet, sesame, figs, melons, grapes, olives, &c. In the summers preceding August 28, 520 B.C. these west winds had been irregular and interspersed with hot sirocco winds from the east, destructive to crops.

(9) The drought was universal. It affected lowlands and highlands, and touched such different growths as grain and grapes. Even the wooded hills, nature's reservoirs, were dry (cf. Am. 1, 2).

(10) For timber it was not necessary to go to distant Lebanon, famous for cedars, nor even as far as Carmel which was also thickly wooded; neighboring hillsides afforded all the timber that the limited means and strength of the little community could utilize. In Haggai's time there must have been woodland in the vicinity. Cf. Neh. 2, 8; 8, 15. *Mountain* here practically means *forest*. Caesar (*Bell. Gall.* 6, 25) uses *Hercynia silva* for the forest-covered mountain system of Germany from

the Black Forest to the Carpathians (cf. JBL 36, 249). Cf. also Goethe's *Füllest wieder Busch und Tal* (for *Berg und Tal*). Heb. *śadê*, field, is Assy. *śadû*, mountain; Heb. *ḥorš*, thicket, is Assy. *ḥuršu*, mountain; Heb. *dobr*, steppe, is Eth. *dabr*, mountain. Haggai meant, Go out to the wooded hills! Contrast Morgenstern's *the Temple mount* in his paper *On Leviticus* 10, 3 in the Haupt Anniversary Volume (Baltimore and Leipzig, 1926), p. 99.

(11) Building stone could be found in the Temple ruins and the devastated city; cf. 2, 15; Ezr. 6, 4. Timber was needed for the framework and roof.

(12) Lit. *then I'll take pleasure in it and glorify myself*. Grotius: *placebit mihi in ea domo ostendere majestatem meam*. As long as Jhvh had no Temple in Jerusalem, He could not dwell among his people and manifest his glory.

(13) V. 13 interrupts the narrative section that follows the poem, and many regard it as a gloss. Sievers inserts a modified form of v. 13^a between vv. 8 and 12 and rejects v. 13^b. V. 13^b, however, contains a sentiment corresponding to v. 8^b and may be the missing line of the triplet and a fitting conclusion to the first poem (cf. ZAT 26, 13, l. 4).

(14) Darius Hystaspis, 521–485 B.C. The passage 2, 3 would be meaningless at a later date, and the political situation described in 2, 6. 7. 21. 22 corresponds to that which existed when Darius Hystaspis ascended the Persian throne. Riessler's view that Darius represents Cambyzes, and that Zerubbabel was identical with Nehemiah and the first Persian governor of Judea, is impossible (cf. JBL 32, 107, n. 1; III, n. 13).

(15) Aug. 28, 520 B.C. Cf. HAV 290; GA 3, 195; JBL 33, 161. The Babylonian year of twelve lunar months consisted of 354 days. The first year of Darius, 521 B.C., contained a thirteenth or leap-year month of thirty days. Strassmaier (*Camb.* 400) has shown that the dark of the moon which was observed on Dûzu 14th in the seventh year of the reign of Cambyzes, occurred July 16/17, 523 B.C. If the 1137 days from Dûzu 14, 523 to Elul (sixth month) 1, 520 be added to the Julian date of July 16/17, 523 for the former, the date of Haggai's first poem must be Aug. 28/29, 520 B.C. The first of Elul was a holiday (Is. 66, 23; Am. 8, 5)

and the poem' was delivered before such a group of people as would assemble about a speaker on a day of this kind.

(16) Lit. *by the hand of* (cf. 2, 1). The divine message was communicated to the people through this channel. In 2, 10. 20 the communication is to the prophet only, presupposing that it was to be passed on to others.

(17) Haggai was a patriotic poet like Amos, Hosea, and Micah. Heb. *nabî* means not *foreteller* but *caused to speak, inspired* (TOCR 1, 271). CD (s.v. poetry) cites Bailey's line in the proem to *Festus: Poetry is in itself a thing of God; He made His prophets poets.*

(18) Zerubbabel, as Albright suggests, may be a late erroneous vocalization, based upon a popular etymology of the name. Originally it was *Zêrbâbêl*, Babylonian *Zêr-Bâbili*, meaning *Offspring of Babylon*, and a common formation in Babylonian (JBL 40, 108). Vocalizations based on popular etymology are very common, and have been collected by Böhl in an important paper on *Wortspiele im Alten Testament*, JPOS 6, 196-212, and in his brochure *Volksetymologie en Woordspeling in de Genesis-verhalen*. *Zerûb-babel* is a monstrosity, quite without parallel (Contrast Haupt, JBL 32, 108).

Zerubbabel was the Davidic scion on whom the Jewish hopes for the restoration of their political independence centered; he was the grandson of the last legitimate king of Judah, Jehoiachin (1 Chr. 3, 17; 2 K 24, 8) who was eighteen years old when he was carried captive to Babylon, and fifty-five when released by Evil-Merodach (2 K 25, 27). At that time he may have been allowed to establish a harem, so that he had seven sons. At his death his eldest son, Shealtiel, it may be supposed, was recognized as head of the Jews. It is possible that neither Shealtiel nor the second son, Malchiram, had sons and that the Zerubbabel who was heir to the throne was born to the third son, Pedaiah (1 Chr. 3, 19). Albright's conjecture (JBL 40, 108) that both Shealtiel and Pedaiah were fathers of sons bearing the name Zerubbabel, more easily solves the apparent discrepancy indicated in n. 27 below. The great joy that would arise among the exiles when an heir to the throne was born about 538 B.C. is pictured in Is. 9, 6 (JBL 32, 108; 35, 283; OLZ 12, 67; AJP 40, 67:

Mon. 29, 299). The babe Zerubbabel was taken with those who returned to Jerusalem in 538 B.C. under the permission of Cyrus. The boy was probably under the protection of his uncle Sheshbazzar whom E. Meyer (EdJ 75; see also *Ezra-Nehemiah*, SBOT, 58, 14) and Albright (JBL 40, 108 f.) identify with Shenazzar, the fourth son of Jehoiachin. Albright proposes *Šin-ab-ušur*, a common neo-Babylonian name (cf. Meyer's *Šin-bal-ušur* and contrast Torrey's view, AJSL 37, 93, n. 1) as the common original for both Shenazzar and Sheshbazzar. Shenazzar may have died as Zerubbabel was approaching manhood in 521 B.C., and perhaps one of the first official acts of Darius was the appointment of the eighteen year old Zerubbabel to succeed his uncle as governor of Judah.

(19) V. 3 is a useless repetition of part of v. 1, and interrupts the argument in vv. 2. 4.

(20) V. 4^b arose from v. 9^b.

(21) VV. 5^a and 7^a are monotonous repetitions of v. 2^a. VV. 5^b. 6 are amplifications of vv. 7^a. 9^a.

(22) André interprets the Hebrew term as a little perforated stone which indicated that its wearer was a serf, but it refers to a leaky purse. Grotius compares the sieves of the Danaïdes. Because of the high prices, money had lost its value, and even the well-paid laborer could buy no more than before. The conditions of 520 B.C. were paralleled by those that followed shortly after the World War. Necessities cost so much that, no matter how often purses are filled, their contents quickly disappear.

(23) V. 11^b is a detailed prosaic account of the drought's effects, and may represent an accretion of glosses.

(24) The *remnant* does not refer to those left in the land after the deportation in 586, nor to their descendants, but to the few who had survived the Captivity, and had returned to Judah, and had not succumbed to the ensuing hardships.

(25) Not *fear* (AV) of punishment by Jhv^h, but reverential awe manifested in obedience and respect.

(26) Neither Haggai nor Zechariah know of any previous work on the Temple. Ezr. 5, 16 is unsupported by evidence or probability, and Ezr. 3, 8-10 is much confused. Hölscher (*Die Propheten*, 334) suggests, on the basis of Jer. 41, 5, that even

the altar of burnt-offering had been erected during the period of the Captivity by Jhvh-worshippers who were left behind. Débris may have been removed; the foundations would not have been destroyed, and may have needed only repairs before the superstructure could be begun.

(27) Shealtiel is named as Zerubbabel's father in Matt. 1, 12; Luke 3, 27; Ezr. 3, 8; 5, 2; Neh. 12, 1 and throughout Haggai; but in 1 Chr. 3, 19 Zerubbabel is named as the son of Pedaiah. See note 18 above.

(28) Joshua was the grandson of Seraiah (1 Chr. 6, 14; **III** 5, 40) who was slain at Riblah in 586, and son of Jehozadak who went into the Captivity. Joshua may have been the first high-priest, the theocratic head of the congregation only after the removal of Zerubbabel in 519. The introductory lines are later than 519. Joshua may represent a subsequent addition. Haggai addressed his poem to Zerubbabel, not to Zerubbabel and Joshua (JBL 32, 113, l. 7; 37, 210; JSOR 2, 78). The statement *and to the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak* must be regarded as an unhistorical tertiary addition. S. E. Cook (EB¹¹ 1, 4^a) says, Several difficulties in the present Biblical text appear to have arisen from the attempt of later tradition to find a place for Aaron in certain incidents.

(29) This gloss may have been inserted in order to prevent the misunderstanding that Haggai was an Angel of Jhvh (so Ehrlich). Heb. *mal'ak* and Gr. ἄγγελος mean both *messenger* and *angel*. The addition does not imply that Haggai and Malachi are the same person (so Cheyne, *Crit. Bibl.* 179).

(30) V. 12^b was probably added to avoid the impression that the people had actually heard the voice of Jhvh (cf. ZDMG 63, 513, l. 13; Deut. 4, 12; John 5, 37).

II

(1) Both André and Böhme felt that the text of the second chapter had been disturbed. Haupt (JBL 32, 113; 37, 211; JSOR 2, 76) suggests that the poem at the end of the book (2, 20-23) originally followed the first poem; 1, 15 must be combined with 2, 20 to provide the date of this utterance. VV. 21-23 breathe a spirit of revolution against the Persian

supremacy, and express the hope that in the midst of the overthrow of the Persian power, the Davidic scion Zerubbabel will restore the political independence of Jhvh's people. Because of its revolutionary character it was probably suppressed after the power of Darius had been established; see above, p. 155. At a later date, probably after the fall of the Persian empire, the poem was appended at the end, since it exhibits the same meter as the preceding lines in vv. 14-16. 18. 19, and also because it formed a more pleasing conclusion to the book, just as Ezra-Nehemiah originally followed Chronicles, which later were given the concluding place in the canon in order to end it with the hopeful outlook of 2 Chr. 36, 23 (cf. Grimm's *Euphemistic Liturgical Appendices*, p. 1).

The rebuilding of the Temple was advocated by Haggai for political purposes. The desire for national independence was strong. Hopes for it were encouraged by the world situation at the death of Cambyses and the grapple for the Persian throne by Darius and others. The result in Judah was a political rebellion, with Zerubbabel, the governor of Judah by favor of the Persians, at its head. Haggai visualizing the world turmoil, lends his support to Zerubbabel. Less than a month after his first address he speaks again to prophesy the success of the rebellion and the exaltation of Jhvh's Chosen, Zerubbabel. According to Haupt, Ps. 21 (to which Ps. 24, 7-10 should be appended) glorifies the coronation of Zerubbabel. Also Pss. 20, 110, 132; 1 S 2, 1-10; Is. 9, 5. 6; 11, 1-6; Mic. 5, 1. 3; Luke 1, 68-79 refer to this Davidic scion (JBL 33, 167; 37, 213. 231; JSOR 2, 81; AJP 40, 69. 72. 74; ZDMG 58, 621; *Mic.* 10; *Mon.* 29, 296, 301, 305).

(2) V. 21 does not refer to a seismic disturbance, but is a poetical figure for the overthrow of the great powers of the earth which in 520 B.C. were the Persian government and its gods (cf. note 7 on III and JBL 37, 282ⁱ). These were apparently tottering to a fall in the confusion that followed the death of Cambyses (cf. JBL 32, 108).

(3) Lit. *throne of kingdoms*, an intensive plural referring to the dominion of the world-wide Persian empire.

(4) Jewish hopes need not be limited by the puny strength of their little community. Jhvh's power, believed to be operating

at the very moment in causing the confusion and dissension within the great Persian empire, was expected by Haggai to bring about its utter destruction (cf. Jud. 7, 22; Ezek. 38, 21; Zech. 14, 13; 2 Chr. 20, 23). Jhvh's hand was at work, and ultimately would set up Jerusalem as His dwelling place, the center of world control (JBL 32, 109-112. 115. 120).

(5) Zerubbabel was to signify to all the world all the authority and favor which a signet ring of Jhvh's hand would carry (cf. Gen. 41, 42; Est. 3, 10; 8, 2). Sellin, *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (1912), p. 179, n. 1, says that the Cherub is called in Ezek. 28, 12 a *signet*; but this passage is very uncertain; see *Ezekiel* (SBOT) 85. 39. 42; Kautzsch's AT³ 1, 899, note *a*. Ezek. 28, 12^b-16 seems to be an illustrative mythological quotation; cf. Is. 14, 12. Sellin's explanation of the obscure phrase in Ezek. 28, 12, rendered in JB: *thou seal most accurate*, is just as questionable as his interpretation (*op. cit.*, p. 178) of the epithet in Is. 9, 6, translated in RV^M: *Father of Eternity* (cf. AJP 40, 72; Mon. 29, 302). For *signet* as a symbol of something precious and dear cf. Jer. 22, 24; Cant. 8, 6; see Haupt, BL 109; Grapow, *Vergleiche im Ägyptischen* (1920), p. 19. For Cant. 8, 6 also compare the lines in Tennyson's poem *The Miller's Daughter*; She is grown so dear, that I would be the jewel that trembles in her ear; and I would be the girdle about her dainty waist and I would be the necklace upon her balmy bosom.

(6) All the Versions count 1, 15^a as the first verse of c. 2, and in the Received Text there is a lesser pericopic division between vv. 14 and 15. Rothstein and Klosterman believe that a passage has fallen out of the text after v. 15. The date in 1, 15 is one which the utterance in 2, 21-23 would suit admirably; the same day of the month is referred to in 2, 20; and the poem in 2, 20-23 is the only one of the four in the book whose attached date lacks mention of the month. What appears as a useless appendage after 1, 14 serves well before 2, 20-23.

(7) Twenty-three days after the date in 1, 1 (see n. 15 on I), *i.e.* Sept. 20, 520 B.C.

(8) See n. 16 on I.

(9) André correctly assigns v. 21^a to the final redactor who conformed the verse to 1, 1 and 2, 2 on the basis of the address

to Zerubbabel in 2, 23. Note the omission of Joshua here; see note 28 on I.

(10) Zerubbabel, chosen for the throne of David.

(11) This addition was probably made by a late glossator who believed the twenty-fourth referred to the ninth month in 2, 10. 18. Cf. the translation of Josh. 5, 2 in the Polychrome Bible and Zech. 4, 12 (JBL 32, 121, 11) as well as *Est.* 22, 14; IJG⁵ 276, n. 5.

III

(1) After seven weeks of work on the Temple the people grew discouraged at the slow progress of its reconstruction. The enthusiasm which marked the beginning of their labors (1, 14) waned, as they became aware of the limited resources of the little community, the restrictive effect of withdrawing workers from productive occupations, and the contrast between the glory of the former Temple and the one which their hands were erecting. Nor had there yet appeared a fulfillment of the prediction of Zerubbabel's exaltation which had been made four weeks before. Haggai saw the necessity of re-establishing the *morale* of the workers.

(2) The Temple had been destroyed sixty-six years before by Nebuchadnezzar (2 K 25, 9. 13). A very few men, seventy-five or eighty years old, could have remained to tell from personal remembrance, of the glory of those bygone days. That their reminiscences would be idealized, and that they would be pessimistic with regard to the times at hand, would be more or less characteristic of their old age. The effect on the public mind of such disparaging remarks was detrimental to the purpose of completing the work.

(3) This comment was doubtless quite familiar to the ears of the people, and was mentioned by the poet, not for emphasis of its truth, but as an introduction which would catch the public attention, and from which he could proceed to combat the discouragement which it caused.

(4) Do not spend time in vain and disquieting comparisons! Take courage and work!

(5) There is no reason for discouragement. Jhvh, abiding among them would beyond a doubt supply all that they might fail to accomplish. Cf. Is. 9, 7 (*Mon.* 29, 302; AJP 40, 72).

(6) The prediction in 2, 21-23 had not been fulfilled. Doubts concerning it had arisen. So Haggai says: Have faith *only a little while longer*; Jhvh has shattered the powers of the world before, and he will do it again *after a little while*. The Hebrew phrase at the beginning of this triplet means lit. *yet once a little it* or *once more a little it is*, i.e., the Persian empire was shaken by rebellions in various provinces at the beginning of the reign of Darius. These insurrections have been crushed. But soon the empire will be shaken again by new uprisings, and this will enable you to regain your political independence (JBL 32, 108). J. D. Michaelis' (1782) rendering (*once more, but only for a short time*) is incorrect; he referred this prediction to Alexander the Great's overthrow of the Persian empire in 331. The same misinterpretation was given by Döderlein in his edition of Grotius' *Annotiones* (1776).

(7) V. 6 does not refer to a physical catastrophe, but to the religious and political upheaval that was taking place over the world, and to battles on land and sea (see n. 2 on II). The hemistich *and sea and dry land* is not a prosaic gloss, as Mitchell thinks.

(8) The same Hand that was destroying the nations will cause these events to bring about the enrichment of Jerusalem, His chosen dwelling place. Rich spoil will flow into the city, when Zerubbabel becomes victorious with Jhvh's aid. The Maccabees provide a parallel 350 years later; cf. Ps. 68, 14. 31 (AJSL 23, 229, n. 21 and 236, n. 48).

(9) The Received Text has the singular, which the Vulgate and Luther explain as referring to the Messiah. The Versions have the plural, and in the Received Text (in which the word, though singular, is accompanied by a plural verb) it can be pointed as a plural without the change of a single consonant. It refers, as the following verse indicates, to the riches that will be gotten from the heathen who are to be subdued by Jhvh's power.

(10) This statement is not declarative of Jhvh's ownership of valuable metals in use or unmined, but is anticipatory of the riches that were to flow into the city when Jhvh's plans for Zerubbabel were fulfilled.

(11) The Temple's humble beginnings will finally be clothed with glory, and the people's poverty will be replaced with pros-

perity. In Is. 9, 6 Zerubbabel is called the Prince of Weal, i.e. prosperity (*Mon.* 29, 302; *AJP* 40, 69).

(12) Oct. 17, 520 B.C., the seventh day of the Feast of Tabernacles (*Ezek.* 45, 25; *Lev.* 23, 34) of which no mention is made here. Its celebration may have been much less elaborate in 520 B.C. than usual because of the poor harvests and other troubles.

(13) V. 5^a is lacking in all the Versions but the Vulgate, and is rejected by nearly all critics. The glossator was probably thinking of a passage like Ex. 3, 12, and meant to say: Remember *the promise which I gave you when you came out of Egypt*. Cf. also Jer. 7, 23; Ex. 19, 5. 6.

(14) *Peace of mind*, i.e. security; *preservation*, i.e. safety; if they start to lay the foundations of the new Temple, they will not be disturbed and endangered. This gloss to the final word of the second poem is preserved in the Greek. We need not suppose that it is based on Ezr. 9, 9^b.

IV

(1) Work on the Temple again lagged, and shrugging shoulders reappeared, when Haggai's extravagant promises of October failed to materialize within the following two months; so he renewed his efforts to inspire the people with enthusiasm. A new kind of appeal was necessary. This time his approach was on the basis of the religious significance of the new Temple.

(2) That is, the meat of a sacrificial victim.

(3) Does holiness spread easily? Does it pass from one object through another to a third? Any one in the crowd familiar with the common ideas of ceremonial contagion knew that the only reply was, No.

(4) Cf. Num. 19, 11-22 (P). Aversion among Orientals to a dead body and the ceremonial defilement of all that touches it is well known.

(5) Does pollution spread easily? Will it spread through an intermediate object or person to a third?

(6) A layman might have hesitated to put aside a valuable skin-bottle of wine that had accidentally been touched by one who had been near a corpse, but every one knew that in such

a case the verdict of the priests would be, Unclean. A layman may be inclined to disregard the rules of quarantine for contagion, but every one knows that any physician will insist on them where a contagious disease exists. As no one needs actually to inquire for the physician's opinion on such a matter, so Haggai's hearers did not actually consult the priests.

(7) The implication in these two questions may be illustrated by the fact that a single disease germ may affect an entire community, but a great amount of disinfectant is required to eradicate an epidemic that has once spread.

(8) The pause that followed vv. 12. 13 made their *argumentum ad hominem* more impressive, and served to separate their dialectic from the exposition that follows. The following lines have three beats in each hemistich, not two as in the preceding three couplets; cf. *Cant.* 14, no. 10, ii and p. 52; BL 101, l. 1.

(9) The people were living without a center of ceremonial and moral cleansing, the Temple, while they were continually in contact with the defiling foreign influences of their day. The altar of burnt-offering did not afford a place strong enough to make the true religion of Jhvh a real influence. Only the reconstructed Temple could dominate their minds. When it had been built, they would be proud that they were Jews, and keep themselves ritually clean.

(10) Their defilement had contaminated their handiwork to such a degree that when they brought the product of their labor before Jhvh, it did not please Him, and He had therefore not prospered them.

(11) Contrast 2, 4 (n. 2 on III). Haggai here directs attention to the past instead of to the future. Such work as had been done on the Temple was being accompanied by evidences of the return of Jhvh's favor.

(12) Lit. *upward*; cf. our expressions, *to trace the stream upward, down to the present time, high antiquity*. The primary connotation of the Hebrew term for eternity (*ôlâm*) is *highness*, i.e. *high antiquity*, time long past. We use *below* (Lat. *infra*) for *later* in a book, and *above* (Lat. *supra*) for that which precedes. Lat. *vita superior* means *former life*, and *aetas superiorum* denotes *past*; also ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω (or ἐπέκεινα) χρόνοις signifies *in former*

times. On the other hand, the past is called in Hebrew: *front*, and the future: *back* (AJSL 24, 141, n. *). Drusius (1550–1616) and J. D. Michaelis (1668–1738) interpreted this Hebrew *upward* correctly as equivalent to *retro ad anteriora tempora* (see Hitzig-Steiner *ad loc.*).

Wellhausen says, *upward* must have the same meaning in both vv. 15 and 18, and any one who denies that *upward* means *forward* cannot expect any consideration of his exegesis. We must assume the risk. The interpretation denounced by Wellhausen is found in Luther's Bible, J. D. Michaelis' translation, Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*, Hitzig's *Prophet. Bücher*, Ewald's *Propheten*², Kautzsch's AT¹; also in Siegfried-Stade's and Francis Brown's dictionaries as well as in VB. V. 18^a (v) is secondary, and the following date (φφ) is an erroneous tertiary addition (see below, n. 29).

(13) The poet invites comparison between two distinct periods in the past which are separated by the date on which the reconstruction of the Temple was begun, Sept. 1, 520 B.C. (cf. 1, 12; Zech. 4, 9; JBL 32, 109; 33, 161). The period before that date he pictures in v. 16, and the interval between Sept. 1 and Dec. 18 he treats in vv. 18. 19.

(14) An experienced farmer might be expected to estimate the amount of grain that had been threshed out, by looking at the size of a pile of straw and chaff. In dry seasons, however, the heads of the grain do not fill out, and the yield of grain in proportion to the straw is much less. An epidemic of disease or *rust* also affects both the quality and quantity. In the summers preceding Sept. 1, 520 B.C. the farmers, who came to store their grain after threshing, found their expectations only half met.

(15) Grapes were trodden in the upper vat of the wine-press; the juice flowed from it into a second vat from which it was drawn into jars and skins (see the cut on p. 68 of the translation of *Judges* in the Polychrome Bible; cf. EB 5312). Heb. *pûrâ* is sometimes used for the press itself (cf. Haupt's *Joel*, n. 59 and AJSL 24, 126). Here it refers to the receiving vat which a vine-dresser might approach with the expectation of drawing off a yield of fifty jars. But in a dry season the grapes shrivel and yield less juice. The seasons preceding 520 B.C. had proven more disastrous to grapes than to grain, and less than half the expected

yield of wine was produced. *Jars* after *fifty* is omitted in Hebrew, just as we say a *quarter* for the fourth part of a dollar, or as *tenner* is used for a ten-pound note, or *tierce* for the third part of pipe (126 wine-gallons). A Roman *amphora* (MLN 33, 432) held about six gallons, a Syriac *hâbîâ* (OLZ 18, 297; ZA 30, 99) about eight gallons. For Oriental store-jars cf. the cut on p. 42 of Müller-Simonis, *Du Caucase au Golfe Persique* (Washington, 1892).

(16) In the interval since Sept. 1 the drought had been broken, and the early rains of October-November had come in abundance to soften the sun-baked ground for plowing and seeding.

(17) Barley and wheat, the two winter grains, had been sown after the fall rains. A good harvest could be anticipated. The fields are generally sown in November-December (see Benzinger, *Hebr. Arch.* 130ⁱ; contrast Matthes, ZAT 21, 125). Sometimes the winter rains are delayed until January (EB 4008). The husbandmen cannot start ploughing before the autumnal rains have prepared the land for the reception of the seed. The ground becomes very hard during the dry season (DB 1, 48^b).

(18) Grain was stored in pits (cf. Jer. 41, 8 and JBL 38, 133, n. 3) or in dry cisterns hewn out of the rock (EB 85). In England a hole dug in a potato- or turnip-field, for storing potatoes, &c. during the winter, is called a *pit* (EB¹¹ 21, 659^b, l. 5). The rendering *barn* (which means originally *barley-place*, *bere-ern*) is misleading, as are also Marti's *Speicher* and Nowack's *Scheuer* (so, too, Wellhausen and Duhm) or J. D. Michaelis' *Kornboden*. There were no covered buildings for the storage of farm-produce in Palestine. For a description of the grain-pits of post-exilic Gibeah, three miles north of Jerusalem, see Albright, *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, vol. IV, p. 27.

(19) The good vintage had already given proof of the changed fortunes.

(20) In vv. 15-19 Haggai appealed to the change in the tide of misfortune since work had begun on the Temple, as evidence of the contention that prosperity was directly dependent on the reconstruction of Jhvh's Temple. Therefore, so he implies, the people should hasten to work on it; the earlier its completion, the sooner will come the full measure of Jhvh's grant of prosperity.

(21) Dec. 18, 520 B.C. The two Hebrew months and three days, which had elapsed since the third poem (see n. 12 on III) was published, amount to two months and but one day in the longer months of the Julian calendar.

(22) Cf. 2, 20 and n. 16 on I.

(23) The questions in vv. 12. 13 were not actually submitted to the priests. It is but a literary device adopted by the poet (cf. JBL 32, 108, n. 4; also Reuss' AT 2, 546, n. 4). The people knew well what the decision of the priests would be, if they were consulted; see above, n. 6.

(24) *Torah* is elsewhere used to denote the Law and is so translated here by the Versions; but, used without the article here, it has the more original meaning of *instruction* or *decision* (cf. JBL 36, 259). The oldest codes of the Law, Ex. 20–23 (E) and 34, 10–26 (J) as well as the Deuteronomic Code and the laws of Ezekiel, perhaps also the Law of Holiness (Lev. 17–26) were doubtless known, and more or less authoritative, at this time; but such incidents as this show that the Law was still living and growing. The priests rendered decisions which might afterwards be codified.

(25) According to Haupt (JBL 36, 149) the addition which is found in the Greek after 2, 14, consists of three glosses, the original Hebrew text of which should have been translated:—(a) *because of their acceptance of bribes*;—(b) *and they were grieved because of their labor*;—(c) *and their hatred of a pleader in the gate*. Gloss *b* belongs to end of IV, vi while he assigns *a* and *c* to Zech. 8, 16. See below, n. 28.

(26) V. 17 is an illustrative quotation which is a loose reproduction of Am. 4, 9. It is rejected by nearly all critics, since it mentions grain-diseases which arise from excessive moisture, whereas the genuine words of Haggai refer to drought; cf. 1, 10. 11.

(27) These words are a euphemistic liturgical appendix to avoid the ominous conclusion *unbearing*.

(28) See above, n. 25. Haupt who holds that Zech. 8, 9–17 is Haggaiian (JBL 32, 107; 33, 161), believes that Zech. 8, 9–17 is a sequel to Hag. 2, 14–19 and was once written in a column parallel to it. Glosses σσ and ττ, having been inserted between the two columns, afterwards crept into the wrong column.

(29) Lit. *in the gate*, i.e. *who pleads with a court in favor of a (poor) defendant*.

(30) This date (Dec. 18, 520 B.C.) cannot refer to the following phrase *The time from the day when the Temple was founded*, since that occurred about Sept. 1; see above, n. 13. It is an addition based on the date given in 2, 10 (α) and is rejected by Wellhausen, Nowack, Marti, Duhm and Budde.

CRITICAL NOTES

חגי, adjectival in form, means *festal* (GK § 86, i; ZDMG 63, 520, l. 11). The name may also be explained as a shortening of חגיה (1 Chr. 6, 15) or of חגריה, as Zaccai (Zacchaeus) is a contraction of Zechariah (cf. JAOS 22, 101; BA 3, 566). Daiches (OLZ 11, 276) regards it as a mixed name, Hebrew in outer covering and Babylonian in content. *Ha-a-ag-ga-a* is found twice in the Murašû contract tablets. The name is not uncommon among the Hebrews, being found in the Talmud and borne by approximately a dozen different men mentioned in the Elephantine papyri where it is exceeded in frequency only by *Hosea*, *Meshullam* and perhaps *Nathan* and *Shallum*.

8

(i) For מ לא עת בא עת read עת בא עת following G οὐχ ἔκει οὐ καίρος, V *nondum venit tempus*, L *usquequo non veniet tempus*, S לא מתי ובא, T לא מקא עדן. Ehrlich's reading לא עת-בנות, with excision of להבנות at the end, and Grätz's עיר בא for מ עת-בא, adopted in Oort's *Emendationes*, are both unacceptable.

For מ העת לכון T has הכרין כשר לכון, *is it thus fitting for you?*

For מ קפונים (G κοιλοστέμμοις, L *caelatis*, V *laqueatis*, T די משללין בסרי ארויא, *which are roofed with planks of cedar*) we must read קפונים; cf. 1 K 6, 15 and στέγη, *roof*; στέγος, *house*. Contrast *Kings* 163, 32. Ehrlich's emendation צפונים, co-ordinated to אתם, is gratuitous; but the rendering *covered* (roofed) *houses* in Reuss' AT (1892) is better than the translation *ceiled* (i.e. *wainscoted*) *houses*.

(ii) Ehrlich admits that v. 7^b should be followed by v. 9.

For **M** לְבַבְכֶּם **GVS** have τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, *corda vestra*, לְבוֹחֶן (so throughout the book) and some critics (cf. ICC *ad loc.*) might feel tempted to read לְבַבְכֶּם; but the plural would be contrary to Hebrew usage (cf. GK²⁸ § 124, s). It would be just as unidiomatic as if a German translator used the plural for our *physics, mathematics, acoustics, gallows, headquarters*. **G** has ξύλα (**S** קישא) for עץ, Hag. 1, 8; ἔργα for מלאכה, 1, 14; θρόνους for כסא, 2, 22; **S** פאריה for יבולה, 1, 10; **V** *jumenta* for הבהמה, 1, 11; cf. last note on מ. Kittel notes *ad* Lam. 3, 41 that many MSS read לבבני instead of לבבנו, and that the plural is supported by **GVS**; but לבבני (we should expect at least לבבותני; cf. Franz Delitzsch's translation of Acts 14, 17) is as incorrect as **M** לְבַבְהֶן (Nah. 2, 8) for לְבַבְהֶן (contrast *Nah*, 46). It is sufficient to refer to the concordances *s.* לָבָם and לְבַבְכֶּם or לָבָם and לְבַבְכֶּם.

Not only לב is used in the singular, even in cases where it refers to a number of persons, but also קרב, נפש, רוח, פה, and this usage prevails also in Assyrian. Gen. 42, 28 we read ויצא לָבָם (**G** καὶ ἐξέστη ἡ καρδία αὐτῶν, *Graec. Ven.* ἐξῆλθεν ἡ σφῶν καρδία, **S** ואל לבהן). Similarly we find in Assyrian: *iplax libbašunu*, their heart feared, or *ikpud libbašunu*, their heart planned.

We often find αἱ καρδίαι in NT where OT has the singular לב; cf. e.g. Mal 3, 24 and Luke 1, 17; Jer. 31, 33 and Heb. 10, 16; Ps. 95, 8 and Heb. 3, 8. 15. **G** has καρδίαν πατρός πρὸς υἱόν for **M** לב אבות ואֵל בני in Mal. 3, 24, **V** *cor patrum ad filios*, **S** לבא דאבהא על בניה, **C** לב אבהן על בנין. Joel (2, 13) says קרעי לבבכם, ואל בגדיכם; **G** has τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, **V** *corda vestra*, **S** לביכון. It is idiomatic Hebrew to say לב בני אדם, לב חכמים, עשו לכם לב, חדש רוח חדשה, פי רשעים, הכינו לב, נתתי להם לב, שמו לבם, אל תשיבו לב, סערו לבכם. The singular ἡ καρδία instead of the plural αἱ καρδίαι is found also in the NT; cf. e.g. Luke 1, 66; 8, 12; 24, 32. 38 where **V** renders: *et posuerunt in corde suo; tollit verbum de corde eorum; nonne cor nostrum ardens erat; but cogitationes ascendunt in corda vestra*. Cf. also John 12, 40; 14, 1; I John 3, 20.

Ehrlich thinks we ought to read פָּנָה אֶל הָרֶבֶה, *ye made room for much* (Gen. 24, 31). It was not necessary for the people to make room for the harvest; they had plenty of garners (cf. n. 18 on IV) and they were not full. Moreover, we should expect at least פָּנָה לְהָרֶבֶה. The phrase פָּנָה אֶל הָרֶבֶה means lit. *to turn the face towards much*, i.e. *to look for in anticipation*.

For **M** וְהִנֵּה **GS** suggest וְהִנֵּה, but **V** has *ecce*. The **L** is emphatic; cf. n. 3 to Haupt, *The Book of Ecclesiastes in Oriental Studies* (Boston, 1894), p. 264; see also GK § 143, e; VG 1, 501, b; JBL 29, 104; 35, 289; AJP 40, 71, n. 27; לִמְעַט is practically equivalent to our *precious little*.

Read בֵּיתָה; **M** הַבֵּית is due to הַבֵּית in the preceding verse. **תָּם** is a conditional clause (GK § 159, g).

אֲנִי שִׁלַּח בִּיהּ מֵאֲרֵתָא **T** is correctly interpreted by **T** *I cast upon it a curse*. For נִפַּח, *blow, curse*, cf. Job 4, 9 where AV translates נִשְׁמַת by *blast*; רוּחַ, *wrath*, in Jud. 8, 3; Is. 25, 4; 30, 28; Zech. 6, 8 (JBL 32, 112, n. 19); Prov. 16, 32; 29, 11; אִף means *heavy breathing*, also *wrath*; Syr. אֲתִנְפַּח, *to be blown upon or away* signifies also *to be blasted*.

For **B** in בּוֹ נִפַּחְתִּי בּוֹ cf. Lat. *afflare* and JBL 32, 112, n. 19; AJP 40, 70, n. 23.

(iii) For **M** יֵעַן מָה נָאִם יְהוָה **G** has διὰ τοῦτο τάδε λέγει Κύριος. But there is a pause after מָה יֵעַן. **V**, correctly, *Quam ob causam? dicit Dominus*. For the two beats of יֵעַן מָה, see AJSJ 19, 130, last line. Cf. וְרִבְבָּל in the second hemistich of ג, ii.

For **M** רָצִים **G** has διώκετε. The following **L** has the connotation of *for the benefit of*. For רוּץ, *to run*, be zealous, cf. Is. 59, 7; Prov. 1, 16; 6, 18; GB¹⁶ 752^a; see also above, p. 162, l. 16. Ehrlich cites Ber. 28^b: אֲנִי רָץ לְחַיֵּי הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא, *I strive for life in the world to come* (BT 1, 104, l. 4). We must not read רָצִים בְּבֵיתוֹ (so Wellhausen, also Duhm, ZAT 31, 108). Nor can we adopt Cheyne's emendation הָרָצִים (*Crit. Bibl.* 179).

(iv) After **עַל-כֵּן** omit **M** עֲלֵיכֶם (**V**, *super vos*) following **G**. **T** has **עַל כֵּן** בְּדִיל חֻבִּיכֶן *therefore on account of your sins*. **M** עֲלֵיכֶם originated as a gloss after וְאִקְרָא in the following line, and later

was transferred to the preceding line because of its resemblance to על-כן.

For **M** מַטְל (**G** ἀπὸ δρόσου, **S** מן טאלא) we must read מַטְלָם; cf. **9**. **C** has מִלְאֲחֶתָּא מַטְרָא, from *sending rain*. Delitzsch (LSAT 12, **m**) thinks that the prefixed **m** in **M** מַטְל is due to dittography. Grätz's reading מַעַל instead of מַטְל is not good.

For **M** וְאִקְרָא **G** has καὶ ἐπαύω.

For **M** חֲרֵב **GS** have ῥομφαίον, חֲרֵבָא, *gladium* (= חֲרֵב).

For **M** עַל in the third line of this triplet, read the archaic form עַלִי. Haupt reads also עַמִי, מַעִי wherever the rhythm requires it; see JBL 38, 151, n. 10.

(v) For **M** וְהִבְאֵתֶם (**C** וְאִתְּוִי, **S** אִתְּוִי, **V** portate), read וְבִרְאֵתֶם, following **G** κόψατε and **L** caedite; וְהִבְאֵתֶם may have been corrupted to וְהִבְאֵתֶם, but not *vice versa*. Ehrlich retains **M**. Grätz (*Emend.*) suggests וְהִטְבַּחְתֶּם, but this would not have been corrupted to וְהִבְאֵתֶם.

The Dageš in אֶרְפָּה־בִּי is due to the enclitic character of בִּי; cf. Haupt, JBL 36, 251¹, *ad* v. 9; 37, 216, v. 2; GK²⁸ § 20, g, l. 7; G²⁹ 66; BuL 188. 199; VG 570, c.

The *Kētīb* וְאֶכְבֶּד is preferable to the *Qērē* וְאֶכְבֶּדָה. Note also that אֶכְבֶּדָה would become in pause אֶכְבֶּדָה. For the meaning *I shall manifest my glory* cf. the translation of Lev. 10, 3 in the Polychrome Bible; also Ezek. 28, 22; Is. 26, 15. According to Morgenstern (ZA 25, 141–153 and the *Haupt Anniversary Volume*, p. 98) כְּבוֹד יְהוָה is a technical term used by Ezekiel and P to designate the semi-material form assumed by Jhvh in revealing himself to mortals. To Ehrlich, אֶכְבֶּד means here *I shall feel amply rewarded*.

After **M** יְהוָה **S** adds חֵילְתָּנָא.

(α) We must not insert לְאֹמֶר אֶמְרֵנָא following **G** λέγων Εἰπόν and 2, 1. 2 and 20. 21; **M** לְאֹמֶר אֶמְרֵנָא should also be omitted in 2, 1. 2. In 2, 20. 21 (וַיְהִי דְבַר יְהוָה אֶל חֲנַי) the insertion of אֹמֶר is correct, but in 1, 1 and 2, 1. 2 (וַיְהִי דְבַר יְהוָה בְּיַד חֲנַי אֶל וְרַבְבֵּל) it is superfluous. Cf. Budde's remarks in ZAT 26, 9; also note on **7**, α.

(β) **M** לאמר is lacking in **GS**.

(δ) Oort's emendation בבתים instead of בבתים is unnecessary, if we read במקוניהם and regard בתיכם as a gloss.

(ζ) Read לשבע for **M** לשבעה.

Grätz (*Emend.*) suggests בו for **M** לו, following **G** καὶ οὐκ ἐθερμάνθητε ἐν αὐτοῖς, but **M** means: A man would clothe himself without feeling warm; cf. Haupt's remarks on impersonal constructions in his paper *The Son of Man in Mon.* 29, 126. Lange in his *Bibelwerk* (1876) gives the correct translation *aber nicht zum Warmwerden für einen*.

Omit **M** המשתכר as a gloss and read ישתכר (so several MSS; cf. ZAT 26, 11) for **M** משתכר. Cf. *Leviticus* 26, 40; *Kings* 289, 20.

Ehrlich's view that הָבֵא in the second hemistich of v. 6 does not mean *to bring in*, but *to produce*, is unfounded; cf. 2 S 9, 10. We do not find אשר תביא האדמה in v. 11.

(π) In **M** על-אשר insert כל, following **GS** and many MSS.

M האדם is a collective noun; **GS** have the plural. Similarly בהמה; cf. above, p. 177, l. 9.

(ξ) V. 13 or portions of it are rejected by nearly all critics. The epithet יהוה מלאך in ξ for the usual נביא suggests that 13^a is an interpolation; but 13^b is a fitting conclusion for the first poem (cf. ZAT 26, 13).

(ο) Ehrlich's view that כל שארית העם does not include the people who had returned from Babylon is untenable; שארית denotes the Jews after the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. In Maccabean texts it refers to the Jews who had survived the Syrian persecution; cf. Haupt's translation of Ps. 76, 11 (ZDMG 61, 287, l. 20; 286, l. 28). Zeph. 3, 13, cited by Ehrlich, is Maccabean (cf. JBL 38, 147, l. 13) and שארית ישראל at the beginning of that verse is a later addition.

(π) For **M** פחת **G** has ἐκ φυλῆς, an attempt to see in the strange word פחת some form related to the more familiar ממשפחת. **G** likewise inserts בית. Heb. פחת is the Assy. *bêl pixâti*, lord of a district, and *paxâtu*, governor (AJSL 24, 131; AkF 6). Cf. above, p. 165, l. 12. In Hebrew we have secondary doubling of the *h*:

pāḥḥâ, pahḥat; cf. *āḥḥād*, one, constr. *ahḥād*; also *ahḥim*, brothers, *āḥḥâu*, his brothers (BuL §§ 24, g; 21, n; contrast AkF 6).

(טט) Insert בַּחַת יְהוּדָה following **GF** and parallels in 1, 1. 14; 2, 2.

(פפ) Read וְאֵל for **M** וְעַל after יִשְׁמַע.

For הוּא שָׁלַח, *as he commanded him to speak*, cf. Prov. 26, 6; 2 S 11, 22; 1 K 14, 6; Is. 55, 11. Grotius says: *Sicut misit Dominus, id est, quae Deus ei dicenda mandaverat, nam שָׁלַח Hebrais saepe hanc significationem habet*. Cf. GB¹⁶ 832^a, e and JBL 26, 24, n. †.

After **M** אֱלֹהֵיהֶם **GVS** add אֱלֹהֵם. Its omission in **M** is due to haplography. We must not substitute אֱלֹהִים for אֱלֹהֵיהֶם, as Ehrlich suggests.

ב

For the Hebrew text of this quatrain see Haupt, JSOR 2, 77.

After **M** אָרַץ **G** adds καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ξηράν, an addition due to the resemblance of 2, 21 with 2, 6.

M מַמְלֻכּוֹת (**G** βασιλείων for βασιλειῶν) is an intensive plural; the great king (ὁ μέγας βασιλεὺς) of Persia is called מַלְכִּים in Ps. 110, 5 (JSOR 2, 76) and in the same way the great Persian empire is called מַמְלֻכּוֹת. In the Sidonian inscriptions of the fourth century B.C. מַמְלַכַּת means *king* (cf. JAOS 45, 272). **V** has the singular for מַמְלֻכּוֹת in ε. Also in **M** the plural forms מַלְכִּים, מַמְלֻכּוֹת, and מַלְכוּיֹת (i.e. מַלְכוּיֹת or מַלְכוּיֹת; cf. Albrecht, § 84, h) which were written מַלְכִּי, מַמְלֻכִּי, and מַלְכוּיִי, respectively (JBL 34, 81; 36, 252; AJSL 32, 74) are occasionally confounded; in Jer. 10, 7 Duhm and Cornill substitute מַלְכִּיהֶם (Θ, τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν αὐτῶν) for **M** מַלְכוֹתָם.

Insert כל before חֹזֶק, following **G**^A.

Read וְהַאֲבִרְתִּי for **M** וְהַפְכֵתִי which is due to vertical ditto-graphy; cf. Mic. 5, 9.

M מַרְכָּבָה is a collective noun; cf. our *horse* for *cavalry*, and *foot* for *infantry*. **GVS** read the plural. The word denotes the scythed chariots of the Persians, the δρεπανηφόρα ἄρματα of Xen. An. 1, 7, 10 and Diod. Sic. 17, 53 (JBL 37, 231, l. 3).

After **M** וְרַכְבִּיהָ **G**^A adds καὶ καταστρέψω πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καὶ καταβαλῶ τὰ ὄρια αὐτῶν· καὶ ἐνισχύσω τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς μου. Cf. ג, σ; ד, μ. סס. טז.

Point וַיִּרְדּוּ (hophal future of רדה, *to subdue*) instead of מַרְדּוֹ (perfect qal of ירד with ו consecutive). Cf. AJSL 32, 70; JBL 34, 58, l. 9; also 38, 163ⁱ. Grätz's emendation חרדו is gratuitous.

Read וַתְּלִימוּ, *footmen*, for מַלְכֵיהֶם which is dittography from the preceding hemistich; cf. Jer. 12, 5; WF 217, iii.

After אֶחָיו Nowack (following Grätz) adds יָפַל; others prefer יַפְלוּ.

Duhm (ZAT 31, 110) regards אִישׁ בַּחֶרֶב אֶחָיו as a secondary addition derived, perhaps, from Ezek. 38, 21; horses, he says, have no swords.

Ehrlich thinks we must evidently read תַּחֲתָם, *instead of them* (*scil.* מַמְלָכוֹת) instead of מַלְכוּתָם, but this would be very prosaic, and תַּחֲתָם would never have been corrupted to מַלְכוּתָם. Moreover, מַמְלָכוֹת denotes one kingdom, *viz.* the Persian empire, and even Haggai did not hope that Zerubbabel would become the supreme ruler of the Persian empire.

To מַלְכוּתָם C adds עָלֶיךָ which supports Haupt's suggestion that an original בִּימִי has been lost because of its resemblance to כִּי־כֵן at the beginning of ו which follows.

(KK) Ehrlich says we must read הַשֵּׁשִׁי instead of בִּשְׁשִׁי, but בִּשְׁשִׁי is a tertiary addition, derived from א, α, as is also שְׁשִׁים which, according to Ehrlich, should be prefixed to א, ג.

ג

(i) מַלְכוּתָם is omitted in G^V L; G^S περιλειφθεῖς. For the article before the predicate cf. GK § 126, k. Since the allusion was to the well-known few who had seen the Solomonic Temple the use of the article is natural.

The plural רִאִים is an intended contrast with the singular רֹאֶה of the first line.

מַה וְמָה means *what, and as what*, not *how*; מַה גָּדוֹל, *how great* = *what a great thing*. Cf. WdG 2, 314, l. 4; contrast GB¹⁶ 401, B. On the other hand, מִי may mean *how*; see last note on ד, v.

Wellhausen's rendering of כְּמוֹהוּ בְּאֵין is correct; Heb. כְּמוֹהוּ can not mean simply *such a thing* (ZAT 26, 13; GB¹⁶ 330^b) or *such a one* (VB; JB). There is nothing contemptuous in כְּמוֹהוּ, as Lange in his *Bibelwerk* supposes. The literal translation would be *its likeness is the likeness of nothing*; cf. GK²⁸ § 161, c. In Arabic when we wish to say, *he is like a dog*, we must say (as in the Koran 7, 175) lit. *his likeness is like the likeness of the dog*; cf. KAT² 505; Fleischer, KS 1, 378. Even Rückert (1831) rendered incorrectly: *Ist nicht ein solches wie Nichts in euren Augen?* and Hitzig (1854): *Ist nicht Seinesgleichen wie keines in euren Augen?* Ewald's statement that older writers would have said הוּא כְּאֵין is unwarranted. The idiomatic כְּמוֹהוּ בְּאֵין and the two corrupt readings אֵין אַתְּכֶם and מְהִיּוֹתֶם certainly do not indicate that Haggai was an old man (Ewald, *Proph.*² 3, 179).

(ii) For the hemistich זָרַבְבָּל cf. first note on א, iii.

After הוּא יְהוָה נֵאֵם add צְבָאוֹת with **UV**.

M חֹזֶק, misplaced in l. 2, should be restored as a plural before וַעֲשֹׂה in l. 3.

(iii) Wellhausen's conjecture that **M** עוֹד אַחַת מַעַט הִיא represents the conflation of two variants, *I shall shake once more* and *I shall shake soon* is gratuitous. We must not delete אַחַת. **G** has ἔτι ἄπαξ = עוֹד אַחַת. Nor can we assume that **S** טוֹב חֲדָא וְכֵן read עוֹד אַחַת פַּעַם or, rather, עוֹד פַּעַם אַחַת. Heb. אַחַת means *once* (GK²⁸ § 134, r) just as Syr. חֲדָא may be used in this sense without the addition of זַבְנָא (Nöldeke, *Syr. Gr.*² § 241). Keil translated correctly: *noch einmal, und zwar in kurzem*. Orelli's explanation of אַחַת as *one period* of time is incorrect. **G** ἔτι ἄπαξ re-appears in Heb. 12, 26.

For **M** עוֹד מַעַט **G** has ἔτι ὀλίγον in Ps. 37, 10, and ἔτι μικρόν in Ex. 17, 4. **M** עוֹד אַחַת מַעַט הִיא is expressed by **C** עוֹד חֲדָא זַעֲרָא הִיא and **V** *adhuc unum modicum est*. The literal translation of the Hebrew phrase is, *again once a little it is*. Both עוֹד and אַחַת are adverbial, while מַעַט is an adjective used substantively as the subject of הִיא, *it is*. The whole phrase forms the first clause of the compound sentence, the second clause of which begins יֵאָמֵר מְרִיעִישׁ.

Ehrlich states that we must read **אם** instead of **אחת**. He thinks the **א** of **אם** dropped out through haplography, and **א** was regarded as a symbol for **י**; **עוד** should be connected with **אמר** in **ז**: *for thus says Jhvh furthermore, If it—the beginning of the reconstruction of the Temple—be insignificant, I shall shake up, &c.* For **עוד אמר** he refers to **ועוד ראיתי** and **עוד למד**, Eccl. 3, 16; 12, 9. But in both passages, which are secondary, **עוד** means *continually, constantly*; see Haupt's Eccl. 17. 33; cf. Ps. 84, 5^b. Duhm (ZAT 31, 109) thinks that **אחת** may mean *at once*; he compares **פתאם**, Mal. 3, 1, and is inclined to regard **מעט היא** as an explanatory gloss.

For **מירעשתי** which is due to **מרעש** at the end of the first line of this triplet, read **השמרתי**; cf. note on **הפכתי** in **ב**, and JBL 35, 228.

Ehrlich thinks that **את-הים** was added because some of the treasures referred to at the end of this triplet came from the sea, **החרבה** being added by way of supplement; contrast n. 7 on III.

Ehrlich's reading **ובאוי** instead of **מירעשתי** is no improvement; but he is right in deleting **כל-הגוים** after **ובאוי**.

For **מקמת** (so, too, **CSV**, **מקמת**, **רנהא**, *DESIDERATUS*) read **מקמת** following **Ἐτὰ ἐλεατὰ** and **electa**; so nearly all modern critics; note the prefixed plural **באי**. The reading **מקמת** with the addition **כל הגוים** is probably due to a subsequent Messianic interpretation; cf. Luke 2, 30. The original reading may have been **המדות** or **המודות** (cf. G²⁹ 45; also LSAT 62) and the omission of the **ו** before or after **ד** may be due to haplography (cf. JBL 37, 216, l. 9, and the last note but one on **ד**, vii). Cheyne's emendation **מנחת** for **מקמת** in the present passage (*Crit. Bibl.* 180) is gratuitous.

(iv) According to Ehrlich, **כבוד** does not mean *glory*, but *wealth*; but this is questionable; cf. his interpretation of **ואכבוד** in **א**, v. Mitchell, too, renders: *wealth* instead of *glory*. For Morgenstern's treatment, see **א**, v.

The mistranslation in AV, *the glory of this latter house* (this would be **כבוד הבית האחרון הזה**) instead of *the latter glory of this house* (so RV) is retained in JB.

(α) Before שֶׁאֵרֵיהֶם prefix כל following ⚡; cf. 1, 12, 14.

(ε) V. 5^a is omitted in ⚡ and is rejected by nearly all critics. ⚡ makes it the direct object of וַעֲשׂוּ in v. 4; כִּרְתִּי may stand for כִּרְתִּי. Perles (MVAG 22, 129) follows ⚡ in connecting וַעֲשׂוּ with אֶת־הַדְּבָרִים. He thinks ε should be inserted after וַעֲשׂוּ and refers to עָשָׂה דְּבָרֵךְ, Ps. 103, 20, עָשָׂה דְּבָרֵךְ, Ps. 148, 8; but ε is prosaic, and the insertion of this clause would destroy the poetic form. Moreover, דְּבָרִים in connection with כִּרְתִּי does not mean *command* (1 K 13, 1; 20, 35) but *promise* (1 K 2, 4; 8, 20). ⚡ renders: *et facite (quoniam ego vobiscum sum, dicit Dominus exercituum) verbum quod pepigi vobiscum cum egrederemini de terra Aegypti*. Duhm (ZAT 31, 109) thinks that we may prefix וְאִקְרִי to אֶת־הַדְּבָרִים, but we may just as well supply וְזָכְרֵךְ; cf. Haupt, *Mic.* 6, 8; contrast Hitzig-Steiner's commentary, p. 328, l. 2. Grätz (*Emend.*) proposed to read אֶל הַבְּרִית אֲשֶׁר כִּרְתִּי. The prefixed אֶת is certainly not the preposition אֶת, *with* (so Marti). Budde (ZAT 26, 14) regards אֶת as dittography of the last two letters of the preceding צִבְאוֹת; he prefers to read: הַבְּרִית אֲשֶׁר כִּרְתִּי.

(σ) After ⚡ adds καὶ εἰρηνηστέον εἰς περικυλιστέον παντὶ τῷ οἰκοδομῶντι τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον, which ⚡ follows. According to Wellhausen, the Hebrew original of this gloss was וְשָׁלוֹם נֶפֶשׁ לְחַיִּים כָּל הַיְסָד לְקוֹמָם, *and peace of mind to restore the whole foundation for re-erecting this Temple*. ⚡ read יָסַד instead of יִסָּד. Wellhausen's reading יָסַד has been adopted by Marti, Nowack, and Budde (ZAT 26, 14). But the כָּל before הַיְסָד would be strange; it would be more natural if it were prefixed to הַיְסָד. Sellin (cited by Nowack) regards περικυλιστέον as a translation of מְחִיָּה. This is preferable to לְחַיִּים, but instead of εἰς περικυλιστέον we had better read καὶ περικυλιστέον = וּמְחִיָּה; the ל should be prefixed to יָסַד. According to Haupt, the ו before שְׁלוֹם is the ו explicative which often introduces glosses (GB¹⁶ 189^b, d; GK²⁸ 484, n. b; cf. *Pur.* 16, 19). We must therefore render this gloss to שְׁלוֹם, *prosperity: that is, peace of mind (security) and preservation (safety) for every one who lays the foundations for re-erecting this Temple*.

Budde (*loc. cit.*) proposed to prefix לקומם to ו, so that the meaning would be: *and tranquillity of mind for the restoration of the whole foundation and the erection of this Temple*; but this is unsatisfactory. For the article in כליהסד cf. Num. 4, 47: כליהבא לעבד; עבדה, πᾶς ὁ εἰσπορευόμενος πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, *every one that came to serve*; Num. 21, 8: והיה כל הנשך וראה אתו והי, πᾶς ὁ δεδηγγμένος ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ζήσεται, *every one that is bitten, when he looks upon it, will live* (GK²⁸ § 127, b). Riessler restores the Hebrew (?) original of this clause as follows: ושלום נפש לכל עשה בקומם הבית הזה (cf. n. 14 on I).

(ττ) Budde and Sievers prefer substitution of אל for ביד to the excision of נא: לאמר: אמר; cf. note on א, α.

ד

(i) מן was substituted for אם (cf. 2, 13) probably by some Aramaic-speaking scribe.

(ii) Before מן יקדש prefix קדוש; the emphatic inf. abs. has often been omitted by the scribes; cf. e.g. JBL 38, 164, l. 2; also 170, v. 5, l. 2; 169, v. 15, l. 1; 168, v. 19, l. 3. The ו in יקדשו was omitted by haplography. The question is not, Is בשר-קדש holy? but, Are the things that come into contact with בשר-קדש holy?

For מן ויאמרו read ויאמרו. The question is hypothetical: If you asked this question, you would receive a negative answer.

(iii) In טמא-נפש the נפש is genitive (GK § 128, x). Heb. נפש, *soul* means both *person* and *dead body*; cf. GB¹⁶ 515^a, a. d; Grimm's *Euphemistic Liturgical Appendices*, 5, l. 6, and JAOS 28, 116. For *person* = *body* (AJSL 26, 1), cf. our *body-guard*, *body-servant* for *personal guard* or *attendant*. For *body* = *dead body*, cf. *corpse*, Lat. *corpus* and Ger. *Leiche* = Eng. *like* which meant originally *body*, then *dead body* (see JAOS 37, 255; cf. above, p. 171). Duhm's statement (ZAT 31, 110) that נפש nowhere denotes a corpse is untenable; nor is it true that, as a rule, one can be defiled by another person only in case that person is dead; cf. e.g. Lev. 13, 45; 15, 5-8. 10. 11. 18. 19. 21-24. 27.

For ויאמרו and ויענו see second note on ii.

The omission of the plural ending in יַמְמֹאוּ at the end of this section may be due to haplography; in **M** it is followed by יִיעֶן.

(iv) For the change in meter see above, p. 172, l. 14.

M אֲשֶׁר is the object of יִקְרִיבוּ, although **G** has καὶ ὅς ἐάν ἐγγίῃσι ἐκεῖ, **L** et quicunque accesserit illo. According to Ehrlich, יִקְרִיבוּ is intransitive as in Ex. 14, 10; the whole clause is to be rendered *und wo sie hintreten, da entsteht Unreinigkeit*. The traditional explanation, he says, deserves no refutation. But his interpretation, endorsed by Riessler (cf. n. 14 on I), is also unacceptable.

(v) **M** וּמַעֲלָה, *and upward*, means *and backward*; cf. above, n. 12 on IV. Zeydner's reading לִמְשָׁה (cited by Matthes, ZAT 21, 124) is impossible. Assyrian derivatives of עֲלִי are commonly used of the past (HW 65, s. *ullānu*). The Jewish grammarians call a word accented on the ultima *milrá'*, i.e. accented *below*, while a word accented on the penult was termed *mil'él*, accented *above*, i.e. with the accent moved *backward* from the end toward the beginning of the word; cf. GK²⁸, p. 58, n. 3; G²⁹ § 12, b; contrast ZAT 27, 285; BuL §§ 12, a; 7, c.

As to וּמַעֲלָה **G**^V has in Hag. 2, 15 ὑπεράνω (**G**^A ἐπάνω), and in v. 18 **G**^F has ἐπέκεινα. In 1 S 16, 13; 30, 25 **G**^V has ἐπάνω, and **G**^L, ἐπέκεινα. Both mean *previously*; they cannot mean *subsequently*; οἱ ἐπάνω (or ἐπέκεινα) χρόνοι denotes *the former times*. For the explanation of the addition וּמַעֲלָה (omitted by **S**) in these two passages (where **T** has וְלַעֲלֹה, **V** et deinceps, *and perpetually*) see n. 12 on IV. In Hag. 2, 15, 18 **T** has וְלַעֲלֹה, **V** et supra in v. 15, but *et in futurum* in v. 18; also **S** has וְלֵהֵל which means *forward, in the future*; the Last Judgment is called וְלֵהֵל דְּיָנָא; Syr. לְהֵל (Nöldeke, § 155, B) is the Heb. הִלָּא; גַּשׁ הִלָּא; *stand back!* (Gen. 19, 9) is in **S**: פְּרוּק לְהֵל.

There is no passage where וּמַעֲלָה means *in the future* (contrast ZAT 26, 14ⁱ). Also in Qidd. 76^a (BT 5, 972, l. 9) וּלְמַעֲלָה refers to οἱ ἐπάνω, *the ancestors*; cf. Levy's dictionary, vol. 3, p. 192^b; contrast Ber. 26^b; Pes. 50^b (BT 1, 97, l. 1; 2, 499, l. 6). Marti's rendering (*rückwärts*) of וּמַעֲלָה, Hag. 2, 15 in Kautzsch's ATⁱ (1894) was correct, and his translation (*die kommende Zeit*) in

AT³ (1910) is wrong. JB, *forward* (Ehrlich, *fürderhin*) is a step backward. J. D. Michaelis (1782) rendered correctly: *tut einen Rückblick in die vorige Zeit*.

According to Ehrlich מטרם is not Hebrew and is illogical. He thinks we must undoubtedly read מיום instead of מטרם. The traditional reading would imply that the people were to consider the entire time from the remotest past down to the beginning of the reconstruction of the Temple. This is indeed far-fetched. It is sufficient to point out that מטרם is preceded by מן היום הזה (cf. also Fleischer, KS 1, 622). But if any one hesitates to read מטרם, he may substitute במטרם. In the first and the fourth of the four Arabic versions of the Psalter, edited by Lagarde (cf. AJSL 2, 103, n. 1) we find in Ps. 90, 2 (cf. JBL 31, 121) instead of *قبل تكون الجبال* or *قبل تحبل الجبال* *ere mountains were brought forth*: *من قبل ان تكون الجبال* cf. also WdG 2, 189, B: *من قبل صلاة الفجر*, *before the morning prayer*, and Reckendorf § 247, f.

For the *enjambement* in the second lines of couplets v and vi see AJSL 23, 240 and *Nah.* 29, l. 14.

For the metrical restoration of this passage cf. Haupt, AJSL 24, 127.

מ מהיותם is meaningless, either at the end of v. 15, or prefixed to v. 16 where מ and all the Versions place it. ὁ τίνας ἦτε correctly read מי הייתם. For מי, *how*, see BA 1, 17; AJSL 24, 127; contrast GB¹⁶ 419^a. The reading מי הייתם (Kautzsch's AT¹, 1894, also AT³, 1910; cf. ZAT 26, 15) is preferable to מה הייתם (so Matthes, Oort, Marti, Nowack, Sievers, Duhm, Ehrlich) or Sellin's emendation מהיותם, *before they restored*. RV *through all that time* (retained in JB) is a paraphrase of AV *since those days were* rather than a translation of the Hebrew text. Matthes' reading מה הייתם (ZAT 23, 125ⁱ) is given in Gesenius' *Thes.* (1835), p. 375^a: *Hagg. II, 16 pro מהיותם cum Alexandrino interprete* (τίνας ἦτε) *legendum videtur מהייתם, i.e. מה הייתם pro מהיותם*; cf. Köhler's *Haggai* (1860), p. 97, n. 1. Similarly Matthes' ספר השיר instead of ספר הישר (ZAT 23, 121) was suggested by J. D. Michaelis

in 1774; see Fürst³ 1, 559^bⁱ; Haupt, *AJSL* 20, 166, n. 26; *JHUC*, no. 316, 22ⁱ.

(vi) We need not read the inf. בא (so Marti, Ehrlich, Duhm); בא is impersonal; cf. second note on א, ז. AV *when one came* is correct. Θ ὅτε ἐνεβάλλετε εἰς κυψέλην κριθῆς εἴκοσι σάτα, καὶ ἐγένετο κριθῆς δέκα σάτα is not a literal translation, but a paraphrase; ערמה does not mean κυψέλη, nor need we add either סאים (cf. GK § 134, n) or שעה (or שערים; Cod. 20 of de Rossi, חשים). U *cum accederetis ad acervum viginti modiorum, et fierent decem*, T עאלין היותן על כרא S מרהיותן עלין לערימת עפרין והוא עשרא E כד עאלין היותן על כרא M מהיותם) מי היותם must be joined to the preceding line.

For the insertion of הנה before היתה in the second hemistich cf. 1, 9.

For M פורה (omitted by S) read מפורה; the omission of the prefixed מ is due to haplography. Θ (πεντήκοντα μετρητάς), U (quinquaginta lagenas), A (amphoras) and T (חמשין גרבין דחמר) take פורה to be a large jar for the storage of wine. The amphora of the Greeks and Romans was also a liquid measure, equal to about six gallons, Landersdorfer, *Sumer. Sprachgut im AT* (Leipzig, 1916), pp. 81. 49 regards פורה as a Sumerian loan word (cf. Haupt, *MLN* 33, 433ⁱ; *AJSL* 24, 126. 171; *ZDMG* 64, 714, l. 17; *AJP* 39, 309; *Joel*, n. 59). Heb. פורה is the fem. of Assyr. *pûru*, urn. Our *vat*, formerly spelled *fat*, is the Ger. *Faß*, barrel, and *Faß* is also a measure of capacity (*JHUC*, no. 306, p. 25).

(vii) In למן the ל is governed by שימו לבבכם at the end of this line. GS connect שימו לבבכם with the following line, but v. 19 is an independent question.

Θ has for M העור הורע במי: εἰ ἐπιγνωσθήσεται ἐπὶ τῆς ἄλφ, הורע being misread הורע.

For M מגורה read ממורה as in *Joel* 1, 17 where Θ has θησαυροί. ממורה is a pit (silo) in which grain is stored, lit. *thrown down* (from מור, *Ps.* 89, 45; cf. *WdG* 1, 125, l. 2 and C, 4). It is not a *threshing floor* as Θ ἐπὶ τῆς ἄλφ and T באדרא (*ZDMG* 64, 705, l. 28) translate. Budde's reading במגורן, *on the threshing floor*

(ZAT 26, 16ⁱ) is unacceptable. Nor can מנורה in this connection mean *object of fear* (so Zeydner, cited by Matthes, ZAT 21, 125). In Joel 1, 17 the plural of ממנורה is written ממנורות; the ו of ממנורה in the present passage may be due to dittography of the ו (JBL 37, 216, l. 9).

For מ ועד read ועד following Ⲭ καὶ εἰ ἔτι and Ⲭ et adhuc; cf. Delitzsch, LSAT § 63^a, l. 4. The omission of ו before ד may be due to haplography.

We must not read נשאם, following Ⲭ τὰ οὐ φέροντα, instead of נשא, as Delitzsch (LSAT 10, l. 5) suggests; if ο and π are eliminated, the singular is correct, and the perfect is preferable to the participle. In December the vintage is over. The fields were sown about November-December (see n. 17 on IV) and the grapes harvested about August-September. RV *yea* (AV adds *as yet*) *the vine has not brought forth* (retained in JB) is untenable.

(α) For אל הני Ⲭ πρὸς Ἀγγαῖον we must not read ביד הני (so S and several MSS, also Marti and Kittel). See note on 8, α.

(β) Scribal expansion, due to כנפו in the following hemistich. Ⲭ has not only ἐν τῷ ἄκρῳ τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ in the second hemistich, but also τὸ ἄκρον τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ in the third.

(γ) ו often introduces affixed glosses (GK § 154, a, n. 1; b; GB¹⁶ 189^b, d) or connects prefixed additions (*Est.* 83, δ; *Mic.* 112, η; 111, μ; 108, ν; JBL 36, 83, γ; 37, 231, ν; 38, 151, λ). The genuine הנוי of v. 14 is the word commonly used for Gentiles, and the glossator may have considered הן העם more appropriate.

(δ) The first clause of this gloss appears in Ⲭ after v. 14 between the two clauses סס and טτ; cf. above, notes 25 and 28 on IV. Ⲭ ὁδυστηθήσονται ἀπὸ προσώπου πόνων αὐτῶν read ויהנו instead of ויהנו. Ⲭ has ὁδύτη for ויהנו in Gen. 44, 31; Pss. 13, 3; 107, 39. Ⲭ may also have read ויהנו; cf. ὁδυστηθήσονται for ויהנו (contrast ZDMG 66, 401) in Zech. 12, 10. G. A. Smith's restoration, ויהנו they vex themselves with their (profane) labors, is not good. Nor can we read ויהנו or ויהנו, as suggested by Sievers (*loc. cit.* 73ⁱ) who is inclined to insert this clause in v. 14 after

restoration of the Hebrew (?) text of this clause inserted between the two clauses of סס and טט: יען משאותיהם בקר יעברו מפני יגיעיהם: ושנאתם בשערים מוביח. See Haupt, JBL 36, 149 and notes on סס and טט.

V. 17, according to Haupt, is a loose reproduction of Am. 4, 9 which he restores as follows:

בִּשְׂדֵּפוֹן וּבִירְקוֹן []	הִקִּיתִי אֶתְכֶם [כַּח־רִבּוּי:]
יֹאכֵל הַגִּזְם	גְּנוֹתֵיכֶם וְקִרְמֵיכֶם ^α
נָאֻם יְהוָה:	וְלֹא שִׁבַּחְתֶּם עָדִי

(α) וְתֹאנִיכֶם וּוִיתִיכֶם

I smote you with a [drought],
Your gardens (of fruit trees) and
vineyards^α
Yet, ye did not return to Me,

with blasting and blight; []
the locusts devoured;
declares Jhvh.

(α) and your fig trees and your olive trees.

ⲙ instead of ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉ at the end of Hag, 2, 17 is no doubt due to the ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉ at the beginning of the verse. Why the glossator used ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉ instead of ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉⲙ we cannot tell. In Ethiopic this verb means to *return*, while in Assyrian it means to *find* (Haupt, JSOR 1, 42). It is poetic in Hebrew, but common in Aramaic and Arabic. Oort (*Emend.*) reads ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉⲙ ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉⲙ (so, too, Budde, ZAT 26, 15) in the present passage, but this would not have been corrupted to ⲁⲓⲛⲃⲉⲙ.

ⲙ ⲃⲣⲣ in Hag. 2, 17 may be a correction of the corrupt ⲃⲣⲣⲓⲛⲃⲉ of Am. 4, 9 (so, Haupt).

(סס) For ⲙⲕⲉⲙ ⲥⲏⲣ cf. 2 Chr. 19, 7; for the construction see GK²⁸ § 115, h. d; WdG 2, 60, A. Ⲭ ⲉⲛⲉⲕⲉⲛ ⲧⲱⲛ ⲗⲏⲙⲙⲁⲧⲱⲛ ⲁⲩⲧⲱⲛ ⲧⲱⲛ ⲑⲣⲃⲣⲓⲛⲱⲛ (Ⲭ *propter praesumptiones eorum matutinas*) read ⲥⲏⲣ instead of ⲥⲏⲣ, but not ⲗⲕⲏⲧⲏⲙ instead of ⲗⲕⲏⲧⲏⲙ, as Wellhausen supposed.

(טט) For ⲥⲏⲣ ⲙⲟⲃⲓⲥⲏⲣ, Ⲭ (καὶ ἐμισεῖτε ἐν πύλαις ἐλέγχοντας, Ⲭ *et odio habebatis in portis arguentes*) read ⲥⲏⲣⲁⲧⲏⲙ; the plural ending in ⲥⲏⲣⲁⲧⲏⲙ is dittography of the initial ⲙ

of מוכיח, and the plural πύλαις is responsible for **Θ** ἐλέγχοντας instead of ἐλέγχοντα (see Haupt, JBL 36, 149), cf. note on μ.

(φφ) Ehrlich says, we must either read ששׁ in the present passage or בהשׁיע in כ, ככ.

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ב

2, 22. 21^b α^a אני-מרעיש זשמים ו¹אָרץ | והפכתי כפא ממלכות
 והשמדתי <כל-חזק² הגוים | והאבדתי מרכבה ולכביה
 ונ³ידן סוסים ורגלי⁴ם | איש-בחרב אחיו יפל⁵;
 ו⁶אקחך זרבבלוי עבדי⁷ | ושמתיך כחותם כימיני⁸;
 23

(α) 2, 20. I, 15 ביום עשרים וארבעה לחדש^a | (היכה) דבר יהודה אל חגיגן לאמר:
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 (ε) 22 ממלכות (ζ) 23 ביום ההוא נאם יהוה צבאות (η) בן שאלתיאל
 (θ) 23 נאם יהוה (י) כי כך בחרתי נאם יהוה צבאות

(κκ) I, 15 בששי בשנת שתים לדרוש המלך
 (μμ) 2, 20 בעשרים וארבעה לחדש

ג

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 את-הבית הזה | בכבודו הראשון
 ומה אתם | ראִים-אתו עתה
 הליא כמהו | כאין בעיניכם;
 4 ii ועתה חזק | זרבבלוי
 ו{{כל-עם הארץ | נאם-יהוה <צבאות
 {חזקו} ועשו | כי-אני אתכם^e; <e>
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6 iii B א^aעוד-אחת מעט-היא | ואני מרעיש
 וישמים ו¹אָרץ | וי²ם ויחרבה;
 7 והש^{1,2,3}מדיתי את-הגוים | ובאו <חמד⁴ תי⁵;
 8 iv לי חספס | ולי הזהב;
 9 גדול יהיה | כבוד הבית^π;
 ובמקום הזה | אתן שלום^{σρ};

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 (γ) 4 וחזק יהושע בן יהוצרק הכהן הנדול (δ) 8 נאם יהוה צבאות
 (ε) 5 את-הדבר אשר כרתי אתכם בצאתכם ממצרים
 (ζ) 6 כי כה אמר יהוה צבאות (η) אתיה (θ) אתיה (י) אתיה (κ) אתיה
 (λ) 7 כל כל הגוים ומלאתי את הבית הזה כבוד אמר יהוה צבאות
 (ν) 8 נאם יהוה צבאות (ξ) 9 הוה (ο) האחרון (π) מן הראשון אמר יהוה צבאות

חגי

א

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DAS TANNAITISCHE GRENZVERZEICHNIS PALÄSTINAS

Von SAMUEL KLEIN, Nové Zámky, Czecho-Slovakie

EINLEITENDES

Als ein aus dem Altertum auf uns gekommenes Dokument, hat das in verschiedenen Quellenschriften¹ enthaltene tannaitische Grenzverzeichnis seit langem schon die Aufmerksamkeit der Palästinaforscher wachgerufen,² die in ihm mit Recht eine bedeutsame Fundgrube für die Ortskunde des Heiligen Landes erblickten. Auf Grund der hier folgenden Untersuchungen glauben wir, dieses Grenzverzeichnis zugleich als eine überaus wichtige Geschichts-urkunde, namentlich was die Kenntnis der jüdischen Siedlungs-verhältnisse betrifft, bezeichnen zu dürfen.

Ohne auf die bisherigen Bearbeitungen dieser Urkunde näher einzugehen, sei nur der Verdienste H. Hildesheimers um die Aufhellung derselben gedacht. Seine Arbeit hat mit aller Klarheit gezeigt, daß im „Grenzverzeichnis“ es sich nicht um ein system-loses Aneinanderreihen von beliebigen Ortsnamen handelt, wie dies früher mehrfach angenommen wurde. Ferner hat er die verschiedenen Rezensionen unserer Urkunde, zum Teil mit Heranziehung handschriftlichen Materials, miteinander verglichen, um auf diesem Wege den ursprünglichen Text — soweit als möglich — zu erhalten. Endlich stellte er als Erster die Frage nach der Ent-

¹ Sifre Deut. 51; Tosefta Schewiit IV 10; j. Schewiit VI 1; Jalkut Deut. 874.

² Bibliographie der früheren Arbeiten s. bei Hildesheimer, Beiträge zur Geographie Palästinas (*Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Rabbiner-Seminars in Berlin* 5645), und in meinem דרך חוף הים = *Die Küstenstraße Palästinas*, hebr. 11 f.; deutsch 13 f. — Kittels Sifre-Übersetzung S. 135 f. bietet nichts Wesentliches.

stehungszeit des Grenzverzeichnisses und versuchte auch, eine Lösung dieses schwierigen Problems zu bieten.

Trotz umfassender Kenntnisse und gründlicher Untersuchung der Einzelheiten ließ aber auch er noch manche Fragen offen, die auch von den späteren Bearbeitern der Urkunde nicht beantwortet wurden. Meiner Ansicht nach bedürfen die einzelnen, vielfach korrumpierten Namen einer erneuten gründlichen Prüfung, ehe sie mit heutigen Ortsbezeichnungen gleichgesetzt werden, und namentlich muß die Frage nach Veranlassung und Entstehungszeit des Grenzverzeichnisses auf Grund des topographischen und sonstigen historischen und halachischen Materials abermals gestellt werden.

Vergleicht man die bei Hildesheimer und bei Luncz³ synoptisch geordneten Listen, so wird man mit Bedauern feststellen müssen, daß in diesen langen Verzeichnissen kaum ein einziger Name in sämtlichen Rezensionen gleichmäßig erscheint! Auch die Anzahl der Grenzpunkte ist in den verschiedenen Rezensionen verschieden. Die größte Zahl von Namen bietet die Wiener Handschrift der Tosefta, und deshalb wurde sie von Hildesheimer zur Grundlage der Untersuchung genommen. Mag nun sein, daß diese Rezension aus anderen Gründen einen gewissen Vorzug den anderen gegenüber beanspruchen darf,⁴ so glaube ich doch nicht, daß die größere Fülle von Namen allein entscheidend sein dürfte. Es ist nämlich sehr gut denkbar, daß eine ursprünglich kürzere Rezension vom Redaktor der Tosefta nachträglich erweitert worden sei. Daher wird es sich methodisch empfehlen, zunächst auf Grund der *kürzesten* Rezension (des Sifrè⁵) den allgemeinen Lauf der Grenzlinie festzustellen und erst dann die in der längeren Rezension enthaltenen Namen (wenn möglich) in diese einzufügen.

Die uns vorliegenden Texte des Grenzverzeichnisses haben eine lange Leidensgeschichte hinter sich. Abschreiber und Drucker

³ *Jahrbuch* ירושלים XI—XII, 290—303. Er benutzte zur Jeruschalmirezension drei Handschriften (S. 284 Anm. 1) und stellt diesen Text an erste Stelle.

⁴ Sämtliche Namen (außer IV) sind mit ך aneinandergereiht. Das zeigt, daß der Abschreiber die einzelnen Namen wohl voneinander unterschied, was bezüglich der anderen Texte nicht immer behauptet werden kann.

⁵ Dieser bietet 35, die Tosefta Wien 41 Namen.

haben die ihnen vollkommen unbekannten und gleichgültigen Namen je nach ihrem Gutdünken geändert oder — verballhornt.⁶ Ohne Korrektur des Textes wird es also bei schwierigen Stellen nicht gehen. Dabei ist aber an der methodisch sehr wichtigen Regel festzuhalten, die mit Bezug auf unsere Urkunde von Dalman⁷ aufgestellt wurde: „Die Texte bedürfen sämtlich der Zurechtstellung mit Hilfe des lokalen Befundes.“

Die Zurechtstellung muß aber auch mit Hilfe des erreichbaren *handschriftlichen* Materials geschehen. Bezüglich des *Sifre*, bzw. des aus ihm geflossenen *Jalkut Schimeoni* standen mir durch die besondere Freundlichkeit des Herrn Dr. L. Finkelstein in New York, dem auch an dieser Stelle herzlichst gedankt sei, drei Handschriften zur Verfügung.⁸ Auch das in letzter Zeit an den Tag geförderte handschriftliche Jeruschalmimaterial konnte in gewissem Maße verwertet werden.

I. DIE REZENSION IM SIFRE

(כ"י לונדון)	(כ"י רומי)	(ילקוט כ"י אקספרד)
תחום מארץ ישראל ועד	תחומי ארץ ישראל עד	
מקום שהחזיקו עולי בבל	מקום שהחזיקו עולי בבל	בכל פרשת אשקלון
(1) פרשת אשקלון	פרשת אשקלון	
(2) חומות מנדל שרשן	חומת מנדל שרשן	חומת מנדל שרשן
(3) דר	דר	דיר
(4) וחומות עכו	וחמת עכו	וחמת עכו
(5) מניאתו	וחאש מניאתו	מניאתו
(6) וניאתו עצמה	וניאתו עצמה	וניאתו עצמה
(7) מברתא	כברתא	כברתא

⁶ Ein besonders krasses Beispiel sei hier angeführt! An Stelle von מרכונא טרוננא דזיטרא דכתב liest man in der ed. princ. des Jalkut: רב תנחום נוצרא. Während die Worte טי דזיטרא (wie es weiter gezeigt wird) gute, ja sogar ursprüngliche Lesarten bieten, enthalten die letzten vier Worte etwas ganz Unsinniges. Ofters wurden unbekannte Namen nach bekannten biblischen Namen geändert, worauf im Laufe der Untersuchung hingewiesen werden soll.

⁷ *Palästina-Jahrbuch* 1922/23, S. 22 Anm. 2.

⁸ Herr Dr. Finkelstein hatte die Güte, mir die Abschriften mit der Bemerkung zu senden: העתקתי נעשו בדיוקנות טובה ואל יהא לכו נוקסו בסטכו עליהן.

(כ"י לונדון)	(כ"י רומי)	(ילקוט כ"י אקספרד)
ובומתא } (8)	ובית זניתא	ובית זניתא
(9) קצרא וגלילא	קצרא וגלילא	קצרא וגלילא
(10) קבייתא רעייתא	קבייא דעייתא	קבייא רעייתא
(11) מצריא רעבתא	מצייא דעבתא	מצייא רעבתא
(12) במותא דביריין	נמותא דביריין	במותא דביריין
(13) פחורתא דייתיר	סחורתא דיתר	נחורתא דייתיר
(14) נחלא דא בעאל	נחלא דאבצל	נחלה דאביצאל
(15) בית ער	בית ער	בית ער
(16) מרעשתא	מרעשתא	מרעשתא
(17) לילא רבתא	לולא רבתא	לילא רבתא
(18) קרבא דבר סנגרא	כרכא דבר סנגרא	כרכא דבר סנגרא
(19) מיספ	מיספ	מיספ
(20) ספנתא	ספנתא	ספנתא
(21) נקיבתא רעייא	נקיבתא רעיין	נקיבתא רעיין
(22) תרנגולא עילאה דכיסרי! sic	תרנגולא עילאה דקיסרי	תרנגולא עילאה דקיסרי
(23) בית סוכת	בית סוכות	בית סוכת
(24) ויונקת	וינקת	וינקת
(25) ורקס דאגרא	ורגס דחגר	ורקס דחגרא
(26) וטורבונא דוימרא דתחום	וטרכינא דוימרא דביתחום	וטורבונא דוימרא רבת רב
בוצרא	ביצרא	טחום ניצרא
(27) סקא	יובקא	יובקא
(28) וחשבון	וחשבון	וחשבון
(29) ונחלת דור	תחלת דור	ונחלת דור
(30) סבוטא	ססותא	סכותא
(31) נימרין	נימרין	נימרין
(32) עליה מוליא זרואי	מליה זירואי	מלייא זירואי
(33) ורקס גיאת	ורקס גיאה	ורקס גיאה
(34) וגינאה דאשקלון	וגינייא דאשקלון	וגינייא דאשקלון
(35) ודרך גדולה ההולכת	ודרך גדולה ההולכת	ודרך גדולה ההולכת
במדבר	במדבר	למדבר

תחומי⁹ ארץ יש [ראל] עד¹⁰ מקום שהחזיקו עולי: Die Überschrift lautet: תחום מאי⁹ Ms. London irrtümlich.
 11 בבל, worauf die einzelnen Grenzpunkte folgen:

⁹ Ms. London irrtümlich מאי תחום.

¹⁰ London: ועד.

¹¹ Jalkut Ms. Oxford fehlt die ganze Überschrift, nur das letzte Wort [בבל] erscheint dort fehlerhaft בבל und zu Punkt 1 gezogen. Den gleichen Schreibfehler

(1) פרשת אשקלון bezeichnet den „Scheideweg von *Askalon*“. „Die Grenze lief hier diesseits der Wegscheide, d. h. der Abzweigung des Zuganges der Stadt vom Hauptverkehrsweg.“¹² Die Stadt selbst wird also vom Gebiete Erez Israels ausgeschlossen.

(2) חומת מגדל שרשן „die Mauern des *Stratonturmes*“ bei Caesarea maritima. Der Turm und die später in seiner Nähe erbaute heidnische, eigentlich herodeanische Stadt blieben außerhalb der Grenzlinie. Ähnlich verhält es sich auch mit

(3) דר, genauer דור,¹³ womit die Küstenstadt *Dora* gemeint ist.

(4) עכו schließen wieder die Stadt *Akko* aus dem eigentlich jüdischen Gebiete aus.

(5) Die handschriftliche Überlieferung ist hier, wie bei (6), nicht ganz verlässlich. Doch können die Namen mit Zuhilfenahme der Tosefta und des Jeruschalmi, wie auch auf Grund des lokalen Befundes hergestellt werden. Es handelt sich um ראש¹⁵ מי נאתו „den oberen Lauf des Wassers von *Gato*“, bzw. um

(6) גתו selbst. Gemeint ist *Gā'tūn* nordöstlich von Akko. Das Wasser des Ortes ist der *Nahr Mefschūch*, dessen Oberlauf die Grenzlinie bildet. Man befindet sich hier am Eingang des galiläischen Gebirges.

(7) כברתא¹⁶ ist mit Dalman¹⁷ richtig bei Chirbet el *Kabarsa* direkt nördlich von Akko, am Westufer des Nahr Mefschūch anzusetzen. Nach den lokalen Verhältnissen wäre es angebracht, diesen Punkt vor (5—6) zu nennen, wie ihn die Tosefta in der Tat hat.

(8) בית זניתא¹⁸ heißt heute Chirbet *Zuënita* unweit nordöstlich von (6).

bietet RN zu Gittin I 1: פרשת בכל בבל א"י שהחזיקו עולי בבל. In seinem Sifrè wurde also neben der richtigen auch die falsche Lesart verzeichnet.

¹² Dalman, *Pal. Jahrb.* 1924, 65.

¹³ Jalkut דור ist דר zu lesen.

¹⁴ RN a. a. O. חומת (ת) שרשן. Ms. Rom und Jalkut bieten חמת, wohl חמת zu lesen.

¹⁵ Ms. Rom ראש, l. ראש.

¹⁶ So ist auch Ms. London statt כברתא zu lesen.

¹⁷ *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1922/23, S. 22 Anm. 2.

¹⁸ בית זניתא oder ביתא in Ms. London ist Schreibfehler für בניתא = זניתא. Derartige Zusammenziehung von בית, bzw. בי mit dem folgenden Wort ist öfters

nauer zu bezeichnen, ihm hier דבירין „*R. der Brunnen*“ hinzugefügt (vgl. רמת מצפה, רמת להי). In der Nähe von R. muß es berühmte Zisternen gegeben haben.

(13) פחירתא דייתיר ist die durch die Londoner Handschrift verbürgte, einzig richtige Lesart. יתיר = פחיר heute genau so — *Jātir* — liegt in gerader Linie nördlich von (12). פחירתא bezeichnen gewisse „Höhlen“ in der Nähe des Ortes, wie in ähnlichem Zusammenhang (bei einer Grenzbestimmung der Stadt Tiberias) gleichfalls פחירתא genannt sind.²⁵

(14) ²⁶ נחלא דאבצאל bezeichnet jedenfalls einen Wādi nördlich, bzw. nordöstlich von (13), der als natürliche Grenzlinie mit Recht verwendet wird. Leider ist der alte Name scheinbar verschwunden. Vielleicht ist der Wādi el-Ma gemeint. Daß in dieser Gegend einst jüdische Siedlungen bestanden, zeigt der Ort el-Jehudije im Osten des genannten Wādis.

(15) ²⁷ בית ער vermute ich in dem nordöstlich von (13) gelegenen *Hāris*.²⁸ (14) wäre also der nördlichste Grenzpunkt in Obergaliläa; von (15) an zieht sich die Grenzlinie in südöstlicher Richtung.

(16) מרעשתא ist zweifellos richtig: *Beʿaschit* östlich von (15).

(17) לילא oder לולא רבתא wird auf Grund der anderen Rezensionen zu ändern und zu bestimmen sein (vgl. Abschnitt II, Punkt 21).

(18) כרכא דבר סננרא. Der Name ס, obwohl in allen Handschriften gleich, bedarf dennoch einer gründlichen Zurechtstellung, wie weiter (Abschnitt IV) gezeigt werden soll.

(19) מיסף, vgl. dazu II, Punkt 16.

(20) ספנתא kann nur das zwischen *Ḥasbējā* und *Rāscheija* gelegene es-Sefine sein. Daß es „viel zu weit nördlich liegt“,²⁹ mag

²⁵ j. Erubin V 22^b; vgl. meine *Beiträge zur Geographie und Geschichte Galiläas* (1909), S. 59 ff.

²⁶ נחלא דאבצאל des Londoner Ms. ist natürlich דאבצאל zu lesen. אבצאל könnte derselbe Name sein wie Phasaël (פסאל). Hildesheimer, S. 33, denkt an 'Ain Iba'al, das aber sprachlich nicht entsprechen kann.

²⁷ Ms. Rom falsch ער.

²⁸ Zu ע = Ḥ vgl. עפריים = חפריים in der Mischna (*Pal.-Stud.* IV, 23 f.; Albright, *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research* IV, 156 f.) und weiter unten Anm. 75.

²⁹ Hildesheimer, S. 24 f.

uns überraschen, spricht aber nicht im geringsten gegen die Richtigkeit der Gleichsetzung.

(21) נְקִיבְתָא דַעִין. Das zweite Wort, der eigentliche Ortsname, ist jedenfalls das biblische 'Ijjōn, dessen Namen heute die Hochebene Merǧ 'Ajjūn bewahrt. Was נְקִיבְתָא bedeutet, ist unbestimmbar. Es wird sich um ein pluralisches Wort handeln, vgl. oben (11) und (13), vielleicht auch (10). Da in unserem Verzeichnis mehrfach natürliche Höhlen oder Schluchten als Grenzpunkte genannt werden, so wird man auch hier an derartige „Durchbohrungen“³⁰ in der Nähe des seitdem verschwundenen alten Ortes 'Ijjōn denken dürfen.

Die Grenze wendet sich nach Osten den Jordanquellen zu und es wird (22) הַרְנָגְלָא עִלְאָה דְקִיסְרִי das „obere Hahnenbild von Cäsarea [Philippi]“ genannt, das auch aus einer anderen Stelle als Grenzpunkt des jüdischen Gebietes bekannt ist.³¹

* * *

Die nun folgenden *ostjordanischen* Grenzangaben beziehen sich auf ein einziges, bisher kaum beachtetes jüdisches Gebiet, nämlich auf das Gebiet der **Trachonen** und des **Haurans**.

Es ist dies eine wichtige Erkenntnis, die zuerst von I. Goldhar ausgesprochen, aber bei seiner völlig unmethodischen Art der Forschung von ihm selbst nicht gehörig verwertet wurde.³² Unabhängig von ihm kam ich zum gleichen Ergebnis und trug auch diese Auffassung schon vor einigen Jahren vor;³³ jedoch ließ ich mich zum Teil von Hildesheimers gerade in diesen Abschnitten seiner sonst vorzüglichen Arbeit unbefriedigenden Ergebnissen leiten, indem ich die von den verschiedenen Rezensionen gebotenen Lesarten keiner schärferen Kritik unterzog. Dies möge nun im folgenden geschehen.

Zum besseren Verständnis der Angaben unseres Verzeichnisses sei aber folgendes vorausgeschickt: Südlich und östlich von *Damaskus* dehnen sich große vulkanische, zum Teil sehr fruchtbare

³⁰ Hildesheimer, S. 37, denkt an ein „Engtal“; Dalman, *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1914, S. 46, an eine „Schlucht“, nämlich des Wādi Charrār.

³¹ j. Demaj II 1, vgl. Abschnitt V, 7.

³² (Jerusalem קדש (תע"ג: 280 ff.

³³ עב"ה הירדן היהודי (*Pal.-Stud.* III), 44.

Grenzverzeichnis genannt antreffen, eher dafür zu sprechen, daß Lavaplateau *W'ar ez-Zákije* bezeichnet, wo natürlich mehrere Ortschaften lagen.

b) Der südwestliche Trachon ist zweifellos mit (26) *טרכונא דוימרא* (oder *ד'תחום בוצרא*) gemeint. Zur näheren Bezeichnung des Gebietes wird (wie bei Eusebius³⁸) deutlich gesagt, es handle sich um jenen Trachon, der im Gebiet Bostras (oder an Bostras Gebiet grenzend) liegt.

Auch das Wort *דוימרא*... ist sehr beachtenswert. Gegenüber der von den Drucken gegebenen Lesart *דוימרא* ist nämlich an *דוימרא* festzuhalten, das von sämtlichen Handschriften des Sifrè und auch von einem alten Texteszeugen (Abschnitt IV) geboten wird.

„Trachon des Zimra“ bezeichnet offenbar jenen Trachon, der nach einem gewissen *Zimra* benannt werden konnte. Diesen Mann und sein Gebiet kennen wir aus jenen Berichten des Josephus, wo er über die Besiedlung des Trachons unter Herodes referiert.³⁹ Der genannte König erhielt um 23 v. Chr. von Augustus größere Gebiete des vom Unwesen der Räuber unsicher gewordenen *Trachons* und siedelte dort babylonische Juden unter Führung eines gewissen *Zamaris* an. Wir dürfen nun den Namen dieses Mannes in der merkwürdigen Grenzangabe *טרכונא דוימרא* erkennen. Sein Gebiet „der Trachon Zimras“ grenzte an das Gebiet *Bosras*. Vielleicht geht man nicht irre, wenn man seinen Namen auch in dem südwestlich von *Es-Sanamen* gelegenen Orte *Zimrin* erkennt.

c) Bezüglich des östlichen Trachons sei zunächst aus Wetzsteins so wichtigem Reisebericht⁴⁰ folgende Stelle angeführt: „Von den 'Aneze werden die beiden Stämme [Géjāt und S'tāje] Ahl el-*Huḡr* الحاجر, d. h. Bewohner des Klüftenlandes, genannt: die Schlupfwinkel des östlichen Trachons heißen die 'Aneze *Huḡr*.“

³⁷ So ist natürlich die eigentümlich korrumpierte Stelle im Manuskript des Jalkut zu berichtigen; vgl. auch oben Anm. 6.

³⁸ *Onom.* ed. Klostermann 110 28: *Τραχωνίτις δὲ καλεῖται ἡ παρακειμένη χώρα τῇ ἐρημῳ τῇ κατὰ Βόστραν τῆς Αραβίας.* 112 22: *Καναθ ... ἐν τῷ Τραχωνί πλησίον Βόστρων.* Vgl. auch *Antiqu.* IV 7 4: Bosora an der Grenze Arabiens.

³⁹ *Antiqu.* XV 10 3. XVI 9 2. XVII 2 1–3. Vita 11, und meine Darlegungen in *עבר הירדן היהודי* 17 ff.; *Jeschurun* IX, 164.

⁴⁰ S. 34.

Es ist unschwer in *el-Hu'gr* das vom Grenzverzeichnis (25) gebotene חגרא zu erkennen, das also ein bestimmtes Gebiet bezeichnet.

Ein mittelalterlicher arabischer Geograph nennt Ar-Rakim in der Nähe von Damaskus.⁴¹ Diesem Rakim entspricht offenbar רקם des Grenzverzeichnisses,⁴² das jedoch in unseren Texten durch ein ר- mit חגרא verbunden — also als רקם וחגרא — erscheint. Eine Anführung der *Sifrè*stelle bei RSbA belehrt uns jedoch, daß in seinem Texte רקם וחגר gestanden,⁴³ somit ursprünglich an zwei gesonderte Gebiete gedacht worden ist. Diese zwei Gebiete findet man tatsächlich in der Mischna (Gittin I 1) angeführt. Rabban Gamliel sagt: „Wer aus dem *Rekem* (מן הרקם) und dem *Hagar* (ומן החגר) einen Scheidebrief nach Palästina bringt, muß erklären, er sei vor ihm geschrieben und unterzeichnet worden.“ Man sieht also klar, es handelt sich um zwei verschiedene, freilich einander nahe liegende Gebiete, deren östlicheres רקם war, wie dies von R. Jehuda in gleichem Zusammenhang (I 2) bezeugt wird, der in רקם den *östlichsten Grenzpunkt* palästinensischen Gebietes erblickt. In bezug auf die Vorschriften des Scheidebriefes gilt sogar רקם im Osten schon als Ausland, und zwar aus dem Grunde, weil seine Bewohner — wie uns wieder R. Jehuda an anderer Stelle⁴⁴ belehrt — proselytischer Abstammung waren.

Ob diese beiden Namen hier im Osten ursprünglich waren, ob sie etwa vom Edomiterland hierher übertragen wurden,⁴⁵ ob wir den alten Namen רקם (oder רגם, wie eine Handschrift hat) in den zahlreichen, „Ruġm“ genannten Steinhäufen der vulkanischen Gegend⁴⁶ erblicken dürfen, sind Fragen, die kaum entschieden

⁴¹ *Muḳaddasi* ed. de Goeje 175; vgl. mein היהודי עבר הירדן 45 Anm.

⁴² Dies gegen meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* 1917, 142.

⁴³ ורקם וחגר דטצינו בססרי מכבוש מצרים וכבוש בכל. . . zu Gittin I 1: Siehe noch Anm. 87.

⁴⁴ M. Nidda VII 3: גרים שחם מפני שהם גרים ושועין ר' יהודה מטמא מפני שהם גרים ושועין.

⁴⁵ Siehe meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* a. a. O.

⁴⁶ Wetzstein, *Reisebericht* 34 Anm. 1. Vgl. dort S. 35: „Merkwürdig aber sind viele Tausende von rohen Wohnungen, welche auf einer Strecke von vielleicht 5 Stunden das südliche Loġf der Dirēt et-Tulūl bekränzen und auf eine ungemein starke Bevölkerung jener Gegenden in früherer Zeit schließen lassen.“ Ebd. 98 Anm. 1: „Einige Duzende von großen Blöcken bilden einen Rīgm.“ Siehe noch *ZDPV* XX, 212.

werden können. Uns genügt hier die Feststellung, daß in unserem Grenzverzeichnis unter רָקֶם וְחִנְרָא *der östliche Trachon* gemeint ist und daß die Grenzangaben (23), (25), (26) auf die in der Nähe von Damaskus sich erstreckenden vulkanischen Gebiete sich beziehen.

Die Feststellung, daß Juden oder jüdische Proselyten in diesen fernen östlichen Gegenden gewohnt haben, mag uns überraschen, sie kann aber nicht bezweifelt werden. Daß es in Damaskus Juden und zahlreiche Proselyten gab, ist eine wohlbekannte Tatsache.⁴⁷ In einer Mischna werden die östlich von Damaskus gelegenen Wüstenseen mit Bezug auf die Vorschriften des Reinigungswassers genannt,⁴⁸ was natürlich nur so einen Sinn hat, wenn in ihrer Nähe Juden gewohnt haben.

* * *

Unsere Aufgabe ist es nun, die im Osten des Landes angeführten Grenzangaben unseres Verzeichnisses der Reihe nach zu prüfen, die Namen festzustellen und zu lokalisieren.

(24) Auf בית כְּנִית, welches nach den obigen Ausführungen entweder den Ort oder — was wahrscheinlicher ist — das Lava-plateau Ez-Zākije bezeichnet, folgt nach der gewöhnlichen Annahme קִנָּה, das die alte biblische Stadt *Kenat* sein soll. Aber hier gibt es überaus auffällige Lesarten. In den Handschriften des Sifrè liest man nämlich anstatt וְקִנָּה—וִינְקָה, bzw. וִינְקָה (Rom: וִיקְנָה). Dies zeigt, daß am Anfang des Namens יי oder יי stand und nachher die Buchstabengruppe נְקָה, keinesfalls aber קִנָּה folgte! Es muß daher angenommen werden, daß Tosefta und Jeruschalmi den unbekannten Namen וִינְקָה oder יִינְקָה sich zurechtgemacht und so den „biblischen“ Namen קִנָּה gewonnen haben. Dieses Streben, „echte biblische“ Namen zu gewinnen, werden wir bei den folgenden Punkten zu beobachten öfter Gelegenheit haben. — Wie nun וִינְקָה—יִינְקָה zu deuten sei, weiß ich nicht mit Bestimmtheit anzugeben. Ich vermute nur, daß in ihm der Name einer heidnischen Kultstätte steckt. Am nächsten liegt es, an *es-Sanamien* zu denken, wo im Altertum mehrere Götzentempel standen. Der eine war

⁴⁷ Bellum j. II 20, 2; s. dazu Derenbourg in *Ben Chananja* 1867: *Forschungen des wissenschaftlich-talmudischen Vereins* Nr. 14.

⁴⁸ Para VIII 10; s. mein חִירְדִּין הַיְּהוּדִי 71 f.

der Fortuna geweiht⁴⁹ (doch dürfte dieser kaum in Betracht kommen, da die Fortuna bei den Juden גדיין genannt wurde). Der heutige arabische Name „Zwei Götzen“ weist jedenfalls auf eine heidnische Kultstätte hin, und die mittelalterliche jüdische Tradition (die bei Saadja Gaon vertreten ist) lokalisierte hier das biblische *Aschtarot Karnajim* („A. mit den beiden Hörnern“).⁵⁰ In den griechischen Inschriften der römischen und byzantinischen Zeit erscheint die Stadt mit dem Namen Αιρε (Aere).⁵¹ Dies scheint nicht semitisch zu sein. Eine absichtliche Verunstaltung des ursprünglich semitischen Namens durfte in יונקת zu suchen sein. Möchten weitere Untersuchungen mehr Licht über diesen dunklen Punkt verbreiten!

Über (25) וְחִנְרָא רְקָם, ebenso über (26) den „*Trachon des Zimra, der an Bosra grenzt*“ ist schon oben das Nötige gesagt worden.

(27) bieten die Rezensionen einen dem biblischen *Jabbok* ähnlichen Namen; auch Ms. Rom hat יוֹבְקָא. Es ist aber ganz bestimmt, daß hier *nicht* dieser Fluß gemeint ist. Liegt er doch in recht weiter Entfernung von dem Gebiete, in welchem wir uns befinden! Es sind wieder die von den beiden anderen Handschriften gebotenen „schwierigen“ Lesarten heranzuziehen. Da findet man יוֹבְקָא und סְקָא. Das י ist wohl sicher zu streichen; dann erhält man יֹבְקָא, d. h. als den eigentlichen Namen סְקָא. Darin ist nun zweifellos Σακκαία der Inschriften⁵² zu erkennen. Es liegt im Osten des Trachons und heißt heute noch *Schakka*. Eine Beschreibung mancher prachtvoller Bauten dieser einst bedeutenden Stadt findet man im Reiseberichte Wetzsteins.⁵³

(28) bieten sämtliche Quellen (auch die Handschriften) חֶשְׁבִּין; und doch kann diese Lesart nicht die ursprüngliche sein! *Hesbon* war eine emoritische Königsstadt (heute heißt der Ort *Hesbān*), die in einer Linie mit der Nordspitze des Toten Meeres lag; da wir aber in den folgenden Punkten noch einige trachonitische, bzw. hauranitische Lokalitäten erkennen werden, so kann bei Punkt 28 nicht an das weit südlicher gelegene *Hesbon* gedacht

⁴⁹ Baedekers *Palästina und Syrien*⁶ (1904), S. 139.

⁵⁰ עֲשֵׂתֵרוֹת קָרְנִים S. 80 s. v. עֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה.

⁵¹ Thomsen, *Loca sancta*, S. 16: Aere.

⁵² Thomsen a. a. O. 100.

⁵³ S. 57 ff.; 68 Anm. 1.

werden. Es handelt sich offenbar wieder um die jedenfalls sehr alte Verschlimmbesserung eines Kopisten, die dann von sämtlichen Rezensionen übernommen wurde. Der ursprüngliche Name muß natürlich ähnlich חשבון oder חשבן ausgesehen haben. Diesen nachzuweisen wird uns nicht schwerfallen.

Südlich vom Trachon (26) erstreckt sich das Haurangebirge. Daß auf ihm zur Zeit des zweiten Tempels zahlreiche Juden wohnten, kann mit voller Sicherheit behauptet werden. Schon der Umstand, daß der Prophet Ezechiel die Grenze von יִזְרָאֵל (47. 16, 18) unter den Grenzpunkten des zukünftigen Landes Israels nennt, mußte die Besiedlung dieser Gegend begünstigen. Tatsächlich findet man einen aus dem Hauran stammenden Lehrer, der gegen Ende der Tempelzeit in Jerusalem lebte. Es ist R. Johanan, der Sohn der Hauraniterin בן החורנית möglicherweise einer Proselytin), oder kürzer: „der Hauraniter“, החורני.⁵⁴ Sein Heimatsort wird nicht näher angegeben. — In der bekannten alten Mischna, welche über die Anzündung der Feuersignale der Neumondsheiligung berichtet (Rosch hasch. II 4), wird als ost-jordanischer Berg חורן genannt. Handschriften bieten הברן. Darunter kann nicht „die Umgebung des Gebirgsstockes, der noch heute Gebl Hauran heißt“⁵⁵ gemeint sein, vielmehr ist darunter, wie die übrigen in der Mischna und Tosefta angeführten Namen zeigen, eine bestimmte alleinstehende Bergkuppe⁵⁶ zu verstehen. Wo lag dieser?

Im Südwesten des Haurangebirges findet man den auch aus dem Altertum nachweisbaren Ort *Hebrān*.⁵⁷ Wie die dort gefundene aramäische Inschrift (aus 47 n.) bezeugt, lag die Stadt im Gebiete des Philippus. Unweit von ihr erhebt sich eine der höchsten Spitzen des Haurangebirges (1478 m hoch). Darin erkenne ich den Berg חורן-הברן von dem auch die Stadt *Hebrān* ihren Namen erhielt. Diese aber ist wohl sicher in unserem Grenzverzeichnis zu finden, nur muß statt חשבון-הברן (d. h. *Habrān*) gelesen werden. Ein Abschreiber, der חברן (= *Hebrōn*) nur in

⁵⁴ Sukka II 7; Erubin 13^b; Jebamot 15^b. Vgl. Derenbourg a. a. O.

⁵⁵ Schürer I⁴, 427.

⁵⁶ Vgl. in der Tosefta R. h. II: בראשונה היו משואין משואות בראשי ההרים 20. עבר הירדן היהודי. Zur Sache vgl. הגבוהים ... בחורן.

⁵⁷ Schürer I⁴, 428 Ende der Anm. 3.

Judäa kannte und es wohl wußte, daß man sich hier im Ostjordanlande befindet, beeilte sich (mittels einer kleinen Änderung) eine ostjordanische Stadt hierherzusetzen, und schrieb anstatt חברן — חשבון, bzw. חשבון. Eine jüdische Bevölkerung in der Haurangegend (בקעת בית חורון) und insbesondere in der Stadt חורון kann bis weit in die Amoräerzeit hinunter nachgewiesen werden. Ja noch zur Zeit der Entstehung des Islams und im späteren Mittelalter können die Spuren jüdischer Siedlungen in dieser Gegend festgestellt werden.⁵⁸

(29) Wieder muß der ursprüngliche Name aus der falschen Lesart herausgeschält werden. Diese bietet etwa נחל זרר, und doch kann es sich hier nicht um den südlich vom Toten Meere die Grenze des Landes bildenden Bach (Deut. 2. 13, 14) handeln!

Zum Glück ist in diesem Fall die ursprüngliche Lesart leicht festzustellen; sie lautete: נחלה דורר⁵⁹ oder (hebr.) נחלת ורר, d. h. „Rosental“. Auf diese Lesarten können die übrigen verderbten leicht zurückgeführt werden. — In unserem Grenzverzeichnis ist der westlich vom *Hebrān*, חברן (28), nach *ʿAtamān* sich hinziehende *Wādi Dahab*, bei den Griechen *Chrysorrhoas* genannt, gemeint. Unser Verzeichnis bietet den ursprünglichen semitischen Namen. Das eben genannte *ʿAtamān*, das wir bald in unserem Verzeichnis kennenlernen werden (30), liegt an beiden Ufern dieses Tales, das seinen Namen natürlich von den es zierenden Rosen erhielt. Wetzstein⁶⁰ berichtet: „Unter der reichen Flora [des südöstlichen Haurans] sah ich viele Blumen, die eine Zierde unserer Gärten sein würden, namentlich eine faustgroße, dunkelrote, prachtvolle Lilie (*Sušan*). Auf der weiten Ebene zwischen Imtān und Ēnak fand ich sie zu Tausenden.“ Ist auch in dieser Schilderung die Rose (ורר) nicht ausdrücklich genannt, so zeugt eben der alte Name für das Vorhandensein dieser in Palästina gar nicht seltenen Blume in dieser Gegend. In der Nähe Jerusalems gibt es auch einen *Wādi el-Wered*, also genau unser נחלה דורר.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Nachweise in עבר הירדן החורני 57 f.; 58 Anm. 2, wo חורון die Stadt gemeint ist; ferner 63.

⁵⁹ Tosefta Wien. Ms. London: נחלת דורר; Rom: נחלת ורר; Oxford: נחלת דורר. ... נחלה דורר [ד].

⁶⁰ a. a. O. 40.

⁶¹ Vgl. Löw, *Flora* III, 194; besonders 197; ferner 207.

(30) Wie 'weiter (Abschnitt IV) gezeigt wird, handelt es sich um einen Namen חַטְמָנָה, wie das heutige 'Atamān im Altertum hieß.

(31) Noch immer befinden wir uns im Haurangebiet. נִמְרִין ist nämlich *nicht* das aus Bibel und Mischna und auch Josephus bekannte נִמְרִין unweit dem Jordan, nördlich vom Toten Meere,⁶² sondern die ḥauranitische Stadt Ναμρα der Inschriften,⁶³ heute *Nimra* genannt. Sie liegt am gleichnamigen Wādi südlich von *Sakka* (27). Die Stadt ist auch aus dem Jeruschalmi bekannt, und zwar wird sie als äußerster Grenzpunkt jenes Gebietes genannt, wohin noch die die Neumondsheiligung mitteilenden Boten aus Palästina (Galiläa) gelangten.⁶⁴ Bemerkt sei, daß dieser Grenzpunkt an ungenauer Stelle im Verzeichnis des Sifrè erscheint; nach der Lage des Ortes müßte er nämlich auf (27) folgen. Wahrscheinlich ist der Name erst später hinzugefügt worden, als die jüdische Siedlung sich dort befestigte. Die oben erwähnten Jeruschalmistellen stammen aus dem 3. Jahrhundert, und der gleichen Zeit gehört auch die Mitteilung des Eusebius an, der über den „bedeutenden Ort“ Ναμρα berichtet.⁶⁵

(32) Die Feststellung des ursprünglichen Textes bietet hier manche Schwierigkeiten. Das zweite Wort ist richtig als der Name von Ζοροα, heute *Zoratwa*, also זִרְוָא oder זִרְוֵא erkannt worden. (Es liegt im Südwesten des Trachons.) Dagegen ist das זִרְוָא vorangesetzte מְלִיָּא, מְלִיָּה, מְלִיָּא⁶⁶ unerklärt geblieben. Die Lösung bringt wieder der lokale Befund. Im Trachon- und Haurangebiet findet man des öfteren das Ortsappellativum *Melah*. Es bezeichnet die Grube oder die Bodenvertiefung, die zur Salzgewinnung verwendet wird. Es konnte natürlich auch als Ortsbezeichnung dienen; so kennt man ein *Melah es-Ṣarrār* im Südosten des Hauran, inschriftlich als Μουλεχ(ου) bezeugt.⁶⁷ In unserem Verzeichnis, wo zweifellos מְלִיָּה zu lesen ist, kann nur eine Lokalität in der

⁶² Hildesheimer, S. 60.

⁶³ Thomsen a. a. O. 92.

⁶⁴ Siehe meine שְׁנוֹת בְּמִצְרַיִם (Pal.-Stud. II), S. 44 Nr. 3 und weiter Ende Abschnitt V.

⁶⁵ On. 138 11: κάπη μεγίστη ἐν τῇ Βασιτανίᾳ.

⁶⁶ Ms. London hat hier zwei Varianten aufgenommen.

⁶⁷ Wetzstein, *Ausgewählte griech. und lat. Inschriften etc.*, p. 275. Siehe auch ZDPV XX, S. 187.

Nähe *Zoroas* in Betracht kommen. In seiner Nähe trifft man tatsächlich ein *Meliḥat* el-‘Aṭasch und ein *Meliḥat* esch-Scherkije (südlich vom ersteren) an. Ersteres konnte sehr wohl nach *Zoroa* als מליח (ה) זורואי „*Meliḥā von Zoroa*“ bezeichnet werden.

Mit diesem Grenzpunkt ist die Abgrenzung der Trachon- und Haurangegend beendet. Nach den oben genauer beschriebenen drei Lavaplateaus wurde ein viereckiges Gebiet, das durch die Namen von סקא (27), ניםרין (31), חברין (28) im Osten, נחלה דורר (29), חטמנה (30) im Süden und מליח זורואי (32) im Nordwesten bezeichnet ist, als zum Lande Israel gehörig festgestellt. *Im Ostjordanlande werden überhaupt keine anderen Grenzpunkte mehr genannt*, offenbar, weil es keine jüdischen Siedlungen mehr hatte: eine wichtige Handhabe zur Zeitbestimmung unserer Urkunde (vgl. Abschnitt VII).

Als Grenzpunkt (33) bietet das Verzeichnis נראה רקם, einen Punkt in der Nähe der nabatäischen Hauptstadt *Petra*, deren semitischer Name Ἀρκαμή, d. h. רקם war und in deren Nähe ein Tal (נראה-גיא) und ein Ort Γαῖα (heute el-*Gi*) existierte.⁶⁸

Zum Schluß werden noch, nach der Rückkehr zum Ausgangspunkt, die ננייא ראשקלון die „Gärten von Askalon“ (wo Gemüsebau eifrig betrieben wurde⁶⁹) genannt.

Die letzte (35) Angabe, welche von der „nach der Wüste führenden großen Straße“ spricht, dürfte hier kaum am Platze und auch nicht ursprünglich sein. Es kann hier nach Bestimmung des südlichsten Punktes bei *Petra* und nach der Rückkehr zum Ausgangspunkt, *Askalon*, nicht mehr von der Straße, welche etwa nach der ägyptischen Wüste führt, gesprochen worden sein. Näheres s. weiter Abschnitt III.

* * *

Eine kurze Übersicht der in der Sifrè-Rezension enthaltenen Angaben ergibt folgende Statistik:

1—4: Küstenstädte;

5—22: Grenzorte Galiläas im Westen, Norden und Nordosten;

⁶⁸ Näheres bei Hildesheimer, 69 ff.

⁶⁹ Siehe meinen Artikel Askalon im Probeheft der Enzyklopädie des Judentums *Eschkol*.

23—32: Trachonen und Hauran;

33: bei Petra;

34: Ausgangspunkt.

(35: Zusatz.)

Bei Punkt 32 hat Ms. London zwei Lesarten verzeichnet, deren keine den ursprünglichen Namen genau wiedergibt.

II. DIE TOSEFTA-REZENSIONEN

(תוספתא כ"י ארפורט)

תחום ארץ ישראל

מגדל חרוב (19)	פרשת אשקלון (1)
ונקיפתא דעיון (20)	חומת מגדל שרשן דקיסרי (2)
תיקרת (21)	ושורא דרור (3)
ובפרא דבר סגרא (22)	ושורא דעכו (4)
וחרנגלא עילאה דלעילא (23)	בכריתא (5)
מן קיסרין	ריש מעון רגעתן (6)
בית סוכת סבל (24)	ורגעתן גרמא (7)
ורקם דחגרא (25)	אגר זניתא (8)
מרכינא דבתחום בצרה (26)	וקצמרא דגליל (9)
חשבון (27)	וקביא רעיתא (10)
ויוקפא (28)	תפלית (11)
נחלה דרור (29)	סניפתא (12)
ויגוד סיכותא (30)	וסחרתא דיתיר (13)
ונמרין (31)	מומתא דבור (14)
מלי חוראי (32)	וממציא דעכתא (15)
ורקם גיאה (33)	מי שפר (16)
וניניא דאשקלון (34)	עילי רבתא (17)
	ומחרשת (18)

Die in der Erfurter (jetzt Berliner) und in der Wiener Handschrift der Tosefta enthaltenen Texte unseres Verzeichnisses sind nicht in allen Punkten übereinstimmend; sie sind auch nicht gleichen Ursprungs und müssen gesondert betrachtet werden.

a) Der Text der E (= Erfurter) -Tosefta ist kürzer. Er zeigt folgendes Bild im Vergleich mit der Rezension des Sifrè (Abschnitt I):

(1—4) sind im wesentlichen gleich. Bei (2) wird zu „Mauer des Stratonturmes“ sachlich richtig דקיסרי „von *Cäsarea* (sc. maritima)“ hinzugefügt; zu (3) ⁷⁰דור [שורא ד] „die Mauer von] *Dor*“. — Statt des hebräischen חומת עכו wird hier (4) das aramäische שורא דעכו verwendet. — (5) כבירתא folgt hier richtig nach Akko (s. I, 7). — (6) ist natürlich ריש מעין דנעתן zu lesen;⁷¹ dann (7) נעתן, wobei wieder aramäisches נרמא statt עצמה im Sifrè auffällt. Das ע' ist sprachlich richtig; א' im Sifrè wiedergibt die galiläische Aussprache. — (8) hat statt hebr. בית-אנר זיתא: Ob dies = נר „Steinhaufen“ ist? — (9) קצטרא דגליל ist bloß andere Schreibart für קצרא. — (10) lies: דעיתא קביא.

Neu ist (11): תפליה. In der Wiener Tosefta findet sich תפניא; (im Jerusch. תפנים) jedoch in anderer Reihenfolge, ein Umstand, der zeigt, daß es sich um einen späteren Einschub handelt. Der ursprüngliche Name wie auch die Lage müssen nichtsdestoweniger festgestellt werden. — Hildesheimers Kombination⁷² (statt תפליה mit Zuhilfenahme von תפניא) תפניה mit dem heutigen *Tibnin* scheint mir nicht richtig zu sein. Das ל ist nicht ohne weiteres in נ zu ändern, vielmehr kann נ sehr leicht Schreibfehler für ל sein. Ferner liegt *Tibnin* etwas zu weit nördlich von den bisher genannten Orten. Daher schlage ich *Dibl* in der unmittelbaren Nähe von *Aita* (10) und *Rāmijā* (14) vor. Zu dem Lautwechsel *dibl* = תפליה können mehrere Analogien bei palästinischen Ortsnamen angeführt werden.⁷³

(12) Für סניפתא ist nach Sifrè ספינתא zu lesen; für (13) מחרתא — פחרתא דיתיר. — (14) ist nach den Ausführungen in Abschnitt I רומתא דבור zu lesen. — (15) muß heißen: ממצרא דעיתא. — (16) מי שפר mag die ursprüngliche Lesart statt מיספר sein und die Bedeutung wie *Kallirrhoë*⁷⁴ haben. — Zu (17) עילי רבתא s. weiter sub b Punkt 21. — Für (18) lies: מרעשתא = מרחשת⁷⁵ im Sifrè.

⁷⁰ דור ist natürlich Schreib- oder Lesefehler.

⁷¹ Jedoch dürfte ursprünglich טייא gestanden haben, vgl. Abschnitt I und hier sub b 5.

⁷² S. 22 ff.

⁷³ ד = יותפת = Jotapata; נרבת = נרבות = Narbata, vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 3 ff. — Zu ס = b s. Hildesheimer, S. 22 f. und weiter Punkt 20.

⁷⁴ Vgl. Ber. r. 33 § 4 ed. Theodor 308 1:3 עין שובה = Καλλιρόη.

⁷⁵ מ = ע vgl. oben Anm. 28 und weiter Anm. 84.

(19) מנרל חרוב ist *neu*. Der Name bedeutet wohl „Turm des Harubbaumes“,⁷⁶ deshalb ist er nicht mit el-Hirbe („die Ruine“) zu vergleichen. Genaue Identifikation kann ich nicht geben, doch dürfte der Turm unweit 'Ijjon gestanden haben, das (20) hier folgt. נקיפתא (statt נקובתא רעיון ist phonetisch richtig. — Zu (21) תיקרת vgl. weiter Abschnitt IV, Punkt 2 und 3; ebendort in bezug auf כפרא דבר סנרא (22), das einer gründlichen Zurechtstellung bedarf. — Zu (23) ist nichts zu bemerken.

(24) bietet die Tos. E zwei Varianten: a) בית סוכת, das nach den obigen Ausführungen (I, 23) בית סבות zu lesen ist; b) סכל dürfte Schreib- oder Lesefehler statt סכת sein. Der Abschreiber wußte nicht, ob סכת oder סכל zu lesen sei, und nahm deshalb beide in den Text auf. — (25) lies nach dem Obigen (I, 25) רקם וחורא. — (26) ist der kürzere Name des südlichen Trachons. — (27) lies: חברן (s. oben I, Punkt 28). — (28) ist in סקא zu ändern (I, 27). — (29) lies: נחלה דורד (I, 29). — Zu (30) יגור סיכותא s. Abschnitt IV, Punkt 6. — (31) ist richtig. — (32) Für מלי חוראי ist einfach מליה ורואי zu lesen. — (33—34) sind in Ordnung. — Die Angabe betreffs der „großen Straße, welche nach der Wüste führt“ *fehlt*: ein Beweis, daß sie im Sifrè später hinzugefügt wurde (vgl. Ende I).

Zusammenfassend kann folgendes festgestellt werden:

1. der Text von E zeigt durchwegs (außer 1) *aramäische* Färbung;
2. gegenüber Sifrè fehlen hier die dortigen Punkte 14, 15, 24 (und richtig 35);
3. neu sind dagegen hier 11 und 19;
4. zu 24 hat E eine Variante verzeichnet.

b) Bezüglich der *Wiener* Handschrift der Tosefta⁷⁷ ist folgendes zu bemerken:

(2—3) zeigt der Text eine Verwirrung. Richtig muß er lauten: (2) ושורא דקיסרה וחומת מנרל שר[שן]. Dazu gab es eine Variante וקיסרין (= דקיסרין vgl. bei a), die inhaltlich das gleiche besagt. Der Abschreiber wußte dies nicht und fügte die Variante an (3) an, wo

⁷⁶ Siehe Krauss, *HUCA* I, 198.

⁷⁷ Eine tabellarische Anordnung der Namen findet man bei Hildesheimer zwischen p. X und XI, weshalb sie hier fortbleiben kann. Hildesheimer verzeichnet die Varianten (in Klammern) aus ed. princ. (s. bei ihm p. X Anm. 32).

aber der Text zu lauten hat: וְשִׁנָּה [ר] דָּוָר⁷⁸ oder wohl richtiger וְשִׁנָּה [ר] דָּוָר⁷⁹. — (5) ist beachtenswert מִיָּא דְנַעֲתִין für מעין (ähnlich Sifrè: מִי). Die Endung -ין statt -ן mag in Galiläa richtig sein.⁸⁰ — (8) וּבִנְיָא ist natürlich בִּנְיָא = בִּי וְנִתָּא zu lesen.⁸¹ — (9) lies: וְקַצְטָרָא דְנִלְיָא, denn es handelt sich bloß um ein Castrum. — (10) ist וְקִבְעִיא⁸² עֵיתָא für עֵיתָא beachtenswert ist. — (11) lies: וְרִמְתָּא דְבֹר (s. oben zu a 14).

(12) bietet einen neuen Punkt: וְבוֹרֵי רִבְתָּא. Hildesheimer verzeichnet die Variante וְטָרֵי ר'. Ist diese richtig, so käme et-Tire nordöstlich (11) in Betracht. Nördlich davon liegt Rās et-Tire. Ähnliche Ortsnamen finden sich auch sonst in Galiläa,⁸³ daher wäre die Hinzufügung von רִבְתָּא „Groß T.“ erklärlich, während dies bei בֹּרֵי unnötig wäre. Zu תַּנְיָא s. oben sub a. — (14) lies: סַפְנָתָא. — (15) lies: וּפְחֻרְתָּא דִּיתָא [י] ר'. — (16) muß lauten: וּמַצָּא [ר] א. — (17) וּמִרְחֶשֶׁת. — (18) ist die Namensform יַצְאָל beachtenswert.

(20) עִילֶשְׁתָּא ist neu und nur hier zu finden. Hildesheimer vergleicht wohl richtig Ḥallūsīje⁸⁴ am Nahr Kāsimīje.

(21) אִילָא רִבְתָּא gegenüber לִילָא des Sifrè verdient unbedingt den Vorzug. In der Tosefta E findet man עִילֵי, worin wohl ursprüngliches עִילֶם vermutet werden darf. In der galiläischen Aussprache wäre dies = אִילָא. Hildesheimer hat den Ort in 'Almōn am Nahr Kāsimīje östlich von (20) festgestellt. Ein anderes אִילָא ist in Untergaliläa bekannt;⁸⁵ daher hier das Appellativum רִבְתָּא wie oben (12). — (24) מִישָׁא ist nur in dieser Handschrift vorhanden. Ich vermute es in Dēr Mimās im Süden der Ebene von 'Ijjōn, nach welchem es in unserem Verzeichnis erscheint.⁸⁶ — Zu (25—26)

⁷⁸ Statt דָּוָר.

⁷⁹ Danach sind meine Ausführungen in *Küstenstraße* p. 4 hinfällig.

⁸⁰ Vgl. צִלְטִין = צִלְטִין (MGWJ 1927, 266); טַבְעִין = טַבְעִין (Pal.-Stud. IV, 40 f.); עֶבְרִין = ΑΚΧΑΒΑΡΩΝ (bei Josephus).

⁸¹ Siehe Anm. 18.

⁸² Ed. princ. hat hier קִבְעִיא, wo א = ע richtig sein kann, da man mit einer galiläischen Ortsbezeichnung zu tun hat.

⁸³ Vgl. Horowitz: וְשִׁנָּה 304, א"י ושכנותיה und in den Anmerkungen.

⁸⁴ Zu ע = ח vgl. Anm. 28, 75.

⁸⁵ Horowitz a. a. O. 23.

⁸⁶ Zum Namen vgl. Krauss, HUCA I, 197 Anm. 67; Löw, Flora III, 417.

s. Abschnitt IV. — (28) lies: ונקת [י]. — (29) lies: והגרה⁸⁷ — ורקם⁸⁷ — (31) נר שדרותא scheint eine biblische Ortsbezeichnung zu sein; in Wirklichkeit eine der am meist verderbten Stellen unserer Liste, s. weiter IV. — (33) lies: ומלת דורואי. — (34) lies: וסקא.

(37) רפיח ורפיח וחוגרא ist *neu* und findet sich nur hier und im Jeruschalmi. רפיח דחגרא. Man nimmt an, es sei damit die bekannte syrisch-ägyptische Grenzstadt רפיח Παφια gemeint.⁸⁸ Auffällig ist dann die Reihenfolge, da dieser Punkt jedenfalls *nach* רקם ניאה bei Petra stehen müßte, während er hier *vor* diesem, ja sogar vor Ammon und Moab (38) erscheint. Jedoch ist (38) ein späterer Einschub, wie weiter (Abschnitt V, 11) gezeigt wird. Immerhin bleibt רפיח auch so sehr auffällig, wenn nicht etwa ein anderes רפיח im Ostjordanlande angenommen werden darf, was noch weiter (Abschnitt III) zu erwägen sein wird.

Übersicht: 1. Die Namen werden in der Wiener Toseftahandschrift mit ך aneinandergereiht;⁸⁹

2. gegenüber Sifrè fehlen die dortigen Punkte 15 und 23 (dieser in Tosefta E vorhanden);

3. neu sind hier 11, 20, 37, 38 (Zusatz).

III. DER JERUSCHALMI-TEXT*

kann nach den bisherigen Untersuchungen wie folgt hergestellt werden:

פרשת [אשקלון]. חומות⁹⁰ מגדל שור[שן].⁹¹ ושורא דרור. ושורא דעכו. וקצרא דגלילא. וכברתא. ובית זניתא. וקובעיא [דעייתא]. ורמותה דבור. וטריי רבתא. תפלית. וספנתה.⁹² ופחרתא דיתיר. ומיצרייא דאייתא. וראש מי געתון. ונעתון עצמה.

⁸⁷ Ed. princ. hat ורכה, das sicher aus והגרה entstanden ist. Jedenfalls beweist die korrupte Lesart, daß zu Beginn des zweiten Wortes ein ך (nicht ך) gestanden hat (vgl. Abschnitt I zur Stelle).

⁸⁸ Hildesheimer 66 ff.; meine *Küstenstraße* 2 f.

⁸⁹ Ausnahme Punkt 4, wo dies sicher nur Zufall ist.

* Vgl. dazu außer Hildesheimers Tabelle (zwischen p. X—XI) Lunz XI—XII. 290 ff.; ferner Ginzbergs *Geniza-Fragm.* p. 362^b; Kommentar des ך״י בן שלמי צדק in der großen Wilnaer Mischnaausgabe zu Schewiit VI, 1.

⁹⁰ חומות in *Geniza-Fragm.*

⁹¹ בתורה, doch könnte dies aus שור entstanden sein; שורשן, wie שורשן.

⁹² So richtig in *Geniza-Fragm.*

מי ספר. 93 ומרחשת. 94 ומגדל הרוב. ואולם רבתא. ונקובתא דעיון... 95 כרכה רכה דבר... 95 ותרגולא עילאה דלמעלה מן קיסרין. וטרכונא דמתחם לבוצרה. ומליח דורבא. 96 ונמרין. ובית סבת. 97 ויונקת. ורפיח דחגרא. ודרך הגדולה ההולכת למדבר. חברין. וסקא. ונחלא דורד. ויגר... 95 ורקם דניעה. וגיניא דאשקלון.

Auffällig sind die mehrfachen Umstellungen. Daß *G'atūn* (I, 5—6) an unrichtiger Stelle erscheint, ist offensichtlich. Es scheint, daß der fahrlässige Abschreiber die an einer Stelle vergessenen Namen ohne viel Überlegen an einer anderen Stelle „nachholte“. — Auch hier erscheint *בית סכל* (für *ככה*), wie in der Variante der *Tosefta* (IIa, Nr. 24).

Unerklärt ist die Stellung von *רפיח דחגרא* und *דרך ההולכת למדבר* inmitten ostjordanischer Ortschaften, falls diese Angaben auf eine Gegend im Südwesten Palästinas sich beziehen sollten (s. Ende I).

Daher glaube ich bezüglich des „großen Weges“ der Ansicht von Z. Horowitz⁹⁸ und A. M. Luncz⁹⁹ beipflichten zu müssen, daß darunter die *große ostjordanische Pilgerstraße* gemeint sei, die im Osten des Landes von Nord nach Süd sich ziehend nach der arabischen Wüste führt. Hier ist natürlich nur jene Strecke gemeint, die an der Westseite des Trachons läuft, hier zugleich die Westgrenze des jüdischen Gebietes bildend.

Ist es aber so, dann muß auch *רפיח דחגרא* der *Tosefta* (oben, Ende Abschnitt II), bzw. *רפיח דחגרא* im *Ostjordanlande* angesetzt werden. Der Sprachgebrauch, bzw. die Übersetzung des biblischen *חצרים* mit *רפיח* und *שור* mit *חגרא* in den Targumim kann bei Entscheidung dieser Frage nicht maßgebend sein,¹⁰⁰ da es sich hier um *wirkliche Ortsbestimmungen* handelt, während die Targumim die zu ihrer Zeit geltende *Exegese* wiedergeben. Freilich hat — wie wir weiter (Abschnitt IV) sehen werden — das palästini-sche Targum *רפיח* (*ohne* *דחגרא*) des Grenzverzeichnisses auf das im

93 *Geniza-Fragm.* מספר.

94 *Geniza-Fragm.* מראשית, also א = ח = ע.

95 Die Ergänzung s. Abschnitt IV.

96 Palästinische Schreibart mit ב (s. oben Anm. 73).

97 Komm. מחריר hat hier סכלי, das ich nicht erklären kann.

98 (תרע"ה Jerusalem) מוקרי אבותינו, S. 58 f.

99 a. a. O. 301 Anm. 3a.

100 Hildesheimer, S. 67.

Südwesten gelegene Rafiah bezogen, doch kann dies bei Berücksichtigung der oben genannten Gründe nicht als richtig anerkannt werden.

Möglicherweise ist דהנרא des Jeruschalmi mit Rücksicht auf jene Exegese dem ursprünglichen רפיה hinzugefügt worden. Doch wage ich dies nicht als sicher zu behaupten, da wir ja im Nordosten des Ostjordanlandes eine הנרא genannte Gegend — einen der beiden Trachonen — feststellen konnten.

Jedenfalls muß aber רפיה oder דהנרא des Grenzverzeichnisses hier im Osten, und zwar in der Nähe der „großen“ Pilgerstraße, neben der es genannt ist, gelegen haben. Wir sind in der Lage, diesen *Grenzort* im Osten aus alter Quelle nachzuweisen:

Josephus fügt jenem Kapitel, wo er die Grenzen Galiläas, Samarias und Judäas feststellt,¹⁰¹ noch einige Angaben bezüglich des Reiches von Agrippa II. hinzu. Dieses umfaßte die Toparchie von Gamala, Gaulanitis, Batanaea und Trachonitis. Es begann beim Libanon und den Quellen des Jordan (im Norden) und reichte (im Süden) bis zum Tiberiassee; seine Ausdehnung (von Ost nach West) war vom Dorfe *Arpha* (Ἀρφαζ) bis Julius (nördlich vom genannten See). Gemeint ist bei Ἀρφαζ das heutige *Er-Räfe* westlich von *Zoraa*, in der unmittelbaren Nähe (östlich) der großen Pilgerstraße.¹⁰² *Das ist nun רפיה unseres Grenzverzeichnisses im Osten des Landes.* Daß in der Transkription des Josephus das ה am Schlusse des Namens nicht erscheint, kann angesichts des ähnlichen Παρφα (= רפיה) nicht überraschen.¹⁰³ Und daß der heutige Name dieses *h* gleichfalls nicht aufweist, hängt damit zusammen, daß im Norden und Nordosten die Gutturale bekanntlich schon im Altertum vernachlässigt worden sind.

IV. RESTE EINER REZENSION DES GRENZVERZEICHNISSES IN DEN PALÄSTINISCHEN TARGUMIM ZU NUM. 34

In den beiden palästinischen Targumim (*a*: Pseudo-Jonatan; *b*: Jeruschalmi-Targum) zu den Grenzen des Landes Kanaan

¹⁰¹ Bellum III 3 5.

¹⁰² Siehe darüber Klausner im קבץ החברה העברית לחקירת א"י II, 135.

¹⁰³ Ein ζ wird von Josephus ans Ende der semitischen Namen sehr oft gesetzt.

(Num. 34) ist eine eigenartige Paraphrase erhalten geblieben, die wir in einem Anhang zu dieser Arbeit eingehender besprechen wollen. Diese Paraphrase schöpfte aus verschiedenen, zumeist tannaitischen Quellen, so auch aus unserem Grenzverzeichnis. Folgende Namen, bzw. Angaben stammen zweifellos aus unserer Urkunde:

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>
(1) רקם גיעה (V. 4) רקם גיאה (V. 4)	(1) רקם דניעה (V. 3) רקם (V. 3)
(2) כרכור דבר ועמה (V. 8)	_____
(3) כרכור דבר סניגורא (V. 8)	_____
(4) דווקינום ותרנגולא עד קשרין (V. 8)	(4) { דיוקינום (פור תלנא) דקיסריון [ד] יוקינום תורנגלא דקיסריון }
(5) קרן זכותא (V. 9)	(5) קרין וכתא
(6) נבתא דחטמונא (V. 9)	(6) בתרא... _____
(7) כיריא (V. 9)	_____
(8) דבית סכל (V. 9)	_____
	(9) כל שריבון זמרא
	(10) רפיה

(Einige weitere Entlehnungen werden im „Anhang“ zu dieser Arbeit besprochen.)

Dazu ist folgendes zu bemerken:

(1) רקם ג' wird bald mit 'א, bald mit 'ע geschrieben (vgl. oben die j.-Rezension).

(2—3) כרכור ist jedenfalls Schreibfehler statt כרכא = כרבא „Festung“. Es werden hier also zwei Festungen genannt: die eine des בר ועמא, die andere des בר סניגורא. Was bedeuten diese Namen und sind sie oder waren sie im ursprünglichen Grenzverzeichnis enthalten?

Die zweite Angabe ist jedenfalls dem Verzeichnis entnommen. So liest man in der Sifrèrezension an 18. Stelle כרבא דבר סניגרא (Ms. London: קרבא — 1. קרבא); ähnlich in der Toseftarezension W (26): כרבא דבר סניגורא; E: כפרא דבר סניגרא (1. כרבא) und im j.: ברכה „die große Festung des Bar...“ Nun ist aber zu beachten, daß in Tosefta W und E dieser Angabe das bis jetzt unerklärte Wort vorangeht: ותיקרת oder ותקרא, an dessen Stelle man im j. ותוקרת oder וחקרת liest. Offenbar ist ותיקרת in וחקרת zu korrigieren. Zugleich zeigt aber der Status constructus

von חֲקֵרֶת, daß nach diesem ein Wort zu folgen hat. Ich glaube sicher, dieses fehlende Wort im Targum zu finden. Die Angabe hat zu lauten: חֲקֵרֶת בֵּר וְעַמָּא. — חֲקֵרֶת ist gleichbedeutend mit בֵּרְכָא und findet sich auch sonst nicht nur als Name der syrischen Festung von Jerusalem, sondern als Name der alten Festung von נוֹשׁ חֶלֶב (Gischala) in Obergaliläa.¹⁰⁴ Es handelt sich also in unserem Verzeichnis um zwei Festungen, die nach je einem „Sohne von ...“ benannt waren. — Wo lagen sie? — In allen Rezensionen erscheinen sie *vor*, zum Teil *unmittelbar vor* dem „Hahnenbild von Cäsarea“, d. h. in dem ehemaligen *ituräischen Gebiete*.

Über Ituräa erfährt man in der römischen Zeit folgendes: Sie erstreckte sich vom Libanon im Westen bis Damaskus im Osten und bis zu Panias und Ulatha (d. h. bis zur Sumpfggend des Hüle-sees) im Süden. Sie hatte räuberische Bevölkerung und räuberische Herrscher, die eine Reihe von Burgen im Libanon errichteten. Sie wurden zwar von Aristobul I. (101—100 v. Chr.) vorübergehend besiegt, aber sie erholten sich bald und mußten von Pompejus bekämpft werden. Aus der Reihe der ituräischen Herrscher kennen wir um 23 einen *Zenodoros* (Strabo nennt ihn einen Räuber ληστής), dessen Gebiet nicht nur über Panias und Ulatha, sondern sogar über *Trachon* hinaus sich erstreckte. *Diese Gebiete fielen nach seinem Tode dem jüdischen Könige Herodes zu*. Etwa ein halbes Jahrhundert später (38—49 n. Chr.) herrscht in Ituräa ein gewisser Σοαῖμος (Sohaemus oder Soëmus).¹⁰⁵

Dieser beiden ituräischen Herrscher Namen sind nun zweifellos in den beiden rätselhaften Angaben unseres Grenzverzeichnisses zu erkennen. חֲקֵרֶת ist offenbar Σοαῖμος. Man trifft zwar diesen Namen in einer Ossuarinschrift in der Transkription סוֹעִים an,¹⁰⁶ aber das palästinensische Targum verwendet mit Vorliebe י für ס; so finden wir weiter (s. Punkt 5) anstatt סְבוּתָא der übrigen Rezensionen im Targum זְבוּתָא. Übrigens ist der Wechsel von ס und י in nichtjüdischer

¹⁰⁴ I Mak. 3, 45 und sonst; Meg. Taan. II (23. Ijjar); M. Arachin IX 6. Zur Sache s. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 34 ff.

¹⁰⁵ Alles nach Schürer I⁴, 707—725. Über Zenodorus S. 714. Über Soëmus S. 720.

¹⁰⁶ Siehe mein *Jüd. Paläst. Corpus Inscriptionum* S. 56 Nr. 166 aus Nazareth סוֹעִים בֵּר טַחָם נֹחַ נֶפֶשׁ; s. dazu noch Dalman, *Orte und Wege Jesu*³, S. 66.

Umgebung auch sonst zu belegen.¹⁰⁷ כרבת דבר oder חקרת בר ועמא ist also eine *Festung des Soëmus*. Der volle Name des Herrschers war nämlich *Bar Soëmus*; so sind viele gut bezeugte ituräische Namen mit בר = Bar, Βαρ zusammengesetzt.¹⁰⁸

In der anderen, jedenfalls korrupten Angabe ist der Name des oben genannten anderen ituräischen Herrschers, nämlich des *Zenodoros*, zu erkennen. Daß סננורא oder סנינורא Name eines Mannes oder einer Ortschaft¹⁰⁹ wäre, ist absolut nicht belegt; daß es nicht das wohlbekannte סנינורא = סטνίγγορος ist, braucht nicht erst bewiesen zu werden. Zudem ist noch auf die Variante סנינורא zu verweisen, während סטνίγγορος immer סנינור geschrieben wird. Auch das ד des j. (סננרא) ist zu beachten. Der ursprüngliche Name ist aus den korrupten Lesarten wiederherzustellen; er muß lauten סינודורא, d. i. *Zenodoros*, bzw. *Bar-Zenodoros*. — Josephus nennt diesen Zenodoros auch mit dem kürzeren Namen *Zeno* und berichtet, daß ein Stück seines Gebietes an Herodes' Sohn Philippus übergeben worden sei.¹¹⁰ Daher heißt es bei Lukas (3. 1), daß Philippus auch über Ituräa geherrscht habe.

Aus den obigen Ausführungen ist zu ersehen, daß gewisse ituräische Gebiete um die Wende des 1. Jahrhunderts im jüdischen Besitze waren. Es ist auch zweifellos, daß Juden in den neuerworbenen Gebieten sich niederließen.¹¹¹ Die Grenzen dieser Gebiete mußten zu einem gewissen Zweck, den wir später kennenlernen, festgesetzt werden. Die *genaue* Lage der beiden genannten Burgen oder Festungen kann freilich nicht festgestellt und es können hierüber bestenfalls Vermutungen geäußert werden.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Vgl. מוחז = מחוז: *MGWJ* 1917, S. 134.

¹⁰⁸ Schürer a. a. O. 708 Anm. 5. Auf Inschriften findet man: Bargathes, Baramna, Barates (ברעתה), Βαραθης.

¹⁰⁹ Dalman, *Wb.*, Levy, *Targ. Wb.* 176 a: „Sannigora“ (?).

¹¹⁰ Bell. j. II 6, 3; s. dazu *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 55 f.

¹¹¹ j. Berachot III 1: ומסילו ליטור: ... להציל השדה מיד בני ואסילו ליטור. In dem rätselhaften Wort ליטור erkenne ich den semitischen Namen von Ituräa = יטור (vgl. Schürer a. a. O. 707 f.). Die Stelle besagt also, daß ein Kohen sogar nach Ituräa reisen dürfe, um ein Feld zurückzuerhalten. Ituräa wird hervorgehoben, da dort angesichts der unsicheren politischen Verhältnisse nicht viel Hoffnung auf die Wiedergewinnung des Grundstückes vorhanden sein dürfte.

¹¹² Man darf vielleicht an die beiden Festungen *Ḳal'at Bustra* und *Ḳ. es-Šubēbe* unweit *Panias* denken. Siehe darüber Robinson, *Neuere biblische Forschungen* 538 f.; Baedekers *Pal. und Syr.*⁶, 229.

(4) דיוקניום, richtiger nach *b* דיוקניום, ist εἰκών „Bild“ und dürfte die vom Targumisten frei vorgenommene Hinzufügung zu der eigentlichen Angabe des Grenzverzeichnisses sein,¹¹³ die in den Worten עד קסרין ותרנולא enthalten ist. Richtig muß es natürlich heißen: דקסרין..., bzw. nach *b* דקסרין (= Caesarea Philippi zur Unterscheidung von קסרין = Caesarea maritima). In *b* ist übrigens diese Angabe zweimal enthalten, das erstemal fehlerhaft: תרנולא..., lies: תרנולא.¹¹⁴

(5) קרן (*a*), bzw. קרון וכותא (*b*) entspricht zweifellos סכותא, bzw. בית סכות (I, 23). Im Worte קרן, richtiger קרון, ist קרי „Dorf“ zu suchen und dürfte richtig קרון (oder קרון) zu lesen sein. Der Targumist will damit die Dörfer der Lavagegend *Zakuta* bezeichnen.

(6) נבחה דחטמונא ist ein sehr bedeutsamer Beitrag zur Zurechtstellung einer Angabe des Grenzverzeichnisses, die scheinbar heillos verdorben ist.

In der Sifrèrezension (30) fanden wir סכותא, ססותא, סכותא, dem in Tosefta W (31) und j. שדרותא יגר entsprach. Man hat entgegen allen kritischen Grundsätzen die an zweiter Stelle genannte Lesart, welche eine wohlbekannte biblische Ortsbezeichnung (Gen. 31. 46) bietet, akzeptiert,¹¹⁵ ohne zu fragen, wieso die Lesart im Sifrè und die in Tosefta E zu erklären sei. Letztere hat nämlich סיכותא יגור, und es ist wahrlich undenkbar, daß ein Abschreiber aus dem wohlbekannten biblischen יגר שדרותא das völlig unverständliche יגור סיכותא oder סכותא machen sollte. Auch die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Sifrètextes spricht entschieden gegen שדרותא יגר. Ms. Rom hat ססותא; London: סכותא; Oxford: סכותא. Sieht man sich diese Lesarten genauer an, so kommt man bald zu der Vermutung, daß sie aus חטמונא entstehen konnten, und anstatt יגור סיכותא von Tosefta E ist sicher יגר חטמונא zu lesen.

Die Richtigkeit dieser Korrekturen wird nun nicht bloß durch unsere Targumstelle erwiesen. Ein in der Tosefta Schewiit IV 9 erhaltenes Verzeichnis der Grenzorte der jüdischen Stadt *Nave*

¹¹³ Vielleicht entstand aber das Wort יוקניום unter Einfluß der oben I, Punkt 24 behandelten Grenzangabe ויונקת, die schon früh mehrfach korrumpt wurde.

¹¹⁴ תרנולא ist die Wiedergabe von חרמן im Targ. Jon. zu Deut. 3. 9.

¹¹⁵ Hildesheimer, 57 ff. Er sucht freilich auch סכותא (= מצפה) zu rechtfertigen; aber die Varianten ססותא, סכותא bleiben unerklärt.

im Ostjordanlande nennt an fünfter Stelle יגרי חטם „die Steinhäufen von Hatam“.¹¹⁶ Heute entspricht diesem alten Namen *Ataman* südöstlich von *Nave*. Der Ort wurde gekürzt חטם, vollständiger חטמונא genannt. Zur Bestimmung der Grenze verwendete man die in der Nähe sich befindlichen „Steinhäufen“ (יגרים = Ruġm) oder einen besonders großen Steinhäufen, יגר. Dieses Wort ist nun ein Verhängnis für die Abschreiber geworden, da infolgedessen das biblische יגר שדרותא hierher versetzt worden ist. Der palästinische Targumist wollte für „Steinhäufen“ einen noch bezeichnenderen Ausdruck gebrauchen und verwendete deshalb (statt יגר) נבחה, das auch sonst als Ortsbezeichnung anzutreffen ist.¹¹⁷ In *b* ist das Wort in korumpierter Form als בחרא¹¹⁸ enthalten (aber zu קרן gezogen), während dort דחטמונא fehlt.

Dieser Grenzpunkt erscheint im Grenzverzeichnis inmitten trachonitischer Ortschaften, was ja den tatsächlichen topographischen Verhältnissen entspricht.

(7—8) כיריא רבית סבל erscheint im Targum als eine Ortsbezeichnung. — כיריא רבית סבל fanden wir in Tosefta E (II a, Punkt 24) und in *j* als Variante zu בית סוכת (lies: בית סכות oder סכת). Der Targumist fand auch diese Lesart in seiner Vorlage und glaubte sie neben dem richtigen וכתא (oben Punkt 5) verwenden zu müssen. — Was aber soll כיריא sein? — Es ist mit ed. Ginzburger zweifellos ביריא zu lesen und mit ביריין des Sifrètextes (I, 12) gleichzusetzen. Demnach ist im Targum כיריא רבית סבל zu lesen.

(9) כון ומרא in *b* ist eine wertvolle Variante (statt des unrichtigen נימרא), die wir durch die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Sifrètextes bestätigt fanden.

(10) רפיה haben wir oben Ende Abschnitt III besprochen. Wichtig ist, daß der Targumist רפיה ohne דחגרא in seiner Vorlage fand. Wir haben den Grenzpunkt im Osten nachgewiesen (s. Abschnitt III); der Targumist selbst dachte jedoch an den syrisch-ägyptischen Grenzort, was daraus hervorgeht, daß er unmittelbar darauf das aus der jüdischen Literatur sonst unbekannte שוקמזיי

¹¹⁶ Siehe dazu meine Ausführungen *JQR N. S.* II, 554 ff.; עבר הירדן היהודי, 41 f.

¹¹⁷ Vgl. im Register meiner *Beiträge zur Geographie und Geschichte Galiläas*: נובת שמאי, ג' דציפורין, נובתא דאריח.

¹¹⁸ So vermutet, wohl richtig, mein Schüler stud. Schwadron in Jerusalem (wo wir das Grenzverzeichnis als seminaristische Übung behandelten).

(lies: שוקמון) (Συκαμαζων der Kirchenväter) an der Küste folgen läßt.¹¹⁹ Doch stand dieser Name sicher nicht im ursprünglichen Verzeichnis.

Der Targumist scheint seine hier besprochenen Angaben aus dem Jeruschalmi geschöpft zu haben. Dafür spricht die ungenaue Reihenfolge ebenso, wie gewisse Übereinstimmung in der Schreibung der Namen.¹²⁰ Jeruschalmi und Targum¹²¹ stammen jedenfalls aus Palästina, und diesem Umstand ist es wohl zu verdanken, daß in dem sonst so schlecht überlieferten Targumtext wir doch einige wichtige Punkte in genauer Schreibung vorfinden konnten.

V. VERWANDTE TEXTE

Zum besseren Verständnis des großen Grenzverzeichnisses müssen noch eine Reihe verwandter Texte der talmudischen Literatur hier besprochen werden:

1. Tosefta Ahilot XVIII 15 תחומי אשקלון ובראשונה היו אומרים: תחומי אשקלון 123 ועד תרעין ה' וממנו עלו חכמים וסוחרים.

Der Bericht besagt, daß ursprünglich ein größeres Gebiet um *Askalon* als ausländisch gegolten habe, in späterer Zeit sei jedoch von mehreren Gelehrten eine Abstimmung vorgenommen und die genannten Orte seien „rein“ — d. h. als palästinensischer Boden — erklärt worden. Wann diese Abstimmung stattgefunden, erfährt man gleichfalls aus der Tosefta, wonach Rabbi, R. Ismaël b. R.

¹¹⁹ Siehe dazu meine *Küstenstraße Palästinas* S. 2 f. Im Targum heißt es nach Rafiah und Sykamozen: ער טמי ספר ימא דטילאח. Ich glaube, das letzte Wort streichen zu müssen, da der Targumist jedenfalls an die Südwestgrenze dachte. Die Ausführungen Dalmans in *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 58 zu diesem Punkte scheinen mir nicht zwingend genug zu sein. Der Targumist hat, wie oben nachgewiesen wurde, das tannaitische Grenzverzeichnis vielfach benutzt; und da die Targumstelle vom Ostjordanlande handelt, glaubte ein Abschreiber oder ein Drucker an Stelle von ימא oder ימא רבה — ימא דטילאח — setzen zu müssen, während der Targumist in Wirklichkeit den ostjordanischen Grenzpunkten jene an der Küste folgen läßt.

¹²⁰ Vgl. סכל (י) oben III, S. 23; גיעה für גיעה in beiden Texten.

¹²¹ Über das Verhältnis der beiden palästinischen Targumim zueinander s. im Anhang.

¹²² So im Toseftazitat bei RS zu XVIII 9. In der Tos.: ועד יגוריו ועד נגב.

¹²³ Richtiger wohl דיי, wie in den Ausgaben der Tosefta.

Josse und R. Elazar ha-Kappar auf Grund einer Aussage des R. Pinḥas b. Jaiṛ die Stadt *Askalon selbst* als rein erklärt hätten.¹²⁴ Es ist nur natürlich, daß die Reinheitsklärung sich auf das ganze Stadtgebiet erstreckte, was ja die erste Toseftastelle ausdrücklich sagt. Trotz dieser Reinheitsklärung wurden aber die Stadt und ihre Nachbarorte (חברותיה) in gewisser Beziehung als ausländisch angesehen, da sie durch das gleiche Kollegium (mit Ausnahme von R. Ismaël b. R. Josse) von den Zehntabgaben freigesprochen wurden.¹²⁵

Unser Grenzverzeichnis vertritt offenbar den *älteren* Standpunkt, da es Askalon aus dem Gebiete Erez Israels ausschließt und das Territorium des Landes nur bis zum Scheideweg, bzw. zu den Gärten (1 und 34 im Sifrè) reichen läßt.¹²⁶ Innerhalb des so ausgeschiedenen Gebietes lagen die in der obigen Toseftastelle genannten Lokalitäten. Mit Sicherheit kann nur יגור — heute *el-Ğura* ganz nahe östlich von Askalon — festgestellt werden.

Das große Grenzverzeichnis ist also jedenfalls einer der Zeit Rabbis vorangehenden Periode zuzuweisen.

2. Ähnliche Berichte besitzen wir bezüglich der Stadt *Cäsarea* am Meere. Auch diese galt früher (מעילם „seit jeher“ heißt es im betreffenden Bericht) als unrein, wurde aber bei einer Gelegenheit (leider wird nur der Tag: der 5. Adar-scheni, ohne das Jahr, angegeben) als rein erklärt, damit ein jeder (d. h. sogar Kohanim) das Stadtgebiet betreten dürfe.¹²⁷

מעשה... ששבתו בחנות של סו' בלוד והיה ר' סנחם בן יאי' יושב לפניו. אמר לו: ¹²⁴ אשקלון מה אתם בה? אמר להן: מוכרין חמין בבסליקאות שלהן ומובלין ואובלין את ססחיהן לערב. Da zur Zeit Rabbis kein Pessachopfer dargebracht wurde, so scheint die von R. Pinḥas bezeugte Tatsache auf die Tempelzeit sich zu beziehen. Vgl. jedoch j. Schewi' VI 36^c: יורדין היינו לסודקי של אשקלון ולוקחין חמין ועולי' לעיריגו ומובלין ואובלין: בחרוסת יגור. Der Anfang des Toseftaberichtes ist jedenfalls nach j. zu korrigieren.

Auf Grund dieser Aussage erfolgte die Reinheitsklärung, der auch R. Ismaël b. R. Josse zustimmte (vgl. die Fortsetzung: שטמאמי טהרה).

¹²⁵ Tos. Ahilot XVIII 4: אע"פ... אשקלון וחברותיה, אע"פ: עירות המובלעות בא"י כגון... אשקלון וחברותיה, אע"פ: שטמאמי טהרה. Dies ist das Ergebnis der zweiten Abstimmung, deren Gegenstand so bestimmt wird: מהו שנהג בה ט' (שום) ארץ העמים?

¹²⁶ Vgl. j. Schewi' VI 36^c: אשקלון עצמה...? ט' ט' דתני' גיניגה דאשקלון דאמרה אשקלון כלחין.

¹²⁷ Tos. Ahilot XVIII: העיר ר' יהודה בן יעקב טבית גובריא ועקב בר' יצחק טבית גוסנין: על קסרי שהחזיקו בה מעולם [במוטאה sc.] והתירוה שלא במנין; א"ר חנן: אותה שנה שביעית היתה... א"ר וריקא בחמשה באדר השני נטנו עליה עשרים וארבעה זקנים והתירוה ש[י]היו הכל נכנסים לתוכה. Es gab also zwei Überlieferungen über die Freierklärung von C.; nach der einen

Eine andere mehrfach korrumpierte, in unseren Texten lückenhafte Tosefastelle gibt auch (ähnlich wie bei Askalon) die einzelnen Punkte des ursprünglich unreinen Stadtgebietes an.¹²⁸

geschah dies ohne Abstimmung, d. h. die jüdische Bewohnerschaft hat die Früchte des früher als zu Erez Israel gehörenden Gebietes einfach als ausländische Bodenerträge angesehen und im Erlaßjahre ohne weiteres genossen. Nach der anderen Überlieferung wurde dies von 24 Gelehrten gestattet. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich um die Sanktionierung eines schon bestehenden Zustandes.

¹²⁸ Tosefta ebd. 13 (617*): ואיזה מזרח קסרי? מכנגד מטרסלין שלה ועד כנגד בית הנת: — Die Frage: „Welche ist die Ostseite von Cäsarea?“ — nimmt offenbar Bezug auf die Mischna Ohol. XVIII 9: קסרין ומערב קסרין קברות, wonach nicht nur das von den Stadtmauern umfaßte Gebiet, sondern auch die weitere Umgebung im Osten und Westen wegen dort befindlicher Gräber unrein sei. Obige Tosefastelle gibt nun die Ostseite an, während sie von der Westseite schweigt. Mit Recht wurde von Büchler (*JQR* XIII, 685) zur Ergänzung dieser Tosefastelle das Zitat bei R. Samuel b. Gama herangezogen: ואיזה מערב קסרי(ו)? מכנגד קורם שלא גזבר בן שאול ועד סוף החומה הישנה והשאר כלה טמאה משום ארץ העמים (Der Kopist der Tosefta übersprang die Worte von einem anderen.) Aber dieses Zitat ist vollkommen sinnlos, und der Versuch von Krauss (*JQR* XIV, 751) es herzustellen und zu deuten ergab kein brauchbares Resultat. — Man muß, von bekannten Tatsachen ausgehend, dem Sinn der Worte näherzukommen versuchen.

An Stelle Cäsareas am Meere stand früher der *Stratonsturm*, der in den tannaitischen Quellen מגדל genannt wird (vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 5 Anm. 19). Das tannaitische Grenzverzeichnis spricht, wie wir oben (I, 2) sahen, von den Mauern (oder der Mauer) des Stratonsturmes zur Bestimmung des vom Lande Israels ausgeschiedenen Gebietes, das also als unrein galt. Dieser Turm stand im Westen, am Meere. Statt מגדל ist auch die Schreibung שרשא denkbar. [Hiefür bietet die Tosefta mehrfache Belege (vgl. meine *Küstenstraße* S. 10 Anm. 3 und s. noch T. Gittin II 10: בן קדראה, l. richtig קדראה = קדרה); zur Sache vgl. Raschi zu Ketub. 69^b oben s. v. ינחם: אין לך לאמר פתח בשום אות אלא א"כ אלף או ה' כמובין לו או ע"י: ינחם וכו' [הנקודה שתחתיה, והיא באה במקום אות כאלו כתוב ינחם וכו']]

Man muß nun die Buchstabengruppe שלאמנובנקשאול schärfer ins Auge fassen und richtig einteilen; etwa so: של אנוב רבנקשאול. Wenn wir das ל am Ende der Buchstabengruppe streichen, bleibt רבנקשאול, worin ich mit gewissen Änderungen [aus ש; רב aus ש; נ; נ; נ hergestellt] vermute. Ist nun „Straton“ da, so muß vor ihm „Turm“ gestanden haben. Daher ist die Buchstabengruppe אנוב mit geringfügigen und sicher erlaubten Korrekturen מגדל zu lesen. Die ganze Gruppe lautet danach: של מגדל שרשא. Wenn wir noch das vorangehende in קטור ändern, so erhalten wir שרשא מגדל, also die im tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis vorhandene Angabe. (Ich bedaure es sehr, mit derartigen Konjekturen operieren zu müssen; eine Nachprüfung der Stelle in der Handschrift des Samuel b. Gama ist mir leider unmöglich!) Die ganze Tosefastelle, ergänzt durch die obige Mischna, besagt nun folgendes: מזרח קסרי(ו) ומערב קסרי(ו) קברות, ואיזה

Im *Osten* der Stadt lagen: a) מטרפלין = τετράπυλον, das mit vier Säulenhallen geschmückte Tor;¹²⁹ b) סמיו = στοία, die die Stadt umgebende Säulenhalle; c) בית הגת, Kelterhaus, da in der Umgebung Cäsareas viel Wein produziert wurde.¹³⁰ Nach Jehuda des Bäckers Zeugnis war die östliche Säulenhalle rein, alles übrige aber unrein.

Im *Westen* werden nach dem von uns zurechtgestellten Text genannt: a) חומה של מגדל שרשאן, die Mauer des Stratonturmes; b) das Ende der alten Mauer. Das zwischen diesen beiden liegende Stück ist unrein, alles andere ist rein.

Aus allem dem folgt, daß das Stadtgebiet Cäsareas ursprünglich als unrein galt, während seine weitere Umgebung zum Lande Israels gerechnet wurde. Der neue Beschluß hatte den Zweck, das *Stadtgebiet selbst* als rein zu erklären. Andererseits aber wurde das *weitere* Stadtgebiet (genau so wie bei Askalon) in bezug auf die Beobachtung der Bodengesetze des siebenten Jahres als ausländisch angesehen. Der ganz gleiche Beschluß betreffs Askalons ist von Rabbi und seinem Bet-din erbracht worden. Man wird also nicht irregehen, auch den Beschluß betreffs Cäsareas ihm zuzuschreiben.

Unser Grenzverzeichnis, das als Grenzpunkt die Mauer(n) des Stratonturmes nennt, schließt offenbar die Stadt selbst aus dem Lande Israels aus, vertritt auch hier den älteren Standpunkt, ist also jedenfalls älter als Rabbi (d. h. die zweite Hälfte des 2. Jahrh.).

3. Das weitere Gebiet Cäsareas sollte also als Ausland angesehen werden. Wie weit dieses Gebiet reichte, wird in einer talmudischen Stelle wie folgt angegeben¹³¹: „Alles, was das Meer sieht (d. h. alle jene Orte, von wo aus man das Meer erblicken kann), ist erlaubt.“ Manche sagen: bis מגדל מילהא, manche sagen: bis zur Höhle מלימון (oder תלימון). Ersteres ist Hirbet *Maliḥa*, bei

מורה קיסרי? סכנגד מטרפלין שלה ועד כנגד בית הגת שלה. העיר יהודה הנחתום על פסיו המזרחי שהוא טהור והשאר כלה מטאה משום ארץ העמים. — ואיזה מערב קסרין? סכנגד חומה של מגדל שרשאן ועד סוף החומה הישנה, והשאר כלה (מטאה) [טהורה] משום ארץ העמים.

¹²⁹ Vgl. *Expos. totius mundi* 26 (angeführt bei Thomsen, *Loca sancta* 74 s. v. Καίσαρεια); *tetrapylon* eius nominatur ubique, quod unum est novum aliquid spectaculum.

¹³⁰ Siehe *Schwarz-Festschrift* 393 [גד[ו]רה של קסרין = אנדור]; ebendort 391 Anm. 24.

¹³¹ j. Demaj II 1 (22 c 34): כל דחמי (מיא) [יטה] [l. mit Ms. j. Rom: שוריי. אית] דבעי מיטר עד מגדל מילהא ואית דבעי מיטר עד מערת מלימון [תלימון] [Ms. R: מלימון].

Eusebius Μαγδαλ. genannt, nördlich von Cäsarea.¹³² In der Nähe dieses Ortes dürfte die oben genannte Höhle zu finden sein. — Unsere Stelle fährt dann fort und sagt unter anderem: **וצורן ודאי**. **בקיטרין**. Das zweite Wort gibt keinen rechten Sinn; es muß dort ein Ortsname gestanden haben: „Die Orte **צורן** und ... sind wie Cäsarea“, d. h. gleichfalls aus dem eigentlichen Land Israel ausgeschlossen. In der Tat findet man in der römischen Jeruschalmi-handschrift¹³³ **וצורן ודאר**, d. h. die Stadt *Dor* (*Dora*) (deren Name auch sonst in dieser Orthographie erscheint¹³⁴) ist gleich Cäsarea zu behandeln. **צורן** dürfte etwa als „Klein-Zōr“ zu erklären und mit dem heutigen *Tel Šūr*, südlich *Dor*, gleichzusetzen sein.¹³⁵

Unser Verzeichnis nennt ebenfalls *Dor*, und da seine „Mauer“ als Grenzpunkt angegeben wird, so ist dadurch das engere Stadtgebiet jedenfalls aus dem Lande Israels ausgeschlossen. Dies mußte deshalb gesagt werden, da in der Stadt seit langer Zeit Juden wohnten;¹³⁶ doch sollte die Niederlassung in *Dor* den die Reinheitsvorschriften beobachtenden Kohanim verboten werden.¹³⁷ In bezug auf *Dor* ist offenbar auch später kein erleichternder Beschluß erbracht worden, vielleicht deshalb, weil die jüdische Bewohnerschaft keine beträchtliche gewesen.

4. Bezüglich *Akkos* liest man in M. Oholot XVIII 9: ... **ומזרח עכו היה ספק וטהרהו חכמים** „die Ostseite Akkos war zweifelhaft (rein), und die Weisen haben sie für rein erklärt.“ Die Westseite,

¹³² Siehe meine *Küstenstraße*, S. 4 f.

¹³³ Die Photographie stand mir durch die Freundlichkeit Prof. Epsteins (Jerusalem) zur Verfügung.

¹³⁴ Jos. 17. 11; I Kön. 4. 11; vgl. Gesenius-Buhl 17, 151. Der Name ist auch in einer korrupten Stelle des Babil anzutreffen. *Hullin* 6^a: R. Zēra und R. Ami kamen ins Gasthaus **דיאי**; Ms. München: **פונדק דאי**; lies: **לפונדק דאי** oder **דדאר**.

¹³⁵ **צורן** als phönikischer Ortsname an der den Phönikiern gehörigen Küste ist weder auffällig noch aber alleinstehend. Nördlich *Dor* findet man *eš-Šurafend*, das offenbar dem phönikischen *Šarafand*, südlich Sidon (= **צורס אשר לצידון**) entspricht. Wir haben also mit phönikischen Neugründungen zu tun. Einen zu einer gewissen Zeit den Phönikiern gehörenden Ort vermutet Dalman (*Orte*³, 61 Anm. 1) in **בית להם צרייה** j. Meg. I 70^a (10 von unten) in Untergaliläa.

¹³⁶ Die Stadt war seit Alexander Jannai jüdischer Besitz (Ant. XIII 12, 4), vgl. Schürer II, 140. Zu Agrippas I. Zeit wird die Existenz einer Synagoge bezeugt (ebd. XIX 6, 3).

¹³⁷ Ähnliches geschah ja bekanntlich bei der Neugründung von Tiberias.

die am Meer gelegene, ist jedenfalls rein gewesen;¹³⁸ an der Ostseite handelte es sich gleichfalls nur um die unmittelbare Umgebung der Stadt (wie bei Cäsarea). Die Stadt selbst galt für ausländisch, deshalb wird sie in unserem Grenzverzeichnis durch Nennung der „Mauern von Akko“ aus dem Gebiet Erez Israel ausgeschlossen.

5. Tos. Ahilot XVIII 14 (617. 11 ff.) *ההולך מעכו לכזיב, מימינו ... משמאל למערב הדרך טמאה משום ארץ העמים ... עד כזיב; ר' ישמעאל בר' יוסי אומר בשם אביו עד לבלאבן*¹³⁹

Das rechts (östlich) von der Akko-Kezib-Straße sich erstreckende Gebiet ist rein (palästinensisch), das westliche ist aber ausländisch. R. Ismaël überliefert im Namen seines Vaters, das gleiche gelte nicht nur bis *Kezib* (*Ekdippa*), sondern noch etwas nördlicher bis *Lablaban*, der Nordspitze des *Rās el Abjad*, bzw. bis *Lebbūna* unweit von *Wādi Hamūl*.

Unser Grenzverzeichnis vertritt hier einen anderen Standpunkt. Nach Akko folgt in ihm *G'atūn südlich* vom Nahr Mefschuh (5—6) oder כברתא (heute *Kabarsa*), gleichfalls südlich vom genannten Bache, aber auf der Westseite der Akko-Kezib-Straße.¹⁴⁰ Ferner beweist unser Verzeichnis, daß weder Kezib noch aber Lablaban zum Lande Israel gerechnet wurde. *Die Angaben des Verzeichnisses weisen also auf eine dem R. Josse (Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts) vorangehende Zeit hin, da der Küstenstrich im Norden noch nicht stark von Juden besiedelt war.*

6. Den mit dem Grenzverzeichnis übereinstimmenden Standpunkt nimmt ein die Tosefta Schewiit IV 6 (vgl. den fehlerhaften Text in T. Halla II 6): *איוו היא ארץ ישראל? — מנהר [ל]דרומה של אכזיב*¹⁴¹ *ואילך וכו'.* Demnach erstreckt sich Erez Israel bis zum südlich von Akzib (= Kezib) fließenden Fluß; dieser ist der Nahr Mefschuh, an dem wir die oben bezeichneten Grenzpunkte fanden.

Dies war die ältere Ansicht. Die jüngere, wonach das Land bis Kezib sich erstreckt, läßt sich genauer datieren; sie stammt von

¹³⁸ Vgl. M. Ohlot XVIII 6: *ביום ובשנות טהור ... המהלך בארץ העמים*.

¹³⁹ Die Lesarten wurden in meiner *Die Küstenstraße Palästinas* S. 10 ff. besprochen. Ebendort auch die Identifikationen.

¹⁴⁰ Die obige Barajta gibt freilich auch zu, daß es auch auf der Westseite einige jüdische Punkte gebe (*משמאלו טמאה ... עד שתיוודע לך שהיא חייבת*), aber dort gilt als Nordgrenze Kezib, während, im Grenzverzeichnis der Nahr Mefschuh als solche betrachtet wird.

¹⁴¹ Zum Text s. *ידעות הכהן לסדעי היהדות* (Jerusalem) I, 72 Anm. 2.

Rabban Gamliel II (etwa 100),¹⁴² obschon sie auf eine alte historische Tatsache zurückzuführen ist. Der Hasmonäer Simon war nämlich Strateg der Meeresküste von der tyrischen Leiter bis zur Grenze Ägyptens, d. h. etwa 3 r. Meilen nördlich von Ekdippa bis zum Bache Mizrajims.¹⁴³ Die Meeresküste innerhalb der genannten Grenzpunkte war also mit Ausnahme der heidnischen Städte Askalon, Cäsarea, Dor, Akko, in gewissem Sinne jüdisch. Unser Verzeichnis berücksichtigt mehr die tatsächlichen Verhältnisse und ist jedenfalls älter als die Halacha (oder Theorie) Rabban Gamliels und R. Josses. Aus anderweitigen Stellen läßt sich tatsächlich nachweisen, daß die Küstenstädte erst nach 70 eine größere jüdische Bevölkerung erhielten und daß Rabban Gamliel es war, der den dortigen Gemeinden seine besondere Aufmerksamkeit zuwandte.¹⁴⁴

7. j. Demaj II 1 sagt der Amora R. Jona, das Land vom „Hahnenbild Cäsarea Philippis“ und höher sei ausländisch אבל מחרנוגול קסריון ולמזן בארץ ישראל, das unter ihm (d. h. südlich) gelegene Land sei wie Erez Israel. Dies stimmt mit der Angabe unseres Grenzverzeichnisses (22) überein und dürfte ihm entnommen sein. Es darf wohl darauf hingewiesen werden, daß der Amora von dem unterhalb Cäsareas gelegenen Land sagt, es sei בארץ ישראל „wie“ E. J. — ein Ausdruck, der darauf hinzuweisen scheint, daß jene Landschaft ursprünglich doch nicht zum Lande Israel gehörte. Wann sie an Palästina geschlagen wurde, wird zu bestimmen sein (s. Abschnitt VII).

8. j. Schewiit VI 1 (36° unten): Priester befragten R. Johanan bezüglich der Strecke von *Nave*. Er gab ihnen im Namen R. Hunjas aus Bet-Hawran zur Antwort: Die Priester pflegen zu gehen bis דררי — und auf der Strecke von *Boşra* bis zum Pardes.¹⁴⁵ Der

¹⁴² M. Halla IV 8: רבן גמליאל אומר: שלש ארצות לחלה. (1) מארץ ישראל ועד; (2) מבוז ועד הנגהר ועד אטנה שתי חלות...; (3) מן הנגהר ועד אטנה ולקנים שתי מוב חלה אחת; רבן גמליאל אומר: שתי חלות בסוריא ור' אליעזר אומר חלה אחת; s. ferner M. Schewiit VI 1, wo die gleiche Einteilung zu finden ist: das jüdische Land wird also bis Kezib ausgedehnt.

¹⁴³ Vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, S. 10 ff.

¹⁴⁴ Siehe *Pal.-Stud.* I, 30 f.; *Küstenstraße*, S. 9 f.

¹⁴⁵ כהניא שאלון לר' יוחנן: אהן חושא (דנייא) [דמוא]; אפר לון ר' יוחנן בשם ר' חנינא דברת דררי; וההן חושא דבוצרייא עד דפרסוס in *JQR N. S.* II, 554. Vgl. meine Ausführungen in

erste Ortsname entspricht Δοροα der Inschriften,¹⁴⁶ heutigem ed-Dūr, etwa 35 km in der Luftlinie südöstlich Nave. Doroa gehörte noch zu Erez Israel (kommt im Grenzverzeichnis, das jedenfalls älter als R. Johānans Gewährsmann ist, nicht vor), während Bošra (heute Bošrā eskī Šchām) südöstlich davon nicht mehr zum Lande gerechnet wird, da die Priester nur bis zum Prachtgarten vor der Stadt gingen. Auch das Grenzverzeichnis betrachtet den „Trachon von Zimra“ nur *bis zur Grenze Bosras* als jüdisch (oben I, 26; II, 26).

9. Einen Grenzpunkt unseres Verzeichnisses, nämlich יַרְמֹנִית, fanden wir in der Liste der im Gebiete Naves gelegenen Ortschaften (vgl. Abschnitt IV, 6).¹⁴⁷

10. Bezüglich נִמְרִין (31) erfährt man aus zwei Angaben des j., daß dies der äußerste Grenzpunkt war, bis wohin die „Sendboten der Neumondsheiligung“ gelangten. Jedenfalls gab es dort eine jüdische Siedlung.¹⁴⁸

11. In der Tosefta Wien findet man gegen Ende des Verzeichnisses (38) „וְעַמּוֹן וְמוֹאָב“. Keine der anderen Rezensionen weist diese Grenzangaben auf; es handelt sich offenbar um einen Einschub, der in gewissen halachischen Texten seine Begründung findet; diese sind:

a) Der Schluß der oben sub 6 angeführten Toseftastelle lautet: אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם [וְ] עַמּוֹן וְמוֹאָב, d. h. die Grenzlinie des Landes zieht sich *nahe* an Ammon und Moab (im Osten) und Ägypten (im Süden); die genannten Länder gehören naturgemäß nicht zu Erez Israel. Ursprünglich mag die Grenzangabe in der Tosefta tatsächlich so gelaute haben: עַמּוֹן וְמוֹאָב. Sie wurde dann auf Grund einer anderen Stelle abgeändert.

b) M. Jadajim IV 3 wird nämlich die Frage besprochen, wie Ammon und Moab bezüglich des siebenten Jahres zu behandeln seien. Die gleiche Frage wird dort auch betreffs Ägyptens besprochen. Aus der ganzen Erörterung ergibt sich, daß es sich um eine *neue* Verordnung der zu Beginn des 2. Jahrhunderts lebenden Lehrer handelt.¹⁴⁹ Vorher galten die genannten Landschaften in

¹⁴⁶ Vgl. Thomsen, *Loca sancta* I, 56. ZDPV 1910, 42; mein עֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה 54.

¹⁴⁷ Tos. Schewiit IV 9; j. Demaj II 1. Dazu JQR a. a. O. 554 ff.; עֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן 42.

¹⁴⁸ j. R. h. I 4; Ketub. II 7. Dazu meine מאמרים שונים לחקירת א"י 44 Nr. 3.

¹⁴⁹ Ich habe die Stelle in meinem עֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן 45 f. besprochen.

jeder Beziehung für Ausland. Sie waren deshalb im ursprünglichen Grenzverzeichnis *nicht* genannt. Daraus folgt, daß unser Verzeichnis älter als die genannte Mischna ist. Wohl gibt es gewisse Spuren jüdischer Niederlassungen im ammonitischen Gebiet schon aus der vorhasmonäischen Zeit;¹⁵⁰ auch nachher siedelten sich Juden in Ammon und Moab an, und gleich den anderen jüdischen Einwohnern des In- und Auslandes zahlten auch diese ihre Schekelsteuer regelmäßig für den Jerusalemer Tempel.¹⁵¹ Doch dürfte ihre Zahl so unbedeutend gewesen sein, daß man ihre Siedlungen im ursprünglichen Grenzverzeichnis übergehen konnte. Erst zu Beginn des 2. Jahrhunderts wurde erwogen, auch diese Gebiete, bzw. Siedlungen ins Land Israel hineinzubeziehen. Diesem Standpunkt entsprechend wurde die Ergänzung עמק ומואב in der Tosefta vorgenommen. Aber aus mehreren Verhandlungen der Amoräer ist klar zu ersehen, daß sie diese Gebiete als ausländisch zu betrachten geneigt waren, obschon es öfters vorkommen durfte, daß Juden sich dort Grund und Boden erwarben.¹⁵²

VI. SINN UND ZWECK DES GRENZVERZEICHNISSES

Die im vorangehenden Abschnitt besprochenen verwandten Texte zeigen mit aller Deutlichkeit, daß die Festsetzung gewisser Grenzpunkte in der mischnischen und der talmudischen Zeit mit den Vorschriften der *Boden- und der priesterlichen Reinheitsgesetze* in engstem Zusammenhange steht. In dieser Richtung ist auch die Zweckbestimmung des großen Grenzverzeichnisses zu suchen. Dies ergibt schon der Zusammenhang, in welchem es in Tosefta und j. Talmud angeführt wird: die Traktate behandeln nämlich die Vorschriften des siebenten Jahres. Es war dringend notwendig zu bestimmen, innerhalb welcher Grenzen diese in Geltung stehen. Die alten, in Num. 34 enthaltenen biblischen Grenzangaben konnten nicht mehr ausreichen; insbesondere sind an der Küste *heidnische* Siedlungspunkte entstanden, somit konnten sie nicht zum Lande gerechnet werden. In anderen Gegenden, ins-

¹⁵⁰ Ebd., 1 ff.

¹⁵¹ Tos. Schekalim II 3; vgl. ebd. 14.

¹⁵² j. Schewiit VI, 36^c 63—36^d 17.

besondere im Ostjordanlande, besonders im ehemaligen Gebiete Halb-Manasses, entstanden wieder *neue jüdische* Niederlassungen, und da erhob sich die Frage: Gehören diese zum Lande, sind auf sie die Boden- und Reinheitsgesetze anwendbar? Diese Frage beantwortet unser Grenzverzeichnis, das also einen *religionsgesetzlichen*, keinesfalls aber einen politischen Zweck im Auge hat. Freilich hängen die Grenzpunkte des Landes mit der Ausdehnung der Machtsphäre des Staates aufs engste zusammen. Es muß daher auch die Frage nach der Entstehungszeit (vgl. Abschnitt VII) des Verzeichnisses gestellt werden.

Vorher aber noch ein Wort über die darin genannten Grenzpunkte im allgemeinen.

Es wurde mit Recht als fremdartig empfunden, daß an der Küste im ganzen vier Punkte genannt sind. „Es bleibt zweifelhaft“ — schreibt Dalman¹⁵³ — „ob *Asdod* in das jüdische Land des Gesetzes eingeschlossen war, da von Askalon bis Cäsarea auffallenderweise alle näheren Angaben fehlen.“ Die gleiche Frage hätte er aber auch bezüglich aller anderen im Grenzverzeichnis *fehlenden* Küstenstädte stellen können! — Die Sache verhält sich aber so: Wir haben oben auf die Tatsache hingewiesen, daß seit dem Hasmonäer Simon der Küstenstrich als jüdisch galt; tatsächlich spricht eine in Mischna und Tosefta erhaltene Halacha vom Lande Israel, das sich von Kezib bis zum Bache Ägyptens ausdehnt.¹⁵⁴ Damit

¹⁵³ *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 66.

¹⁵⁴ Siehe oben Anm. 142 und Tos. Halla Ende II (und Parallelstellen), wo נחל מצרים genannt wird.

Der Küstenstrich von Askalon südwärts bis zum Bache Ägyptens war freilich sehr schwach bewohnt. Juden durften dort nur in ganz minimaler Zahl sich aufgehalten haben, weshalb über jenes Gebiet keine Verfügung getroffen zu werden brauchte, d. h. theoretisch galt es als jüdisch, in der Praxis wurden die Boden- und Reinheitsgesetze dort nicht angewandt, weil es kaum Juden dort gab. Diesen Sachverhalt erfährt man aus j. Schewiit VI 36^a 49 (Ven.): מפני מה לא נזר על אותה הרח שבגוריק... מפני שנייה רע עד חזק... עד נחל מצרים.

Die Ferge bezieht sich auf die Gegend von *Gerar* (= Gerarikè), südlich von Gaza bis zum Bache Ägyptens. Was ניוו bedeutet, ist mir nicht klar. Vielleicht ist ניו = נב „Frucht“. Es sei hier die Parallelstelle nach Ber. r. ed. Theodor 702 3-5 (64, 3) angeführt: מפני מה נזרו על הניוו זה שבגוריק, מפני שהוא ניוו רע, ועד אינן חייבו... עד נחל מצרים.

ניוו soll nach den Kommentatoren = נוה = Wohnen bedeuten. Wenn vor ניו nicht לא zu ergänzen ist (wie in j.), so meint die Stelle: Warum wurde be-

ist gesagt, daß von der Küste landwärts *alles* heilig sei. *Die in unserem Verzeichnis genannten vier Punkte sind eben die Ausnahmen.* Bezüglich Cäsareas und Akkos werden als Grund der Ausschließung das Vorhandensein von Gräbern auf dem Territorium dieser Städte oder in ihrer unmittelbaren Nähe angegeben. Ähnliches haben wir bezüglich Askalons erfahren, da auch dort bei der Grenzbestimmung der Stadt ein „großes Grab“ genannt war (s. Abschnitt V, 1). Das gleiche darf wohl sicher mit Bezug auf Dor vermutet werden. In allen diesen wie in den übrigen Küstenstädten (etwa Gaza, Joppe, Apollonia und Hefā) gab es jüdische Einwohner.¹⁵⁵ Eben mit Rücksicht auf die Priester und manche die Reinheitsgesetze beobachtenden Laien mußte der Charakter der im Verzeichnis genannten Städte genauer festgestellt werden. Später, nachdem diese Städte (vgl. oben Abschnitt V) rein erklärt wurden, hätten sie keinen Platz mehr im Grenzverzeichnis des Landes Israel.

Was aber die übrigen, im Norden Galiläas genannten zahlreichen Orte betrifft, so sei zunächst auf die auffällige Tatsache hingewiesen, daß kein einziger der Grenzorte, außer קיסרין Cäsarea Philippi, in der an galiläischen Ortsnamen reichen talmudischen Literatur sonst erscheint.

stimmt, daß in der Gerarikè (so ist natürlich statt Geradikè zu lesen) die Bodengesetze angängig seien? Antwort: Weil das Wohnen(?) dort schlecht sei (daher ohnedies keiner sich dort niederlassen wird). Dazu paßt die weitere Frage: Wie weit ist dort die Gegend zehntpflichtig (חייבו)? — Bis zum Bache Ägyptens.

In j. wird dann mit Recht die Frage aufgeworfen: והרי עזה ניחה יפה! ohne darauf eine Antwort zu geben. *Gaza* liegt in einer fruchtbaren Oase, ist aber heidnisch, somit sollte man es (gleich Askalon, Cäsarea, Dor und Akko) als ausländisch erklären. Es scheint aber, daß zur Zeit der Anlegung unseres Verzeichnisses keine Juden dort wohnten. Auch später dürfte die jüdische Bevölkerung eine minimale gewesen sein.

Zum folgenden Satz in j. טישעשע וכו' vgl. meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* 1920, 186 f. und dagegen Epstein, ebd. 1921, 90.

¹⁵⁵ Vgl. die zahlreichen jüdischen Grabinschriften aus *Joppe* in meinem *Jüd. Pal. Corp. Inscr.*, S. 36 ff.; ebd., S. 51 (Nr. 157) aus *Apollonia*; S. 52 aus *Gaza*; S. 54 aus *Jabne*; S. 99 (Nr. 181): *Cäsarea*; dazu noch zwei neue im Sammelband ציון (Jerusalem 5686) I, 18 ff. — Alt hat *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1922/23 S. 102 Anm. 2 noch je zwei Inschriften aus *Cäsarea* und aus *Hefā* nachgewiesen. Aus *Askalon* stammt die völlig undeutliche Grabinschrift Nr. 180 (Ergänzungen), die aber einer späteren Zeit angehören mag; aus *Asdod* die Synagogeninschrift Nr. 15 (S. 85).

Nun erfährt man in betreff auf Cäsarea Philippi, daß dieses bis zu einem Hahnenbild palästinisch, nördlich davon ausländisch sei. Diese Stadt lag also hart an der Grenze des jüdischen Gebietes, ja, es galt nur zum Teil als jüdisch. Ähnlich muß es sich mit den übrigen galiläischen Ortschaften verhalten, die unser Verzeichnis nennt: sie sind hart an der Grenze Palästinas, d. h. an der galiläisch-syrischen Grenze gelegene Orte, die aber jedenfalls jüdische oder neben der heidnischen auch jüdische Bewohnerschaft hatten. Südlich von der Grenzlinie galt der Boden als jüdisch, nördlich davon als heidnisch. Dies hatte besondere Bedeutung für die Beobachtung der Bodengesetze auf den an der Grenze gelegenen Feldern. Daher werden an einer Stelle unseres Verzeichnisses (I, 11) die „Ackergrenzen“ (מִצְרֵי) von 'Ajta genannt.

Man kennt diese an der Grenze Palästinas, bzw. Syriens gelegenen Orte aus verschiedenen halachischen Bestimmungen und einigen agadischen Sätzen:

1. Kauft einer ein Feld in Syrien in unmittelbarer Nähe Palästinas, das Feld kann jedoch von Palästina aus in Reinheit erreicht werden (d. h. zwischen dem palästinischen und dem syrischen Boden ist keine Trennung vorhanden), so ist das Feld rein und die Bestimmungen der Zehnt- und der Bodengesetze des siebenten Jahres sind dort angängig.¹⁵⁶

2. Palästinische Städte in der unmittelbaren Nähe der Grenze erhalten besondere Wächter (im siebenten Jahr), damit die Heiden nicht eindringen und die (ohnedies spärlichen Früchte) des Brachjahres plündern.¹⁵⁷

3. Ist die Mauer einer an der Grenze gelegenen Stadt eingestürzt, so darf sie an Halbfeiertagen regelrecht wiederhergestellt werden (obwohl sonst derartige Arbeiten an Halbfeiertagen verboten sind).¹⁵⁸

4. In der Tosefta¹⁵⁹ findet man eine Kontroverse zwischen R. Josse und R. Eleazar bezüglich der „Grenzen von Erez Israel

¹⁵⁶ M. Oholot XVIII 7: הקונה שדה בסוריא סמוכה לארץ ישראל וכו'.

¹⁵⁷ Tos. Schewiit IV 7: עירות א"י סמוכות לספר מוסיפין עליהן שומר, כדי שלא יסוצו גוים ויבזו מירות שביעית.

¹⁵⁸ Tos. Moëd K. I 7: הושת העיר שנפרצה ... אם היתה סמוכה לספר סותרה. — Nr. 3 a s. im Nachtrag.

¹⁵⁹ Tos. Maass. sch. II 15; Baba K. VIII 19: ר' יוסי אומר: תחומי א"י שבכתובין גדונין בחוצה לארץ; ר' אלעזר א' גדונין בא"י.

in den [heiligen] Schriften“. Nach ersterem werden sie als Ausland, nach letzterem als Inland beurteilt. — Die ausdrückliche Betonung der Grenzen „in den *Schriften*“ weist darauf hin, daß den beiden um die Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts lebenden Lehrern ein Grenzverzeichnis außer jenem (oder jenen) in den heiligen Schriften enthaltenen bekannt gewesen ist. Wie die dort genannten Grenzpunkte zu beurteilen seien, sagen sie jedoch nicht.

5. In einer anonymen Aggada¹⁶⁰ wird das Wort משכנותך „deine Wohnstätten“ in Psalm 43.3 auf die „Grenzgebiete von Erez Israel“ angewandt und hinzugefügt: diese seien ebenso heilig wie Erez Israel selbst. Obwohl Mose und Ahron das Volk nur in jene Grenzgebiete geführt hatten, gilt dies so, als hätten sie es in das Innere des Landes gebracht. — Diese Aggada vertritt offenbar die Ansicht, daß sowohl die in der Bibel, als auch jene in der Traditionsliteratur genannten Grenzpunkte als Inland zu beurteilen sind.

6. R. Josse b. Ḥanina meint, die im Buche Josua genannten Ortschaften seien jene, die an der Grenze der Stammgebiete lagen.¹⁶¹ Auch daraus ist zu schließen, daß die Grenzorte als zu Erez Israel gehörig zu beurteilen sind.

Für unsere Frage ergibt sich aus diesen Stellen, daß die im großen Grenzverzeichnis genannten galiläischen Orte hart an der Grenze lagen, aber als zum Territorium des Landes gehörig betrachtet wurden.

Aus der Reihe der auf Cäsarea Philippi folgenden Grenzpunkte sind mehrere auch aus anderen Stellen der Traditionsliteratur bekannt. Wie wir sahen, handelt es sich um die Trachonen und den Hauran, — solche Landschaften, die auf Grund biblischer Angaben, da sie im ehemaligen Gebiet Manasses lagen, sicher zu Erez Israel gerechnet werden durften.

VII. DIE ENTSTEHUNGSZEIT DES GRENZVERZEICHNISSES

Auf Grund obiger Untersuchungen steht jedenfalls fest, daß unser Grenzverzeichnis frühere Verhältnisse als die Aussprüche der Lehrer des 2. Jahrhunderts widerspiegelt. Wann wurde es angelegt?

¹⁶⁰ Pesikta r. c. 15 (69^b): הרי קדשך . . . משכנותיך: אלו ספרי א"י שהן קדושים בא"י.

¹⁶¹ j. Meg. I 1 (Z. 15 v. u.): הסמוכות לספר מנה. Vgl. noch zur Sache Krauss, *Heatid* III, 41 f.

Schon bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung des Verzeichnisses muß es auffallen, daß darin besonders viele Grenzpunkte im *Norden und Nordosten des galiläischen Gebietes* erscheinen. Diese Punkte führen aber über jene Grenzen Galiläas hinaus, die man aus den Angaben des Josephus als die offiziellen Grenzen der Landschaft in den letzten Jahren des jüdischen Staates kennt.¹⁶² Solche unzweifelhaft außerhalb jener Grenzen gelegenen Punkte sind Jatir (13), Ulschata (II b, 20) Ijjon (21), Sefinta (20); ferner die in Ituräa festgestellten Festungen des Soëmus und des Zenodorus (18; II, 21—22; s. S. 25 ff.).

Nicht minder überraschend sind aber die zahlreichen Grenzpunkte in den *Trachonen* und im *Hauran* (von 23 bis 32).

Wann wurden diese und jene syrisch-ituräischen Gebiete zum Lande Israel gerechnet, bzw. wann wurden sie von Juden in solchem Maße besiedelt, daß sie als jüdisch angesehen werden konnten?

Die Antwort kann hierauf auf Grund sicherer historischer Berichte gegeben werden.

Im Jahre 23 erhielt Herodes vom Kaiser Augustus die Gebiete von *Trachon*, *Auranitis*, *Batanäa* und die von räuberischen Stämmen bewohnte Landschaft östlich vom Genezarethsee. Er siedelte besonders in *Batanäa* viele Juden an, die die Landschaft vor den Räubern schützten und dadurch eine zahlreiche jüdische Bewohnerchaft dorthin lockten.¹⁶³ Auch im *Hauran* entstanden jüdische Siedlungspunkte um die Wende des 1. Jahrhunderts, wie wir dies oben (Abschnitt I, 28) feststellen konnten.

Eine andere wichtige Gebietserweiterung des herodeanischen Reiches war die im Jahre 20 erfolgte Schenkung der früher dem *Ituräer* Zenodorus gehörenden Landschaften *Ulatha* und *Panias* und des umliegenden Gebietes nördlich und nordöstlich vom Genezarethsee.¹⁶⁴ Nach Herodes' Tod gehörten die gleichen Landschaften im Osten und Norden dem Tetrarchen Philippus. Es werden als seine Gebiete genannt: *Batanäa*, *Trachonitis*, *Auranitis*,

¹⁶² Bellum j. III 3, 1: der nördlichste Grenzpunkt ist Θελλα beim Hulesee, heute *Et-Tlel*. Siehe dazu Goldhar, ארצות 258; Dalman, *Orte und Wege*³, 210; meine *Pal.-Stud.* IV Anhang III.

¹⁶³ Ant. XV 10, 1; Bellum j. I 20, 4. Siehe hierüber mein עבר הירדן 17 ff.

¹⁶⁴ Ant. XV 10, 3; Bellum j. I 20, 4; vgl. Schürer I⁴, 369.

Gaulanitis, *Panias* und *Ituräa*.¹⁶⁵ An einer Stelle nennt Josephus jenes Gebiet, das früher dem Ituräer Zeno[dorus] gehörte, jetzt aber im Besitze Philippus' war, bis *Ina*.¹⁶⁶ Gemeint ist das heutige *Hine* südwestlich von Damaskus. Derselbe Ort erscheint als ב[יה] zusammen mit noch einem Orte: א[ימה] (heute *Bêt Imā*) an einer Stelle der Tosefta als Beispiel für solche Städte, die im Gebiete Erez Israel „verschlungen“ sind, wo Juden mit Heiden zusammen wohnen und ihre Felder gemeinschaftlich bearbeiten.¹⁶⁷

Die Ansiedlung jüdischer Kolonisten in diesen nördlich vom eigentlichen Galiläa gelegenen und in den trachonitisch-ḥauranitischen Gegenden erheischte die religionsgesetzliche Regelung der neuangeschlossenen Gebiete mit Bezug auf die Bodenabgaben und die Vorschriften des Erlassjahres, was wahrscheinlich in die Kompetenz des großen Bet-din in Jerusalem gehörte. Dies mußte naturgemäß sofort nach Gründung der neuen Siedlungen geschehen. Einige der hierauf bezüglichen Halachas haben wir schon oben kennengelernt. — Auf Grund obiger Darlegungen *stehe ich nicht an, die Anlegung des großen Grenzverzeichnisses in der Regierungszeit Herodes', und zwar um das Jahr 20 v. Chr., anzusetzen.*

Das ursprüngliche Verzeichnis konnte natürlich nur die zur Zeit des Herodes besiedelten Grenzorte enthalten; später wurde es mit dem Wachsen der jüdischen Bevölkerung in den Grenzgebieten um die Namen der neuen Siedlungen erweitert. Ein solcher später hinzugefügter Ortsname ist z. B. der von Cäsarea Philippi, da diese früher Panias genannte Stadt, wie der Name zeigt, durch Philippus ausgebaut und benannt worden ist.

¹⁶⁵ Vgl. Schürer I⁴, 425.

¹⁶⁶ Bellum j. II 6, 3. Die Korrektur Schürers a. a. O. Anm. 2 (Πανειαδᾶ statt Ιναῶ) ist verfehlt.

¹⁶⁷ Tos. Kilajim II 16 = j. Orla Ende; 63^b (vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 55 f.): אין עושין עם הגוי בכלאים, אבל עיירות הטובלות בא"י כגון באינה ובאימה וחברותיה עושין עמון בכלאים. Die „verschlungenen Städte“ sind verschieden von den „nahegelegenen“ Städten, über die im vorigen Abschnitt gesprochen wurde. Die עיירות הטובלות lagen tatsächlich in Palästina, nur waren ihre Einwohner zumeist Nichtjuden, weshalb jene Städte in bezug auf die Bodengesetze der Thora als außerpalästinisch behandelt werden. Tos. Ahilot XVIII 4 nennt als solche Städte: מוסריא (Hippus) und אשקלון; Tos. Gittin I 3: כפר סימאי im Gebiete Akkos. Vgl. zur Sache Gittin 4a: אמר אביי בעיירות הטובלות לא"י וטובלות בתחום א"י עסקין; ferner im Nachtrag (Anm. 158a).

Demgegenüber ist zu beachten, daß in der älteren Rezension (Sifrè) der Name von *Cäsarea am Meere* nicht vorkommt, sondern der *Stratonsturm* (2) genannt ist. Dies spricht entschieden für die Anlegung des ursprünglichen Verzeichnisses *vor* dem Jahre 10, dem Jahre der Vollendung der Bauarbeiten an Stelle des alten Stratonsturmes,¹⁶⁸ und bestätigt unsere Ansetzung der Urkunde um 20.

Das Grenzverzeichnis ist aber im Laufe der Zeit mehrfach umgearbeitet worden. Dies zeigen die nachgewiesenen Erweiterungen, wie sie besonders in der Wiener Toseftarezension aufzufinden sind. Im Laufe der Jahrhunderte mußten ja verschiedene Änderungen in den Siedlungsverhältnissen der Grenzgebiete eingetreten sein, denen entsprechend das Verzeichnis jeweilig geändert, bzw. ergänzt wurde. Unser Verzeichnis, *wie es in der Tosefta E und j. vorliegt*, stammt nach ausdrücklicher Bezeugung des j. aus dem Lehrhause R. Hijaas,¹⁶⁹ *es zeigt somit im großen ganzen den Stand der jüdischen Grenzsiedlungen im 3. Jahrhundert.*

Eine interessante und lehrreiche Analogie bietet hierzu ein ähnliches, im Jeruschalmi mitgeteiltes Verzeichnis der im Gebiete von Tyrus gelegenen jüdischen Ortschaften. R. Ami, der im 4. Jahrhundert in Tiberias lebte, bemerkt dazu: „Dieses Verzeichnis bezieht sich auf die frühere Zeit, aber heute gibt es andere Städte, die von Juden besetzt sind und deren Bodeneträgnisse im siebenten Jahre verboten sind.“¹⁷⁰

Das *ursprüngliche* Verzeichnis in seiner Gänze herzustellen, ist heute nicht mehr möglich; doch dürfte die Sifrèrezension, als die kürzeste, dem ursprünglichen am nächsten stehen.

* * *

¹⁶⁸ Schürer I⁴, 372. Vgl. Neubauer, *Geogr.* 12, Anm. 1.

¹⁶⁹ j. Schewiit VI 1, 36^e letzte Zeile: RSb Lakisch fragt R. Hana ben Abba, ob das dort gekaufte Land als palästinensisch zu betrachten sei. Der Befragte antwortet darauf (36^d 1): *אני לא שמעתי מרי חיה הגדול אלא מרשתת אשקלון*. Und R. Hana weist offenbar auf unsere Barajta hin, wo die erste Angabe *מרשתת אשקלון* lautet; und dürfte wohl die Bedeutung „und so weiter“ haben (vgl. zur Stelle Hildesheimer p. XII f.). Diese j.-Stelle beweist übrigens, daß *עמון ומואב* im ursprünglichen Verzeichnis *nicht* enthalten waren, vgl. oben Abschnitt V, 11.

¹⁷⁰ j. Demaj II 1 (22 d), Tos. Schewiit IV, 9 wird das Ortsverzeichnis mitgeteilt; dazu bemerkt R. Ammi nach dem Text der j.-Handschrift Rom, die mir in Photographie durch die Güte Prof. Epsteins (Jerusalem) vorlag: *הוא דאח אמר ברשאונה, אבל עכשיו יש * עירות אחרות שהחזיקו בהם יש [ראל] שהם אסורות ** (Von * bis * fehlt in dem Vulgärtext des j.)

Über das Schicksal der jüdischen Grenzler kann leider nur sehr wenig gesagt werden. Nach Philippus' Tod (34) wurden seine Gebiete zur Provinz Syrien geschlagen; aber schon drei Jahre später erhielt sie Agrippa I. von Caligula zurück, und sie verblieben aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach auch nach 70 im Besitz Agrippas II.

Die jüdische Besiedlung der nichtjüdischen, sogar mit Götzentempeln und Götzenbildern gefüllten ostjordanischen Städte wurde von den Lehrern der Mischna sehr warm befürwortet: sie sollten, soweit es nur ging, wieder einmal jüdisch werden.¹⁷¹ — Weniger erfolgreich dürfte die Besiedlung der syrischen Grenzorte gewesen sein. Von den zahlreichen Grenzorten ist — wie schon oben bemerkt wurde — in der talmudischen Literatur sonst kein einziger erwähnt, was dafür spricht, daß ihre Bewohner nur mit sehr schwachen Fäden mit den Juden Galiläas und ihren Lehrern verbunden waren. Immerhin muß auf die recht zahlreichen halachischen Sätze hingewiesen werden, die von diesen Grenzlern und von solchen Juden sprechen, die in Syrien Grund und Boden sich erworben haben. (Abschnitt VI.)

Nicht sämtliche im Norden genannten Orte lagen in der ehemaligen Ituräa, also im neuen Gebiet der Herodeaner. Aber auch die Grenzpunkte von 5 bis 12 unseres Verzeichnisses gehörten nicht zum eigentlichen Galiläa; sie lagen an der Grenze der Stadtgebiete von Ptolemais und Tyrus. Diese wie jene waren allerlei feindlichen oder kriegerischen Angriffen in hohem Maße ausgesetzt. Ihre Bewohner heißen in einer apokalyptischen Schilderung אנשי הנבול, von denen gesagt wird, daß sie in den leidvollen Tagen vor dem Erscheinen des Messias herumirren würden. Das besagt für uns, daß diese Grenzorte in einer Zeit der höchsten Not, da man die Ankunft des Messias sicher erwartete, viel gelitten hätten, zum Teil auch untergegangen seien.¹⁷² Das mag sich auf die Zeit der hadrianischen Verfolgungen beziehen.

Im Ostjordanlande haben die jüdischen und proselytischen Siedlungen (vgl. Abschnitt I, 25) dem Christentume vorgearbeitet, d. h. die neue Religion konnte dort deshalb so rasche Erfolge er-

¹⁷¹ Siehe dazu die Einleitung zu meinem עבר הדרך היהודי.

¹⁷² Siehe die Quellen bei Klausner, הרעיון המשיחי בישראל (Jerusalem חר"ו), 285 f. Auf diese Beziehung jener Schilderung auf die „Grenzler“ hat mich Immanuel Löw (brieflich) aufmerksam gemacht.

zielen (dies erkennt man an den überaus zahlreichen Kirchenruinen der Haurangegend), weil dort eine Schicht jüdischer Siedler vorhanden war. Ob ein Teil dieser Siedler etwa zur Zeit der byzantinischen Religionsverfolgungen selber zum Christentum oder später zum Islam übergetreten sei — wer vermag es heute zu sagen?

* * *

Ist nun unser Grenzverzeichnis seinem Ursprung nach der Zeit des Herodes und seiner Nachkommen zuzuweisen, so gewinnt es über seinen ursprünglichen religionsgesetzlichen Zweck hinaus eine besondere Bedeutung als ein wichtiges Dokument zur Kenntnis der Besitz- und Siedlungsverhältnisse der herodeanischen Zeit.

Daß außer den trachonitischen und hauranischen Orten kein ostjordanischer Grenzpunkt darin genannt ist, findet seine Erklärung in dem bestimmten Zweck des Verzeichnisses: *es sollten darin die äußersten Grenzpunkte jüdischer Siedlungen in ursprünglich nichtjüdischen Gegenden angegeben werden.* Das eigentlich jüdische Ostjordanland (עבר הירדן, Peräa) brauchte und durfte also darin nicht berücksichtigt werden; dort mußten die Boden- und Priester-gesetze selbstverständlich beobachtet werden. Seine Grenzen sind aus anderen Quellen bekannt; diese in das Verzeichnis aufzunehmen, war ebenso überflüssig wie jene von Judäa oder Galiläa. — Tief im Süden des Landes, gleichfalls in nichtjüdischer, edomitischer oder nabatäischer Umgebung, gab es eine jüdische Siedlung bei *Petra*, die im Verzeichnis (33) genannt ist.

Noch ein Wort über die Überschrift des Grenzverzeichnisses!

In der Tosefta lautet diese: תחום ארץ ישראל; in j. תחומי ארץ ישראל. In der Sifre: תחומי [י] ארץ ישראל ועד; ähnlich im Sifre: תחומי ארץ ישראל ועד; ähnlich im Sifre: תחומי ארץ ישראל ועד. Es kann nicht zweifelhaft sein, daß die kürzere Überschrift die ursprünglichere ist. Die längere weist eine Erweiterung auf, die mit Rücksicht auf die Mischna Schewiit VI 1 (vgl. Halla IV 8) vorgenommen wurde. An den betreffenden Stellen wird von der Besitzergreifung (חוקה) der aus Babel Hinaufziehenden, die „von Erez Israel bis Kezib“ sich erstreckte, gesprochen, ohne nähere Angaben über die Grenzen mitzuteilen.

Unser Verzeichnis wurde später als die nähere Ausführung jener kurzen Halacha angesehen, daher die erweiterte Aufschrift: כל שהחזיקו עולי בבל, die wörtlich der obigen Mischna entnommen ist.

ANHANG

KANAANS GRENZEN IN DEN PALÄSTINISCHEN TARGUMIM ZU NUM. 34*

1. Es seien hier die beiden Texte,** in parallelen Spalten geordnet, wiedergegeben:

ת' ירושלמי:	ת' יונתן:
(3) ויהי לבון תחומא מדרומא ממדברא דרקם כל קביל תחומיהון דאדומאי ויהי לבון [תחום] דרומא מסייפי ימא דמלחא מן מדינחא.	(3) ויהי לבון תחום דרומא מן מדברא דציני שור פרזלא על תחומי אדום ויהי תחום דרומא מן סייפי ימא דמלחא מדינחא.
(4) ויקף לבון תחומא דרומא מן מסקיותא דעקרבין ויעבר' בשור פרזלא ויהי מפקנוי מדרום לרקם דניעא ויפוק דירת אדריא ויעבר לקסם ^ב .	(4) ויקף לבון תחומא מן דרומא למסיקתא דעקרבין ויעבר לציני שור פרזלא ויהון מפקנוי מן דרומא לרקם ניאה ויפוק לשירית אדריא ויעבר לקיסם.
(5) ויקף תחמא מן קסם לנילום מצרים ויהון מפקנוי מערבא.	(5) ויקף תחומא מקיסם לנילום דמצראי ויהון מפקנוי למערבא.

^a So ist zu lesen statt דעבר.

^b So ist zu lesen statt בק'.

* Zu den targumischen Paraphrasen s. Neubauer, *La Géographie du Talmud*, 430—432; Friedmann, *נבולות א"י וסוריא* in *Luncz' Ierusalem* II, 46—67. Keine dieser Arbeiten ist befriedigend. Ich selbst habe schon im Jahre 1907 in einer Abhandlung (*Magyar Zsidó Szemle* XXIV, 238—258) diese Targumim sowohl nach der textlichen, als auch nach der geographischen Seite zu beleuchten, bzw. herzustellen versucht. Daß die hier gegebene Untersuchung von der dortigen in vielen Punkten abweicht, versteht sich, nach einer zwanzigjährigen Beschäftigung mit der Materie, von selbst.

** Beide Texte nach *מקראות גדולות Wilna (Rom)* mit mehreren Korrekturen.

¹ Die in Klammern gesetzten Ziffern beziehen sich auf den Vers, in dessen Targum die betreffende Stelle sich findet.

ת' יונתן:

(6) ותחום מערבא ויהוי לבון ימא רבא אוקיננס ותחומיה הינון מי בראשית עם מיא קרמאין דהוון כגויה אבירוי ופרכירויי כרכוי ומדנתיה ניסוי ומחוזוי ספינתיה ואלנותיה דין יהוי לבון תחום מערבא.

(7) ודין יהוי לבון תחום צפונא מן ימא רבא תכוונן לבון לשוורוס אומנס.

(8) משוורוס אומנס תכוונן לבון מעלך לאנטוכיא^ב ויהון מפקניו דתחומא לתרי^ג צטרוי מכוונן לכרכוי דבר ועמה ולכרכוי דבר סנידורא^ד ודיוקינס [ד]ותרנגולא^ה דקסרין מעלך לאבלס דקילקא.

(9) ויפוק תחומא [לזפירין] ויהון מפקניו^ו למציעות דרתא רבתא דממצעא בין טירת עינוותא לבין^ז דרמשק דין יהוי לבון תחום ציפונא.

(10) ותכוונן לבון לתחום מדינחא מטירת עינוותא לאפמיאס^ח.

(11) וייחות תחומא מן אפמיאס^ט לדפני מן מדנח לעינוותא ויחות תחומא ויקוף לתחום ימא דניסר ממדינחא.

(12) וייחות תחומא ליורדנא ויהון מפקניו לימא דמלחא. רקס^י גיעא מן דרומא שוורוס אומנס מן צפונא ימא רבא מן מערבא ימא דמלחא מן מדנחא דא תהוי לבון ארעא דישראל למצרני חוזר חוזר.

ת' ירושלמי:

(6) ותחום [מערבא] ימא רבא הוא אוקיננס ניסוי ומחוזיי וספינתא עם מיא קרמא דאית כגויה הינון מי בראשית דין יהוי לבון תחום מערבא.

(7) ודין יהוי לבון תחום צפונא^א מן ימא רבא תכוונן לבון לשוורוס [א]מנס.

(8) משוורוס [א]מנס תכוונן לבון למעלי אנטוכיא ויהון מפקניו [ד]תחומא לאוולס דקלקא.

(9) ויפוק^ב תחומא לזפירין ויהון מפקניו דירת עיינותא דין דיהוי לבון תחום ציפונא^ג.

(10) ותכוונן לבון תחומא מדינחא^ד מדירת עיינותא לאפמיס.

(11) ויחות תחומא מאפמיס^ה לדפני מדינחא לעינוותא ויחות תחומא וימטי סמך לימא דניסר מדינחא^ו.

(12) ויחות [תחומא] ליורדנא ויהון מפקניו ימא דמלחא דא תהי לבון ארעא לתחומהא חוזר חוזר.

^א So ist zu lesen statt סריכויי.

^ב So ist mit Targ. Jerusch. zu lesen.

^ג So ist zu lesen statt תרי.

^ד S. oben IV, 3.

^ה So ist zu lesen statt תי.

^ו So ist zu lesen statt בית.

^ז So ist zu lesen statt אפמיאס.

^ח So ist zu lesen statt ריקס.

^א So ist zu lesen statt טחריי.

^ב So ist zu lesen statt צפוניא.

^ג So ist zu lesen statt ויפוק.

^ד So ist zu lesen statt מעריבא.

^ה So ist zu lesen statt לא.

^ו So ist zu lesen statt מן מערבא.

ת' יונתן:

(15) תרין שבטין ופלגות שבטא
קבילו אחסנתהון מעברא לזורנא
מדינא.

(11) סמך לניסר: כרך מלכותהון
(דאדומא) [דאמוראי]...

(8) ודיוקינוס [ד]תרנגולא דקסרין
(11) ויחות תחומא למערת פניאס
וממערת פניאס יחות תחומא לטור תלנא
ומטור תלנא יחות תחומא לעינ ומעינ
ייחות תחומא ויסב מישרא נחלא ארנונא
(9) [ויפוק] לקרון זכותא ולגבתא
דחטמונא ולביריא^k ובית^l סכל
(11) וייתי למדברא וציני טור פרולא
מי מצותא אבלו ודמוכא
אחסנות שיבט
ראובן וגד ופלגות שיבט מנשה.

i So ist zu lesen statt לניסר.

j In der Ausgabe: עד : דווקנוס ותרגולא

k So ist zu lesen statt ביריא, s. Abschnitt IV, 7—8.

l So ist zu lesen statt דבית.

ת' ירושלמי:

(15) תרין שבטיא ופלגות שבטא
קבילו אחסנתהון מן ירנא דיריחו קדמאין
מן מדינא מן מישר ימא דמלחא נפק
להון תחומא לכנרת כרך דמלכתהון
דאמוראי ומכנרת כרך מלכותהון דאמוראי
נפק להון תחומא לטור תלנא ולחמתאⁱ
דלבנן ומטור תלנא ומחמתא^j דלבנן
נפק להון תחומא לחובא דימ^k [י]
צפון עיינותא דדמשק ומן חובא די מן
צפון עיינותא דדמשק נפק להון תחומא
לדיוקינוס תורנגלא^j דקסרין די מן
מדנח מערת^k דן ומן [ד]יוקינוס תורנגלא
דקסרין די מן מדנח מערת^k דן נפק
להון תחומא לנהרא רבא נהרא פרת
דעלוי סדר נצחני קרבו די מתעבדין
ומן נהרא רבא נהרא פרת נפק להון
תחומא לקרון זכ^l [נ]תא [ונבתא דחטמונא]^l
כל טרכון^m זמרא ובית מלכותא דעוג
מלכא דמתנן נפיק לרפיח ולשוקמוזיןⁿ
עד דמטי ספר ימא (דמילחא) הדין הוא
הולקתהון דתרין שבטיא ופלגות שבטא.

i So ist zu lesen statt ולחמתא.

j So ist zu lesen statt טור תלנא.

k So ist zu lesen statt מערב.

l So ist zu lesen statt נתא, vgl. weiter in den Erläuterungen.

m So ist zu lesen statt שרכין.

n So ist zu lesen statt ולשוקמזין.

Die Gegenüberstellung und Vergleichung der beiden Texte zeigt deutlich, daß im sogenannten *Targum Jeruschalmi* eine vollständige Paraphrase zu den Versen 3—12 und zu V. 15 (wo die Grenzen des *Ostjordanlandes* im Pentateuch nur kurz angedeutet sind) vorhanden ist, während *Targum* (Pseudo-) *Jonatan* nur die Paraphrase zu den Versen 3—12 ursprünglich enthielt. Es scheint aber, daß es zu der Paraphrase des V. 15 im *Targum Jeruschalmi* eine große Anzahl von Varianten gab, die, am Rand des Targums geschrieben, irrtümlich in verschiedene Stellen des (Pseudo-) *Jonatan*

Targums hineingeschoben wurden. Bei Auslösung dieser Glossen aus dem Text dieses Targums erhält man die Fragmente einer anderen Paraphrase, welche mehrere wertvolle Varianten zu Targum Jeruschalmi (V. 15) enthalten. Oben sind diese Fragmente in die parallele Kolumne des יונה ת aufgenommen worden.

2. ERLÄUTERUNG DER PARAPHRASEN

Diese Targumim sind aus folgenden Bestandteilen zusammengesetzt: *a)* aus der wortgetreuen Übersetzung der betreffenden pentateuchischen Stellen, wobei aber schon einige biblische Ortsnamen durch *neuere* ersetzt wurden; *b)* aus Einschaltungen gewisser Stellen aus dem Buche Ezechiel; *c)* aus aggadischen Zusätzen, deren Quellen zumeist nachweisbar sind; *d)* aus Angaben, die dem großen tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis entnommen sind.

a) Vers 3: מִדְּבַר צִין wird in Jer. mit מִדְּרָקָם wiedergegeben. דְּרָקָם ist sonst die targumische Übersetzung von דְּרָקָשׁ, das in der Wüste Zin lag, weshalb der Targumist, pars pro toto gebrauchend, für צִין – דְּרָקָם verwendete. — Die Paraphrase von Ps. Jon. צִין = צִיני טור פרולא geht auf eine Ezechiel- und eine Mischnastelle zurück. Ezech. 47. 19 wird als *südlicher* Grenzpunkt des Landes תְּמָר genannt. Der Targumist faßte diesen Ortsnamen = „Palme“ auf und dachte dabei an die הַר הַבְּרֹזֶל „Palmen des Eisenberges“, die in Mischna Sukka III 1 genannt sind,³ ohne zu bedenken, daß der „Eisenberg“ im südlichen Moab⁴ lag und mit der Wüste Zin nichts zu tun hat. — In der im Targ. Jon. zu V. (11) enthaltenen Glosse zu V. 15 wird gleichfalls צִין mit צִיני טור פרולא paraphrasiert, wo natürlich gleichfalls an תְּמָר gedacht wurde. Vgl. noch Num. 33. 36: Jon. Targ. צִין = דְּרָקָם היא פרולא; dagegen 13. 21: מִדְּבַר דְּצִין.

Vers 4 und 5: Für עֲקָרִיִּים des Bibeltextes bietet Targ. Jer. עֲקָרִיִּין, dagegen Ps. Jon. עֲקָרִיִּים, Var. עֲקָרִיִּית. Während ersteres als aramäische, bzw. hebräische Form gut begreiflich ist, dürfte es sich bei letzterem um eine Verwechslung dieses südlichen עֲקָרִיִּים mit einem nordjudäischen עֲקָרִיִּית handeln.⁵ — Merkwürdigerweise

³ Vgl. dazu Sukka 32^b, Erubin 19a.

⁴ Josephus, Bellum j. IV 8, 2: τὸ Σιδηροῦν καλοῦμενον ὄρος.

⁵ M. Maasser sch. V 2, s. dazu meine Ausführungen in MGWJ 1917, 144.

findet sich hier auch im Targ. *Jerusch.* die Wiedergabe von צין mit טור פרולא, während es oben (V. 3) רקם dafür setzte — ein Beweis für die oberflächliche Arbeit der volkstümlichen, von den Talmudgelehrten nicht besonders geachteten Targumisten!⁶

רקם דניעא oder ניאה ר' steht für קרש ברנע des Bibeltextes hier und an vielen anderen Stellen.

חצר א' = מיר(י)ת א' ist die Übersetzung von חצר א'; vgl. noch weiter zu V. 9.

עצמן, bzw. קיסם hier und V. 5 ist die Wiedergabe von עצמן. Hildesheimer⁷ und Dalman⁸ denken an *El-Kusēme* beim östlichen Ende des Wādi el-'Arisch in der Wüste. Während aber נחל מצרים (V. 5) sonst in den alten Übersetzungen mit dem genannten Wādi gleichgesetzt wird, geben dafür die palästinischen Targumim hier und Gen. 15. 18 den Nil als Grenzpunkt an. Daher glaube ich קיסם mit *Kasion* an der ägyptischen Küste unweit vom Nil gleichzusetzen.⁹ Dagegen wendet Dalman ein, daß demnach die Grenze schon hier am Mittelmeer angekommen wäre, während sie doch erst beim folgenden Punkt (נחל מצרים = Nilus) erreicht werden soll. Dieser Einwand wäre berechtigt, wenn diese Targumim überall besondere Genauigkeit bezüglich der topographischen Verhältnisse an den Tag legten. Dies ist jedoch (wie wir z. B. bei ציני הר הברול sahen) nicht der Fall. Ihnen genügt es, wenn sie — indem die Grenze des Landes bis zum Nil ausgedehnt wird — eine bekannte Grenzstation zwischen Petra = רקם (V. 4) und dem Nil mit einer der biblischen Stationen gleichsetzen können.

Vers 7: הר ההר des Bibeltextes wird mit (אומנים, Omanus) טורוס אמנוס *Taurus Amanus* dem Amanusgebirge im Norden gleichgesetzt, und zwar auf Grund gewisser tannaitischer Sätze, die wir später (sub c) anführen werden. Die palästinischen Targumim setzen diesen Namen ganz sinnlos sogar an Stelle des im Süden gelegenen הר ההר (Num. 20. 22; 33. 37; Deut. 32. 50) — ein Vorgang, der kein gutes Zeugnis für ihre Genauigkeit stellt!

Vers 8: חמת wird hier, wie sonst, mit אנטוכיא Antiochia wiedergegeben. — Für צדקה erscheint hier im Targ. *Jerusch.* אולם רקלקאי.

⁶ Vgl. Zunz, *Gottesd. Vorträge*², 78 Anm. c—d.

⁷ *Beiträge*, S. 77 Anm. 570.

⁸ *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 58 Anm. 1.

⁹ *Die Küstenstraße Palästinas*, S. 2 Anm. 1.

= אבלם רק' im Pseudo-Jon., wo (nach Ezech. 47. 15 צדרה) dem Namen מַעֲלָה vorangestellt wird. קלקא ist natürlich *Cilicien*. Zur Gleichsetzung mit צַדְרָה kamen die Targumim infolge der wörtlichen Übersetzung dieses Namens „seitwärts“, wobei an das seitlich von Palästina(-Syrien) gelegene *Cilicien*, bzw. seine Inseln gedacht wird. Da aber hier nur eine bestimmte *Örtlichkeit* in Betracht kommen kann, so mußte man den Grenzpunkt genauer mit אבולם רק' fixieren. Man denkt dabei gewöhnlich an Αὐλῶν Κιλικίως „die cilicische Pforte“; ¹⁰ jedoch dürfte die Ansicht Nöldekes die einzig richtige sein, wonach א' die Insel Ελαουσα (bei arabischen Geographen أولاسى) in der Nähe von Cilicien bezeichnet.¹¹ — Eine so weite Ausdehnung den palästinensischen Grenzen zu geben, entspricht einer in der talmudischen Literatur öfters vertretenen Ansicht, wonach alle von Juden bewohnten Länder in gewissem Sinne zu Palästina gehörten.¹² So sagt auch Philo,¹³ Jerusalem sei die Hauptstadt nicht nur von Judäa (d. h. von Palästina), sondern von den meisten Ländern wegen der Kolonien, die es ausgesandt hat. Unter diesen Ländern nennt er dann Cilicien, ferner mehrere Inseln und Satrapien. Die jüdische Diaspora stellt in gewisser Beziehung Großpalästina dar! Vgl. noch weiter sub c (wo die tannaitische Grundlage von צדרה = einer „Insel“ aufgezeigt wird).

Im Ps. Jon. Targ. findet sich hier ein größerer Einschub. Demnach würde צדרה „die beiden entsprechenden Seiten“ bedeuten. Dies ist offenbar eine andere Übersetzung des Textwortes צדרה, da dieses Targum unter den „beiden entsprechenden Seiten“ die im tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis genannten beiden *ituräischen* Festungen versteht, denen er noch das gleichfalls von dort bekannte „Hahnenbild von Cäsarea (Philippi)“ hinzufügt (s. Abschnitt IV).

¹⁰ Hildesheimer, Anm. 255.

¹¹ Jos., Ant. XVI 4, 6. Ich kenne diese Ansicht Nöldekes aus seinen handschriftlichen Glossen zu Neubauers Geographie, die mir durch die gütige Vermittlung I. Löws zur Verfügung stehen. Die Josephus-Stelle zeigt, daß die Insel den palästinensischen Juden bekannt war.

¹² Tos. Terum. II 12, T. Halla II 11; j. Schewiit VI 1, j. Halla IV 4; b. Gittin 8a: ר' יהודה אומר: כל שכנגד א"י הרי הוא כא"י שני גבול ים והיה לכם הים הגדול וגבול; vgl. dazu Tossafot z. St.

¹³ Im Briefe Agrippas an Caligula; angeführt bei Schürer III⁴, 5 f.

Vers 9: Für das biblische זְפִירִיִּן wird hier das ähnlich lautende זְפִירִין verwendet, wobei an *Zephyrion* in Cilicien gedacht wird, wo eine jüdische Diasporagemeinde bestand.¹⁴ — דִּירַת (טִירַת) עֵינֵינוּתָא ist die Übersetzung von חֲצַר עֵינִין (vgl. oben zu V. 4), wobei עֵינִין als Plural aufgefaßt wurde. Über den Zusatz des Ps. Jon. Targ. siehe sub *b*.

Vers 10: Für שָׁפָם wird אַפְנִים (אֶפְמִיאַם) = *Panias* gesetzt, was durch die Metathese der Buchstaben (פֶּמֶשׁ = שָׁפָם) erreicht wird.

Vers 11: רִבְלָה wird mit דְּפְנִי wiedergegeben. Gemeint ist Δαφνη,¹⁵ heute Tel-Defne, in der Nähe der Jordanquellen (bei *Panias*). Wie kam man zu dieser Gleichsetzung (die sich übrigens auch in der Vulgata findet, wo es heißt: ... descendent termini in *Ribla* contra fontem *Daphnim*)? — Im „Lande Hamat“ gab es ein anderes רבֿלה (Jer. 39. 5; 52. 27), das in der Aggada mit דְּפְנִי *Dafne* bei *Antiochia* gleichgesetzt wird.¹⁶ Es scheint überhaupt, daß der Ortsname *Dafne* bei den Jordanquellen dem Umstande seine Entstehung verdankt, daß dort der Grenzpunkt *Ribla* gesucht wurde, und da das antiochische *Ribla* = *Dafne* war, so wurde dieser Name von dort an die Jordanquellen verpflanzt. Dabei mochte noch der Umstand mitgespielt haben, daß Ezech. 6. 14 für *Ribla* יִמָּה דְּנִיָּסָר steht und dieses ein wenig mit דְּפְנִי gleich klingt. — יִמָּה דְּנִיָּסָר ist die ständige Wiedergabe von יָם בְּנֵי־נָרַח in den Targumim.

Zu Vers 12 ist nichts zu bemerken, während die Erläuterung zu Vers 15 später folgt.

b) Oben wurde schon auf einige auf *Ezech.* zurückgehende Stellen hingewiesen. Ferner sei bemerkt: Der Einschub im Ps. Jon. Targ. V. 9: לְמַצִּיעוֹת דְּרַתָּא רַבְתָּא דְּמַמְצֵעָא בֵּין טִירַת עֵינֵינוּתָא לְבֵין דְּרַמְשָׁק (vgl. auch V. 15 Jer. Targ.: עֵינֵינוּתָא דְּרִי) geht auf Ezech. 47. 16 zurück, wo חֲצַר עֵינִין נָבֹל und nachher דְּרַמְשָׁק נָבֹל, ferner חֲצַר הַתִּיכּוֹן דְּרַמְשָׁק (vgl. auch 48. 1) vorkommen. — רַבְתָּא ist die eigene Zutat des Targumisten; vgl. z. B. Gen. 10. 10 בָּבֶל רַבְתָּא, wo das Appellativum im hebräischen Text nicht vorhanden ist.

¹⁴ Sifre Num. 5, 8; Tos. BK VI, b. 113 a, j. Ab. z. II 4: Rabbi Akiba hielt sich eine Zeitlang dort auf.

¹⁵ Bellum j. IV 1, 1.

¹⁶ j. Schekalim VI 2; j. Sanhedr. X 6; Pesikta r. 31 (146^b l. Z. דְּסִנִּי שֶׁל רַבְלָה). Josephus, Ant. XVII 2, 1 nennt Antiochia ἡ ἐπὶ Δάφνης.

c) *Aggadische* Zusätze sind in *Vers 6*: das große Meer, das ist der *Ozean* samt seinen Inseln (נָחוֹ = νῆσος), Provinzen und Schiffen, auch mit den Urgewässern. Ps. Jon. Targ. ist noch ausführlicher in der Aufzählung. Da wird gesagt, die Grenzen des Ozeans seien: die Urgewässer,¹⁷ die Luft (אֲבִירָי = ἄνῃ), welche über dem Ozean (bis zum Firmament) lagert; die Bezirke (περιχώρη), die befestigten Städte (בְּרִיּוֹ) der Meeresprovinzen und auch אֱלִנוֹתֶיהָ (dessen Bedeutung vielleicht „Küste“ ist).

Diese ganze Darstellung hat eine an mehreren Stellen mitgeteilte Barajta zur Grundlage,¹⁸ wo gesagt wird, daß jene Inseln (יִבִּיּוֹן) im Meere, die innerhalb der vom Bache Ägyptens bis zum Breitengrad des Berges Amana (= Taurus Amanus) gezogenen Linie liegen, als zu Erez Israel gehörig angesehen werden. R. Jehuda geht noch weiter und folgert aus Num. 34. 6 (also aus der Stelle, zu der unsere Targum-Paraphrase gehört), daß alle dem Lande Israel gegenüber gelegenen Länder zu ihm gehörten. Diese letztere Ansicht macht sich der Targumist zu eigen, wobei er die einzelnen am und im Meere, d. h. dem großen Ozean gelegenen Gebiete, ja sogar die dort fahrenden Schiffe, aufführt. — Auch die Gleichsetzung von צַרְדָּה mit einer *Insel* von Cilicien (s. oben sub a) geht auf die Worte R. Jehudas zurück, der von den „seitwärts gelegenen Inseln“, הַיַּמִּין שֶׁבְּצַרְדֵּיהֶם, spricht und meint, man müsse sich eine Linie denken von קַפְלִיָּה (יָם) bis zum Okeanos im Norden und vom Bache Ägyptens bis zum Okeanos; die dazwischenliegenden Inseln gehörten alle zu Erez Israel. — Die Lage von קַפְלִיָּה ist nicht sicher bekannt.¹⁹ Doch darf es *nicht* südlich vom Taurus Amanus gesucht werden; es dürfte eine Örtlichkeit an der cilicischen Küste sein.

¹⁷ Vgl. Ber. r. 5, 2 (Theodor 33. 2): אֲוִקִינוֹם (ים) וְצֶלְקָן בֵּינֵיהֶם.

¹⁸ Vgl. Anm. 12; vgl. auch ZDPV 1910, 221 ff.

¹⁹ Siehe dazu Dalman, *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 55, Anm. Er denkt an die Station *Cappareas* (also etwa קַפְרֵיָא!) zwischen Aleppo und Epiphania (ZDPV 1917, 24 sub VIII). Nach dem im Text Ausgeführten muß es aber weit nördlicher gesucht werden. Es seien noch die Worte I. Löws aus einem Briefe (7. Mai 1914) angeführt: „Die einstimmige Überlieferung“ schließt *caput* oder κεφαλὴ + ὄρος aus. Serillos קַפְרֵיָא kommt angesichts der einhelligen Tradition in T, j und b nicht in Betracht.“

* Hier die von Löw verzeichneten Varianten: „קַפְלִיָּה La TTer II 284; TChall II 99 28; j Švi VI 36^a₃; j Chall IV 60^a₄₄. קַפְלִיָּה TChall a. O. Zuck-

d) Aus dem tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis stammen die oben Abschnitt IV behandelten Namen und einige in der Paraphrase zu *Vers 15* enthaltene Punkte, die wir im folgenden besprechen wollen.

Nach dieser Paraphrase ist der Ausgangspunkt der ostjordanischen Grenze von der „Ebene des Toten Meeres“. Dies geht auf Deut. 3, 10; Jos. 13, 9, 10 zurück, wo מישור vom Targumisten als die Ebene, d. h. die *‘Araba*, nördlich vom Toten Meer erklärt wurde. Nun heißt es weiter, von dieser Ebene habe sich die Grenze gezogen nach „Kinneret, der Königsstadt der Emoräer“. Hier kann כנרת unmöglich richtig sein, liegt doch diese Stadt am Westufer des nach ihr benannten Sees (vgl. Jos. 19.35), während es sich hier um das Gebiet der ostjordanischen Stämme handelt. Ferner ist zu beachten, daß im Targ. Jerusch. das biblische Kinneret überall, auch hier V. 11, mit dem später gebräuchlichen נַיִסר (ניסר) wiedergegeben wird; warum sollte gerade hier der alte *biblische* Name erscheinen? — Unbegreiflich ist ferner, wieso Kinneret als eine „Königsstadt der Emoräer“ bezeichnet wird, während es ja im Gebiete Naftalis lag! Das Wort bedarf offenbar der Zurechtstellung.

Als eine *emoritische Grenzstadt* wird in der Bibel יַעֲזֵר genannt (Num. 21. 32; 32. 3, 35). Dafür verwenden die Targumim den Namen der Festung von *Machaerus*: מכבר oder מכור. Die Gleichsetzung ist sicher falsch; aber das störte nicht den Targumisten, diesen Namen auch hier zu verwenden. Aus dem ursprünglichen מכבר oder מכור kann durch einen Abschreiber sehr leicht כנרת gemacht worden sein, und da dieser Name einmal schon im Texte war, so hat daraus der Glossator, dessen Bemerkungen wir im Pseudo-Jon. Targ. zu V. 11 vor uns haben, folgerichtig נַיִסר gemacht.²⁰ Natürlich ist dort דאדומאי in דאמוראי zu ändern.

Die Grenzlinie reicht im Norden bis zum „Schneeberg“, d. h. dem Hermon (vgl. Deut. 3. 8; Jos. 13. 11²¹ und zum „*Hammat* im

“TTer a. O. קלוריא Gitt. 8* auch Ms M und כרים 60* Ven; 42* 18 Berlin, I 252 Luncz. Auch Ratner zu j. Švi p 54 aus מלאכת שלמה.“

²⁰ Dabei mochte er auch an Deut. 3, 17 gedacht haben, wo כנרת (aber der See!) als Grenzpunkt erscheint.

²¹ Ps. Jon. zu Deut. 3, 9. Hebräisch: הר השלל Sifrè Num. 131 (47^b), j. Sanhedr. X 2.

Libanon“. Dieses ist Ezech. 47. 16 entnommen (wo freilich der Libanon nicht erwähnt ist). — Der folgende Grenzpunkt ist „*Hoba*, nördlich von den Quellen von Damaskus“. Die biblische Grundlage ist in Gen. 14. 15 (vgl. die Targumim dort, קמאל = Nord), bzw. Ezech. 47. 17 (חצר עינין) zu finden. Dann folgt der dem tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis entnommene Punkt: „das Hahnenbild von Cäsarea“, „das östlich von der Höhle Dans“, d. h. der Grotte von Panias, liegt.

Hier folgt eine merkwürdige Angabe: „vom Hahnenbilde zieht sich die Grenze zum großen Strome Euphrat, wo die Reihe der göttlichen Kämpfe gemacht wurden.“ Die Stelle ist, so wie sie uns vorliegt, unverständlich. Die im Pseudo-Jon. Targ. enthaltene Glosse zu V. 11 hilft aber ein wenig weiter. — An Stelle von נהרא פרת מִי־שָׂרָא מִי־שָׂרָא נַחֲלָא אַרְנוֹנָא רַבָּא נַהֲרָא פֶּרֶת liest man dort מִי־שָׂרָא מִי־שָׂרָא נַחֲלָא אַרְנוֹנָא; die Angabe bezieht sich also auf den Bach *Arnon*, wo nach Num. 21. 14 große Kämpfe stattfanden, die von der aggadischen Dichtung ganz besonders verherrlicht wurden.²² Diese Kämpfe fanden aber ihre Schilderung schon im סֵפֶר מַלְחָמוֹת דֵּה. Die aramäische Übersetzung dieser Worte lautet סֵפֶר קִרְבֵּי דֵּה im Targ. Jerusch. Num. 21, 14; aber ebenso richtig wäre סֵפֶר קִרְבֵּי דֵּה. Diese Worte glaube ich im korrupten Text unseres Targums סֵפֶר... קִרְבֵּי דֵּה zu erkennen, wo vielleicht statt סֵפֶר — סֵפֶר zu lesen ist. Vor קִרְבֵּי setzt dort der Targumist noch das Wort נִצְחָנִי. Ursprünglich stand auch im Targ. Jerusch., wie eben diese Andeutung auf die Kämpfe am Arnon zeigt, נַחֲלָא אַרְנוֹנָא; erst später hat ein unwissender Abschreiber, der an Stellen, wo als äußerster Grenzpunkt des Landes der Euphrat genannt ist, denken mochte,²³ aus נַחֲלָא אַרְנוֹנָא — נַהֲרָא רַבָּא נַהֲרָא פֶּרֶת gemacht.

Doch weiter bleibt es schwierig, wieso der Arnon in den Zusammenhang eingefügt werden konnte? Wurden doch unmittelbar vorher *nördliche* Grenzpunkte genannt (Hermon, Hamat im Libanon, Hoba bei Damesek, Ēnan bei Damesek, Cäsarea Philippi), und folgen nach dem Arnon wieder eine Anzahl dem tannaitischen Verzeichnis entnommene Grenzpunkte, die der Targumist ganz richtig in die Nähe des Königreiches von Og, des Königs von

²² Vgl. Berachot 54a/b; Raschi zu Num. 21. 14-15.

²³ Exodus 23. 31; Deut. 1. 7.

Basan (= מתן), verlegt; wie erklärt sich dann inmitten dieser Grenzpunkte, die im Nordosten lagen, die Erwähnung des Arnon? — Ich glaube, die Lösung des Rätsels in einer mißverstandenen, bzw. schlecht gelesenen Angabe unseres tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnisses zu finden.

Wir haben oben (Abschnitt I, 29) einen Grenzpunkt נחלא דורר festgestellt. Aber wir sahen auch, daß dieser Name frühzeitig schon als נחלא דורר, d. h. der Bach *Zered* gelesen und geschrieben wurde. Diese Lesart lag auch wohl dem Verfasser des palästinischen Targums vor. Nun wird in Num. 21. 12, also unmittelbar vor der Erwähnung der Kämpfe am Arnon, der Bach Zered genannt. Da glaubte nun der Targumist damit zugleich den Arnon verbinden, bzw. an seine Stelle setzen zu dürfen, was ihn dann weiter dazu veranlaßte, auch der dortigen Kämpfe zu gedenken.

Die weiteren Grenzpunkte, ebenso auch שוקמון, sind schon oben (Abschnitt IV) besprochen worden. Auch in der Angabe des Pseudo-Jon. Targ. (11) וייתי למרבא ist eine Angabe des tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnisses למרבא להולכת (s. oben, Abschnitt III) verwertet worden. Hier wird noch מי מצותא, d. h. ציני מור פרולא (= תמר) auf Grund von Ezech. 47. 19 neben תמר genannt, worauf noch zwei Worte, אכלו ודמוכה, folgen. Sie sind wohl zu מי zu ziehen, also אכלו ודמוכה „[מי] Wasser der Trauer und des Todes“. Gemeint ist wohl die Trauer um den Tod Ahrons, wie dies in Num. 20. 28–29 in Zusammenhang mit dem Haderwasser, V. 13 mitgeteilt wird.

Auf Grund dieser Untersuchung können wir unser Urteil bilden: Die Grenzangaben der targumischen Paraphrasen zu Num. 34 tragen nichts zur Kenntnis der Grenzen Palästinas in der biblischen Zeit bei. Die in ihnen enthaltenen Gleichsetzungen mit späteren Namen sind zumeist aggadischen Charakters. Die Zusätze zum Text des Pentateuchs sind dem Buche Ezechiel, dem tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis und anderen tannaitischen Texten entnommen. Ihr eigentlicher Wert besteht darin, daß sie zur Feststellung mancher Angaben des tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnisses ein kritisches Hilfsmittel uns an die Hand geben.

NACHTRAG

Zu Abschnitt VI, S. 41 vor 4. ist als 3a einzufügen:

Wenn Heiden an einem Sabbatag an der Grenze gelegene Städte — sei auch nur mit der Absicht, Stroh oder Stoppel von dort zu nehmen — überfallen, so dürfen die jüdischen Bewohner gegen sie mit Waffen ausziehen und überhaupt den Sabbat entweihen.^{158a}

^{158a} Tos. Erub. III 3, b. 45a: אפילו ליטול את התבן, את הקש, יוצאין עליהן בזיון וטחללין את השבת... באו לעיירות הטובלעות, אין יוצאין עליהן בזיון, אלא אם כן באו לעסקי נפשות s. weiter Anm. 167; zur Sache vgl. meine Ausführungen in *Jeschurun* IX, 165 ff.

REGISTER DER ALTEN ORTSNAMEN.

Die mit einem * versehenen Namen sind die des Grenzverzeichnisses.

Petitzahlen weisen auf die Anmerkungen hin.

cor. = corruptela, worauf die richtige Namensform folgt.

אבלם דקלקא ^{52f.}	*בומתא cor.,	*ברכה רבה ובר סגדא
אגדור ¹³⁰	s. בוניתא,	כרכה cor.
אגדור זיתא ^{19, s.} בית זיתא	בית זיתא	געתון ^{5, s.} *גני(א) אתו עצמה
אבלם ^{s.} אבולם	*בוצרא ^{6, 18, 91, 36} בצרא	גבתא דחטמונה ^{28, s.}
אולם (Galiläa) ²¹	*[בוניתא] ^{18, s.} בית זיתא	גרי חטם ^{s.}
*אולם רבתא ²¹	*ביריין ²⁹	גדרה של קסרין ¹⁸⁰
טוורוס ^{s.} אומנוס	בית גובריא ¹²⁷	גוב ³⁰
כזיב ^{35, s.} אכזיב	*בית דיגלי ⁹⁷	גובתא דארית
אמנה ¹⁴²	*בית זיתא ⁵	גובתא דציפורין
s. Antiochia אנטיוכיה	בית גיפנין ¹²⁷	גובת שמאי
s. Panias אפמים	בית לחם צרייה ¹³⁵	גוש חלב ²⁶
ארגונא ⁵⁷	סכות } *בית סכות cor.	גינא דאשקלון [*]
*ארץ ישראל ^{157, 159, 160, 167, 47, 53 12}	בית סכות } *בית סכות s.	17f. (גינא, גינא)
ארץ מצרים ³⁷	*בית סכות ^{9f., 12, 20, s.} זכותא	אשקלון ^{s.}
*אשקלון ^{11, 5, 18f.}	*בית סכל ²⁴	כנרת ^{s.} 56
פרשת א' ^{30f., 167, s.}	ער } *בית ער cor.	געתון ^{(נ) גרמא} 19, 23, 35,
	*בית ער ⁷	ריש מיא דג' ^{s.}
	*במותא דביריין	גרריק ¹⁵⁴
	רמותא ד' cor.	
באימה ⁴⁴	בקעת בית חוררתן ¹⁵	*דאר ^{34, 134,}
באימה ^{44, s.} Ivav	ברת חורון ¹⁴⁵	דור ^{s.}
בבל ^{47f.}	בית ח' cor.	דבלה ⁵⁴

*דרך גדולה ההולכת
במדבר 17, 23, 58 (למדבר)
5, 18 f. דר = דור

דור 3 3 cor.
52 דירת אדריא
54 דירת עיינותא
54 דפני
145 דריי

cor., *האש מגיאתו
ראש s.

חגרא II, s. *החגר
142 הנגר
52 הר ההר
56 21 הר השלג
I I, s. רקם הרקם

זרואי I 6, s. *זורואי
26 זכותא
54 זפירין }
זפרין }
*זרבאי } I 6
*זרואי }

14 f., 20, *חשבון חורין
s.

14 f. *חברין
II, 22 87 *חגרא

5 18, *חומ(ות) מגדל שרשן
20, 33

3, 5 *חומ(ות) עכו
57 חובה

14 חורין חורן
I 6 *חשמונה

חמת (Libanon)
52, 56 f.

34 *חמת עכו
28 חפריים

23 חצרים

52 חצר אור

54, 57 חצר עינן

25 *חקרת בר ועמא

114 חרמון

cor. (חשבון)

80 טבעין, טבעון

5 I f. טור פרולא

28 114 טור תלנא

52 טוורוס אמנוס

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SPUREN DES MATRIARCHATS IM JÜDISCHEN SCHRIFTTUM (SCHLUSS)

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EXKURSE

EXKURS I. DAS KIND EINES JUDEN VON EINER NICHTJÜDIN.

A. DIE KINDER DER VON ESRA UND NEHEMIA AUSGESONDERTEN FRAUEN.

Wir haben im Text S. 221 (*HUCA* IV) die Ansicht erwähnt, daß diese Frauen Proselytinnen waren, mit der Bemerkung, daß diese Ansicht entschieden falsch ist. Dies soll hier ausgeführt werden.

Der Repräsentant dieser Theorie ist Graetz:¹

„Es ist von allen Historikern übersehen worden, daß, da der Hohepriester und die Leviten usw., also die geistlichen Spitzen, solche Mischehen eingegangen sind, sie dieselben für erlaubt, selbst nach dem Gesetze der Thora erlaubt gehalten haben müssen. Sie haben also die עמי הארצות, wie sie Esra und Nehemia nannten, nicht als Götzendiener, sondern als גרים, Proselyten, betrachtet und haben damit das als gesetzlich sanktioniert, was später als selbstverständlich galt (Mischnah Kid-duschin IV, 1): לויי וישראלי גירי וחרורי מותרים לבא זה בזה, daß Ehen mit Proselyten gestattet sind.“ Ferner *ibid.* S. 120: „Die Vertreter des Volkes und Tempels haben sich zum Hohne des Gesetzes mit Heiden verschwägert! Esra hielt es für eine entsetzliche Sünde; nach seiner Anschauung bildete der judäische oder israelitische Stamm eine ‚Heilige Nachkommenschaft‘ und erleide durch Vermischung mit fremden Völkerschaften, auch wenn sie das Götzentum fahren gelassen, eine Entweihung.“ Wozu in der Anmerkung: „Esra 9, 1 f. Man beachte den Ausdruck והתערבו זרע קדש בעמי הארצות.“

¹ *Geschichte* II³, S. 108.

Dies nimmt L. Freund² mit Begeisterung auf. Er meint, daß aus diesen Worten Esras „mit Recht geschlossen wird, daß die Ursache seiner Entrüstung eher in der Verletzung des nationalen Bewußtseins als in der religiösen Überzeugung zu suchen ist“.

Diese Theorie kann aber schon deshalb nicht richtig sein, weil es nach ihr heißen müßte: התערבו עמי הארצות בורע הקדש „Es vermischten sich die Völker des Landes mit dem heiligen Samen.“

התערבו עמי הארצות kann nur bedeuten, daß jüdische Frauen sich an fremde Männer verheiratet haben, wie ja in der Tat beide Arten der Vermischung vorhanden waren.³ Auch Esra 9, 14 ist allgemein von Verschwägerung mit den Völkern des Landes die Rede. Es ist also aus Esra 9, 2 für die Motive der Maßnahmen Esras nicht das allergeringste zu entnehmen. Dagegen sagt Nehemia (13, 25—27): „und beschwor sie bei Gott: Ihr sollt eure Töchter nicht ihren Söhnen geben und von ihren Töchtern keine für eure Söhne und für euch selbst nehmen. Hat nicht ihretwegen Salomo, der König von Israel, gesündigt?... Auch ihn verführten die ausländischen Frauen zur Sünde. Und nun müssen wir von euch hören, daß ihr all dieses große Unrecht begeht, euch an unserem Gotte zu versündigen, indem ihr ausländische Weiber heimführt?“

Hier wird also ausdrücklich gesagt, daß die Entfernung der fremden Frauen aus religiösen Motiven erfolgte und daß die Frauen der Judäer ebenso ihr Heidentum behielten wie die Frauen Salomos. War etwa der Schriftgelehrte Esra mehr Nationalpolitiker als der Staatsmann Nehemia?

Diese Nehemia-Verse hat auch L. Löw⁴ übersehen. Er schreibt: „Die Motivierung beider (Esras und Nehemias) stimmt nur insofern überein, als sie eine Beeinträchtigung der väterlichen Religion durch die Mischehe nicht zur Sprache bringt. Von Verleitung zu einem fremden Kultus konnte auch bei dem

² Schwarz-Festschrift S. 168.

³ Vgl. Nehem. 13, 25.

⁴ Gesammelte Schriften III, 149.

gänzlichen Verfall der nichtjüdischen Kulte in Palästina zu jener Zeit keine Rede sein.“

Löw meint ferner (S. 150) in bezug auf Nehemia: „Er begnügt sich mit einem Promissiveid für die Zukunft, ohne auf die Auflösung der bestehenden gemischten Ehen zu denken.“

Er hat Nehemia 13, 3 übersehen: „Und als sie das Gesetz vernahmen, sonderten sie alle Frauen von Israel ab.“

B. DIE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER GEONIM IM FALLE BOSTONAI.

Hammurapi § 171: „Aber auch wenn der Vater bei seinen Lebzeiten zu den Kindern, welche ihm die Magd geboren hat, ‚Meine Kinder‘ nicht sagt, und der Vater stirbt und die Söhne der Magd mit den Söhnen der Gattin die väterliche Habe nicht teilen — wird die Freilassung der Magd und ihrer Kinder bewirkt. Die Kinder der Gattin haben keinen Anspruch auf Sklavendienst gegen die Kinder der Magd.“

Die Bestimmung im § 171 erklärt sich daraus, daß die Adoption, wenn auch nicht ausdrücklich erfolgt, doch immerhin möglich, ja wahrscheinlich ist, aber nicht sicher. Daher kann hier nicht das strikte Recht zur Anwendung kommen, sondern ein Ausgleich, ähnlich wie im talmudischen Recht: Vermögen, auf welches zwei Parteien gleichberechtigte Ansprüche haben, wird unter die Streitenden geteilt.⁵ Daraus ergibt sich, daß im Falle der sicheren Nichtadoption die Kinder der Magd Vollsklaven sind. So auch im talmudischen Recht: wenn der Herr Kinder hat von seiner Sklavin, so sind sie Sklaven.⁶

Um so interessanter ist es, daß in frühgaonischer Zeit, im Falle der Kinder Bostonais von seiner persischen Kriegsgefangenen (Sklavin), manche Geonim dahin entschieden, daß die Kinder der Perserin wohl nicht mit den legitimen Kindern Bostonais miterben, aber auch nicht als Sklaven behandelt werden dürfen.⁷

⁵ ממון המושל בספק חולקין. Baba Kama 35b, 46a; Baba Mezia 2b, 6a u. a.

⁶ Mechilta z. St. 76a: על שפחתו שילדה עבדים; להביא את הרב שבא על שפחתו וילדה (Ex. 21, 4). וילדה לו. Sifra Behar, Parascha VI, 3: מותר אתה לשעבדו עבד. Vgl. auch *Responsen der Geonim Scha'are Zedek* 28b, N. 46.

⁷ *Responsen der Geonim* שער צדק 2b—3a, N. 17, 25a, N. 15: לא כי האי לא שרו רבנן מעולם לזבניה ולא מיחש בעבד אלא תורת משוחרר עליו.

Diese Entscheidung widerspricht, wie wir sehen, der strikten Halacha in der Mechilta und im Sifra, wo ausdrücklich gesagt wird, daß man solche Mischkinder als Sklaven behandeln darf. In den anderen halachischen Quellen wird die Frage nicht berührt. In der Agada gibt es einen Anhaltspunkt dafür, daß in der alttalmudischen Zeit dieselbe Anschauung über diese Frage geherrscht hatte, wie wir sie bei den Geonim finden. Die Agada erzählt nämlich:

„Die Bewohner Kanaans kamen vor Alexander, um mit den Kindern Israels Prozeß zu führen. Palästina, sagten die Kanaanäer, war unser Besitz, und die Kinder Israels hatten es uns geraubt. Gebiha ben Pesisa, der Vertreter der Juden, antwortete: Kanaan wurde von Noah dazu verflucht, Sklave seiner Brüder zu sein; ein Sklave kann aber keinen Besitz haben, sondern alles, was er hat, gehört seinem Herrn. Ein anderes Mal kamen die Nachkommen Ismaels und die Nachkommen der Ketura vor Alexander, um mit Israel über den Besitz Palästinas Prozeß zu führen. Sie meinten: Palästina wurde Abraham für seine Nachkommen verheißten; nun sind wir Nachkommen Abrahams und haben Anspruch auf Palästina. Gebiha ben Pesisa antwortete ihnen: Die Nachkommen Ismaels und der Ketura hat Abraham bei seinen Lebzeiten abgefertigt, wie es heißt: „Aber den Söhnen der Kebsweiber, die Abraham hatte, gab Abraham Geschenke und ließ sie noch bei seinen Lebzeiten von seinem Sohne Isaak hinweg östlich in das Ostland ziehen.“ (Gen. 25, 6).“⁸

Der Anwalt der Juden antwortete also nicht, daß die Nachkommen Hagars und Keturas den Nachkommen von Sarah, der Herrin, Sklavendienste leisten müssen.

⁸ Synh. 91a: כשבאו בני אפריקא לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו לו ארץ כנען שלנו היא דכתיב (במדבר ל"ד ב') ארץ כנען לגבולותיה וכנען אבוהון דהנהו אינשי הוה אמר להן גביהא בן פסיסא וכו' אמר להן מדיבן אתם מביאים ראיא אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא ראיא אלא מן התורה שנאמר (בראשית ט"ו כ"ה) ארור כנען עבד עבדים יהיה לאחיו עבד שקנה נכסים עבד למי נכסים למי וכו' ושוב פעם אחת באו בני ישמעאל ובני קטורה לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו ארץ כנען שלנו ושלכם דכתיב (בראשית כ"ה י"ב) ואלה תולדות ישמעאל ישמעאל בן אברהם וכתיב (שם י"ט) ואלה תולדות יצחק בן אברהם אמר להן גביהא בן פסיסא להבנים תנו לי רשות ואלך ואדון עמכם לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון וכו' אמר להם מדיבן אתם מביאים ראיא אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא ראיא אלא מן התורה שנאמר (שם) ויתן אברהם את כל אשר לו ליצחק ולבני הפלגשים אשר לאברהם נתן אברהם סתנות Vgl. Gen. r. XLI, 7. Vgl. noch oben IV. 219 Anm. 34.

Andere Geonim gingen noch weiter und meinten, es sei vorauszusetzen, daß Bostonai selbst sie freigelassen habe, so daß seine Kinder von ihr im vollen Sinne legitim seien.⁹

Maimunis scharfe Zurückweisung dieser gaonäischen Entscheidung ist, wie wir gesehen, vollkommen berechtigt, und alle Versuche der Späteren, die Geonim vor Maimuni in Schutz zu nehmen, müssen als mißlungen bezeichnet werden. In den talmudischen Quellen ist von dieser Theorie keine Spur vorhanden und sie hat den Wortlaut in Mechilta und Sifra gegen sich und auch die Auffassung der Thora, die Hagar, Bilha und Silpa Sklavinnen nennt, auch nachdem sie Abraham und Jakob übergeben wurden. Es scheint daher jener Gaon recht zu haben, der andeutet, daß die Legitimierung der Kinder Bostonais von der Perserin auf politische Einflüsse zurückzuführen sei.¹⁰

Für die Entscheidung des Gaon war vielleicht auch das islamitische Landesgesetz maßgebend gewesen. Im islamitischen Recht gilt nämlich folgendes: Die Sklavin, mit der der Herr Umgang hat und deren Kind er als das seinige anerkennt, wird mit dem Tode des Herrn von selber frei; aber auch schon bei seinen Lebzeiten darf sie nicht veräußert werden: sie ist eine sogenannte *umwalad*. Ihr von dem Herrn anerkanntes Kind tritt in dieselbe Rechtslage: es wird ebenfalls mit dem Tode des Herrn frei und hat die Rechte eines legitimen Kindes. Dies gilt auch von den folgenden Kindern der Sklavin, die nicht ausdrücklich anerkannt zu werden brauchen, es genügt, wenn der Herr sie nicht verleugnet.¹¹

⁹ *Scha'are Zedek* a. a. O. Genizah Fragments in *JQR* 1902 S. 244; Schechters *Saadyana* SS. 76, 78. Vgl. noch Alfassi und Ascheri zu Jeb. 23 a, Mischnah Thora גירושין X, 19 und נחלות IV, 6.

¹⁰ ואף אינן איתלו בשלישי ובטלכותא שהיו קרובים לטלכות והוה אחי אטם מרובאנא ובתר הכין שקל בר בריה דשאהראטא בת רב חנינאי ואיסשוטא מילתא לאכשוראנן . . . והני מילי לא אקילו בה רבנן אלא לענין בני נשיא ואף ביד דטלכותא *Saadyana* S. 76. Vgl. auch Tykoczinski, *Debir* I, S. 150 und zum Thema überhaupt Aptowitzer, *Die syrischen Rechtsbücher* S. 84 ff.

¹¹ Vgl. Kohler, *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, II VII, 1 (1914) S. 88. Ebenda 126 aus dem budhistischen Recht: „Wenn der Herr die Sklavin notzüchtigt, so wird sie entweder von selber frei oder sie kann sich um einen geringen Preis loskaufen.“

Die Geonim deuten auch an, daß zur Legitimierung der Kinder Isdadwars auch der Umstand beigetragen hat, daß ihre Nachkommen sich mit vornehmen Familien verschwägert hatten, aus denen manche Exilarchen und Häupter der Lehrhäuser hervorgegangen sind.¹² Etwas Ähnliches findet man schon im Talmud, wo R. Jochanan sagt, daß er von Familien weiß, daß sie illegitim sind, er sie aber nicht namhaft machen will, weil sie mit den Großen des Geschlechtes verschwägert sind.¹³

C. DIE AGADA ZU UNSERER FRAGE.

Wir haben gesehen, daß die Halacha einstimmig das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin oder Sklavin für einen Nichtjuden, bzw. Sklaven erklärt. Wir haben auch gesehen, daß diese Anschauung in der Agada verwertet wird. Nun gibt es aber in der Agada eine Stelle, in der scheinbar eine ganz merkwürdige Anschauung über unser Thema zum Ausdruck kommt, daß nämlich das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin ein Mamser ist. Es wird nämlich erzählt: Als Rabbi Zaddok als Gefangener nach Rom gebracht wurde und eine Matrone ihm eine Sklavin zum ehelichen Umgange sandte, lehnte er ab und gab als Grund folgendes an: Was soll ich tun, ich stamme von Hohepriestern ab und möchte nicht die Zahl der Mamserim in Israel vermehren.¹⁴ Büchler bemerkt unter Hinweis auf diese Stelle: „Auch ein Kind aus dem Umgange eines Juden mit einer Nichtjüdin wird als Mamser bezeichnet.“ Er bemerkt dazu: „Dieses könnte allerdings als Übertreibung gelten, da nach rabbinischem Gesetz das Kind eines Juden von einer Heidin als Heide gilt, wie es auch in der bekannten Auslegung von Lev. 18, 21 im Buche der Jubiläen 30, 10 und im Talmud von R. Ismael als an das Heidentum verloren erklärt wird, da es bei der Mutter aufwächst.“

¹² *Saadyana a. a. O. Debir I, SS 146, 147.*

¹³ אמר ר' יוחנן היכלא בדינא היא אבל מה אעשה שהרי גדולי הדור נמטעו בה. Kidd. 71a. Vgl. Jerusch. Jeb. VIII, 9a; Kidd. IV, 3 65d.

¹⁴ רבי צדוק היה גדול הדור כשנשבה לרומי נשלחו ממנו נשים אחת ושלחה לו שפחה אחת יפה כיון שראה אותה נתן עיניו בכולה שלא יראנה וחיב וישב ושונה כל הלילה. לשחרות הלכה והקבילה אצל גבירתה אמרה לה שזה לי הסוד משתתנני לאיש הזה שלחה וקראה לו. מפני מה לא עשית עם אשה זאת בדרך שיעשו בני אדם. אמר לה ומה אעשה מכהונה גדולה אני אמרתי שטא אמא עליה והרבתי ממורים בישראל. Abot R. Nathan, Kap. XVI. Vgl. Büchler, *Schwarz-Festschrift* S. 146.

Aber gerade dadurch wird der Ausspruch R. Zaddoks, „er möchte nicht die Zahl der Mamserim in Israel vermehren“, desto unverständlicher. Es ist daher klar, daß R. Zaddok unmöglich daran denken konnte, das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin als Mamser zu bezeichnen. Dies hätte auch Büchler erkannt, wenn er nicht das Wort *בִּישְׂרָאֵל* übersehen hätte. Der Ausspruch R. Zaddoks kann nur den Sinn haben: Das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin ist Nichtjude; wenn er dann mit einer Jüdin Kinder zeugt, so sind diese Kinder Mamserim.¹⁵

EXKURS II. DAS KIND EINER JÜDIN VON EINEM NICHTJUDEN.

Es gibt darüber eine Meinungsverschiedenheit, die durch Jahrhunderte sich hinzog. Nach der einen Ansicht, die im Babli rezipiert wurde, ist das Kind ein Volljude, es darf eine Jüdin heiraten.

Die Talmudstellen, die unsere Frage behandeln, sind: Mischnah Jeb. 69 b; Sifra *אמור*, Perek IV, 5; Babli Jeb. 16 b, 23 a, 44 b—45 b, 70 a; Kidd. 70 a, 75 b; Ab. Sara 59 a; Jerusch. Jeb. V, 15 6 c; VII, 5 8 b; Kidd. III, 14 64 d; Tosefta Kidd. V, 12; Jeb. 99 a.

Philo bezeichnet den Lästere (Lev. 24, 10 ff.) als *νόθος*, d. h. als uneheliches Kind.¹⁶ Dies sagt aber nach jüdischem Recht nichts über den Charakter des Kindes.

Über den Grund, warum ein Kind solcher Verbindung als Mamser gilt, gehen die Ansichten der alten Kommentare auseinander. Die einen erklären: das Kind richtet sich nach der Mutter, es wird ihr „nachgeworfen“, wie der Terminus lautet, für sie aber war die Verbindung mit dem Nichtjuden verboten.¹⁷ Nach anderen ist es die Berücksichtigung der Abstammung väterlicherseits, die das Kind zum Mamser macht.¹⁸ Aber auch nach dieser Ansicht ist die Mutterseite

¹⁵ So R. J. Emden in seinen Glossen zu Aboth R. Nathan.

¹⁶ *De Vita Mosis*, II, § 24 (Cohn-Wendland IV, S. 245 § 192).

¹⁷ So Raschi Kidd. 75 b; Tossafoth Jeb. 23 a v. *קטרי*; vgl. Toss. Kidd. 75 b v. *ורי* und Or Zarua I N. 607.

¹⁸ Sche'eltoth N. 25; vgl. *העקב שאלה* z. St. Anm. 6. Vgl. auch Raschi Jeb. 45 b v. *בנין*.

maßgebend, da nur sie das Verbot trifft. Wäre die Vaterseite ausschlaggebend, so wäre das Kind ein Nichtjude, bzw. ein Unfreier. In jedem Falle also richtet sich die Abstammung des Kindes nach der Mutter (vgl. weiter unten).

In bezug auf הולד כשר gibt es eine merkwürdige Auffassung, daß nämlich gemeint sei: Das Kind ist Nichtjude und darf, wenn es Proselyt wird, eine Jüdin heiraten.¹⁹

Aber הולד כשר kann unmöglich diese Bedeutung haben. In der Tat blieb diese Ansicht vereinzelt, da alle alten Autoritäten ein solches Kind als legitim ohne jegliche Einschränkung erklären.²⁰

Was aus der Halacha sich ergibt, wird auch von der Geschichte bestätigt. Ein radikaler Gegner Johann Hyrkans ruft ihm zu: „Übergenuß für dich die Königskrone! Überlasse das Priesterdiadem den Nachkommen Arons.“ Denn es war das Gerücht verbreitet, daß die Mutter Hyrkans in Modiim gefangen war.²¹ Also selbst bei der Annahme, daß ein Nichtjude der natürliche Vater Hyrkans war, war dieser bloß für das Priesteramt untauglich, galt aber sonst als Volljude und sogar als regierungsfähig. Die Abstammung väterlicherseits kommt also nicht in Betracht.

Anders aber im Falle Agrippas. Er stammte väterlicherseits von Proselyten ab, daher haben ihn die radikalen Pharisäer für regierungsunfähig erklärt.²²

Dieselbe Auffassung betreffend Mischkinder bei jüdischer Mutter finden wir schon zur Zeit Esras und Nehemias, denn nur aus ihr sind die Berichte über die Ausscheidung der fremden Frauen verständlich. Es heißt zunächst bei der Feststel-

¹⁹ So Raschi Kidd. 68 b; vgl. Toss. Kidd. 75 b v. ורבי und מדרשׁא z. St. So auch Raschi Jeb. 23 a (wo es mit Unrecht von R. S. Lurja und R. J. Serkes gestrichen wird. Vgl. Or Zarua a. a. O).

²⁰ Vgl. Sche'eltoth NN. 25, 95; Hal. Gedoloth, ed. Warschau 175 b (ed. Berlin S. 308), RIF Jeb. IV N. 60 und besonders Nimuke z. St. Raschi Kidd. 76 a; Mischneh Thora, Issure Biah XV 3—4, Meiri Jeb. 45 a, Minchath Jehuda z. Ex. 2, 12 (Daath Zekenim 29 c oben), Pentateuchtossafoth (Hadar Zekenim 51 c), Hizkuni und Nachmanides zu Lev. 24, 10. Wichtig ist Traktat גרים III, 7: ישראל שבה על בת: עובד כוכבים ידון בדיני ישראל ועובד כוכבים שבה על בת ישראל ידון בדיני ישראל.

²¹ Kidd. 66 a; Josephus, *Antiq.* XIII 10, 5. Niese III, 204, § 291.

²² Vgl. Text II c.

lung der Tatsachen: „Denn sie haben welche von deren Töchtern für sich und ihre Söhne zu Weibern genommen und der heilige Samen vermischte sich mit den Bewohnern des Landes“ (Esra 9, 2). Es wird also festgestellt, daß jüdische Männer heidnische Frauen und heidnische Männer jüdische Frauen geheiratet haben.²³ Daher ist auch weiter (Vers 14) allgemein von der Verschwägerung mit den „Völkern der Greuel“ die Rede.²⁴ Um so auffallender ist es, daß in dem weiteren Verlauf der Erzählung im Berichte von den Maßnahmen Esras zur Entfernung der fremden Elemente nur von den heidnischen Frauen und deren Kindern die Rede ist (10, 3): „So laßt uns jetzt feierlich geloben, alle solche Weiber und was von ihnen geboren ist, kraft der Entschließung meines Herrn und derer, die vor dem Gesetze unseres Gottes Ehrfurcht haben, fortzuschaffen, und nach dem Gesetze soll verfahren werden.“²⁵ Wie ist es nun zu verstehen, daß von der Entfernung der männlichen Fremden mit keiner Silbe die Rede ist? Aber Esra, der hauptsächlich aus religiösen Motiven handelte, mußte das Hauptgewicht auf die Entfernung der fremden Frauen und ihrer Nachkommen legen; diese Kinder waren gesetzlich Nichtjuden, wuchsen aber unter Juden auf, sie bildeten einen Fremdkörper im Volksorganismus und trübten die Reinheit der Familie. Die fremden Männer aber, die jüdische Frauen geheiratet, kommen in dieser Beziehung nicht in Betracht. In der Regel kommen die jüdischen Frauen in die Familien ihrer heidnischen Männer, gingen dort unter und kamen für das jüdische Volk nicht mehr in Betracht. In den seltenen Fällen aber, wo die heidnischen Männer in die Familien ihrer jüdischen Frauen hineingeheiratet haben, bildeten sie in ihrer Person keine Gefahr für die Reinheit des Volkes, da sie für sich kenntlich waren; ihre Kinder aber von den jüdischen Frauen waren Juden. Durch sie war also die Reinheit des Volkes nicht bedroht. Derselben Erscheinung begegnen

²³ Vgl. Exkurs I A.

²⁴ ולתחתן בעמי התועבות.

²⁵ Vgl. noch 10. 10, 11, 14, 17—19 und Vers 44, wo wiederum die Frauen mit ihren Kindern erwähnt werden. Im 3. Buch Esra 9, 36: „Alle diese haben fremde Frauen heimgeführt und entließen sie samt den Kindern.“

wir bei Nehemia. Auch er verwirft natürlich beide Arten der Verschwägerung mit den heidnischen Völkern; das Hauptübel sieht er aber in den fremden Frauen: „Auch besuchte ich zu jener Zeit die Juden, welche Weiber aus Asdod, Ammoniterinnen und Moabiterinnen, heimgeführt haben. Deren Kinder redeten zur Hälfte asdoditisch oder entsprechend der Sprache des betreffenden Volkes und verstanden nicht, jüdisch zu reden. Und ich machte ihnen Vorwürfe und fluchte ihnen, ja, ich schlug und raufte einige von den Männern und beschwor sie bei Gott: Ihr sollt eure Töchter nicht ihren Söhnen geben und von ihren Töchtern keine für eure Söhne und euch selbst nehmen. Hat nicht ihretwegen Salomo, König von Israel, gesündigt? Unter allen den vielen Völkern gab es keinen König wie er, und also war er von seinem Gotte geliebt, daß ihn Gott zum König über ganz Israel machte! Aber auch ihn verführten die ausländischen Frauen zur Sünde. Und nun müssen wir von euch hören, daß ihr all dies große Unrecht begeht, euch an unserem Gotte zu versündigen, indem ihr ausländische Weiber heimführt.“ (Neh. 13, 23—27).

Nun ist aber Neh. 13, 1 besonders auffallend: „Damals wurde dem Volke aus dem Buche Moses vorgelesen, und es fand sich darin geschrieben, daß kein Ammoniter oder Moabiter jemals der Gemeinde Gottes angehören dürfe.“

Aus Esra (9, 1) wissen wir, daß die Bevölkerung Judäas mit allen das Land bewohnenden Völkern verschwägert war: Kanaaniter, Hetiter, Pheresiter, Jebusiter, Ammoniter, Moabiter, Ägypter und Amoriter. Von diesen zehn Völkern wird in unserer Stelle aus der Thora Moses bloß das Verbot betreffend Ammoniter und Moabiter verlesen. Warum dies? Warum nicht auch das Verbot der Verschwägerung mit den kanaanitischen Völkern und den Ägyptern?²⁶ Dies kann nur daraus erklärt werden, daß es sich hier um Männer dieser Völker handelt und jene Stelle deshalb zur Vorlesung gewählt wurde, um besonders den Ammoniter Tobia, den Verwandten des Priesters Eljasib (13, 4), den Feind Nehemias und des Aufbauwerkes, zu treffen, wie in der Tat im Zusammenhang

²⁶ Ex. 34, 12—16; Deut. 7, 2—4.

dieser Erzählung die Vertreibung Tobias aus der Tempelkammer berichtet wird. Daher heißt es im Vers 3: „Und als sie das Gesetz vernahmen, sonderten sie alle Fremden von Israel ab.“ Die Fremden, aber nicht auch ihre Nachkommen?! Weil diese als Kinder jüdischer Mütter Juden waren und zum Volke gehörten. Ihre Väter aber mußten aus national-politischen Gründen entfernt werden.

Aus unseren Ausführungen ergibt sich nun die Unrichtigkeit der Theorie Geigers betreffend die Bedeutung und die Wandlung des Begriffes Mamser, die auch aus anderen Gründen unhaltbar ist.

Geiger behauptet: Mamser bedeutete ursprünglich einen Mischling aus Juden und Philistäern, dann auch allgemein ein Kind, von dessen Eltern ein Teil Nichtjude war. Später aber, als die Nationalität zurückgedrängt und die Religion allein herrscherin wurde, besonders in der jüngeren Halacha, wurden die Fremden den Juden gleichgestellt und der Ausdruck Mamser wurde für ein Kind aus verbotener Ehe gebraucht.²⁷ Er führt für seine Theorie eine „alte talmudische Tradition“ an, nämlich den Satz: „Das Kind, welches aus dem Umgange eines Nichtjuden oder Sklaven und einer Jüdin entspringt, ist ein Mamser.“

Dies ist doppelt unrichtig. Erstens heißt es nicht „Mamser ist ein Kind eines Nichtjuden von einer Jüdin“, sondern „das Kind eines Nichtjuden von einer Jüdin ist ein Mamser“; also ist Mamser der weitere Begriff, in dessen Inhalt auch der Mischling gehört, ohne aber den Begriff auszufüllen. Zweitens darf hier nicht im Sinne Geigers von einer alten Tradition gesprochen werden, da gerade R. Akiba, der nach Geiger der Repräsentant der jüngeren Halacha ist, diese Ansicht vertritt, der auch mehrere Amoräer folgen.

Geiger meint ferner, daß die Übersetzung Mamser in der Septuaginta zu Deut. 25, 3 ἐκ πόρνῃς daraus sich erklärt, daß die Frau, die Umgang mit einem Nichtjuden pflegt, als Buhlerin zu betrachten ist. Demnach wäre ein Mamser nur das Kind einer Jüdin von einem Nichtjuden, nicht aber auch um-

²⁷ *Urschrift* 52 f., 350 f.

gekehrt das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin; wie verträgt sich das mit der Theorie Geigers, daß für die Ausschließung des Mamser nur nationale Rücksichten maßgebend waren? Ist die heidnische Frau weniger fremd als der heidnische Mann?

Daher kann die Septuaginta nur an das Kind einer jüdischen Mutter aus verbotener Ehe denken, wie die Halacha, ohne Unterschied des Alters, es tut. Sprachlich läßt sich die Übersetzung der LXX so erklären, daß sie auf Grund des Wechsels von מ and מ, ממור = ממון = מעם ומונה = ἐκ πόρνῆς deutet. Daß die LXX zu Zach. 9, 6 ממור mit ἀλλογενεῖς — Fremdstämmling übersetzt, beweist weder die Richtigkeit dieser Auffassung noch ihre allgemeine Geltung wie auch ihr Alter. Der späte griechische Übersetzer von Zach. 9, 6 hat seine Übersetzung des Ausdrucks ממור aus dem Zusammenhang erraten, ohne erkannt zu haben, daß seine Vorlage Mamser als Schimpfname für die Philistäer gebraucht.

Die Ansicht, daß ein Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten ein Mamser ist, ist gewiß zelotischen Ursprungs und stammt frühestens aus der Zeit des ersten Zusammenstoßes zwischen Juden und Römern, also etwa aus dem Jahre 60 ante. Im rabbinischen Schrifttum erscheint als ältester Vertreter dieser Ansicht R. Zaddok, der Priester, Augenzeuge der Vernichtung des jüdischen Staates und der Zerstörung des Tempels durch die Römer, der selbst als Gefangener nach Rom geschleppt wurde.²⁸

Ein wichtiger Anhaltspunkt für den zelotischen Ursprung der in Rede stehenden Ansicht ist die Tatsache, daß unter den „18 Verordnungen“, die von den zelotisch gestimmten Schammaiten ausgegangen sind und für die sie die Zustimmung der Hilleliten nur durch Waffengewalt erlangen konnten, zwei den geschlechtlichen Verkehr von Juden mit Heiden und umgekehrt von Jüdinnen mit Heiden betreffen.²⁹

²⁸ Vgl. Exkurs I C.

²⁹ Mischna Sab. I, 4; Tosefta das. I, 16—21; Babli 14b, 15a, 17b; Aboda Sara 36a—b, Jer. Sab. I, 4 3c. Das. heißt es: תלמידי ב"ש עמדו להם מלמטה והיו הורגין בתלמידי ב"ה. תני ששה מהן עלו והשאר עמדו עליהם בחרבות ובריחים בתוך שמונה עשרה: Das. 3^d. אמלו גדול אינו מבטל מפני שעמדו להן בנפשותיהן.

Wichtig ist es, daß ausdrücklich als Praxis der Zeloten angegeben wird, an einem Juden, der einer Heidin beigewohnt hat, Lynchjustiz zu üben.³⁰ Warum aber sind die Zeloten nur im Falle des Verkehrs eines Juden mit einer Heidin so streng vorgegangen und nicht auch im umgekehrten Falle des Verkehrs einer Jüdin mit einem Heiden? Dies erklärt sich aus den Beweggründen ihres Zelotismus: nationalpolitischer und patriotischer Eifer. Das aus der Verbindung eines Juden mit einer Heidin entsprossene Kind ist Heide und wird in praxi von seiner heidnischen Mutter erzogen, es vermehrt so die Zahl der Feinde Gottes und seines Volkes. Anders aber das Kind einer Jüdin von einem Heiden. Theoretisch gilt es als Jude, wenn es auch — nach der Ansicht der Zeloten — illegitim ist, und wird faktisch als Jude erzogen. Es ist nicht von Natur Feind des Volkes, kann sogar auch für dessen Freiheit kämpfen.

Daraus erklärt sich auch die merkwürdige Erscheinung, daß in der bekannten allegorischen Deutung von Lev. 18, 19 bloß der geschlechtliche Umgang eines Juden mit einer Heidin dem Molochdienst gleichgestellt wird. Nur in diesem Falle geht das Kind dem Judentum verloren, es wird ein Feind Gottes — *אויב למקים*.³¹

Dagegen ist im Buche der Jubiläen (30, 7—10), wo ebenfalls diese allegorische Deutung vorkommt, von der Übergabe einer jüdischen Frau an einen heidnischen Mann die Rede. Dies wohl deshalb, um das Verbot an das Ereignis Dina-Sichem anlehnen zu können.

L. Freund verweist zur Unterstützung der Theorie Geigers auf den Fall Agrippa. Er findet eine Schwierigkeit in der Meinungsverschiedenheit zwischen Agrippa und den Weisen. „Die Schwierigkeit wird aber beseitigt, wenn man annimmt, daß zu Agrippas Zeit noch die alte Auffassung Geltung hatte, wonach der Sohn aus einer Mischehe Mamser ist. Agrippa als Abkömmling des Herodes, der im Talmud

³⁰ *הבועל ארמית קנאים היו פוגעים בו*. Mischna Synhed. IX, 6. Vgl. dazu Lerner, *Magazin* IX, 125 Anm. 2.

³¹ Mischna Megilla IV, 9; Jonathan zu Lev. 18, 21; Sifre Deut. 171; Megilla 25a; Jer. Meg. IV, 9 75c und Synhed. IX, 7 27b.

als Sklave und Fremder bezeichnet wird, müßte daher als Bastard, respektive Fremder betrachtet werden und dürfte nicht König sein. Die Weisen, bei denen damals der Sturz der Sadduzäer Begeisterung hervorgerufen hatte, dürften auch wegen Agrippa, der sich ihren Verordnungen angepaßt hatte, eine neue Bestimmung getroffen haben, wonach in Mischehen die Abstammung der Mutter ausschlaggebend sei, die auch nicht allgemeine Zustimmung fand.“

Ich bedaure es, meinem Freunde Freund sagen zu müssen, daß er nichts weniger übersehen hat, als daß Agrippa von den — unter Johann Hyrkan bekehrten — Idumäern stammte, die nach der biblischen Vorschrift (Deut. 23, 8) schon im dritten Geschlecht zur Ehe mit Juden zugelassen sind. Agrippa — nach Freund sogar der zweite dieses Namens — konnte sich also unmöglich als Bastard betrachten.

Es sei hier auch noch auf die Beschneidung des Timotheus in Apostelgeschichte 16, 1—3 erinnert. Da L. Löw zuerst darauf hingewiesen hat,³² überlasse ich ihm das Wort:

„Daher hieß auch Paulus, welcher nur gegen die Beschneidung der Heidenchristen eiferte, hingegen die Pflichtmäßigkeit derselben bei den Judenchristen anerkannte, den Timotheus als den Sohn einer jüdischen Mutter und eines heidnischen Vaters im Sinne des ihm ohne Zweifel bekannten Gesetzes beschneiden.“

Der Verfasser der Apostelgeschichte gibt als Grund der Beschneidung des Timotheus an: „Wegen der Juden in jenen Gegenden, die alle wußten, daß sein Vater ein Grieche ist.“ Dies kann keinen anderen Sinn haben als den: Die Juden in jenen Gegenden kannten den Vater des Timotheus und konnten daher mit Recht voraussetzen, daß der Grieche seinen Sohn nicht beschneiden ließ, daher mußte ihn Paulus beschneiden.

Die Agada weicht hier, wie sonst nicht selten, von der Halacha ab. Sie gibt nämlich als Ursache des Streites, von dem Lev. 24, 10 die Rede ist, folgendes an: Der „Sohn der Israelitin, dessen Vater ein Ägypter war“, wollte, da er mütterlicherseits von Dan stammte, sein Zelt im Lager Dans aufschlagen. Die Daniten ließen es nicht zu, weil — meinten sie —

³² *Gesammelte Schriften* III, 123.

die Familien nur nach väterlicher Abstammung sich richten, so sei er als Sohn eines Ägypters selbst ein Ägypter und habe im Lager Israels nichts zu suchen. In diesem Sinne entschied auch Mose. Aus Zorn über die Abweisung lästert er den Namen Gottes.³³ Die letzte Bemerkung, er wurde Proselyt, bereitet den Kommentatoren große Schwierigkeit: warum — fragen sie — mußte er Proselyt werden, da er doch nach der rezipierten Halacha ein Israelit war?³⁴

Dieser Schwierigkeit suchen R A b D. und R. Simson aus Sens zum Sifra dadurch zu entgehen, daß sie erklären, der Sifra stehe auf dem Standpunkt, daß der Sohn einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten ein Mamser sei. Dies trifft insofern zu, als der Sifra diesen Standpunkt einnimmt,³⁵ aber daraus ist für die Hauptfrage nichts gewonnen, denn ein Mamser ist in jeder Beziehung Jude.³⁶ Dann aber heißt es in der Mischna Jeb. VII, 5 und in der erwähnten Sifrastelle, daß das Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten, obwohl es Mamser ist, seiner Großmutter den Genuß der Priesterhebe ermöglicht, bzw. sie von demselben ausschließt, je nachdem sie als Nichtahronidin mit einem Ahroniden oder umgekehrt als Ahronidin mit einem Nichtahroniden verheiratet war.³⁷ Also ist das Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten, obwohl illegitim, das Kind seiner Mutter. Mit welchem Recht also wurde der Sohn der Israelitin und des Ägypters aus dem Lager seines Mutterstammes gewiesen?

Über diese Schwierigkeit setzten sich R A b D. und R. Simson hinweg. Daß aber ein Mamser ein Jude ist und sich nicht erst bekehren muß, konnte ihnen auch nicht für einen

³³ Sifra אטור, Parascha 14: ויצא בן האשה הישראלית מנין יצא מבית דינו של משה שבה ליטע: אהלו בתוך מחנה דן אטור לו מה טובך לישע בתוך מחנה דן. אטור להן מבנות דן אני. אטור לו הכתוב אומר איש על דגלו באותות לבית אבותם יחנו בני ישראל. נכנס לבית דינו של משה ויצא מהוייב ועמד. וגידף, בתוך בני ישראל מלמד שנתגייר. ויצאו במחנה על עסקי מהנה בן הישראלית ואיש הישראלי זה שמנגדו

³⁴ Vgl. Pentateuch-Tossafoth, Hizkuni, Minchath Jehuda und Nachmanides an den oben angeführten Stellen.

³⁵ אטור Perek V § 4.

³⁶ Mischna Jeb. II, 5.

³⁷ מפורסם וטאכיל כיצד בת ישראל לכהן ובה כהן לישראל וילדה הימנו בת והלכה הבת ונשאית לעבר או לבתי וילדה הימנו בן הרי הוא ממור היתה אם אטור בת ישראל לכהן תאכל בתרומה. בת כהן לישראל לא תאכל בתרומה.

Augenblick entgehen. Deshalb erklären sie: Nicht der Lästere selbst, sondern sein Vater war Proselyte. Aber diese Erklärung ist aus diesem Grunde unhaltbar, weil die Bemerkung des Sifra auf den Bibelsatz „in der Mitte der Kinder Israels“ sich bezieht und offenbar erklären will, wie es kam, daß der Sohn des Ägypters sich im Lager Israels aufhielt.

R. Simson macht gegen seine eigene Erklärung den Widerspruch geltend, der sich aus ihr zu dem Midrasch³⁸ ergibt, daß der Lästere der Sohn des von Mose getöteten Ägypters war. Er läßt daher seine Erklärung fallen und meint: Die Bemerkung des Sifra bezieht sich auf den Lästere selbst, der, obwohl von Geburt Jude, deshalb Proselyt werden mußte, weil er von dem Judentum abgefallen war. Damit aber ist nicht viel erreicht, da das Proselytentum des Lästerers ebenfalls in Widerspruch steht zur Agada,³⁹ nach der Mose im prophetischen Schauen erkannt hatte, daß von dem Ägypter kein Proselyt abstammen wird. Aber auch die Erklärung an sich ist unannehmbar. Dies braucht nicht erst bewiesen zu werden.

Aber all die Schwierigkeiten entfallen, wenn man sich zu der Behauptung entschließt, daß die Agada im Sifra von der Halacha abweicht und das Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten für einen Nichtisraeliten hält. Der Lästere war also seiner Nationalität nach ein Ägypter. Wie kam es nun — fragt der Sifra — daß er im Lager Israels auferzogen wurde und sich dort aufhielt? Darauf die Antwort, daß er Proselyt wurde.

Diese Agada ist gewiß polemischen Charakters und ist gegen diejenigen gerichtet, die auf Grund der mütterlichen Abstammung Anspruch auf die höchsten Würden erhoben. So die Hasmonäer und andere. Doch darüber an anderer Stelle ausführlich.

Im Sifra folgt nach der Angabe betreffend die Ursache des Streites folgende Bemerkung: Wiewohl es zu jener Zeit

³⁸ Lev. r. XXXII, 3; Tan. אָמֵר § 24 (ed. Buber § 32). Vgl. noch Tan. שְׁמִיטָה § 9 und Ex. r. I, 28.

³⁹ Mid. Ps. XXIV § 7; Mid. Abchir in Jalkut Ex. § 167; Jonathan, Fragmententargum und Raschi zu Ex. 2, 12. Vgl. noch Ex. r. I, 29.

keine ממורים gegeben hat, so war er (der Lästere) gleichsam ein ממור.⁴⁰ Der Sinn der Meinungsverschiedenheit ist folgender: Wiewohl — sagen die Gelehrten — es zu jener Zeit, das ist vor der sinaitischen Gesetzgebung, keine Mamserim im eigentlichen Sinne gab, so war doch der im Ehebruch gezeugte Lästere gleichsam ein Mamser, da Israel sich in Ägypten aus eigenem von Unzucht fernhielt — wie es die Agada so oft betont.⁴¹ R. Levi hingegen meint, daß der Lästere ein eigentlicher Mamser war, da Ehebruch auch den Noachiden verboten war.⁴²

EXKURS III. AGRIPPA.

Im Jeruschalmi Sotah z. St., 22 a, wird von R. Hananja ben Gamliel überliefert, daß an dem Tage, an dem die Juden dem Agrippa geschmeichelt haben, es viele Erschlagene gegeben: תני ר' חנניה בן נמליאל אומר הרבה חללים נפלו באותו יום שהחניפו לו. Daraus hat schon Derenbourg⁴³ geschlossen, daß die Erzählung der Mischna Sotah VII, 8 sich auf Agrippa II. bezieht:

« Ceci paraît se rapporter à Agrippa II, sous lequel les luttes entre les Juifs et les Romains ne cessaient guère tandis que rien de semblable n'eut lieu sous Agrippa I^{er}. »

Dies führt Brann⁴⁴ folgendermaßen aus:

„Der Bericht ist sicher historisch... Von den übrigen (d. h. nichttalmudischen) Quellen haben wir aber gar keine Andeutung für einen Aufstand, der in dieser Zeit, und besonders im Jahre 41, stattgefunden hätte und in welchem viele Opfer gefallen wären.“⁴⁵

Aber über einen am Tage der Thoravorlesung durch Agrippa II. im Jahre 63 aus Anlaß des heuchlerischen Zuerufes an den Vortragenden stattgefundenen Aufstand ist in

⁴⁰ אף על פי שלא היו ממורים באותה שעה הוא היה ממור. Dasselbe in Lev. r. XXXII, 4, wo hinzugefügt wird: Nach der Ansicht des R. Levi war er ein wirklicher ממור: ר' לוי אומר ממור ברור היה. Vgl. noch Tan. אמור § 24 (ed. Buber § 32).

⁴¹ Vgl. z. B. Mechilta בא V und Parallelen.

⁴² Vgl. Synhed. 56b, u. a.

⁴³ Essai S. 217.

⁴⁴ Monatsschrift 1870 S. 542 f.

⁴⁵ Diesen Beweis betont auch Büchler, *Die Priester und der Cultus im letzten Jahrzehnt des jerusalemischen Tempels* S. 12 f.

den nichttalmudischen Quellen ebenfalls keine Andeutung vorhanden. Die Nachricht im Jerusch. ist also entweder historisch trotz des Schweigens der nichttalmudischen Quellen — dann kann sie auch auf Agrippa I. bezogen werden, oder sie ist nicht historisch — dann sagt sie auch nichts für Agrippa II. Hat aber der Berichterstatte die Aufstände gegen die Römer als Strafe für die Heuchelei gegen Agrippa erklärt, dann ist ja seine Nachricht historisch völlig wertlos. Ein so unzuverlässiger Chronist kann auch leicht Agrippa I. mit Agrippa II. verwechselt haben.

Man hat aber gar nicht das Recht, R. Chananja b. Gamliel den Unsinn zuzumuten: Weil die Pharisäer dem Agrippa geschmeichelt haben, haben die Juden einen Aufstand gegen die Römer hervorgerufen. In der Nachricht des Jerusch. handelt es sich gewiß nicht um einen „Aufstand“, sondern bloß um eine Schlägerei zwischen strengen und gemäßigten Pharisäern, indem die Zeloten die alte gesetzmäßige Auffassung von der Regierungsunfähigkeit der Idumäer trotz ihrer mütterlich-jüdischen Abstammung mit schlagenden Beweisen verteidigten — wie die Schammaiten bei den „18 Verordnungen“ und die Pharisäer bei dem Versuch der Sadduzäer, das Connubium mit moabitischen Proselytinnen als unzulässig zu erklären.⁴⁶

Brann macht überhaupt große Anstrengungen, den Bericht über die Vorlesung des Königsabschnittes und auch andere talmudische Nachrichten betreffend Agrippa auf den zweiten Träger dieses Namens zu beziehen, und gelangt dadurch zu sehr merkwürdigen Theorien. So bemerkt er am Schlusse seiner Ausführung:

„Schließlich war Agrippa beim Volke verhaßt, weil er nur den Römern diene, nach ihrem Wunsche und dem Meistgebot die hohepriesterliche Würde vergab, weil er ein durchaus sittlich schlechter und verkommener Mensch war. Daraus erklärt sich leicht, daß die talmudischen Weisen über das vom Volke gemachte Zugeständnis im höchsten Grade erbittert

⁴⁶ Vgl. oben Exkurs II.

waren und in dem bald darauf folgenden unglücklichen Ereignis das Werk der strafenden Vorsehung erblickten.“⁴⁷

Also: die Zeitgenossen Agrippas II., die ihn als sittlich verworfenen römischen Spion und Schergen haßten, die seine ganze Niedrigkeit und Gemeinheit unmittelbar erfahren haben, haben den Verräter als Bruder begrüßt, während die talmudischen Weisen etwa hundert Jahre später jene Begrüßung scharf tadelten. Das ist ein Zuviel des Sonderbaren.

Büchler, a. a. O. S. 14, führt für Agrippa II. ein viel schwereres Geschütz auf, nämlich die Tosefta Sota VII, 16, in der gesagt sein soll:

„daß Agrippa am selben Tage den Thoraabschnitt vortrug, an welchem R. Tarfon den lahmen Priester die Trompete blasen sah. Da R. Tarfon zur Zeit der Zerstörung des Tempels ein junger Priester war, ist es ausgeschlossen, daß er im Jahre 41 unter Agrippa I. seinen Onkel in der Festversammlung soll fungieren gesehen haben, so daß es unzweifelhaft wird, daß einzig und allein Agrippa II. im Jahre 62/63 gemeint sein kann.“

Diesen Beweis sucht A. Epstein⁴⁸ dadurch zu entkräften, daß er meint, die Tosefta wolle nicht sagen, daß alle drei Ereignisse an einem und demselben Tage erfolgten, sondern bei einer und derselben periodisch wiederkehrenden Gelegenheit, aber in verschiedenen Zeiten. Dies sagt nicht viel. Es ist bloß Behauptung gegen Behauptung. Wichtiger ist, daß Büchler den Toseftatext ungenau zitiert. In allen Ausgaben heißt es *משום רבי נתן אמר*, so auch B. Sota 41 b; der Satz bezieht sich auf den Bericht über die Thoravorlesung Agrippas in der Mischna und hat mit der Erzählung R. Tarfons nicht das allergeringste zu tun.⁴⁹

In der Tat hat Büchler in einer späteren Schrift⁵⁰ seine Meinung aufgegeben, denn er bemerkt dort: „daß die Vorschriften der Mischna über die Beteiligung des Königs an dem Gottesdienste und Opfer im Tempel und an öffentlichen

⁴⁷ Brann, a. a. O. S. 548.

⁴⁸ *Monatsschrift* 1896 S. 140 f.

⁴⁹ Vgl. noch Josef Lehman, *REJ* XXXVII (1898) S. 31.

⁵⁰ *Das Synhedrion in Jerusalem* S. 61.

Aufzügen sich gleichfalls auf einen der beiden Agrippa beziehen.“

Spricht nun nichts für Agrippa II., so spricht alles gegen ihn:

1. Agrippa II. war nicht König der Juden und war daher nicht zur Thoravorlesung berechtigt. Brann a. a. O. S. 547 meint:

„Vor allem wurde Agrippa II. seit dem Jahre 49, obgleich er eigentlich nur Fürst von Chalkis war, von den Juden als König angesehen, weil er, wie bereits bemerkt, das Aufsichtsrecht über den Tempel hatte und die Ein- und Absetzung der Hohepriester von ihm abhing.“

Aber das Recht auf Schacher mit dem Hohepriesteramt konnte unmöglich Agrippa II. die Geltung als König verschaffen. Das Recht auf Einsetzung der Hohepriester haben die Römer für sich und dann für ihre herodäischen Sklaven usurpiert; für die Juden aber war einzig und allein das Synhedrion befugt, Hohepriester einzusetzen.⁵¹ Wenn also die Juden den wirklichen Königen dieses Recht absprachen, so konnten sie unmöglich einen Privatmann, der dieses Recht usurpiert hatte, eben wegen dieser Usurpation als König ansehen.

2. Es ist ausgeschlossen, daß ein Mensch von der sittlichen Verworfenheit Agrippas II., der jahrelang mit seiner Schwester in Unzucht lebte, je das Bedürfnis empfunden haben konnte, an einer religiösen Handlung teilzunehmen und bei der Wahrnehmung, daß er ein Gebot übertrete, Tränen zu vergießen.

Brann (S. 547) meint: „Um die Meinung zu verstärken und sich gleichsam einen Schein von Legitimität zu verschaffen, wird Agrippa gerade dieses Gesetz, das eine öffentliche Demonstration involvierte, strikter beobachtet haben.“ Aber gerade eine solche Demonstration ist bei dem feigen Knechtssinn Agrippas II. ausgeschlossen.

Es bleibt daher bei der alten, natürlichen Auffassung, daß der Bericht über den Vortrag des Königsabschnittes auf Agrippa I. sich beziehe. Dasselbe gilt von allen anderen talmudischen Nachrichten, in denen von Agrippa ein religiöser oder sonst vornehmer Zug mitgeteilt wird.

⁵¹ Tosefta Synhed. III, 4.

EXKURS IV. KAUFHE IM ALTEN ISRAEL.⁵²

Für den Bestand der Kaufhe in Altisrael ist besonders die Arbeit Jakobs um Rahel und Lea (Gen. 29, 18, 27) wichtig. Es ist dies ein alter Brauch in der Kaufhe: das Erdienen der Ehe. Wenn der Bräutigam den Kaufpreis nicht bezahlt, leistet er ihn in Arbeit ab.

Wir finden das Erdienen der Ehe auch bei Mose. Daß er einen Kaufpreis für Zipporah bezahlte, wird nicht erwähnt (Ex. 2, 20), dafür hütete er aber nach der Ehe die Schafe seines Schwiegervaters (Ex. 3, 1). Dieselbe Arbeit, wie Jakob bei Laban.

In der Kaufhe galten aber folgende Bestimmungen:

1. Wird der Kaufpreis vor der Ehe gezahlt oder durch Arbeit geleistet, geht die Frau in den Besitz des Mannes über, sie wird sein Eigentum; die Kinder aus dieser Ehe gehören ihm.

2. Wird aber kein Frauenpreis bezahlt, dann wird der Mann zum Knechte in der Familie der Frau und hat ihr zu dienen, nicht nur, indem er die Kinder zeugt, sondern indem er sonst für die Schwiegereltern und Schwäger Arbeit verrichtet.

3. Wird aber der Kaufpreis nach der Ehe gezahlt oder durch Arbeit abgetragen, so geht zwar die Frau in den Besitz des Mannes über und er wird Herr der Familie, jedoch verbleibt ein Teil der Kinder bei der Familie der Mutter.⁵³

Daraus erklärt sich die „Meinungsverschiedenheit“ zwischen Jakob, Rahel und Lea einer- und Laban andererseits. Jakob hat den Kaufpreis für Lea vor der Ehe abgedient, hingegen den für Rahel erst nach der Ehe abgetragen. So hätte von rechtswegen ein Teil der Kinder Jakobs im Hause Labans verbleiben müssen. Laban aber, der in puncto Redlichkeit nicht sehr pedantisch war, dehnte dieses Recht auf alle Kinder und auch auf die Frauen und das Vermögen Jakobs aus und meint: „Mein sind die Frauen, mein sind die Kinder und mein ist das Vieh, und alles, was du hier erblickst, das ist mein“

⁵² Über die Kaufhe im alten Israel vgl. besonders L. Freund, *Zur Geschichte des Ehegüterrechtes bei den Semiten* S. 20. Vgl. noch J. Neubauer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des biblisch-talmudischen Eheschließungsrechtes* SS. 8 f., 33 und 206.

⁵³ Vgl. Kohler, *Kultur der Gegenwart* II, VII, 1 SS. 22 f., 53 f., 132.

(Gen. 31, 43): Rahel und Lea dagegen meinten, da die Arbeit Jakobs um Rahel nur durch einen Betrug ihres Vaters erzwungen wurde, so hat Laban gar keinen Anspruch mehr an Jakob. „Haben wir etwa noch Teil und Erbe im Hause unseres Vaters? Gelten wir ihm nicht als Fremde, nachdem er uns verkauft und das Geld, das er für uns bekam, längst verzehrt hat“ (Gen. 31, 14, 15).

Aus dem Brauche der Teilung der Kinder erklärt sich folgende Agada:

Auf die Frage, wie es kam, daß Mose seinen Sohn nicht beschnitten hat, antwortet die Agada: Jethro hat mit Mose einen Pakt geschlossen, daß der erstgeborene Sohn Moses von Zipporah ihm gehören soll.⁵⁴ Da Mose den Kaufpreis für Zipporah erst nach der Ehe abgetragen (Ex. 3, 1), so gehörte von rechtswegen ein Teil der Kinder der Mutterfamilie.

Aus der Kaufehe erklärt sich die Geschichte Juda-Thamar. In der Kaufehe ging die Witwe in den Nachlaß des Mannes über und wurde von seiner Familie als Nachlaßstück in Anspruch genommen.⁵⁵ Thamar fiel nach dem Tode ihres Mannes in den Besitz seines Bruders Onan und wurde nach dessen Tode für den jüngsten Sohn Judas, Sela, bestimmt. Inzwischen aber erfolgte ihr Verkehr mit Juda, und als ihre Schwangerschaft bemerkt wurde, wurde Juda berichtet: Deine Schwiegertochter Thamar hat gebuhlt und ist richtig dadurch schwanger geworden. Da gebot Juda: Führt sie hinaus, daß sie verbrannt werde! (Gen. 38, 24.) Als sich aber herausstellte, daß sie von Juda schwanger war, sprach Juda: „Sie ist in ihrem Rechte gegen mich. Warum habe ich sie auch nicht meinem Sohne Sela zum Weibe gegeben?“ Dies ist nur in folgender Weise zu verstehen: Thamar, als Eigentum der Familie Judas, verfiel wegen ihres Verkehrs mit einem nicht zur Familie gehörenden Manne der Todesstrafe. Aber gegen den Verkehr mit ihrem Schwiegervater, dem Erben seiner kinderlos verstorbenen Söhne, war nichts einzuwenden.

שבשעה שאמר משה ליתרו תן לי צמורה בתך לאשה אמר לו קבל עליך דבר זה שאומר לך ואני נותנה לך לאשה אמר לו מה אמר לו בן שוהיה לך תחלה יהיה לעבודה זרה מכאן ואילך לשם שמים וקבל עליו. Mechilta I יתרו (ed. Friedmann S. 57b f.), Jonathan Ex. 4, 24.

⁵⁵ Kohler a. a. O. SS. 22, 108, 122, 134.

Das Erbrecht der Familie des Mannes an seiner Witwe wurde später von der mosaischen Gesetzgebung auf die Ehe mit dem Bruder des kinderlos Verstorbenen beschränkt.

EXKURS V. DAS ERBRECHT DER TOCHTER BEI DEN SADDUZÄERN.

Vgl. Poznański, *JQR* VIII, 692 Anm. und seine Bemerkung in seiner Ausgabe von Geigers *Hebräischen Aufsätzen* (קבוצת מאמרים) S. 93. Poznański stützt sich auf die Angabe Ahron b. Elias, *Gan Eden* 165 d. Dies beweist aber nichts, da Ahron b. Elia sich auf die Angabe B. Bathra 115 b beruft; er kann also nicht als selbständiger Zeuge geführt werden. Wichtiger ist, daß ältere Karäer auf dem Standpunkt stehen, daß die Tochter ein gleiches Erbrecht mit dem Sohne hat.⁵⁶ Dazu gehört auch die Ansicht Daniel al-Kumsis, daß die Tochter den dritten Sohnesteil erbt.⁵⁷ Der Zusammenhang aber zwischen Karäern und Sadduzäern ist, wenn auch nicht absolut sicher, so doch höchstwahrscheinlich.⁵⁸

Gegen den Zusammenhang der Karäer mit den Sadduzäern macht Revel⁵⁹ die Tatsache geltend, daß die Karäer häufig eher mit den Pharisäern übereinstimmen als mit den Sadduzäern. Dies beweist natürlich nichts. Erstens ist Zusammenhang noch nicht Kopie, zweitens ist es Tatsache, daß die jüngeren Karäer, besonders seit Ahron b. Eliah, eine Schwenkung zum Rabbinismus vollzogen haben.

Was aber unseren speziellen Fall betrifft, können auch aus Angaben im Talmud wichtige Anhaltspunkte dafür gewonnen werden, daß in der Tat die Sadduzäer der Tochter ein gleiches Erbrecht mit dem Sohne zugesprochen haben:

1. Der von den Sadduzäern für die Gleichstellung der Tochter mit der Sohnestochter geltend gemachte axiomatische

⁵⁶ *Gan Eden* 165 d—166 a.

⁵⁷ Pinsker, *Likkute Kadmonioth* S. 85; *Gan Eden* 169 d; Baschjazzi, *Adereth Eliahu* 101 a.

⁵⁸ Vgl. die bekannte Theorie Geigers an zahlreichen Stellen seiner Schriften; s. Poznański in *Abraham Geiger* S. 382—386, besonders 382 Anm. 2; Harkavy zu Graetz V, 4 S. 477; Poznański, *REJ* XLIV, 176 f.; Schechter, *Jewish Sectaries* I, S. XXI. Vgl. noch Aptowitz, *WZKM* 1910 S. 8.

⁵⁹ *JQR* NS III, 352 f.

Schluß (קל וחומר) lautet ja allgemein: Wenn die Enkelin erbt, um so mehr die Tochter. Um aber dem Einwande der Pharisäer zu entgehen, mußten die Sadduzäer entweder der Sohnes-tochter das Repräsentationsrecht neben den Onkeln absprechen oder der Tochter ein Erbrecht neben den Söhnen zuerkennen; daß sie den ersteren Weg eingeschlagen hätten, ist deshalb unwahrscheinlich, da sie ja eine Begünstigung der Tochter anstrebten — folglich blieb ihnen nur der zweite Ausweg: die Tochter hat ein gleiches Erbrecht wie der Sohn.

2. Im Babli⁶⁰ wird erzählt, daß manche jüdischen Richter nach der Theorie des R. Sacharja ben ha-Qasab judizierten, daß aber Samuel und Rabbi Nachman gegen jene Richter heftig auftraten und ihnen sogar die Anwendung von Gewalt, Verhängung des Bannes, angedroht haben. Auch im Jerusch.⁶¹ wird gegen die Ansicht R. Sacharias Sturm gelaufen und bemerkt: Unsere Brüder im Auslande sind unwissende Laien, die die Halacha entstellen, indem sie wie R. Sacharia entscheiden.⁶² Ferner wird im Babli erzählt:

„Der Patriarch Juda II. begegnete dem Rabbi Janai und richtete an ihn folgende Frage: Woher wissen wir, daß in bezug auf die Güter der Mutter der Sohn den Vorzug hat vor der Tochter? R. Janai antwortete: Es heißt in der Thora (Num. 36, 8) „von den Stämmen“, damit ist der Stamm der Mutter dem Stamm des Vaters gleichgestellt; wie nun beim Stamme des Vaters der Sohn den Vorzug hat vor der Tochter, ebenso beim Stamme der Mutter hat der Sohn den Vorzug vor der Tochter. Darauf Jehuda II.: Demnach müßte der Erstgeborene auch bei den Gütern der Mutter einen Anspruch auf einen Doppelanteil haben. Anstatt einer Antwort sagte R. Janai zu seinem Begleiter: Weg von hier, dieser Mann da will keine Belehrung annehmen.“⁶³

⁶⁰ B. Bathra III a.

⁶¹ B. Bathra VIII, I 16a.

⁶² אחינו שבהוצאה לארץ הריגות הן והן מועין את ההלכה.

⁶³ בעא מיניה מניין לבן שקודם לבת בנכסי האם אמר ליה דבתיב (במדבר ל"ו ח') משותט מקיש
מטה האם למטה האב מה מטה האב בן קודם לבת אף מטה האם בן קודם לבת. א"ל אי מה מטה האב בכור
נוטל מי שנים אף מטה האם בכור נוטל מי שנים. אמר ליה לשמעיה נוד לית דין צבי לטילא.

Woraus erklärt sich diese Heftigkeit, Gereiztheit und Erbitterung gegen eine Rechtsanschauung, die von angesehenen Tannaiten und auch von keinem Geringeren als R. Simon ben Jochai⁶⁴ vertreten und mit einer anerkannten hermeneutischen Regel (רין) begründet wird?⁶⁵ Darauf kann es nur eine Antwort geben: Die Gleichstellung der Tochter mit dem Sohne in bezug auf Muttergüter wurde nicht ihrer selbst willen als irrige Rechtsauffassung so heftig bekämpft, sondern weil sie heterodoxer Abstammung war. Ihre heterodoxen Ahnen konnten aber nur die Sadduzäer gewesen sein. In der Tat war R. Sacharia ben ha-Qasab, der älteste Vertreter dieser Ansicht unter den Pharisäern, ein Zeitgenosse Rabbi Jochanan ben Sakkais, der den erbrechtlichen Kampf gegen die Sadduzäer ausgefochten hat.

Vom logischen und juristischen Standpunkte aus kann es aber gar keinen Unterschied geben zwischen Muttergüter und Vatergüter. Wer daher in bezug auf Materna die Tochter dem Sohne gleichgestellt, muß konsequenterweise dasselbe auch bei Paterna tun. Wenn aber R. Sacharia und die späteren pharisäischen Anhänger seiner Theorie diese Konsequenz nicht gezogen und bei Paterna den Sohn in seinem Vorzugsrecht belassen, so haben sie sich diese Inkonsequenz deshalb zuschulden kommen lassen, weil der natürliche Wortsinn von Num. 27, 8 der Tochter nur in Ermangelung eines Sohnes das Erbrecht zuerkennt. In bezug auf Materna aber, von denen in der Bibel nicht ausdrücklich die Rede ist, konnten sie der Tochter zu ihrem natürlichen Rechte verhelfen.

Die Sadduzäer hingegen haben die Gleichstellung der Tochter mit dem Sohne konsequent durchgeführt und ihr ein volles Erbrecht zugesprochen. Sie taten dies nicht so sehr aus Rücksicht auf das schwache Geschlecht, für das sie bekanntlich eine starke Schwäche zeigten, sondern vielmehr aus politischen Gründen: um sowohl den Hasmonäern wie auch später den Herodäern, die mütterlicherseits von Juda (Ex. 6, 23), bzw.

⁶⁴ Siehe oben, IV 227, Anm. 62.

⁶⁵ B. Bathra a. a. O.

den Hasmonäern stammten, einen Anspruch auf das Königtum zu sichern.⁶⁶

Wie die Sadduzäer sich mit Num. 27, 8 abgefunden, werden wir bald sehen. Wichtig ist zunächst folgende Erzählung im Jerusch. a. a. O.:

„R. Janai und R. Jochanan saßen beisammen, da kam zu ihnen der Patriarch Jehuda II. und fragte: Was bedeutet der Satz: „und jede Tochter, die ein Erbe erbt von den Stämmen“? Sie antworteten: Damit werden Mutterstamm und Vaterstamm gleichgestellt, wie beim Vaterstamme die Tochter bei Vorhandensein eines Sohnes nichts hat, ebenso beim Mutterstamme. Darauf Jehuda II.: Vielleicht umgekehrt, wie die Tochter ein Erbrecht hat neben dem Sohne beim Stamme der Mutter, so auch beim Stamme des Vaters. Darauf R. Janai: Ist jemand dort? Dieser Mann will die Worte der Thora nicht hören.“⁶⁷

Also wieder dieselbe Erbitterung und Gereiztheit, die aber hier deshalb verständlicher erscheint, weil Jehuda II. die aus der Ansicht R. Sacharias sich ergebende Konsequenz zieht und der Tochter auch bei Vatergütern neben dem Sohne ein Erbrecht zuspricht. Num. 27, 8 hat Jehuda II. sich in der Weise zurechtgelegt, wie R. Papa im Babli:⁶⁸ In Ermanglung eines Sohnes erbt die Tochter den ganzen Nachlaß, neben dem Sohne aber erhält sie die Hälfte. Daß Jehuda II. gewagt hätte, seine Theorie auch in die Tat umzusetzen, ist nicht wahrscheinlich. Wahrscheinlich aber ist es, daß er im Falle von Tochter und Sohnestochter mit seiner Theorie Ernst gemacht hat oder Ernst machen wollte. Denn nur so ist die Emphase in dem Ausspruche Rabs zu verstehen: Wer behauptet, die Tochter erbt neben der Sohnestochter, selbst wenn er ein Patriarch in Israel ist, achtet man auf ihn nicht.

⁶⁶ Aus ähnlichen Motiven haben auch judenchristliche Kreise ein Interesse für das Erbrecht der Tochter gehabt. Vgl. oben, IV 239, Anm. 107.

⁶⁷ ר' ינאי ור' יוחנן הוון יתבין עאל ר' יודן נשייא ושאל וכל בת יורשת נחלה במשותף מהו א"ל מ"קיש משה האב למשה האב, מה משה האב אין לבת במקום בן אף משה האב אין לבת במקום בן, או חילוק מה משה האב יש לבת במקום בן, אף משה האב יש לבת במקום בן. א"ל ר' (יוחנן) [ינאי] אימא מן תמן לית אהן גיברא בעי מישמע מילי דאורייתא.

⁶⁸ B. Bathra 110b oben.

In der Tat finden wir auch bei einer anderen Gelegenheit Rab in Opposition gegen Jehuda II.: Jehuda II. hat heidnisches Öl zum Genusse freigegeben. Rab aber hielt das Verbot aufrecht, worauf Samuel zu ihm sagte: Iß, wenn nicht, werde ich dich als einen widerspenstigen Gelehrten (זקן ממרא) bezeichnen.⁶⁹ Diese halachisch ganz und gar ungerechtfertigte Bezeichnung⁷⁰ kann nur daraus erklärt werden, daß Samuel gewußt hatte, Rab enthalte sich nur aus Protest gegen Jehuda II. des Genusses heidnischen Öls.

Wir haben nun gesehen, daß Jehuda II. bestrebt war, die Frau in bezug auf das Erbrecht dem Manne gleichzustellen, so hatte er zweifellos auch der Mutter dasselbe Erbrecht zugesprochen wie dem Vater.⁷¹ Wir haben auch gesehen, daß diese seine Stellungnahme für die Frau Gegenstand heftigen Protestes war. Vielleicht nun läßt sich daraus folgende merkwürdige Erzählung verstehen:

„Jose aus Maon machte in einer Predigt einen heftigen Ausfall gegen Jehuda II., der darüber in Zorn geriet, vor dem der Prediger flüchtete. Durch die Vermittlung des R. Simon ben Lakisch ließ sich Jehuda II. besänftigen und den Prediger zu sich kommen, um sich zu überzeugen, ob er thorakundig sei und Belehrung annehme. Er richtete an ihn folgende Frage: Was bedeutet der Bibelvers (Ez. 16, 44): Fürwahr, jeder Spottversdichter wird den Spruch auf dich anwenden: ‚Wie die Mutter so die Tochter‘. Der Prediger antwortete: Wie die Mutter so die Tochter, wie das Geschlecht so der Patriarch, wie der Altar so die Priester.“⁷²

Es ist nun merkwürdig, daß Jehuda II. gerade diesen Bibelvers gewählt; es gibt in der Bibel viel schwierigere Stellen, deren Erklärung ein besseres Zeugnis für die Kenntnisse und

⁶⁹ זקן ממרא. Ab. Sarah II, 9 41 d.

⁷⁰ Vgl. Synhed. 86 b f.

⁷¹ Vgl. oben, IV 226, Anm. 59.

⁷² Gen. r. LXXX, 1; Jerusch. Synhed. II Ende 20 d, wo ausdrücklich Juda II. genannt wird. (Im Jeruschalmi fragt der Patriarch zuerst um die Bedeutung von Hosea 2, 7. Aber wie aus Gen. r. und Ruth r. I, 2 hervorgeht, sind die beiden Fragen nicht bei einer und derselben Gelegenheit und auch nicht an eine und dieselbe Person gerichtet worden. Der Jeruschalmi-text ist überdies äußerst verworren).

den Scharfsinn des Erklärers wäre; warum hat also Jehuda II. gerade diesen Vers hervorgesucht? Aber als der Patriarch von dem Inhalte der Predigt Joses erfahren und dadurch erkannt hatte, daß er zu seinen Gegnern gehörte, wollte er auch wissen, wie er und seine Kreise über seine (des Patriarchen) Stellungnahme in der Frage des Erbrechtes von Tochter und Mutter denken, daher wählte er den Vers Ez. 16, 44, der sich am besten dazu eignete, dem Prediger Gelegenheit zu geben, sich über das Erbrecht von Mutter und Tochter zu äußern.

Der Prediger hat entweder den Wink nicht verstanden oder wollte auf das Thema, das auch halachische Kenntnisse und Schlagfertigkeit erfordert, nicht eingehen. So ist der Patriarch nicht auf seine Rechnung gekommen, aber er hat aus der allgemein gehaltenen Antwort Joses genug erfahren, mehr als ihm lieb war.⁷³

Es ist wohl auch möglich, daß die Gegner des Patriarchen seinen Standpunkt im Erbrecht — eine Begünstigung von Mutter und Tochter und Beeinträchtigung der Männer — damit verspotteten, daß sie ihn durch den Ezechiel-Vers zum Ausdruck brachten: „Fürwahr, jeder Spottversdichter wird den Spruch auf dich anwenden: wie die Mutter so die Tochter.“ „Eine echte Tochter deiner Mutter bist du, die ihres Mannes und ihrer Söhne überdrüssig ward.“

Die oben erwähnte Deutung von Num. 27, 8 wird im Jerusch. a. a. O. als Ansicht der Gelehrten der Völker angeführt, zugleich mit der Widerlegung, die sie seitens jüdischer Gelehrter erfahren. Wer sind diese Gelehrten der Völker?

J. T., Z f h B IX 135, bespricht Megillath Ta'anith c. 5 mit der richtigen Erkenntnis, daß dort zwei Versionen zur Erklärung von תבוא לרינא zusammengefloßen sind. Die eine Version bezieht dies auf die griechische Zeit und lautet: בימי מלכות יון היו דנין ברניי נכרים וכשנברה יד בית חשמונאי ובטלום היו דנין ברניי ישראל ואותו יום שבטלום עשאוהו יום טוב. Die zweite (jüngere) Version bezieht den Gedenktag auf einen Sieg über die Sadduzäer

⁷³ Daraus erklärt sich auch die merkwürdige Erkundigung, die der Patriarch über den Prediger aus Maon eingezogen hat: Ob er Belehrung annimmt. Es ist dies eine ironisch-bittere Anspielung auf die von R. Janai in bezug auf den Patriarchen gebrauchte Phrase, dieser Mann nimmt keine Belehrung an: לית דין צבי למילי.

zur Zeit R. Jochanan b. Sakkais. Diese Version ist im babylonischen Talmud B. Bathra 115 b angeführt. Er setzt dann fort: „Daß die *דיני נכרים* der ersten Version von der sadduzäischen Ansicht verschieden sind, beweist Jerusch. B. Bathra VIII, 1, wo zuerst die Ansicht der *חכמי נזירים*, dann die der *צדוקים* widerlegt wird.“ Also sind die *נכרים* in Megillath Ta'anith identisch mit den *נזירים* im Jeruschalmi, demnach hätten die griechischen Juristen des Antiochus Epiphanes ihre Rechtssätze aus der Bibel abgeleitet und mit Juden darüber disputiert. Dies klingt nicht sehr wahrscheinlich.

Wreschner⁷⁴ versteht unter den Gelehrten der Völker die Samaritaner. Dagegen sprechen folgende Tatsachen: Erstens werden die Samaritaner im Talmud nicht als *נזירים* bezeichnet, zweitens sprechen die Samaritaner, wie Wreschner selbst S. 40 feststellt, der Tochter nur ein Teilerbrecht zu.

Revel⁷⁵ verweist auf Sabbath 116 b. Dies ist ein Irrtum. Erstens handelt es sich in dieser Stelle in Sabbath um Judenchristen, die im Talmud *מינים* und nicht *נזירים* genannt werden. Zweitens sagt dort der judenchristliche Richter, daß das mosaische Gesetz, welches die Tochter vom Erbrecht ausschließt, durch das Evangelium aufgehoben wurde, das der Tochter ein gleiches Erbrecht wie dem Sohne zuspricht. Die Gelehrten der Völker im Jeruschalmi dagegen berufen sich für ihre Rechtsanschauung auf Num. 27, 8.

Es bleibt daher nichts anderes übrig, als unter den Gelehrten der Völker syrische Christen zu verstehen, die ihre Deutung der fraglichen Numeristelle bei ihrer jüdischen Umgebung kennengelernt haben.⁷⁶ So erfahren wir von den Gelehrten der Völker, daß ihre Ansicht bei den Juden verbreitet war.

EXKURS VI. ENDOGAMIE.

1. Abraham, Isaak und Jakob heirateten in ihrer Familie.⁷⁷
2. Num. 36, 6—9: „Das ist, was Gott in betreff der Töchter Zelaphchads befohlen hat: Sie mögen sich verheiraten,

⁷⁴ Samaritanische Traditionen S. 39.

⁷⁵ JQR NS III, 340 Anm.

⁷⁶ Vgl. Aptowitzer, JQR XIX, 609.

⁷⁷ Gen. 20, 12; 24, 4; 28, 2.

mit wem es ihnen gefällt; nur müssen sie einen Angehörigen ihres väterlichen Stammes heiraten, damit nicht israelitischer Erbbesitz von einem Stamme zum anderen übergehe; vielmehr sollen sämtliche Israeliten an dem Erbbesitz ihres väterlichen Stammes festhalten. Und alle Mädchen, die in einem der israelitischen Stämme zu Erbbesitz gelangen, müssen einen Angehörigen ihres väterlichen Stammes heiraten, damit sämtliche Israeliten den väterlichen Erbbesitz behaupten und nicht Erbbesitz von einem Stamme zum anderen übergehe; vielmehr sollen sämtliche israelitischen Stämme an ihrem Erbbesitze festhalten.“

3. Mit der Endogamie hängt wohl die Vorschrift zusammen, daß der Hohepriester nur eine Jungfrau aus seinem Stamme zur Frau nehmen darf.⁷⁸ Die Bedeutung מעמיו — aus seinem Stamme — hat Geiger⁷⁹ genügend nachgewiesen. Hinzuzufügen ist noch folgendes:

Es könnte gegen die Bedeutung מעמיו aus seinem Stamme eine wichtige Instanz angeführt werden, nämlich die Übersetzung der LXX ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ. Aber dieser Einwand ist nicht allzu mächtig, denn nicht bloß Kodex A, sondern auch andere wichtige Kodizes bei Field⁸⁰ lesen ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ. Diese Lesart wird auch von Philo bestätigt und noch mehr von der LXX selbst, die auch in Vers 13 ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ liest. Der Zusatz erklärt sich aus der Methode der LXX, die Bibeltexte zu parallelisieren. Diese Erklärung ist viel natürlicher als die Annahme Frankels,⁸¹ die Worte ἐκ τοῦ γένους in Vers 13 seien nichts weiter als eine Randglosse zu Vers 14, „die aber in den Text kam und dann herauf zu Vers 13 gezogen wurde“. Auf Philo verweist auch Ritter:⁸² „Aus Philo dürfte wohl zu schließen sein, daß die eigentliche Übersetzung der LXX für מעמיו (Vers 14) ἐκ τοῦ γένους (Stamm?) war und gerade ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ ein durch die palästinische Halacha entstandenes Glossem ist.“ Wie er aber unmittelbar vorher

⁷⁸ Lev. 21, 14 כִּי אִם בְּתוּלָה מֵעַמּוֹ יִקַּח אִשָּׁה.

⁷⁹ *He-Chaluz* V, 73—75 קְבוּצַת מַאמְרִים ed. Poznański, S. 131 ff.).

⁸⁰ Hexapla I, 203 b Anm. 17.

⁸¹ *Einfluß* S. 160.

⁸² *Philo und die Halacha* S. 73.

meinen kann, „man muß entschieden Frankel beistimmen“, ist mir ein Rätsel.

L. Ginzberg, in seinen Bemerkungen zu קבוצת מאמרים ed. Poznański S. 405, erklärt die Übersetzung der LXX folgendermaßen: Da die LXX auch in Vers 13 מעמיו gelesen hat, so hat sie, um nicht das Wort beidemal gleich zu übersetzen, מעמיו in Vers 13 mit „aus seinem Stamme“ und in Vers 14 mit „aus seinem Volke“ wiedergegeben.⁸³

Aber es dürfte schwerfallen, eine solche Vorliebe für Abwechslung in der LXX nachzuweisen; vielmehr ist das Streben der LXX nach Harmonisierung bekannt. Man würde diese Abwechslung noch begreifen, wenn durch sie ein Fortschritt erzielt wäre, wenn sie nämlich zuerst „aus seinem Volke“ und dann als nähere Bestimmung „aus seinem Stamme“ geboten hätte. So wie der LXX-Text uns vorliegt, macht er die Erklärung Ginzbergs unmöglich.

Freilich heißt es Ezechiel 44, 22: Sie dürfen sich keine Witwe oder Verstoßene zum Weibe nehmen, sondern nur Jungfrauen vom Samen des Hauses Israel. Aber Ezechiel weicht ja jedenfalls von Leviticus ab, da er in der Fortsetzung sagt: „Eine solche Witwe jedoch, die von einem Priester als Witwe hinterlassen ward, dürfen sie heiraten.“ Dies ist entweder gegen die Vorschrift des Leviticus, wenn er an den Hohepriester denkt, oder geht über den Leviticus hinaus, wenn vom einfachen Priester die Rede ist. Die halachische Umdeutung der Ezechielstelle ist in diesem Falle nicht ausschlaggebend.

Wie Josephus מעמיו auffaßt, kann nicht festgestellt werden, da er in der betreffenden Bestimmung das Wort gar nicht wiedergibt. Er sagt bloß, der Hohepriester muß eine Jungfrau heiraten und muß diese behalten καὶ ταύτην φυλάττειν. Zwar wollen manche, die dem φυλάττειν keinen Sinn abgewinnen können, es in φυλέτην ändern, aber abgesehen von der sprachlichen Schwierigkeit und davon, daß diese Lesart von keinem Kodex bestätigt wird, ist Ginzbergs Erklärung des

⁸³ אין ספק שפילון יסד דבריו על השבעים שהם קראו בויקרא כ"א ו"ג אשה בבתוליה מעמיו יקה, וכאשר היה קשה להם למה שנה הכתוב מעמיו שתי פעמים תרגמו מעמיו הראשון משבטו ועמיו השני תרגמו עמו ממש.

φυλάττειν aus der Halacha, daß der Hohepriester nicht unverheiratet sein darf, sehr wahrscheinlich.⁸⁴

Besonders großes Gewicht auf die Endogamie wird im Buche Tobit gelegt:

„Und als ich ein Mann geworden, nahm ich Anna aus unserem väterlichen Geschlechte zum Weibe und zeugte mit ihr den Tobias (1, 9). Hüte dich, Kind, vor aller Unkeuschheit — und vor allem: nimm ein Weib aus dem Geschlechte deines Vaters. Nimm kein fremdes Weib, welches nicht aus dem Stamme deines Vaters ist; denn wir sind Nachkommen von Propheten: Noah, Abraham, Isaak und Jakob. Unserer Väter vor Alters gedenke, mein Kind, daß diese alle Weiber nahmen von ihren Brüdern und gesegnet wurden in ihren Kindern, und ihr Geschlecht wird das Land besitzen (4, 12). Als sie sich aber Rages näherten, sprach der Engel zu dem Jüngling: Bruder, heute werden wir bei Raguel übernachten. Er ist dein Verwandter und hat einzig eine Tochter mit Namen Sara. Ich werde ihretwegen mit ihm sprechen, daß sie dir zur Frau gegeben werde. Denn dir kommt ihr Erbe zu, weil du allein aus ihrem Geschlechte bist. Und das Mädchen ist schön und klug (6, 10—13). Da besprach er die Sache mit Raguel, und Raguel sprach zu Tobias: Iß und trink und laß dir's wohl sein, denn dir gebührt es, mein Kind zu nehmen.... Doch jetzt laß dir's wohl sein. Tobias aber sprach: Ich genieße nichts, bis ihr sie mir feierlich zugeführt habt. Da sprach Raguel: So nimm sie hin von nun an nach dem Gesetze. Du bist ihr Bruder und sie gehört dir. Der barmherzige Gott geleite euch aufs beste (7, 10—11). Sodann rief Raguel sein Weib Edna und sprach zu ihr: Schwester, richte das andere Gemach und führe sie hinein (7, 15).“

Das Gesetz, an das Raguel denkt, kann nur Num. 36, 6—9 gemeint sein.

4. An diese Bibelstelle denkt auch Philo:

„Die vorgesetzte Behörde soll sich um die Behütung der hinterbliebenen Mädchen kümmern und wenn sie herangewachsen sind, um passende Verheiratung, indem sie unter

⁸⁴ Vgl. Ritter a. a. O., Ginzberg a. a. O. S. 406.

Männern von unbestrittenem Ansehen die besten auswählt. In erster Reihe sollen V e r w a n d t e (ausersehen werden); finden sich solche nicht, dann auf jeden Fall Angehörige desselben Geschlechtes und desselben Stammes, damit die Mitgiftgüter nicht durch Verschwägerung in den Besitz eines anderen Stammes übergehen, sondern bei den Losen bleiben, die zu Anfang unter die Stämme verteilt wurden.“⁸⁵

Zu „Verwandte“ bemerkt Heinemann: „Das ist 4. Mos. 36, 6 nicht vorgeschrieben; Philo scheint der Meinung zu sein, daß auf alle erbfähigen Töchter Bestimmungen, wie sie für die Erbtöchter in Griechenland galten, wenn auch nicht in voller Schärfe, anzuwenden seien.“ Wahrscheinlicher aber ist es, daß Philo an Num. 36, 10 denkt: „Wie Gott Moses befohlen hatte, so taten die Töchter Zelopphads, indem Mahla, Thirza, Hogla, Milka und Noa, die Töchter Zelopphads, die Söhne ihrer Oheime heirateten. Mit Männern aus den Geschlechtern der Söhne Manasses, des Sohnes Josephs, verheirateten sie sich, so daß ihr Erbbesitz bei dem Stamme verblieb, zu dem das Geschlecht ihres Vaters gehörte.“ Philo verstand die Stelle so, daß das Gebot Gottes an Mose in erster Reihe an Verwandte dachte. So verstand ja auch der Verfasser des Buches Tobit.

5. „Es war ein altes Gesetz in Israel, daß kein Erbbesitz von einem Stamm zu dem anderen übergehen durfte, daher konnte kein Mann eine Frau heiraten, die nicht seine Stammesgenossin war. Folgte aber eine Frau aus Neigung einem Manne, der nicht aus ihrem Stamme war, so verließ sie ihr Vaterhaus ohne Erbteil, und die Leute nannten sie Gastwirtin, weil sie einen Mann liebte, der nicht zu ihrem Stamme gehörte.“⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Philo, *De spec. leg.* II, 16. Cohn V, 116 § 125 f. Deutsch von Heinemann in *Schriften der jüdisch-hellenistischen Literatur* II, 141.

⁸⁶ גיטוסא הוה בישראל מלקדמין דלא מיסתחרא אחסנתא משבטא לשבטא ובכח לא הוה יביל לא גברא למיסב איתתא דלא משבטא וכד הוה איתתא דרחמא גברא דלא משבטא הוה נפקא מבי נשא בלא גברא דלא משבטא והוה אנשי קרן לה סונדקיתא דרחיטא גברא דלא משבטא. Zusatzargum zu Richter 11, 1 bei Kimchi z. St. Vgl. betreffs des Verzichtes auf die Erbschaft Josephus, *Antiq.* IV, 7, 5 und Ginzberg in seinen Bemerkungen zu קבוצת באריות ed. Poznański S. 405.

6. Der vom Targum mitgeteilte alte Brauch des Verbotes der Ehe von Stamm zu Stamm wird auch im Talmud als bekannt vorausgesetzt. Es wird nämlich das in der Mischna Ta'anith IV, 8 erwähnte Volksfest am 15. Ab dahin erklärt, daß zu einer gewissen Zeit das Connubium zwischen den einzelnen Stämmen freigegeben wurde.⁸⁷

7. Aber auch in viel späterer Zeit finden wir, daß Heiraten außerhalb der Familie unbeliebt waren. So wird gesagt, daß sowohl bei Heiraten zwischen einer Ahronidin mit einem Nicht-ahroniden wie auch umgekehrt zwischen einer Nichtahronidin mit einem Ahroniden der in Priesterfamilien übliche Betrag der Kethuba nicht eingehoben werden kann. „Es ist eine Strafe, damit jeder sich an seinen Stamm und an seine Familie anschließe.“⁸⁸

Ferner heißt es in der Mischna Kidd. IV, 4: Wenn jemand (ein Priester) eine Priestertochter heiratet, muß er ihre Stammesreinheit in weiblicher Linie vier Grade aufwärts prüfen. Heiraten aber Leviten oder Israeliten eine Priesterin, müssen sie noch einen Grad höher hinauf die Stammesreinheit prüfen. Dazu im Jeruschalmi 66 a die Frage: Forderst du da nicht bei Israeliten eine strengere Stammesreinheit als bei Priestern? Jawohl, es ist eine Strafe, damit jeder sich an seinen Stamm und seine Familie anschließe.⁸⁹

So nach dem Text des Jeruschalmi. Nach der Mischna im Babli (76 a) und in den Mischnaausgaben handelt es sich im zweiten Absatz um einen Priester, der eine Levitin oder eine Israelitin heiratet, was Ginzberg a. a. O. dazu brachte, irrtümlich auch den Ausspruch des Jeruschalmi in diesem Sinne zu verstehen. Der Ausspruch *אחת זו ואחת זו* in Jerusch. Kidduschin ist eine assoziative Angleichung an Jerusch. Kethuboth. In beiden Stellen ist der Autor des Ausspruches R. Jose b. Bun im 4. Jahrhundert.

⁸⁷ יום שהותרו השבטים לבא זה בזה Ta'anith 29b; Baba Bathra 121a; Jerusch. Ta'anith 69c; Threni r. Proömium 33.

⁸⁸ קנס קנסו בהן כדי שיהא אדם מידבק בשבטו ובמשפחתו Jerusch. Kethuboth I, 5 25c.

⁸⁹ לויים וישראלים מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחת, ולא נמצאת מחמיר בישראל יותר מן הכהנים. א"ר יוסי בי ר' בון אחת זו ואחת זו קנסו הכנים כדי שיהא אדם דבק בשבטו ובמשפחתו.

8. Von besonderer Wichtigkeit ist folgende Baraita:

„Du sollst deine Tochter nicht entweihen (Lev. 19, 29). Da hätte ich daraus entnehmen können, daß ein Priester seine Tochter nicht an einen Leviten oder Israeliten verheiraten darf, daher heißt es: ‚indem du sie der Buhlerei zuführst‘ (Lev. das.), es ist bloß von einer Entweihung durch Buhlerei die Rede.“⁹⁰

Also ohne ausdrückliche Angabe der Thora wäre eine Heirat zwischen einer Ahronidin und einem Nichtahroniden verboten! In diesem Sinne heißt es an einer anderen Stelle, daß das Hochzeitsmahl bei einer Heirat zwischen einer Ahronidin mit einem Nichtahroniden keine *סעודה של מצוה* ist und ein Gelehrter daran nicht teilnehmen darf. Eine solche Verbindung führt zu keinem guten Ende: entweder frühzeitiger Tod oder Armut stellt sich ein.⁹¹

NACHTRÄGE

Annual IV I. Bibel. — Die beiden Söhne der Rizpa, der Tochter Ajas: II Sam. 21, 8.

S. 212 Anm. 20. Absalom Sohn einer Kriegsgefangenen. — Auch Synhed. 107a.

S. 229 Nr. 3. Rechabiten. — Vgl. Midr. Abchir in Jal. Ex. § 169 (= Bubers *Likkutim* S. 15 Nr. 34): Jethro wird mit Rücksicht darauf als Priester bezeichnet, daß dereinst von seinen Töchtern Hohenpriester abstammen werden. Vielleicht aber wird hier an Pinchas gedacht, der mütterlicherseits von Jethro abstammte. Vgl. dazu Aptowitzer, *Parteilpolitik der Hasmonäerzeit* S. 27 f.

S. 233 ff. Nichtenehe. — Daß die Empfehlung der Nichtenehe eine Demonstration gegen die diese Ehe verbotenden Samaritaner war, schon bei Reifmann, *Bet Talmud* I, 78; Büchler, *Haẓofeh* X, 42 scheint sich der Ansicht Reifmanns anzuschließen. Dagegen Krauss, *Studies in Jewish literature issued in honor of Professor Kaufmann Kohler* S. 171 zitiert für diese Ansicht Ginzberg und bemerkt gegen sie: „Ich kann es auch nicht als Erklärung ansehen, daß die Pharisäer die fragliche Ehe aus bloßer Opposition gegen die Gegenpartei erlaubt hätten.“ In der Tat ein gewichtiger Einwand. Meine Erklärung, daß die Nichtenehe ein Überbleibsel der Verwandtenehe ist, finde ich in anderer Formulierung bei Krauss, a. a. O. S. 172.

S. 238 Nr. 12. Rabbi Zaddok Priester und mütterlicherseits von Benjamin. — In manchen rabbinischen Quellen wird der Patriarch Jehuda I. als Nachkomme des Hauses David bezeichnet. Sab. 56b; Keth. 62b.

⁹⁰ אל תחלל את בתך להונותה יכול לא יתננה ללוי לא יתננה לישראל, ח"ל להונותה, לא אסרתי
ונות. אלא חילול שהוא לשם זנות. Sifra קדושים, Perek VII, 1; Synhed. 76a.

⁹¹ Pes. 48a.

In anderen Quellen dagegen gibt der Patriarch seine Genealogie an: Von Benjamin und von den weiblichen Angehörigen des Hauses David. Jerusch. Kilajim IX, 3, 32b; Keth. XII, 3, 35a; Gen. r. XXXIII, 3. Vgl. noch Theodor zu Gen. r., S. 305f. Über diesen Widerspruch wurde schon R. Hai Gaon befragt. Er antwortete, daß in der Tat die beiden Talmude darüber auseinandergehen und daß für uns die Angabe des babylonischen Talmuds die ausschlaggebende ist: der Patriarch stammte wirklich von David ab. *Resp. der Geonim* ed. Harkavy Nr. 349 S. 176. Nachdem wir aber solch starke Reminiszenzen an das Matriarchat auch in talmudischen Quellen haben, ist die Annahme einer Verschiedenheit der Traditionen über die Abstammung des Patriarchen nicht notwendig: der babylonische Talmud denkt an die Abstammung mütterlicherseits. So schon M. Kunitzer, *המחקר* II Nr. 147.

Über die Angabe des zweiten Makkabäerbuches, daß Menelaos aus Benjamin stammte, vgl. ausführlich Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik der Hasmonäerzeit* S. 317. Vielleicht ist an die benjaminitische Abstammung des Menelaos mütterlicherseits zu denken wie bei R. Zaddok.

S. 239 Anm. 107. — Vgl. Nachmani, *ספר ויכוח הרמב"ן* ed. Steinschneider S. 18: Vom heiligen Geiste gezeugt, wäre er kein Sprößling Isais, und selbst vom Schoße eines Weibes aus dessen Nachkommenschaft geboren, würde er am Königtume kein Erbrecht haben, weil Töchter und deren Söhne, wo männliche Erben vorhanden sind, nach dem Gesetz nicht erben können und David allezeit männliche Nachkommen hatte (Poznański, *Schiloh* S. 209, XLVII).

Annual V Exkurs I C. Lev. 18, 21 in der Deutung R. Ismaels und des Jubiläenbuches. — Vgl. dazu Synhed. 82a: Wer mit einer Heidin verkehrt, der verschwärt sich gleichsam mit den Götzen.

Exkurs IV Kaufehe. Einer der Söhne Moses sollte dem Jethro hören. — Die Agada auch bei Ephraem zu Ex. IV mit der Variante, daß Zippora es war, die das eine Kind nicht beschneiden ließ. Vgl. Ginzberg, *Livre d'Hommage à la mémoire du Dr Samuel Poznański* S. 204.

Exkurs V Erbrecht der Tochter bei den Sadduzäern. — Zipser, *Ben Chananja* 1867, S. 168: „Gegen die Usurpation des Herodes jedoch, als noch männliche Nachkommen der Hasmonäer vorhanden waren, scheint R. Joch. ben Sakkai in seiner Polemik mit jenem Sadduzäer, welcher behaupten wollte *חורש הבת עם הבן* (B. Bathra 115), energisch aufgetreten zu sein. Besagter Sadduzäer wäre ein Verfechter der herodischen Erbrechte gewesen. Daß aber von Seite der Sadduzäer die Erbschaft den Töchtern auch gegen Söhne zugesprochen wurde, ist aus Sabbath 116b zu ersehen.“

Was den Disput R. Jochanans mit den Sadduzäern betrifft, so hat den politischen Hintergrund desselben schon Geiger erkannt. *Urschrift* S. 143f. Ausführlicher in *Ozar Nechmad* III 1860, wiederabgedruckt in *Kebuzath Ma'amarim* ed. Poznański S. 92f. Was aber die Stelle Sab. 116b betrifft, so ist Zipsers Bemerkung ein unbegreifliches Mißverständnis, da dort von Sadduzäern keine Spur vorhanden ist.

Exkurs VI Endogamie. — Vgl. noch zum Thema Judith VIII, 1—2; Krauss, *Studies in Jewish literature issued in honor of Professor Kaufmann Kohler* S. 172 und die Literatur in Anm. 2; Büchler, *Hazofeh* X, 42.

IV 210f. Anm. 11 Das Zitat Kimchis. — Pes. r. XXII (ed. Friedmann 111b): אל האמן בנר עד עשרים ושתיים דורות. Ebenso Or Zarua I N. 531 aus Jelaḡdenu (= Pes. r.). Aber Jal. Ruth § 601 aus Mid. Ruth (fehlt in unseren Texten) עד עשרים וארבעה דורות. Ebenso in einem Genizahfragment in בני שבט III ed. Davidson S. 223: ברוכים רבותינו שאמרו אל האמן בנר עד ארבעה ועשרים דורות: zu Pes. r. und Davidson a. a. O.

IV 220 „Die Söhne Rahels und Leas, die die Adoption der Sklavinnen nicht anerkannten und diese für Sklaven hielten, mußten konsequenterweise auch die Söhne Josefs von der Ägypterin Aseneth als Fremde ansehen, die nicht, zur Familie Jakobs gehören. Daher mußte Jakob die Söhne Josefs adoptieren, sie zu seinen Kindern machen.“ — Herr Dr. H. J. Zimmels macht mich auf folgende Bemerkung des berühmten R. Abigedor b. Eliah ha-Kohen aus Wien (13. Jahrh.) in Cod. Uff. 235 der Hamburger Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek f. 139^b aufmerksam: ויקרא שמו בישראל (רות ד' י"ד) מי שיתחתנו עמו ועם זרעו וכן ויקרא בהם שמי ושם אבותי (בראשית ט"ז ט"ז) לפי שכל בני יעקב בחרו להן צרפניות בנות נישואין לנשים ולא רצו להתחתן בבני יוסף שילדה לו אסני בת מוטיסרע לכי הוצרך יעקב לוטר ויקרא בהם שמי שיעבדו לאלהי ושיהיו כל כך חשובי בני יוסף כשאר בני יעקב.

IV 235 unt. Erbllichkeit der Berufe. Ausspruch der Agada: man soll nicht den Beruf seines Vaters lassen. — Dieser Brauch und diese Anschauung bei den Persern; als Theorie bei den lautern Brüdern:

„Die Kunst der Väter und Ahnen verleiht der der Kinder große Vollendung, besonders wenn auch ihre Geburtsstunde darauf hinweist. Deswegen ward in der Herrschaft Ardaschir Babagans einer jeden Stufe der Menschen bestimmt, daß sie notwendig die Kunst ihrer Väter und Ahnen treiben und sie von derselben nicht abweichen sollte. Man meinte, dies gehöre zu den Bestimmungen Gottes nach dem Buche Zaraduschts.“ Dieterici, *Logik und Psychologie der Araber* S. 98.

V 262. — Graetz beweist aus der Tatsache, daß auch der Hohepriester eine fremdnationale Frau geheiratet hat, daß solche Mischehen auch nach dem Gesetze der Thora für erlaubt galten, was nur möglich war, wenn diese Frauen Proselytinnen waren. Er hat aber übersehen, daß der Hohepriester auch nach dem Gesetze der Thora eine Proselytin nicht heiraten darf (vgl. Exkurs VI S. 290f.); nach der Halacha darf es auch nicht ein einfacher Priester, was er aus der von ihm angeführten Mischna Kidd. IV 1 hätte ersehen können.

V 270 Absatz 2 „Von diesen zehn Völkern“. — In dem angeführten Vers Esra 9, 1 werden wohl bloß acht Völker genannt, aus Neh. 2, 10 und 13, 28 und 13, 23 erfahren wir, daß auch Verschwägerungen mit den Völkern Chori und Asdod stattgefunden haben.

V 276 „Hasmonäer und andere usw.“. — Betreffend die Hasmonäer vgl. Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik der Hasmonäerzeit* S. 95; die anderen sind Sadduzäer und Judenchristen, vgl. hier S. 286 und Anm. 66.

V 271 Mitte. Kampf um die Zulässigkeit des Connubiums mit moabitischen Proselytinnen. — Vgl. Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik* Kap. IV S. 31—48, besonders S. 38.

V 291 Ez. 44, 22. — Ausführlich darüber, *Parteipolitik* S. XXIII.

THE JEWISH CATACOMBS AND INSCRIPTIONS OF ROME: AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR DISCOVERY AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY

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THE existence of Jewish catacombs at Rome was entirely unknown until the year 1602, when, on December 14th, Antonio Bosio, the celebrated explorer of the Christian catacombs, found a cemetery which he identified as being of Jewish origin.¹ It was in a vineyard on the Via Portuense about a mile outside the Porta Portese on the hill called Rosato in the district of Monteverde. I shall quote from Bosio's own account, which, though often referred to, is not easily accessible. After describing how, in company with the Marchese Giovanni Pietro Caffarelli and Giovanni Zaratino Castellini, he explored the vineyards and regions about the Via Portuensis, he goes on: "On Saturday, Dec. 14, 1602, issuing from the aforementioned gate (Porta Portese), we entered the first branch road at the right, and ascending the Colle Rosato, we came into a vineyard, which was formerly the property of Bishop Ruffino, but was at this time owned by the children of Muzio Vitozzi. At the extremity of this vineyard, which faces the Tiber, we found a narrow opening to a cave, difficult and dangerous to negotiate, situated in a precipitous cliff, below which lies a valley, where there are large tufa quarries beneath the cemetery. Making our way through this opening with bodies bent, we entered the catacomb. It is excavated in the tufa (in some parts exceedingly unfirm) and is of moderate extent. Still, in the two hours that we remained there we apparently traversed it all. We noticed however that there were other entrances and galleries, choked with earth, which may possibly extend considerably further. This cemetery is similar in construction to the others, with its tombs cut in the walls, and in some spots

¹ Bosio, *Roma Sotterranea*, Rome 1632, 141 ff. In the second edition (1650), which is less rare, see pp. 186-192.

containing trenches and sepulchres excavated in the pavement. We did however observe one feature in which it differs from the other catacombs: the tombs are, for the most part, closed not with tiles and slabs of marble, but with bricks covered with stucco, on which the epitaphs were in nearly every case painted in red letters. Some of the inscriptions were even cut into the stucco, and of these we found a good number. The inscriptions were all in Greek and in a fragmentary condition, for the tombs had been opened by inquisitive and greedy excavators, who had destroyed portions of the bricks and stucco which had borne the inscriptions. Consequently no complete sense can be derived from them, for there survive only the first words, which are practically always the same, as follows: ἐνθάδε κίτε ἐν εἰρήνῃ. On one tomb there was still entirely visible in red letters the name ΑΣΑΠΙΚΗ. The cemetery, which is very crudely constructed, contains only two private chambers (*cubicoli*), and even these are very small and mean, as is, in fact, the entire cemetery; for therein one can see not a fragment of marble nor a sign of painting, except that on nearly every sepulchre there is painted in red or imprinted in the stucco the seven-branched candlestick. We found there many lamps of terra cotta, crudely made and practically all broken. One only was intact and bore the figure of the aforementioned candlestick. From the fact that we found in this cemetery no sign of Christianity, and we read on the fragment of one inscription the brief word ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓ, and from other details mentioned above, we decided that this was the particular cemetery of the ancient Hebrews.”² Bosio’s great work, *Roma Sotterranea*, was published in 1632, three years after the author’s death, by Giovanni Severani.³ This first folio edition was followed in 1650 by a second quarto edition with far fewer plates. Soon afterward there appeared a shabbily written

² *Op. cit.*, 142 f. The passage is quoted by Kirchhoff in *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, IV, 587. Kirchhoff quotes also Castellini’s brief description from a MS at Verona.

³ It actually appeared in 1634. See H. Leclercq, *Manuel d’archéologie chrétienne*, Paris 1907, I, 35.

Latin version by Paolo Aringhi, who made many additions of his own.⁴

In the course of the century which followed ten Jewish inscriptions were found at Rome. It was believed, without adequate proof, that they all came from the catacomb on the Via Portuense, the only Jewish catacomb known at that time. These inscriptions, eight of which are in Greek and two in Latin,⁵ were published in part—to cite only the earliest works—by Spon in 1685,⁶ Fabretti in 1699,⁷ Doni in 1731,⁸ Lupi in 1734,⁹ Muratori in 1739,¹⁰ Marangoni in 1740,¹¹ Venuti in 1748,¹² and Corsini in 1749.¹³ These

⁴ *Roma subterranea novissima*, Rome 1651. On the Jews and their catacomb see vol. I, 390-402.

⁵ *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (CIG) 6337, 9904, 9906, 9907, 9908, 9920, 9921, 9923; *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (CIL) VI. 29756, 29757. Of these, CIG 9907 and CIL VI. 29757 most probably came from the Monteverde catacomb, since they mention, respectively, the synagogues of the *Agrippenses* and the *Augustenses*, the members of which used this catacomb.

⁶ Jacob Spon, *Miscellanea eruditae antiquitatis*, Lyons 1685, p. 371, Nos. 118-120 (= CIG 9906, 9907, CIL VI. 29756).

⁷ Raphael Fabretti, *Inscriptionum antiquarum quae in aedibus paternis asservantur explicatio et supplementum*, Rome 1699, p. 389, Nos. 246-248 (= CIG 9907, 9923, 9906); p. 465, No. 101 (= CIL VI. 29756).

⁸ J. B. Doni, *Inscriptiones antiquae cum notis*, Florence 1731, p. 528, No. 22 (= CIG 9921); a posthumous work, edited by A. Gori.

⁹ Antonio Lupi, *Dissertatio et animadversiones ad nuper inventum S. Severae Martyris epitaphium*, Palermo 1734, p. 51, pl. VIII [misprint for VII] (= CIG 9908, 9906), p. 140 (= CIG 6337), p. 177 (= CIG 9920), p. 178 (= CIG 9904). Lupi's readings are fairly accurate, but his explanations are of no value.

¹⁰ Lodovico Antonio Muratori, *Novus thesaurus veterum inscriptionum*, Milan 1739, I, 152, No. 4 and II, 708, No. 3 (= CIG 9906; the first version is from Lupi); II, 1129, No. 6 (= CIG 6337; from Lupi); III, 1674, No. 3 (= CIG 9920); IV, 2045, No. 7 (= CIL VI. 29757; from Marangoni). Muratori's readings are unreliable (cf. his two different versions of CIG 9906) and his attempts at interpretation are ludicrous.

¹¹ Giovanni Marangoni, *Acta S. Victorini, Episcopi Amiterni et Martyris*, Rome 1740, 151 (= CIL VI. 29757). On the manuscript notes of Marangoni see *infra*, note 24.

¹² Ridolfino Venuti, "Dissertazione sopra due antiche greche iscrizioni" in *Giornale dei Letterati*, Rome 1748, 149 (= CIG 9920), 151 (= CIL VI. 29756, from Fabretti), 152 (= CIG 9904), 153 (= CIG 9907, from Fabretti, and 9906, from Spon).

¹³ Edoardo Corsini, *Notae Graecorum sive vocum et numerorum compendia*, Florence 1749, Appendix, Diss. II, p. 30 (= CIG 9921, from Doni). I had no

scholars, unacquainted as they were with Jewish antiquities, not infrequently failed to recognize the Jewish character of these inscriptions and classified them as pagan or Christian.¹⁴ It appears that even before Bosio discovered the Jewish catacomb, Claudius Menestrier (died 1639) had seen two of these inscriptions in 1592 and transcribed them in a manuscript, which is now preserved in the Vatican Library.¹⁵ His readings, which differ somewhat from all the other versions, have hitherto been unnoticed. Two of the ten inscriptions are still extant, one (CIG 9920) in the Museo delle Terme¹⁶ and the other (CIG 9904) in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran Museum.¹⁷ The other eight I was unable to find in their last recorded locations, nor am I acquainted with any notice of their having been seen after the 18th century, with the exception of one (CIG 9906), which Padre Garrucci saw near the church of Santa Chiara before 1862.¹⁸

The catacomb itself was still accessible in the middle of the 18th century. The antiquarian, Giuseppe Bianchini, claims to have visited it (before 1747) in company with Cardinal

opportunity to consult the following additional references: T. S. Baier, *Lucubrationes de inscriptionibus Iudaeorum graecis et latinis*, Königsberg 1721, 15 (= CIL VI. 29756), cited by Brunati, *Leggendario*, etc. (see *infra*, note 33), p. 190; Ciacconio, *Inscriptiones sacrae et prophanae collectae Romae et in aliis Italiae urbibus*, MS at Ferrara, fol. 40 (= CIL VI. 29756), cited in CIL, *l. c.*; Giovenazzi, *Della città di Aveia ne' Vestini*, 1773, 57 (= CIG 6337), cited in CIG, *l. c.*; Reinesius, *Syntagma inscriptionum*, 1001, No. 444 (= CIG 9907) and *Epistolae ad Hoffm. et Rup.*, Ep. XLI, p. 359, No. 300 (= CIG 9907), both citations in CIG, *l. c.*

¹⁴ e.g. CIG 6337 is classified as pagan by Lupi and by Kirchhoff (in CIG); CIG 9921 as Christian by Corsini; CIL VI. 29757 as pagan by Muratori and by Marangoni; CIG 9920 is hesitatingly called Jewish by Lupi, who thinks it may possibly be Christian, although the stone shows the *menorah*, *shofar*, *lulab*, and even the Hebrew word, שלום.

¹⁵ Cod. Vat. Lat. 10545, fol. 150 (= CIL VI. 29756), fol. 239 (= CIG 9907).

¹⁶ No. 67613. It had previously been in the Museo Kircheriano (Brunati, *Musei Kircheriani Inscriptiones*, Milan 1837, 119), from which it was removed when the archaeological collection was transferred, about 1889, to the new National Museum in the Baths of Diocletian.

¹⁷ Among the *inscriptiones veterum Iudaeorum ex variis coemeteriis*, No. 13.

¹⁸ *Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei*, 38 f.

Domenico Passionei, a noted archaeologist.¹⁹ Since however his description of the place is very indefinite, and the two cuts with which he illustrates the seven-branched candlestick are almost identical with those which had been published in Bosio's work more than a century earlier, I am inclined to think that he may not have seen the catacomb at all but that he appropriated both description and illustrations from Bosio. His reliability as an archaeologist is called in question also by De Rossi, who says of him: "His epigraphical notes are of practically no value since they either present material taken from published works or are based on very inaccurate copies of the inscribed stones."²⁰ Ridolfino Venuti refers to the catacomb as still existing in 1748, but, despite references in modern writers, he does not describe it nor does he state that he even visited it.²¹ The catacomb appears to have been visited in 1748 by Gaetano Migliore, who claimed to have seen a number of tombs and a few cubicula, some fragments of inscriptions and representations of Jewish cult symbols before the danger of being buried alive compelled him to withdraw.²²

In the decade between 1740 and 1750 thirteen inscriptions²³ were found in this catacomb of Via Portuense. Early

¹⁹ *Delle magnificenze di Roma antica e moderna*, Rome 1747, I, 57. The reference is wrongly given as page 70 by Venuti, *Giornale dei Letterati*, 1748, 147; Lanciani, *New Tales of Old Rome*, 247; Berliner, *Geschichte der Juden in Rom*, I, 47.

²⁰ *Inscriptiones Christianae*, I, Rome 1861, p. xxx.

²¹ *Giornale dei Letterati*, 1748, 147 f. For his alleged description of the catacomb see De Ricci, *Comptes-Rendus Acad. Inscr.*, 1905, 245 and *JE*, IX, 471; Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*, III⁴, 65 and note 101.

²² *Ad inscriptionem Flaviae Antoniae commentarius sive de antiquis Iudaeis exercitatio epigraphica*, Cod. Vat. Lat. 9143, fol. 113 ff. Cf. Lanciani, *New Tales of Old Rome*, 247; Berliner, *Gesch. d. Jud. in Rom*, I, 47. De Ricci in *JE*, IX, 471 refers to this MS as being in *Codex Ferrar.* 269. The MS, if indeed it is the same, is in the Vatican Library under the number indicated above.

²³ CIG 9901-9903, 9912-9919; Fiorelli, *Catal. del Mus. Naz. di Napoli, Raccolta epigr.*, II, No. 1965; and an inscription published by Oderici, *Dissertationes*, 254 (see the following note) and by Greppo, *Notices*, 27, No. 8 (see *infra* note 38), but ignored by modern writers. It is not included in Vogelstein and Rieger's collection (*Gesch. d. Jud. in Rom*, I, 459-483) nor in Müller-Bees, *Inscr. d. jüd. Kat. am Monteverde*. That this inscription was found at the Monteverde catacomb is attested by Marini (Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 938, No. 6), Oderici, and Greppo. That it is Jewish is proved by the *menorah* engraved upon it.

copies are found in the manuscript notes or published works of Marangoni,²⁴ Venuti,²⁵ Uhden,²⁶ Raponi,²⁷ Migliore,²⁸ Marini,²⁹ Nicolai,³⁰ Cardinali,³¹ Osann,³² Bru-

²⁴ Marangoni's manuscript notes contained CIG 9919 and the inscription discussed in the previous note. His copies of these inscriptions were first published by G. A. Oderici, *Dissertationes et adnotationes in aliquot ineditas veterum inscriptiones et numismata*, Rome 1765, 253f. Marangoni's texts of these inscriptions were copied also by Fabio Danzetta (wrongly referred to as "Faldo Danzelta" in Müller-Bees, *Inscr. d. jüd. Kat. am Monteverde*, p. 168) in a MS now in the Vatican (Cod. Vat. Lat. 8324, fol. 109).

²⁵ *Giornale dei Letterati*, 1748, 145 (= CIG 9903), 146 (= Fiorelli 1965).

²⁶ The readings of Uhden, whose manuscript notes are in the Berlin Museum, are reproduced by Kirchhoff in CIG 9901-9903, 9912-9916.

²⁷ *Inscriptiones ad Iudaeos Italicos spectantes Velitris in museo Borgiano*, 1789, Cod. Vat. Lat. Mus. Borg. 278, fol. 154-160 (= CIG 9901-9903, 9912-9916, and Fiorelli 1965). Raponi's readings of these nine inscriptions, which were then in the museum at Velletri (see p. 305), are entirely accurate.

²⁸ *Ad inscriptionem Flaviae Antoniae, etc.* (see *supra* note 22), Cod. Vat. Lat. 9143, fol. 114 (= CIG 9903), 120 (= CIG 9919), 122 (= CIG 9912, 9913), 124 (= Fiorelli 1965), 125 (= CIG 9914), 140 (= CIG 9902), 149 (= CIG 9901).

²⁹ Gaetano Marini, *Gli atti e monumenti de' fratelli Arvali*, Rome 1795, 342 (= CIG 9917), 347 (= CIG 9918); *Iscrizioni cristiane greche*, Cod. Vat. Lat. 9102, fol. 197 (= Fiorelli 1965), 212 (= CIG 9919); *Epitaphia Hebraeorum*, Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 938-941, includes all thirteen of the Monteverde inscriptions, several of the Jewish inscriptions which had been found earlier, and a number of others which he was probably the first to copy and identify as Jewish. A few of these are, as far as I have been able to determine, still unpublished, including one (fol. 939, No. 2), which is stated to be from the Monteverde catacomb; it is now in the monastery at St. Paul's on the Via Ostiense. Marini's readings, though on the whole fairly accurate, are not always reliable.

³⁰ Niccola Maria Nicolai, *Della basilica di S. Paolo*, Rome 1815, 161, No. 264 (= CIG 9917); 163, No. 268 (= CIG 9918). Nicolai adds three other Jewish inscriptions of the collection at St. Paul's. His readings are very inaccurate.

³¹ Clemente Cardinali, "Iscrizioni antiche inedite" in *Giornale arcadico di scienze, lettere, ed arti*, XI (Rome 1821), 229-235, Nos. xx-xxiv (= CIG 9901, 9913-9915, Fiorelli 1965). I have not seen his version of CIG 9902 in his *Opuscoli letterarii*, Bologna 1819, II, p. 245, No. xc, cited by Kirchhoff in CIG; nor his *Iscrizioni antiche inedite*, Bologna 1819, No. 432 (= CIG 9913), No. 433 (= CIG 9915), cited by Müller-Bees, *Inscr. d. jüd. Kat.*, 162, 168. Cardinali's readings, which are based on manuscript copies of the stones, are not reliable.

³² Friedrich Osann, *Sylloge inscriptionum antiquarum graecarum et latinarum*, Leipzig 1834, 472, No. 2 (= CIG 9918); 474, No. 12 (= CIG 9917)—among the "inscriptiones Basilicae S. Pauli ad Viam Ostiensem." Osann includes all the Jewish inscriptions which he found at the Vatican (these are now at the Lateran), at St. Paul's, and in the Palazzo Rondanini (these are now in the Museo delle Terme), eight in all.

nati,³³ and, to add few later names, Burgon,³⁴ and Garrucci.³⁵ Two of these inscriptions (CIG 9919 and Oderici 254) have apparently disappeared; of the others, two (CIG 9917, 9918) may now be seen among the inscriptions on the walls of the monastery adjoining the basilica of St. Paul on the Via Ostiense; nine were taken to the Museo Borgiano at Velletri, from which later³⁶ five (CIG 9901, 9902, 9903, 9913, Fiorelli 1965) were removed to Naples and are now in the Museo Nazionale; the remaining four were taken to Rome: of these, two (CIG 9912, 9914) are in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran Museum, and two (CIG 9915, 9916) are in the Capitoline Museum.³⁷

³³ Giuseppe Brunati, *Leggendario o vite di santi bresciani*, Brescia 1834, 191 (= CIG 9903).

³⁴ Rev. John William Burgon, *Letters from Rome to Friends in England*, London 1862, 165, No. 27 (= CIG 9916); 167, No. 30 (= CIG 9902); 169, No. 32 (= CIG 9913), No. 33 (= CIG 9902). In the section headed "Specimens of early Jewish sepulchral inscriptions," pp. 162-174, the Rev. Burgon presents accurate copies of both these and other inscriptions which he saw at Rome and in the Naples Museum.

³⁵ Raffaele Garrucci, *Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei scoperto recentemente in Vigna Randanini*, Rome 1862, 26 (= CIG 9916); *Dissertazioni archeologiche di vario argomento*, II, Rome 1865, 188, No. 5 (= CIG 9918), No. 6 (= CIG 9913); 190, No. 12 (= CIG 9903); 192, No. 17 (= Fiorelli 1965); *Storia della arte cristiana*, VI, Prato 1880, pl. 492, Nos. 2, 3 (= CIG 9901, Fiorelli 1965).

³⁶ At some time before 1834, for Brunati saw and copied CIG 9903 at Naples before that year (see *supra* note 33).

³⁷ Twelve of this group of thirteen inscriptions (Oderici, p. 254 is omitted; cf. note 23) were published with facsimiles and detailed notes by N. A. Bees in Müller's, *Inchriften der jüdischen Katakomben am Monteverde zu Rom*, Leipzig 1919, pp. 151-172, Nos. 173-184. Bees states (p. 164) that CIG 9917 was formerly at Velletri, but this is hardly possible, for neither Raponi (see note 27) nor Marini (see note 29) included it among the inscriptions of the museum at Velletri, while Marini himself saw this inscription at Rome before 1795 (*Atti de' fratelli Arvali*, 342 and Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 940, No. 6). It was already in St. Paul's by 1815 (Nicolai, *op. cit.*, 161; cf. *supra* note 30). Dessau wrongly conjectures (in Müller-Bees, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 and 160) that CIG 9917 and 9918 are in the cloister of St. Paul's ("im anstoßenden Klosterhof"). They are actually on the walls of the monastery itself, where they have been for a number of years. That they were once in the cloister is indicated by the fact that Nicolai included them among "iscrizioni affisse al muro nel chiostro." Bees, further, fails to note (*op. cit.*, p. 165, No. 180) that Fiorelli 1965 was at Velletri before it came to Naples. It is included among the inscriptions of the Velletri Museum

For a century after the discovery of these inscriptions nothing further seems to have been done with the catacomb, nor was anything of importance written about it. J. H. G. Greppo did, to be sure, in 1835 publish a pamphlet entitled "Notes on Inscriptions found in certain Jewish Tombs at Rome."³⁸ In this essay he described only nine inscriptions,³⁹ thinking that these were all that existed at the time.⁴⁰ His readings have no independent value for he had not seen the inscriptions which he described, but had copied them from the above cited works of Spon, Fabretti, Muratori, Oderici, and Lupi. Of the thirteen inscriptions which had been found at the Monteverde catacomb after 1740 he knew only one.⁴¹ Greppo announced that he was planning a great work on all the monuments of the ancient Jews, but I can find no trace of it.

After a century of neglect even the site of the Jewish catacomb was forgotten. In 1843 the archaeologist, Padre Giuseppe Marchi, aided by the engineer, Themistocle Marucchi, and the architect, Francesco Fontana, made a vain search for the entrance to the cemetery.⁴² They carefully examined, foot by foot, the entire region where the catacomb was believed to lie. When they thought that they had discovered the site, they had a path laid open by two master masons to an aperture, through which the explorers crawled part way, when they discovered that they were entering not the celebrated catacomb, but what was probably an ancient reservoir for rain water. After two more equally unsuccessful

by Raponi (Cod. Vat. Mus. Borg. 278, fol. 155) and by Marini (Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 940, No. 9). Bees has omitted the reference to Raponi and has given the Marini reference incorrectly.

³⁸ *Notices sur des inscriptions antiques tirées de quelques tombeaux juifs à Rome*, Lyons 1835.

³⁹ Pp. 8-28 = CIG 9907, 9906, 9908, 9919, 9904, 9923, 9920, CIL VI. 29756, and the inscription published by Oderici, *op. cit.*, 254 (cf. *supra* notes 23 and 24).

⁴⁰ The manuscript notes of Migliore and Marini (see *supra* notes 28 and 29) contain at least 31 Jewish inscriptions of Rome, but some of these had probably not yet been published by 1835.

⁴¹ CIG 9919, which he had found in Oderici, *op. cit.*, 253.

⁴² Marchi, *I monumenti delle arti cristiane primitive nella metropoli del cristianesimo*, Rome 1844, 22.

attempts Marchi was convinced that the catacomb was completely inaccessible and that the entrance would never be found. In 1879 Mariano Armellini, one of the leading Christian archaeologists of his time, announced with a mistaken confidence that he had rediscovered the entrance, but that it was so choked with earth that excavation was necessary.⁴³ Then Nikolaus Müller, who was to contribute more than any other archaeologist to the study of the Jewish catacombs, made a vain search in 1884 and again in 1888.⁴⁴ In 1900 and in 1904 M. Seymour de Ricci unsuccessfully attempted to rediscover the lost catacomb.⁴⁵

Finally, in October 1904 word was received by the Commissione di Archeologia Sacra that laborers, who were blasting at Monteverde outside the Porta Portese, had come upon some ancient tombs. Nikolaus Müller, who was given the opportunity to examine the discovery, announced that this was the catacomb which had been discovered by Bosio three centuries earlier.⁴⁶ The excavation was carried on under Müller's direction with the co-operation of the owner of the vineyard, Marchese Pellegrini-Quarantotti, from November 1904 to January 1905, and again in the spring and fall of 1906. Lack of funds delayed further operations until 1909, when after a small amount of work the excavation was abandoned, and the catacomb was allowed to collapse so completely that restoration was impossible.⁴⁷ In the meantime, in 1907, all the inscriptions and other relics which could be saved had been taken to the Christian Museum of the Lateran, where they were arranged under Müller's direction in a separate room called the Sala Giudaica. In 1912 Müller,

⁴³ "Il cimitero degli antichi Ebrei presso la Via Portuense" in *Cronachetta Mensuale*, ser. II, vol. V (Rome 1879), 27-30.

⁴⁴ Müller, *Die jüdische Katakomben am Monteverde*, Leipzig 1912, 20.

⁴⁵ *Comptes-Rendus Acad. Inscr.*, 1905, 245 ff.

⁴⁶ Müller, *op. cit.*, 18 ff.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 20. When the catacomb was discovered, an unsuccessful effort was made to induce the wealthier Jews of Rome to bear the expense of excavation, since the papal archaeological commission had all it could do to excavate the Christian catacombs. See Anton de Waal, in *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde*, XIX (1905), 141.

who was preparing a comprehensive work on the Jewish catacombs of Italy, published a small preliminary monograph on the Monteverde catacomb.⁴⁸ In the same year Müller's untimely death deprived Jewish archaeology of one of its greatest investigators. The inscriptions of the Monteverde catacomb were published several years later under the auspices of the *Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums* by Dr. Nikos A. Bees, one of Müller's pupils, with a very detailed commentary and excellent facsimiles of nearly all the inscriptions.⁴⁹ This work, though magnificently edited and enriched with notes by Deissmann, Dessau, and other distinguished scholars, unfortunately contains many errors of reading and interpretation.

At the end of the year 1913 a new region of the catacomb was found, and stripped of its inscriptions in June 1914.⁵⁰ These inscriptions, which were few and comparatively unimportant, were added to the collection in the Lateran. All the Jewish inscriptions of the Sala Giudaica were published, very inadequately, by G. Schneider-Graziosi,⁵¹ a young archaeologist, who lost his life at the battlefield. After the war Professor Roberto Paribeni, the director of excavations in the Roman district and director of the Museo delle Terme, published 25 new inscriptions which were found at the catacomb.⁵² Through the courtesy of Professor Paribeni, I was

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.* After the author's death his description of the catacomb was published in Italian: "Il cimitero degli antichi Ebrei posto sulla Via Portuense" in *Dissertazioni della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia*, ser. II, vol. XII (1915), 207-318.

⁴⁹ *Die Inschriften der jüdischen Katakomben am Monteverde zu Rom*, Leipzig 1919. For reviews of this work see Th. Reinach, "La cimetière juive de Monteverde" in *REJ*, LXXI (1920), 113-126; P. Kretschmer in *Glotta*, XII (1923), 192 ff.; H. J. Leon in *American Journal of Archaeology*, xxxi (1927), 392 ff.

⁵⁰ R. Kanzler, "Scoperta di una nuova regione del cimitero giudaico della Via Portuense" in *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXI (1915), 152-157.

⁵¹ "La nuova Sala Giudaica nel Museo Cristiano Lateranense" in *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXI (1915), 13-56.

⁵² "Iscrizioni del cimitero giudaico di Monteverde" in *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1919, 60-70; "Iscrizione latina del sepolcreto giudaico di Monteverde sulla Via Portuense," *ibid.*, 1921, 358 ff.

permitted to examine these in the basement of the Museo delle Terme, where they were temporarily placed.

The catacomb itself has so completely fallen into ruin that it is no longer accessible. In all, 207 Jewish inscriptions have been found in this catacomb. Of the 185 items in the Müller-Bees collection, only 166 may properly be counted, for at least seven are clearly pagan inscriptions,⁵³ and twelve others are to be excluded either because they bear not a single letter or for other reasons.⁵⁴ Five inscriptions, which had been found at an earlier time, were omitted from the collection,⁵⁵ and 36 others were found after Müller's death.⁵⁶ Of the 207 inscriptions, 138 are now in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran, 3 in the Capitoline Museum, 3 in the monastery at St. Paul's, 24 in the Museo delle Terme, 5 in the Museo Nazionale at Naples; the remaining 34 are either lost—for the most part in the ruins of the catacomb—or their present locations are unknown to me.

In the meantime other Jewish catacombs had been discovered. A large catacomb was found on May 1, 1859 at the Via Appia in the Vigna Randanini a short distance from the basilica of St. Sebastian near the branch road called Via Appia Pignatelli. This cemetery, which is very well preserved, was thoroughly explored and described by Padre Raffaele

⁵³ Nos. 4, 43, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105.

⁵⁴ Nos. 64, 72, 157, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171 show no letters; No. 161 has only traces of two sigmas; Nos. 17 and 18 are clearly parts of the same inscription (cf. Vaccari in *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXVIII, 1922, 44-47); No. 75 is the same as 142, as noted in the "Nachträge und Berichtigungen" (to Müller-Bees) on p. 174.

⁵⁵ CIG 9907 and CIL VI. 29757 (cf. *supra* note 5); the inscription published in Oderici, *Dissertationes*, 254 (*supra* note 23); an apparently unpublished inscription, now in the collection at St. Paul's, copied by Marini in Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 939, No. 2 (*supra* note 29); an inscription, found about 1900 (*Notizie degli Scavi*, 1900, 88 and *Bull. Comm. Arch. Comun.*, 1900, 223), which is almost certainly from the Monteverde catacomb, because it not only refers to the synagogue of the *Augustenses*, which is mentioned in five other inscriptions found in this catacomb, but the stone itself was found near the Piazza di S. Francesco alla Ripa a short distance inside the Porta Portese. This last inscription, which was on a sarcophagus, is now in the Capitoline Museum.

⁵⁶ Eleven were published in 1915 by Kanzler and by Schneider-Graziosi, twenty-five by Paribeni in 1919 and 1921 (*supra* notes 50-52).

Garrucci, one of the most eminent of Christian archaeologists.⁵⁷ Jewish cemeteries had now been found in those two sections of the city where it was known from the literary sources that the Jews had settled; namely, the Transtiberine region⁵⁸ and the district outside the Porta Capena at the Via Appia.⁵⁹ In the catacomb there were found among other objects about 180 inscriptions, 130 of which were published by Garrucci⁶⁰ and 5 by Marucchi.⁶¹ The rest, with the exception of three,⁶² are still unpublished. When the vineyard was sold in 1884, many of the inscriptions were removed, but some were later replaced.⁶³ In 1904 M. de Ricci found 136 inscriptions in the catacomb;⁶⁴ in 1922 I was able to find only 121. Not a few of those which Garrucci and Marucchi saw entire are now in a fragmentary condition. All of the inscribed stones have been inserted in the walls of the catacomb, but with no apparent attempt to place them near the spot where they were found. Portions of the same inscription are sometimes divided between widely separated parts of the catacomb. Some of the inscriptions which were in the catacomb when Marucchi published his *Guida* in 1884 are now to be found elsewhere. Four are in the Museo delle Terme;⁶⁵ one is in the Capitoline

⁵⁷ *Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei scoperto recentemente in Vigna Randanini*, Rome 1862, and "Descrizione del cimitero ebraico di Vigna Randanini" in his *Dissertazioni archeologiche di vario argomento*, II, Rome 1865, 168-178. Before Garrucci's monograph a very incomplete and inaccurate description had been published by E. Herzog: "Le catacombe degli Ebrei in Vigna Rondanini (sic)" in *Bull. Ist. Corr. Arch.*, 1861, 91-104.

⁵⁸ Philo, *Legat. ad Gaium* 23.155 (Cohn-Wendland).

⁵⁹ Juvenal 3.12-16.

⁶⁰ In *Cimitero*, 23-69; "Nuove epigrafi ebraiche di Vigna Randanini" in *Diss. Arch.*, II, 153-167 and "Epigrafi inedite di Vigna Randanini," *ibid.*, 178-185.

⁶¹ "Scavi nella Vigna Randanini" in *Cronachetta Mensuale*, ser. III, vol. II (1883), 188 ff. Marucchi refers to a large number of the inscriptions without giving the full texts in his pamphlet, *Breve guida del cimitero giudaico in Vigna Randanini*, Rome 1884 (reproduced in his *Le catacombe romane*, Rome 1905, 234-247 and *Éléments d'archéologie chrétienne*, II, Paris 1903, 208-226.

⁶² CIL VI. 7649, 7663 and Müller, *Mitteil. Deutsch. Arch. Inst., Röm. Abt.*, I (1886), 56.

⁶³ Marucchi, *Catacombe romane*, 244, note 2.

⁶⁴ *JE*, IX, 471.

⁶⁵ Those published in Garrucci, *Cimitero*, 31, 51, 52, 60.

Museum;⁶⁶ I found half of one stone at Columbia University in New York City, while the other half is still inside the catacomb, as I have shown elsewhere.⁶⁷ Also a small fragment, which the late Schneider-Graziosi saw in the Vigna Angelucci at Velletri,⁶⁸ is clearly from the missing portion of a stone, the greater part of which is in the catacomb.⁶⁹ Of the published inscriptions from this catacomb I was unable to locate 32, but I copied 19 which have not yet been published.

This catacomb, which is on property now owned by the Marchese di Roccagiovine, is the only Jewish catacomb in Rome which is accessible to visitors. It is described in many of the guide-books, and there is usually some guide available to conduct visitors through the subterranean corridors. Some of the galleries, which are thought to be insecure, are closed to visitors, and may be examined only with the permission of the owner. In these galleries I found several inscriptions. Some parts of the catacomb are unfortunately still unexcavated.

In 1867 Giovanni Battista de Rossi, the greatest Christian archaeologist of the 19th century, found a small Jewish catacomb in the vineyard of Conte Cimarra by the Via Appia, beyond St. Sebastian's. De Rossi published only a brief announcement of his discovery with the promise of a plan and full description,⁷⁰ but the promise was not carried out. Abraham Berliner published De Rossi's copies of six of the inscriptions.⁷¹ Neither the catacomb nor its inscriptions appear to be available.

A fourth Jewish catacomb was discovered in 1882 by Commendatore Orazio Marucchi, who was then at the beginning of a distinguished career in the field of Christian

⁶⁶ Garrucci, *Diss. Arch.*, II, 179, No. 8.

⁶⁷ "A Jewish Inscription at Columbia University" in *American Journal of Archaeology*, XXVIII (1924), 251 f.

⁶⁸ *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXI (1915), 53 f. Possibly more of the missing inscriptions are at Velletri, for the Angelucci family once owned Vigna Randanini.

⁶⁹ It was almost entire when Garrucci copied it (*Cimitero*, 54).

⁷⁰ "Scoperta d'un cimitero giudaico presso l'Appia" in *Bull. Arch. Crist.*, V (1867), 16.

⁷¹ *Gesch. d. Jud. in Rom*, I, Frankfurt 1893, 90 ff.

archaeology.⁷² It was situated on the left of the Via Labicana in the Vigna Apolloni, more than a mile outside the Porta Maggiore. It had accidentally been found by workmen, who were reopening an ancient *pozzolana* quarry. No actual excavation was attempted until January 1884, when after only three days of digging under Marucchi's direction, the work was discontinued on account of lack of funds, nor has it ever been resumed. The five inscriptions which were found there are so fragmentary that they are of small value.

In 1885 Nikolaus Müller found another small Jewish catacomb on the Via Appia Pignatelli, near the main Via Appia and close to the large catacomb of Vigna Randanini and the Christian catacomb of Praetextatus.⁷³ Müller found there three Jewish inscriptions, and several pagan inscriptions on stones which had been used to close the openings of the *loculi*. The brief preliminary description was to be followed by a detailed account, which was to be included in Müller's work on all the Jewish catacombs of Italy, a work which was unhappily cut off by the author's death. Both this catacomb and that of the Via Labicana are no longer accessible.

Lastly, in 1919 a sixth Jewish catacomb was discovered on the grounds of Villa Torlonia on the Via Nomentana at the intersection of Via Lazzaro Spallanzani about a half mile from the Porta Pia. The discovery was made by the workmen of Prince Don Giovanni Torlonia while they were digging the foundations for a new stable. The catacomb was excavated at Prince Torlonia's expense under the supervision of the engineer, Agostino Valente. An investigation was made by Professor Roberto Paribeni and the architect, Italo Gismondi. Paribeni published a brief description of the catacomb with

⁷² Marucchi, "Di un nuovo cimitero giudaico sulla Via Labicana" in *Dissert. Pontif. Accad. Arch.*, ser. II, vol. II (1884), 499-532; also published separately. The account is reproduced in his *Catacombe romane*, 279-297 and *Élém. d'arch. chrét.*, II, 259-275. Cf. *Bull. Arch. Crist.*, 1883, 79 f and 1884, 42 f.

⁷³ Müller, "Le catacombe ebraiche presso la Via Appia Pignatelli" in *Mitteil. Deutsch. Arch. Inst., Röm. Abt.*, I (1886), 49-56. Cf. Fiorelli in *Mem. Accad. Lincei*, I (1885), 334 (= *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1885, 158).

the texts of 52 inscriptions and a plan by Gismondi.⁷⁴ Through the generous permission of Prince Torlonia, I made two visits to this catacomb, which is not otherwise accessible, and made copies and measurements of 68 inscriptions, 22 of which have not yet been published. Of those published by Paribeni I found all but six. His readings, which were taken under difficulties, can be corrected in many important details. Nearly all the inscriptions are still in their original places inside the catacomb, for they are painted on the stuccoed closures of the *loculi*. The few inscriptions on marble had been removed to the stable. The catacomb has not yet been completely excavated. Certain portions, which threaten to collapse, have been buttressed with wooden supports.

To sum up, six Jewish catacombs have been found at Rome: three by the Via Appia, one each at the Via Portuense, the Via Labicana, and the Via Nomentana. These catacombs have yielded, to my knowledge, the texts of 452 Jewish inscriptions,⁷⁵ 42 of which are still unpublished. Besides, there are 34 others (four still unpublished) which were found at Rome, but the specific catacomb from which each came cannot be determined with certainty.⁷⁶ In addition, eight Jewish inscriptions (one unpublished) were found at Porto, about fifteen miles from Rome, where there was a Jewish community which may have had some connection with the community at Rome.⁷⁷ This makes a total of 494 Jewish

⁷⁴ "Catacomba giudaica sulla Via Nomentana" in *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1920, 143-155. Cf. the briefer notice in *Atene e Roma*, 1920, 181 ff.

⁷⁵ Monteverde 207, Vigna Randanini 157, Vigna Conte Cimarra 6, Via Appia Pignatelli 3, Via Labicana 5, Via Nomentana 74.

⁷⁶ Seven of these are in the Museo delle Terme, four at St. Paul's, three in the Lateran Museum, two in the Capitoline Museum, one at S. Maria in Trastevere, four at Naples; the remaining thirteen I was unable to find. Of those at the Terme, three (CIG 9909, 9922, and Garrucci, *Diss. Arch.*, II, 191, No. 13) had once been in the Palazzo Rondanini on the Corso.

⁷⁷ G. B. De Rossi in *Bull. Arch. Crist.*, IV (1866), 40; Lanciani in *Ann. Ist. Corr. Arch.*, XL (1868), 191; Le Blant in *Comptes-Rend. Acad. Inscr.* XIV (1886), 195 f.; J. Dérenbourg, "Elazar, Le Peitan" in *Mélanges Renier*, Paris 1887, 438 ff.; J. Ficker, *Die altchristlichen Bildwerke im christlichen Museum des Laterans*, Leipzig 1890, 36, No. 86. These inscriptions are now in the court of the Bishop's Palace at Porto, with the exception of the inscription published by Ficker and half of

inscriptions found at or near Rome. Whether or not Rome will yield more Jewish catacombs and inscriptions, the material at present available is sufficient to permit a partial reconstruction of certain aspects of the ancient community.

the long epitaph in Dérenbourg, *op. cit.*, 440, which are now in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran. De Ricci, *JE*, XI, 471 and Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*, III⁴, 66 assert that a Jewish catacomb was found at Porto, but there is no such statement in the authorities which they cite.

AN UNKNOWN HEBREW VERSION OF THE SAYINGS OF AESOP

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IN the library of Columbia University there is preserved a manuscript which I think is unique, by one Elijah ben Menahem Raba, at once the author and the scribe. The manuscript was formerly in the possession of the Temple Emanuel in New York City, having been in the collection bought of Müller of Amsterdam in the year 1868, and presented by the Trustees of the Temple to Columbia in the year 1893. Elijah ben Menahem Raba lived in Carpi, in the Dukedom of Modena.¹ Raba's father resided in Padua, where he composed, so far as our knowledge reaches, seven different writings, of which mention is made in Wolf's *Bibliotheca Hebraea*. Only three of these seem to have reached the printer, the one entitled *Beṭ Moed* having been edited by his son in the year 1604-1605.²

The manuscript before us contains several compilatory works by the younger Raba: a collection of Talmudic sayings arranged alphabetically and commented on pithily by the collector; a similarly ordered collection of wise saws culled from the Midrash and Talmud, arranged according to the occurrence in them of the numbers 1, 2, etc., up to 10—likewise commented

¹ Cf. *Ben Chanania*, Szegedin 1866, p. 215; *Catalogo dei Manoscritti Ebraici della Biblioteca della Comunità Israelitica di Mantova, compilato dal Rabbino Maggiore Marco Mortara*, Livorno 1878, p. 58. (For the use of this little book I am indebted to the late Rev. Dr. S. Morais of Philadelphia). Mortara says that Raba lived in Padua, but the MS. is stated distinctly to have been written in Carpi. On the title-page we read, חזקת משפלת מעלת אדונינו דודוס דון אלפונסו יר"ה דאספסה, נתנשה אמן אמן כ"ה. Of course, Alfonso II (1559-1597), the persecutor of Tasso, and the last legitimate offspring of the Italian branch of the *Este* house, is meant. Cf. Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, x, pp. 365 ff. Cf., also, *REJ.*, 1925, p. 72; Eisenstadt-Wiener, *Da'at Kadoshim*, p. 147; Steinschneider, *Purim and Parody* for a bibliography of the Raba family, as well as Neubauer, *Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Juden*, 3rd let. *al fin*.

² And not 1608, as Fürst, *Bibliotheca Judaica*, ii, p. 352, and Benjacob, *Ozar Ha-Sepharim*, p. 75, No. 363 state. Cf. Steinschneider, *Catalogus*, col. 1733.

upon and, together with the first, provided with careful references to the originals. Then comes another list of sayings taken from philosophic and moral works in alphabetical order, and lengthily commented upon by the collector.³

The last place in the manuscript is taken by the Hebrew translation from an Italian original, which is also given.⁴ The 355 sayings bear the Hebrew title *Aderet Eliyahu*; Italian title they have none. In a long, rhymed prose introduction, his own work—Raba, the younger, gives the reason for this, his choice of name. The collection itself in short sentences of two στίχοι, which rhyme with each other, is headed thus: “Behold this: it existed, however, in olden times, in a Gentile speech. The writer composed it who is called by name Aesopo of Phrygia,⁵ a Gentile who composed many proverbs, in number without end. By the aid of Heaven, the high, the exalted, I shall translate it into the Assyrian⁶ speech. I open my lips and take up my parable and I say.”

I know not by what right these sentences are dubbed “Of Aesop,” for he it is without doubt who is here set up as their author. The Italian translations and “Bearbeitungen” of Aesop are many;⁷ but in none of them have I been able to discover—from the title—a likeness to these “sayings” (which

³ A fragment from the Genizah, now in the British Museum (Or. 5560E) contains a collection of sayings arranged in series of twelve, according to the subject-matter. I have a copy of this fragment and hope to publish it. Cf., also, *Jehuda Bonsenior and his Collection of Aphorisms*, JQR., viii, pp. 632 *et seq.*

⁴ Cf. Steinschneider in *MGWJ.*, xliii, p. 268.

⁵ Wiener (*Ben Chananja*, *loc. cit.*) misread the title, and fashioned out of it one “Aesopo, פאריני a fruitful Christian author of the Middle Ages,” of whose existence I find no proof.

⁶ This term is applied usually to the script only and not to the language of the later Hebrew. See Kohut, *Aruch Ha-Shalem*, i, p. 324. I know of a few cases only where it is used for the language. Cf. Yerushalmi, *Sotah*, vii, 21 b; *ZDMG.*, xliii, p. 258; Levi, *Elia Levita und seine Leistungen als Grammatiker*, Breslau 1888, p. 35. אשורית = Syriac; cf. *Ozar Neḥmad*, ii, p. 242; Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Lug. Batav.*, p. 66; Fürst, *Der Kanon des Alten Testaments*, p. 118. סורית is used more commonly in this connection. Cf. Steinschneider, *Catalogus*, p. 66; *Jewish Literature*, p. 353; *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, xiv, p. 13. The same meaning attaches to the Arabic ألسرياني—which Harkavy has not noticed in *MGWJ.*, xiv, p. 32.

⁷ Cf. S. F. W. Hoffmann, *Bibliographisches Lexicon*, i, p. 89.

word might, in the Hebrew, as well mean "proverbs"). The Hebrew itself indeed possesses a recension of the real pseudo-Aesop⁸ and another collection which has been thrice done by the printer—1516, 1544, 1605;⁹ but nothing, so far as I can ascertain, like the work of Raba. It may be that the name Aesop was used for any collection of wise saws or proverbs. Wilhelm von Christo in his *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*¹⁰ says: "Auch mit Sprichwörter-sammlungen wird Aesopos als Συρετις λόγου καὶ αποκριματος in Verbindung gebracht."¹⁰

The translation is very free. The effort to produce clauses of the desired shortness and rhyme has, in some cases, effaced nearly all traces of the original. I doubt whether the translator was well up in his Italian; at times he seems to have made some bad mistakes.

[The editor of the Italian original comments as follows: I wish to express my perplexity as regards the Italian part of the MS. As it has come down to us, it leaves the impression that it is the work either of an author unworthy of the name or of an ignorant scribe. There are no doubt certain dialectal traits in it, although these are not homogeneous, and cannot with precision be ascribed to any one locality. There may also be certain words and locutions which are peculiarities of Judeo-Italian. But the many gross errors in grammar and orthography, the utter disregard of gender and number, of nominative and accusative, of agreement between subject and verb, between noun and adjective, confusion between homonyms,—all these can hardly be said to be due to any locality or any period. Yet it is just as rash to state that a man as versatile as our author can have been ignorant of his mother-tongue, or that its original Christian author did not know his native language. A solution of these problems might prove to be a contribution.—A.S.H.]

⁸ Landsberger, *Die Fabeln des Sophos*, Posen 1859; cf. Geiger in *ZDMG.*, xiv, pp. 586 *et seq.*; Frankel, *Monatsschrift*, ix, p. 72; Jacobs, *The Fables of Aesop*, p. 216; Steinschneider, *Hebr. Übersetz.*, p. 844.

⁹ These are the dates given by Steinschneider, *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, xiv, p. 53. Landsberger, *Fabulae aliquot Aramaeae*, p. 13, gives 1516, 1546, 1697. Paulus Cassel, however, in his critical edition of these fables (*Mischle Sindbad*, Berlin 1888, p. 307) says that the dates are 1517, 1543 and 1608. In the Bodleian there is a MS. containing an Italian and a Hebrew translation of Aesop's fables; but I know nothing of its character. See Neubauer, *Catalogue*, p. 1123.

¹⁰ Ed. Wilhelm Schmid, München 1912, i, p. 193. See, also, *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift*, 1908, pp. 1144 *et seq.* on Victor Jensted's *Opuscula*, St. Petersburg 1907. "No. 20 Αἰσώπου λόγοι 'Sprüche des Aesop' in Moskau und Dresden, pp. 217-231." Cf., also, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, i, p. 170: Αἰσώπου παροιμίαι; also v. p. 331.

As I have already said, I have cause to believe that the manuscript is unique. I do not doubt that this very one was at one time in the possession of Dr. M. Wiener, who has described it.¹¹ In 1866 it became the property of N. Coronel,¹² from whom it passed (presumably through the hands of Giuseppe Almanzi)¹³ to the auction room of Frederick Müller of Amsterdam, and thence to its present resting place.¹⁴ I had also among my own books (it may be well to mention) a little manuscript volume containing the *Toledot Aezopu* in a late Italian hand. It seemed to have a big gap at the end; but, so far as I can see, there is nothing like it in the libraries whose catalogues I have. It is a Judaizing adaptation of the Aesopian history, for which responsibility was believed to rest¹⁵ upon the shoulders of the 14th century monk Planudes; whom it seems best, since the days of Meziriac's *Vie d'Aesop*, to revile as hard as one can, speaking of nought but "the gross forgeries of that lying monk Planudes."¹⁶

In the following publication I have had the excellent assistance of my student, Mr. Abraham S. Halkin, who has taken upon his shoulders the responsibility of editing the whole Italian original. I owe him many thanks for this.

¹¹ *Ben Chananja*, loc. cit.

¹² On whom cf. Geiger, *Zeitschrift*, 1872, p. 124; *JE.*, s. v.

¹³ The best part of the collection given by the Trustees of Temple Emanuel to the Library of Columbia University, has come from his collection, which, originally, was meant to go to the *Beth Hamidrash* in London (*Jewish Chronicle*, London, March 25, 1865). On Müller's sale see *ibid.*, August 28, 1868, p. 7. On Almanzi himself, see *JE.*, s. v. (where, in the Bibliography, my own article should be cited as having appeared in Vol. V, not IV of the *JQR.*) and *Rivista Israelitica*, viii, pp. 230 et seq.

¹⁴ Cf. his *Catalog.*, Amsterdam 1868, p. 346. The MS. also contains the signatures, as it seems, of two Censors. On fol. 192 b, there is that of "Fra Luigi da Bologna, 1599," which name appears often upon Hebrew MSS. and prints of this period; cf., e.g., *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, xiv, p. 60; Neubauer, *Catalogue*, col. 1099. On fol. 195 b there appears also the name "Camillo Jaghel, 1613." See *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, v, pp. 100 and 125; and William Popper, *The Censorship of Hebrew Books*, Index.

¹⁵ But see Jacobs, *The Fables of Aesop*, p. 19.

¹⁶ The words of the anonymous author of the *Select Fables of Esop and other Fabulists*, Birmingham 1764, Preface, p. 111. He was, also, the author of a collection of wise saws. See M. Tren in *Philologus*, xlix, p. 185.

1. L'huomo deue molto bene considerare il fine prima che uēga a fare cosa alcuna.
2. E' molto piu bella la Bellezza del animo che quella del corpo.
3. Se gli huomini scelerati mutano ben stato et condecione no muteno però i custumi.
4. Le cose humani come dice Sālustio ugualmēte p¹⁷ la concordia crescono e p la discordia rouinano.
5. Gli huomini p l'usura et abondanza si marciscono et ritardono dal ben fare.
6. Se noi nascōderemo i nři pecati da gli huomini nō gli potremo nascondre da dio il qual sole uede ogni cosa.
7. Fuggiamo quelli amici che ne pericoli fugano per non darci haiuto.
8. Quelli che ha i piu forti a tempo cedono sonno migliori di quelli che nō li cedono.
9. Quelli che piu che li altri pecano che persuedano a i principi de far male.
10. Spesse uolti il danno esser dotrina al' huomo.
11. Li adulatori sonno da essere ripresi.
12. Quelli che lasciano i loro consueti exercitij et uogliano fare quel che nō sano sonno deleggiati et spesse uolti uengono ha pericolo.
13. L'huomini diuentono sauij con il danno et pericolo.
14. La continueua conuersatione fa che quelle cose che noi tememo grandemente ne paiono piaceuole.
15. Un huomo sauio deue comp[or]tare l'ingiurij che se li fano da quelli che nō li sonno p sangue congiunti quando uede che quelli si fano ingiuria ancora fra lor medesimi.
16. Quelli che sonno belli di Corpo nō ano senso d'animo ne industrio alcuno.
17. Con li tristi et scelerati nō douemo hauer Compagnia.
18. Quel che si può prouare in fatti nō fano bisogna paroli.
19. A Dio niuna cosa è ascosa ne anco esse si puo gabare.

¹⁷ This is the author's usual abbreviation for per.

20. E matto colui che p speranza de maggior guadagno lascia andare cio che a in mano ben che sia picciolo.
21. I maggiori deuano partire li fatichi con i minori acio che tutti si saluano.
22. Fuggiamo l'amicicia di quelli huomini la cui uita et dopia et il parlare dubioso.
23. Dobiamo fuggire quelli che tratano malo li lor famigliare et domestici.
24. L'huomini catiui quando aão maggior piacere tanto piu se inamāno a far male.
25. Dobiamo patientemente soportare il male quando uedemo che chi ne e causa pate male egli ancorra.
26. Spesse uolti alcuni sperādo prendere altri uiē preso lui.
27. Quelli che nō saō gouernare le cose lore et uogliono hauer cura de quelli che nō importano ad essi.¹⁸
28. Le cose publichi et priuati si distrugieno quādo i principi eserceteno la crudeltà.
29. L'hauaro p l'auaritia gabbare ancor a Dio.
30. Quelli che nel prencipio de far male nō sonno castigati fano semp magior male.
31. Niuno potere schiuare quel che deue intrauenere.
32. Nō ci douemo atristare quando perdemo le Richezze che nō hauemo hauuto dalla natura che nō pono stare di cōtineuo cō noi.
33. Molti huomini facilmento prometeno quel che con effetto nō possō dare.
34. Le cose nō si deuono fare inconsideratamente.
35. L'huomini prudenti mandano gli nemici cō astutia a i piu forti.
36. Alcuno guadagnare p l'altri fatichi.
37. Noi ricadere in quelle cose alli quali hauemmo ateso.
38. Li Rè nō si deueno aleggersi p bellezza ma p fortezza e prudēza.

¹⁸ This saying, as also a few others, is unfinished.

39. L'huomo deue stare in ordine p ogni bisogno che possa
sucedre.
40. L'huomo p un picciolo guadagno si metta a grã pericolo.
41. Un timido p qual si uoglia amonetione nō si puo fortificare.
42. Se tu hai una cosa che nō l'adopri è quanto se tu nō¹⁹
l'hauessi.
43. Quando si piglia una cità l' poueri subito fogano è li Richi
sono presi.
44. Molti p nō hauer obbidito alli sauij e prudenti s hano fatto
male a lor medesimi.
45. Alcuna uolta quelle cose che paiano nociui soño utili è quelli
che paiano utili sonno nociui.
46. Molti fugendo i piccioli pericoli incorrono in maggiori.
47. Chi fa dispiacere a quelli da quali ha hauuto beneficio Dio il
castiga.
48. Molti huomini fingendo hauer pauura e poi amazzono i suo
nemici.
49. Quelli che sonno oratori prudenti quelle cose che li sono dati
contra dalli nemici si conuertono in proprio laudo.
50. Le cose nō si deuono giudicare p celerità ma p prefetione.
51. Quelli che cercono inganare l'amici essi soño prima offesi.
52. Una trista natura nō nodrisce mai buoni Costumi.
53. Quello che ogni giorno machina male spesso cada nel lacio
suo medesimo.
54. Non bisogna perseuerare nel male p che la consuetudine piega
assai l'huomo mal fare benche nō uoglia.
55. La musicha spesso fa diferire la morte.
56. La natura de prima stare semp_p ferma e che egli tentò l'im-
possibile.
57. La forza del corpo esser migliora che la belezza.
58. Nella auersita e in²⁰ utile²⁰ la penitenza.
59. Cio che si fa fuora di tempo e uitoperoso.

¹⁹ MS. has dō.²⁰ MS. has two separate words.

60. Molti huomini i consigli loro essergli causa di lor mali.
61. Molti prometono grã cose et nõ pono fare le picciole.
62. Si deue conoscere il ben fattore e a quello esser obligato.
63. Quelli che nõ soño stati pertecipi del bene ne del male nõ sogliono esser fermi amici.
64. L'huomini che hano usanza catiua piu tosto moiono che mutar natura.
65. Alcuni huomini p la loro ingnoranza lasciar andare gli nemici e scaciare l'amici come lor traditori.
66. Molti huomini si guardano da nemici e poi ritrouano amici che sonno de quelli pigiori.
67. L'huomini della Città allora fanno miglior guadagno quando hanno messo sedetione in essi.
68. Quelli che nõ sapendo il uero pensano inganare l'altri.
69. La gola è causa de molti mali.
70. Un huomo glurioso esser puoco stimato.
71. Questi giouani che nõ sano fare alcuna cosa non soño da esser ripresi ma i lor parenti che nõ l'año insegnato.
72. Da piccioli cose si conoscono le grande et da cose manifesti si conosce li dobiosi.
73. Quelli che lasciano le cose alli quali sonno atti et uogliono fare altro meritamente patiscono l'uersità.
74. L'huomini che lasciano i lor exercitij et atendono a quelli che nõ se li conuengono meritamẽto soño sfurtunati.
75. Molti insegnando l'arte ritoricha nelle scuole si pensono essere qualche cosa ma quando uanõ in publico sonno di puoco prezzo.
76. Quelli cosi che sonno utili a buoni a catiui soño danosi e inutile.
77. Tutti gli innamorati soño senza uergogna.
78. Molti huomini uogliono piu tosto uiuere da sè poueramente che con altri Ricamente.
79. Un Ribaldo con simulatione uole tradire i semplici.
80. Queli che combatano cõ i piu forti di loro disprezzano la salute.

81. Quelli che p natura soño Catiui se mutano stato nō mutano Costumi.
82. Noi nō dobbiamo essere quelli medesimi semp p che quelli che si mutano fugano spesso i pericoli.
83. L'huomini che d'improuiso paiano teribili come fai isperiēza di loro nō sonō poi di tanto prezzo.
84. Non douemo seguire i guadagni quando sonō pieni de pericoli e miserij.
85. La sorta data dalli fatti nō si puo mutare.
86. Molti ignoranti paiano saper qualche cosa a che nō gli conosce ma come parlano sonō scoperti.
87. Li mal fatori sonō conosciuti solamente ala uista.
88. Quelli che tradiscono i loro compagni spessi uolti rouinano se medesimi.
89. La Crudeltà nō si puo mai placare ben che li siano fatti grã beneficij.
90. Le cose teribili si fanō con la consuetudine di puoca stimã.
91. Quelli che resisteno a i primi che li fano ingiuria da li altri sonō piu rispetati.
92. Alcuni p troppo alegrozza fanō le cose senza Consiglio et si meteno in ruuina.
93. Tra li serui quelli sonō piu infelici che parturiscono piu fig:li²¹ in seruitù.
94. Alcuni huomini guardano delli Ruuini delli altri.
95. Molti huomini p pazzia fanō piacer alli strani e danō all'amici.
96. E gran dolore quando alcuno pate da suoi proprij.
97. Quel che si dice et nō si puo prouare cō isperienza esser poco creduto.
98. L'huomo si deue contentare delle cosi presenti e fugire l'ingordigia.
99. L'huomo nō deue fare una cosa e dire un altra.

²¹ The author employs this abbreviation for figliuoli.

100. Sonno alcuni che uinceno i grandi et sonõ uinti da piccioli.
101. P la pietra pretiosa considera la sapienza et p il gallo considera l'huomo catiuo p che i catiui nõ amano le uirtù ne sanõ a che cosa se adoprino.
102. Facilmento si troua il bastõ p far male al cane se un huomo potẽto ti uol nocere facilmente trouara la causa assai haerato quel che nõ puo resistere.
103. Il simile acade a cittadini partegiani che quando p copodità di sognerigiare se offendono l'un l'altro metono a pericolo la lor uita.
104. Non lasciamo le cose certi p le incerti.
105. La fede semp p fu rara e massimo in questa ettà è piu rarra apresso li potenti, e semp p fu cosi onde e meglio uiuere cõ tutti para p che chi uiua cõ huomini di lui piu potenti bisogna semp p che ci lascia andare del suo e cõ un par suo semp la ragione sarà oguala.
106. E prouerbio anticho che cio che fai ad un ingrato è gitato uia.
107. Spessi uolti quelli che cerchi de giouare ti nocono.
108. Ci douemo sforzare quando odiamo cose che se dispiaceno che nõ facciamo ne dicciamo cose indegni di noi p che spesso uolti i tristi et scelerati si alegrano quando gli huomini da bene li resistono assai che cerchino uendicarsi di loro e debiamo inimitare i Caualli che quando i Cagnioli loro abaiano li disprezzõ.
109. Le Rizezzi paiano dileteuoli ma chi guarda bene anõ in se pericoli e maritudine.
110. Non dobbiamo dare fedà ad ogni uno.
111. Sonno alcuni tanti desiderosi di lodi che con sua uergogna e danno in preda a parasi i guatoni.
112. Nella fortuna prospera tu nõ ti deue alzare ne esser superbo p che se la fortuna si muta quelli che tu ai offesi si uendicaraanõ e fà che facci differenza fra l'amici p che sonõ certi di quelli che nõ sono tuoi ma della tua tauola e della tua fortuna la quale come si muta quelli ancora ti uoltano le spalle.

113. L'huomo nō deue tentare cosa alcuna di fare doue ei²² si
conosci mal atto dalla natura.
114. Qualche uolte l'huomini grādi hanō bisogno de piu umile
e bassi.
115. Dio esaudisce i Relegiosi e buoni ma gli scelerati nō ode.
116. Molti sonno da puoco et nō si sanō consigliare ne anco
atēdono a chi li consiglia bene ma quando soño ne pericoli
e danō cominciono a conoscere et condaneno lalor pacia
et allora dicono è quell'altra cosa bisognaua fare.
117. Auiene alla plebba come alle rane che si anō un Ra mansueto
dicono che e tristo et lodono la begnenità del primo questo
hauiene p che semp odino le cosi presenti e desidrono le noue.
118. Nisuno dice la fauola della sua sorte sauerchio si lamēti
molti cercando la noua la uecchia di nuouo desidrano.
119. Guarda che p una picciola comodità tu nō ne perdi un
granda et guardati de nō hauer fede ad ogni homo p che
sonō molti che p inganare non solamēte parlano beg:te,
ma ancora si portano beg:te.
120. Non si uol creder ad ogni cosa p che molti si offeriscono
farti piacere nō p tua comodità ma p sua.
121. Dobiamo proibiri il timore senza causa p che spesi uolti
è piu graue il timore del pericolo che esso pericolo anzi
qualche uolte quel che temiamo e cosa redicola.
122. Semp e amata la presenta utilità.
123. In ogni cosa bisogna l'animo l' uirtù giace senza confidāza
e la confidanza duce e Regine d'ogni uirtù.
124. E cosa utile al fig:lo obbidire el padre e alla madre et al
gioueno si conuiene obbidire el uechio.
125. La frauda con la fraude si scacia e chi prenda diletto di fare
frode nō si deue lamentare s'altri l'inganeno.
126. Ad un mancador di fede nō hauer mai fede perdonare
l'ingiuria è cosa de misericordia ma hauersi cura e cosa di
prudenza.

²² The reading ei is the more probable, but it may possibly be ci.

127. iL²³ riso merita il riso et il giocho merita il gioco e l'inganõ l'inganno.
128. Sonno aburiti quelli li quali uogliono alzarsi piu de' quelli cõ i qual uiueno.
129. Ciascun la sua dote costui de la bellezza quello delle forze del corpo questo delle ricchezze quello delli amici potenti ogni uno deue essere del suo cõtento ne si sforza hauendo inuidia al superiore contendre con lui miserio è il primo il secondo uera paccia.
130. Il nemico è da esser temuto ma molto piu quel che e nemico et finge de esser amico.
131. Non puochi sonõ coloro che nella felicità di se stessi ne della modestia si ricordano ma p che nella prosperità insolenti diuentano nelle auersita facilmente incorono ondi siano cauati i felici p che se la fortuna la saurota li uolta e li trabucha in qualche insortamò l'esser stato de prima prospero l'induce al sommo della miseria che meglio saria p lui nã esser mai stato felice ne contento.
132. Chi lascia i compagni nelle hauersità nã deue esser partecipe della sua felicità.
133. L'inuidia e danosa e il piu delle uolte rouina quello che a inuidia.
134. Quello che è da fugirse con gran deligenza cerchiamo e quel che fuggiamo sopra il tutto è da ricercarsi desiamo la beatitudine prima che sapiamo doue ella se sttia onde nã da marauigliarsi se ruiniamo nelle felicità e morti fuori de ogni nostro intendimento come senza ragione ci gouerniamo.
135. Guarda molto bene à chi tu uoi nuocere p che se tu te imbatti in un piu galiardo di te nã a lui ma a te nocerai.
136. E paccia se quando fai trigua tutta la tua guardia dai in mano al nemico p che chi una uolta è stato nemico mai nã cessi d'esser nemico et trouara causa di nocerti quando ti uedra spogliato de ogni aiuto.

²³ Author had originally Li; but he crossed out the last i and placed an i before the capital L.

137. Guarda bene a chi fai del bene p che sonno molti che fanō male a quelli da quali hano hauuto bene.
138. La Compagnia dei membri et del uenire sonno come l'huomana società il membro ha bisogno del altro membro e l'amico a bisogno dell'amico però douemo aiutarci l'un l'altro p che li ricchezzi e l'honori non bastono ad un huomo ma a bisogno de l'amici ancora.
139. Sonno molti che anō bisogno et a molti hauanzano le ricchezze ma niun richo uol dare al pouero quel che gli auanza.
140. Nelli pericoli e cosa difficile il nascondersi p che come la fortuna comincia perseguitare alcuno mai nō lo lascia fina alla fine ouero l'huomo si perda da lui medesimo.
141. Non ti fidare di paroli ma guarda a i fatti di quello che ti da paroli.
142. Uedrai molti nella mediocrità esser lieti senza penssieri ma se tu l'uedi fatti richi saranno mal contenti pieni di fastidij e di curi.
143. Molti combatono contra la pouertà et come l'ano superata diuentano serui de le Ricchezze.
144. Per l'aquila intenda i Richi e potenti che semp fano ingiuria a pueri pur qualche uolte i pueri cercando de uendicarsi hanō cio che da richi gli era tolto.
145. Chi praticha cose cattui che fanō qualche male auenga che sia inocente e castigato della medesima pena.
146. Un huomo scelerato quando uol nocerti facilmente troua la causa.
147. Li pueri sonō spesso opresi da i Richi con falsi testimonij.
148. Nō dar fede ad ogni uno che sō molti che dimostrando di giouare nocono.
149. Quando uno a in uso dire buggie quādo dice il uero nō li a creduto.
150. L'huomo deue misurare se medesimo et nō fare quāto uede fare ad altri ma quanto uogliono le forze sue.
151. Soño molti che p inuidia nō lascian ofar ad altri quel che nō possono far loro.

152. Ad un huomo quieto e begnigno facilmente si fa ingiuria ma ad un huomo feroce nō cosi p che semp e riguardato.
153. Cio che da dio ci uien dato cō grato hanimo l'habbiamo da riceuere douendo sap che ogni cosa che egli fa è cō ordino peso e misura.
154. Doue nō sonno le forze fa misterio hauer ingiegno.
155. Ecosa strana coregere i gia inuechiati in un usāza il ch̄ douemo fare quando quelli erano giouani che piu facilmēte haurebbero lor obiditi.
156. Douemo hauer semp gratij a chi ci fa del bene.
157. Felice quel che alli altrij spesso impara.
158. Il tempo e il luogo danno spesso uolti audacio à un uile.
159. Li seruitori desiderono i primi patroni quando de pigiori espremētono.
160. Quelli che al uolgo sonno felici sonno infelici piu de li altri.
161. Non sono hamici tutti quelli che fano buoni paroli p che sotto quelle spese uolte stà nascosto il ueleno.
162. A tutti la cosa sua par bella.
163. Quando hauemo forza douemo cercare qualche cosa p la uecchiezza che e debola.
164. Ad uno afflitto nō si uol dare piu afflitione per che assai è misero chi e misero.
165. Non riprendere mai alcuno del uitto tuo propio.
166. Qualche uolte un glorioso pensa che li sia honore cio che gli e uituperio e uergogna.
167. E meglio uiuere con un compagno uguale sēza pericolo che con un piu potente cō pericolo. *
168. Niuno deue disprezare gli altri p che la natura a dato la dote sua à ogni persona e chi nō ha la tua uirtù forsi ne ha un altra che nō e meno bella della tua.
169. Niuna cosa e più ferma che la concordia e la discordia ogni cosa la fa debola.
170. Per che li huomini sonno pigeri nelli cosi d'altri quādo uolemo ch̄ una cosa sia bē fatta la douemo far noi proprij.

171. Che cosa e piggiora che l'auaritia e che piu pazza che l'inuidia la qual più che ad altri nocchia male a se stessa desidera.
172. Quel che tu nō poi fare con la forza fallo cō la prudentia e astutia.
173. Ogni uno deue fare cio che pote p fauorire la sua causa.
174. Alli uolti sonno gabati quelli che sogliono gabbare li altri.
175. Alcuni sonno tanti intratabili che con arte e ingegno alcuno nō si possono metigare.
176. Sonno alcuni che fanno tanto pazzo attione che si può giudicare che nō habbiano cura.
177. Niun deue disprezzare il suo nemico ben che sia picciolo.
178. Li uoti otiosi niente giouano p che Dio nō gli essaudisce ma fa misterio che tu ti aiuto da te medesimo e così ti aiuterà iddio.
179. Sol spesso acadre che il fig:lo che e manco amato da suoi parenti diuenta migliore de quel che è amato.
180. Per uiuer bene bisogna afaticarsi p che un huomo otioso e dato in tutto à piaceri rare uolti fa bon fine.
181. La libertà è meza signoria.
182. Quelli che si dolono da lor medesimi sonno befeggiati e alle uolte odono cose che li arencresce e f[a]gnole tacere.
183. Quelli che rompano l'amicitia ben che gli offesi nō possono uendicarsi nō fuggono mai la uendetta de Dio.
184. Quelli che lasciano quel che hanno in mano cō speranza de guadagnare piu sonno pazzi e fuora de raggione.
185. Sonno alcuni che sotto colore de carità consigliano ad altri il propio comodo.
186. E pazzia dimandare aiuto da q:lli che nuocono piu presto che giouar possino.
187. Gli catiui prometono de far benefitio e faño il cōtrario.
188. Sonno alcuni se alle uolte giouano ad alcuno lo fano ben p forza.
189. Non deue l'huomo alegrarsi de q:lli cose li quali à da dolersi.
190. La continueua fatica parturischia gran tesoro.

191. Ogni coşa si fa bene quando si fa al suo tempo.
192. Quel che nõ puo fare l'arte qualche uolta fa la fortuna.
193. Non dobbiamo pensare d'inganare i Dei.
194. Chi considera la sorte humana nelli casi auersi mai si aflaghe.
195. Ben che un sttia in gran pericolo nõ mai uoria morire.
196. Quelli che sonno troppo hauari spesse uolti nocono a lor medesimi.
197. Alle uolti le mente humana è tanta cieca nell'odia che l'huomo nõ cura de morire pur che moia il suo nemico prima de lui.
198. La maggior parte de i pericoli ne quali incoriamo è p ñra caggione e nõ ne accusiamo la fortuna.
199. Un prudento se è gabbato una uolta mai piu nõ si fida de simulatori.
200. Quelli che incorrono pazzamente in qualche disgr[a]tie sonno piu beffeggiati da tutti.
201. Che si orna de cosi d'altri come le perde si conosci qual egli è.
202. Li pazzi nelle prosperità si scordano di lor medesimi e ne gli auuersità si ricordano di q:l che sonno.
203. Quando si deue consigliare un hamico si deue farlo che quando nõ importa è un beffegiarlo.
204. L'huomo saggio niente lassa per fuggire gli pericoli.
205. Il saggio quando si salua d'un pericolo si sa guardare da q:llo.
206. Li prudenti facilmente scropono i consigli de cattiu.
207. L'huomo nõ si deue mettere in mano de nemici se nõ è sicuro de potersi difendre.
208. La bellezza nõ consista in quantità ma in qualità.
209. Apresti l'huomini catiui nõ uale raggioni ne uerità.
210. Nelle prosperità l'huomo nõ si deue molto ralegrare aciò che nõ cade in qualche rouina.
211. Cio che noi desideramo contra li nemici alle uolti cade sopra di noi.
212. Le cose che si faño quando nõ è il suo tempo nõ possono durare.

213. Quanto piu dio è amico a buoni tanto è piu nemico a i catiui.
214. Quando l'ingiuria è granda l'odio mai nõ si può leuare.
215. La presentia de i nemici semp e molesta et è da essere schiuata p che mai nõ puo portare se nõ danno scorne e dishonore.
216. Un huomo prudente deue singere nõ uoler q:lle cose che nõ può conseguire.
217. Un astuto conosce quel che de' seguire et quello deue fuggire.
218. Chi uol far tradimento a suoi dispiace a ogni uno.
219. L'huomini catiui o poco o assai che peccano nõ si uol hauer compassione alcuna.
220. Quelli che nõ usano le commodità presenti p lor ingnoranza le perdono.
221. Non disprezare il consiglio de quei ti ammoniscono.
222. Nelle prosperità l'huomo nõ si deue confidare molto ne anco nelle hauersità atristarsi.
223. È da guardare quando uno ti fa un piacere con chi animo lo fa per che molti sotto ombra de seruir ad altri seruano a se medesimi.
224. Alle uolte regna magior clementia ne li animali brutti che ne gli huomini che nõ hanno altro di buone che il nome.
225. in²⁴ La casa di poueri e maggior libertà che in casa de ricchi.
226. Nõ così è da amarsi la patria se ignobile sei che ad altri luoghi nõ andiamo potendo altroue essere beati.
227. Le picciole incomodità si uogliono ricompensare con l'utilità.
228. Meritamēte si deuan castigare q:lli che cercono far dispiacere a psoni dalli quali nõ haño offeso alcuna.
229. Non douemo fare cosa maggiori delle ñre forze.
230. Non douemo temere i frapatori me q:lli che sonno de puochi parole.
231. Al huomo liberale iddio li dona molte cose accio che ua fidelmente et nõ pensa che la malignità de catiui è semp pronta a mal fare.

²⁴ The word in was inserted after the saying was written, and therefore the L of la is capitalized.

232. Quello che uiua del suo e piu sicuro che q:llo che uiue della robba d'altri.
233. Nõ douemo temere de mutare padroni pur che nõ siano piggiori de primi.
234. La uita dei poueri è piu sicura che quella de ricchi.
235. Nõ ci douemo corucciare con q:lli i quali ci ofendono costretti da altri.
236. Nõ ci deue rincrescere d'esser nati brutti cõcio sia che la bellezza noce il piu delle uolte.
237. Noi nõ douemo temere la morte p cui tutte le miserie e calamità del mondo si dissoluoно.
238. Morto che sia il marito l'amor della doña e passato.
239. Per mostrare le cose pretiose se incita altrui a rapirli.
240. Quel mal che l'huomo si fa da lui medesimo e molto fastedioso.
241. Nõ e al mondo cosa piu misera che l'essere auaro nõ sapendosi pigliare de quel bene che la natura li conciedi.
242. Al huomo liberale Iddio dona molte cose accio che a i molti bisogni possa suuenire.
- [243.²⁵ Noi nõ hauemmo quello arbitrio nelle cose d'altro che ui hanno i padroni.
244. Uane sonno l'insidie delle donne cõ l'huomo prudente.
245. L'huomini hanno d'istimarsi da lor fatti e nõ dal corpo giudicarli.
246. Scostateui da pazzi e quanto da q:lli ui alongati tanto ui acostati a saggi.
247. L'ricchezzi della eredità fanno passare il dolore del padre morto.
248. Un padre di famiglia otioso qualche uolta fà più che nõ faño q:lli che di continueo lauoreno.
249. Le Ricchezzi sonno q:lli che aquistono l'amici anzi nemici uestiti cõ panni d'amicitia gli quali tanto durano quanto utile sentono da te preuenirli.

²⁵ The saying is in brackets. Is it due to its liberal tone?

250. À un huomo falace mai nō douemo dar fede ne perdonargli quando lo potemo ponire.
251. Mai l'huomo nō si deue ralegrare della morta del nemico p che ella e comuna a tutti.
252. Molti laudano quel che e da farsi ma pochi esser ch si metono all'impresa de farlo.
253. Non ci douemo pore a pericolo imprudentemente.
254. Nō dobbiamo credere a sogni tanto piu intorno a q:lle cose che dalla uolentà libera dell'huomo dipēdono.
255. Quanto l'huomo sia inclinato a lodarsi se stesso tentando di quel bene che da iddio li uien dato come da lui dipenda gloriarsi et dal male de' che egli stesso ne e caggione la colpa in altri ritorcere.
256. Quanto puoco frutto facci colui che acongregare si prenda uno che da la natura poco saggio sia in cui la fortuna il piu delle uolte dimostrare uole quanto sia il suo fauore.
257. Quanto li giouani semplici debiano esser acorti p nō esser colti dalle falsce lusinghe delle meretrici.
258. Quelli che se uendicano sonno manco offesi da altri et se gli ha rispetto.
259. Noi soporttiamo i ñri guai patientemēte quando uedemo altri hauer peggio de noi.
260. Per fuggire un pericolo presente spese uolte noi incoriamo in un maggiore.
261. Dobbiamo chiedre aiuto a chi si pò socorere il qual è sol iddio.
262. La uecchiezza nō deue esser dispretiata.
263. Nō si douemo fare amici a coloro che sonno à noiiferenti de costumi.
264. Nelle prosperità molti habbiamo che fanno l'amico i quali se uedono che la fortuna riuolta da noi i piedi coloro nō restono anco de fargli compagnia ma alcuna uolto auuiene che a loro mal grado restono ancora essi in q:lla anersita inuolupati.
265. Quando alcuno cometta errore nō deue acusare la fortuna ne il diauolo ma se medesimo.

266. Nelle corte soño stimati più i cinedi che i uertuosi.
267. Niuna cosa si deue sprezzare quantunque uila p che nō e cosa si picciola e bassa che nō sia buona a un bisogno.
268. Meglio è a morir presto e gloriasamente che uiuere lungo tempo cō uergogna e uituperio.
269. Molti lasciano il uitio p che nō lo possono piu esercitare.
270. Ogni uno deue esser contento dell'arte sue p che p tutto si trouano calamità et angustia e insoportabile desaggi.
271. La gratia che si ha e q:lla p la quale alcuno è grato cosa che nō li auiene solo p l'operare che egli fà.
272. Quanti piu sig:ri habbiamo sopra di noi p la lora tirania tanti più guai necessarie è che habbiamo.
273. Niuno ama tanto altri che uoglia morire p lui.
274. Alcuni fingono che la morte de qualche uno gli rincesca nientedimeno la desiderano sommamente.
275. La pessima qualità de alcuna donna che cio che di bene faño il fanō p il timore nō p carita che egli habbiano.
276. L'huomo nō si deue considerare all'aspetto ma all'opre sue p che alle uolte sotto alla pella d'una pecora e ascoso un Lupe.
277. L'huomo prudente deue star semper a ordine cōtra i nemici.
278. Quando farai piacere al tuo nemico p semp p ti pagará d'ingratitude.
279. Un mal uecino cō ogni incomodità si deue fuggire.
280. Tu nō ti dei mai fare compagni q:lli che nō puoi caciare di casa et che sonno piu potenti di te.
281. L'ingegno supera la uelocità et la forza del corpo.
282. Un huomo etratto e solo quando stà fra gli ingnoranti.
283. L'huomini de catiua nattura rarrissimi uolti si possō leuare da i uicij p alcuna esortatione.
284. Nō douemo combattere cō q:lli che soño piu gagliardi de noi.
285. Niuna cosa è tanto miracolosa che in spatio di tempo nō si pongono in tacere.
286. Niuno nō si deue tanto confidare nella sua grandezza che faccia dispiacere a i poueri con speranza che q:lli nō siano bastanti a uendicarsi.

287. Noi douemo esser cõtēti d̄lle cose ñre e nō desideare q:lle che a noi nō sonno uguali.
288. Douemo hauere pacientia quãdo iddio ci toglia la robba et i fig:li p che a arbitrio de fare maggior cose d'q:ti.
289. La fortuna auersa fa isperientia delli amici.
290. Alcuni uolte si lauda qualche uno nō p honorarlo ma p farlo rouinare in qualche male trouãdo poi q:ti falsi laudatori semp qualche scusa al suo ingaño.
291. Nō douemo giudicare gli huomini secondo l'habito ma secondo la uirtù.
292. Niuno è tanto dure e deficile che nō si plache per li doni.
293. L'huomo sauio deue tentare tutti li uie prima che uenire all'arme.
294. Le cosi utili si deuono propore alle deletteuoli.
295. Noi douemo fare imparare alli ñri fig:li un arte dalla quale possono cauare qualche frutto.
296. Niuno e tanto da puoco che nō sia buono a qualche cosa.
297. Quando i cittadini cattiuu sonno in guerra fra lor lasciano stare i buoni.
298. Come alcuna donna entra in una casa ci entra il fuoco.
299. Siamo semp aparecchiati al ben morire p che nō sapiamo ne il di ne l'ora della ñra morta.
300. Nō debiamo far tesoro qui in terra doue nō è la ñra patria ma nel ciel doue etarnalmēte il goderemo.
301. La fortuna e semper amica a un felice et ancora che egli nō uole gli da le ricchezze et altri beni et è semp nemica al pouero.
302. L'animo deficilmente si può celare che con parole nō si scopra all' uolte massimamēte nelli affetti amorosi.
303. Nisuno sapiente e acetto nella sua patria.
304. Le cose di potenti nō si lodono p uerità ma p timore.
305. Nō dobbiamo disprezare alcuno che egli nō sarà tanto inutile et uano che a qualche ñro bisogno nō ne possi aiutare.
306. Alcuna uolta q:llo che noi pensiamo ce sia daño ci aporta grandinissima utilità et però nō douemo semp dolerci de q:l che ci hauiene quantunque ci mostra spauenteuole.

307. Le Ricchezze nõ si aquistono p lo più senõ con perdita dell'anima e desaggio del Corpo.
308. À tutti i lori fig:li paiano belli benche siano brutissimi.
309. A q:lli che paiano felice nõ douemo hauer inuidia p che alle uolte la felicità e piena de miserij.
310. Quanta e ostinata la natura delli donni li quali p nõ cedere qualche cosa di puoco o niun mumento a loro maggiori nõ si curano de esser fieramēti [per]cossi.²⁶
311. Chi e morso del serpente ha pauura della lucerta.
312. L'huomo deue semp considerare donde possa esser ofeso dal nemico.
313. Meglio e uiuer sicurmente in pouertà che in ricchezza con pauura.
314. Quelli che sonno in trauaglio et pericolo la tardità aiuta.
315. Molti si faño religiosi p uiuere senza fatica.
316. Molti uolti p l'ingratitude che alcuno ha de qualche beneficio riceuuto incorre in q:l medesimo trauaglio di prima onde desideraua esser scacciato fuora.
317. Nõ ci douemo mai fidare de q:lli i quali hauemo offesi.
318. Quelli che nõ obidiscono i suoi parenti capitono male.
319. Quel che si ralegra del mal d'altri qualche uolta pate quel medesimo.
320. Quelli che cercano gabbari li altri nõ si deuono dolere se sonno loro gabbati.
321. L'huomo sauio deue fingere ogni escusatione per leuarsi del furore del tirraño.
322. Se il padrone e negligente in guardare le cose sue nõ die hauer sperāza che i famigliari le guardino.
323. Non douemo giudicare la uirtù d'un huomo dalla grandezza delle parole ne del corpo.
324. Nõ debiamo fondare le ñre speranze in questi cose dal mondo che sonno cosi fralli.

²⁶ MS. obscure; conjecture based on Hebrew paraphrase.

325. L'huomo deue stare auertito de nō cadere in mano de qualche tiranno che nō gli perdoni ne Alla robba ne alla uita unde ne causi lutto a se stesso et a i suoi amici.
326. Li pazzi p leuarsi un peso da dosso se ne metono un maggiore.
327. Niuno dura fatica senza speranza d'alcun premio.
328. Douemmo temere piu i quietti e taciti che i parabolani che brauano de parole.
329. Niuna cosa indebolisce i soldati piu che il coito e la desuetudine del combattore.
330. Quanto uno è piu benifitio meno può tollerare la ingiuria.
331. Quelli che pigliono moglie incorrono in gran pericolo.
332. Che tutto uole tutto perde.
333. Douemmo imparrare le scienze liberale accio che siamo tenuti in prezzo.
334. Il più delle uolte il perdonare noce più al mal fattore che la uendetta che cōtra d'esso si pensa fare.
335. Nō si deue domandare addio se nō q:l che a lui piace p che qualche uolta domandiamo cosa che sonno contra de noi.
336. Quelli che uogliono contendere cō i maggiori di loro oltra che nō possono figli uguali spesso danno da ridere alli altri.
337. Molti cercano far piacere a lor nemici per ricōcigliarseglio.
338. L'huomo spesse uolte p cupidigia di guadagno ua in pericolo della uita.
339. Coloro como se dice p prouerbio si sforzano tener un piede in due staffe et al'ultimo ne in q:ta ne in q:lla lo ferma.
340. Alcuni uolendosi liberare da un pericolo mediocoro cascano in un maggiore.
341. La libertà e sopra ogni altra cosa pretiosa et amabile.
342. Quello che con la forza del corpo ci e uietato de fare deua si con l'ingegno.
343. Douemo esser contenti da doni da Dio dateci et dalla natura.
344. L'huomo prudente deue considerare nō solamēte il tempo presente ma ancora il future.

345. Il male 'si a d'atribuire a quello il qual ne e causa.
346. È manco male soferire l'ingiuria d'un solo che uolendo q:llo ponire farsi molti nemici.
347. Quelli che uogliono prendere ognà cosa spesse uolte appena pigliano il puoco.
348. L'instabilità de li huomini i quali sogliano antepore le cose nuoue ancora che siano piggiori alli uecchie.
349. Dobiamo patientemente tolerare le batteturi de maestri p che sogliono essere causa de molti beni.
350. La liberta della uita esser d'antepore a tutti li delicij de q:to mondo.
351. Nō uogliamo ricercare q:lle cose che ne sonno negati dalla natura.
352. Nō si deuono giudicare l'huomini dall'abito ma de le opre p che molti sotto uestimenti de pecore sonno lupi rapaci.
353. Le cose troppo afretati nō sonno durabili.
354. Quãdo uno e in pericolo dell' uita nō si a da consumare il tempo in ciãce ma si a d'aiutare piu presto che si puo.
355. Chi a patito mali graui teme ancora i ligieri.

IL FINE

בשם השם

אמר המחב'

מתוקה שנה העובד הבורא מאהבה, ואשר בחייו רדף אחר עבודתו ית"ש בחבה, וכעבד העובד אדוניו בלי תקוה, ושלא על מנת לקבל פרס ומתנה, אם מעט ואם הרבה, אשר שמר ועשה, מהמצות והחקים אשר נצטוה, יאכל ויערן מזיו תאר השכינה, בעולם שכולו עונג ושמחה, ובחיים נצחיים ובמנוחה רבה, והשבע ורכיו הדיעה מחכמ' התורה, לעשיר בבינה ובמדע ובכל חכמה, אינו מניח הנוף מובדל מהצורה, בכלל אשר הובא שם למטרה, לישן שנת קבע עד עת התחייה, כי שפחותיו דובכות שם בתורה, כמו שעשה כל ימי חייו אשר חיה, וזה לך המעיין האות והראיה, על דברי אשר עדן אונך שמעה, מדעת אנקלוס הגר בוצינא קדישא, אשר תרגם הפסוק אשר התחלתי ההקדמה, ע"ד האמת והקבלה, כפי אשר אמרנו בלי חסירתא ויתירתא, שתרגם בסימת דמיכת נברא די פלח למרי עלמא²⁷ דרוק ושכח ותמצא, ותבא עליך ברכה, אם כן איפה ראוי לנועיר מתרדמת הילדות, כי כולו הוללות וסכלות, ולחזק בקרנות מעלת החכמות, אשר יהיו לבעליהם מעלה וכבוד, וכל אדם צריך לבדוק עד שירו מנעת, ועד אשר יניע עיני השכל והדעת, כפי אשר נשמע לו מאת הבורא, ובוה מן השמים יורוהו את אשר יעשה, כי הבא לטהר מסייעין אותם, ופוקחין עיני שכלו כפי תאותו, וממלאין חשקו ורצון תשוקתו, בחכמה ובשכל כאשר תשיג ידו, ללמוד וללמד לדעת ולהורות, ולחבר חבורים ע"צ הנאות, לתועלת המבקש דרך אמונה, ואת פני מבין חכמה, ולזהות כי חפשתי מצאתי הון לי, יקר מכספי ויתר זהבי, ה"ה דברי תוכחת מוסר ומשלים, למראה נאים וליופי נחמדים, בלשון וכתיבה נוצרית, אשר חברו מחוסר ברית, אמרתי לא טוב היות דבר של תועלת ומעלה, בלשון וכתיבה בלתי שלמה, ובוה העתקתי דבריו התועלתיים, בעט סופר ולשון למודים, ובלשון הקדש הנקרא אשורית, כדי שיהיה מובן לכל רב ותלמיד, וקראתי את שמו אדרת אליהו כי הבאי' אליו ישמעו ויראו ועל שמי כי כן נקרא אני הצעיר והנכנע אליה, כן לסמא דכולא בה, כ"ת א"א מ"צ מנחם רבא, וכמו שהאדרת הוא מעיל ומעטה, וכסות אשר האדם בו יתכסה, להציל ולהגן עצמו מצינתה של כימה, אשר ישלוט עליו בימי הקור בחימה, כן ראוי ומתוויב לכל נברא, לעטוף במעיל זה הנורא, אשר מזהיר האדם ומוכיחו, ויורה הדרך הראוי לילך בו, ויצילוהו ממדות הפחותות והמגונות, וילמדוהו ארח חיים ומעלות המדות, כפי אשר עיני המעיין יראה, ויקבע אותו בשכל ובפה, ולאיש אשר אלה לו יאכל ויערן בעולם אור כולו, ויזכה לראות נחמת ישראל, בבא לציון גואל, ויבנה בית הבחירה, ונשמח בבית השואבה בכ"א.

וסי' לדבר כי אדרת עולה תר"ה ועם מספר אותיות שם הספר שהוא אדרת אליה שהם שמונה עולה למספר תר"ג כנגד התרי"ג מצות וזה להורות כי דברי הספר אינן נגד כוונת תורתנו הקדושה, אך הוא סייג ומגן לכל המצות ושמו יוכיח.

ראה זה חדש הוא כבר היה לעולמים בלשון
נצרי חברו המחבר הנקרא בשם
איסופו מפרגיו נצרי אשר דבר משלים הרבה לאין
קץ, ובסערא דשמיא מרומא עילאה אעתקנו בלשון אשורית.

ואשא משלי ואומר

אפתח נא שפתי

- א. יש לאדם להבין אחרית דבר מראשיתו. שרם במלאכה יתחיל לשלח ידו.
- ב. אינו דומה יופי הנשמה השכלית. ליופי היולית הגוף החומרית.
- ג. אם הכסילים ישנו מקום דירתם. לא על זה ישנו רוע מעלילותם.
- ד. כל הרברים באהדות ואהוד יפרו וירבו. ובמחלוקת ואיבה ישחיתו ויחריבו.
- ה. העושר והממון הם לאדם סבות. להרחיקו מפעולות הטובות.
- ו. אם נסתיר חטאתינו מחברינו. לא נסתירם מהאל כי הוא לבדו רואנו.
- ז. רחק מחבורת האהובי אשר ירחקו ממך. ובצרתך ינוסו ללא עורך.
- ח. מי שלעת המצטרך לגבורים ממנו יודה. הנה ימצא חועלת הרבה.
- ט. החטא יותר כאב נמרץ. הוא המסית המלך להרע ויעץ.
- י. פעמים הרבה הנזק והחסרון. יהיה לאדם משל ורמיון.
- יא. הנואף והמנאפת יצטרכו לתוכחת.
- יב. מי שמנית אומנותו הרגיל בו. ומתחיל דבר אשר לא ידע עשותה כהלכתו. מטיל עצמו בסכנה לרעתו.
- יג. בני אדם יחכמו וישכילו בינה. עם הנזק ורוב הסכנה.
- יד. החבורה התמידית מסבב סיבה. שהפעולה גדולה נראה נוחה וקלה.
- טו. ממדות ודרכי החכמים. לשמוע חרפתם ואינם משיבים. מאשר לא יהיו להם קרובים, כשיראו כי נ"כ איש לרעהו מחרפים.
- טז. מי שיש לו תמונת הגוף נאה. יודע חסרונו בשכל ובנשמה.
- יז. עם הכסילים ובלתי מדרגה. אין ראוי לילך עמם בחבורה.
- יח. במקום שיוכיחו מעשים. אין ראוי להרכות דברים.
- יט. אין דבר מן הבורא נסתר. וגם לראותו מי יוכל.
- כ. מי שמנית מה שקנה. כדי להרכות ברווחה. סכלותו גדולה וטמא טמא יקרא.
- כא. המושפע בהון יתחייב להשפיע לאחרים. ומהונו יפזר ויעזור דלים.
- כב. התרחק מן המדברים אחד בפה ואחד בלב. וגם מאשר אמר בזה אולי לא אדע דבר.
- כג. התרחק מן האנשים אשר יזיקו למיודעיהם. כי גם לך יזיקו ותאבד עמהם.
- כד. מי שסורו רע כאשר ירבה טוב טעם תאותו. כן ירבה וכן יפרוץ רעתו ורשעתו.
- כה. סבול הרע והנזק אשר יקרך. כשהמסכבו גם הוא ייצר בצערך.
- כו. פעמים יחשב אדם לצוד זולתו. ויהפך המחשבה וילכד הוא ברשתו.
- כז. הכסיל לאולתו לא ידע לכלכל את עצמו. ולפעמים ירצה לעשות את אשר אינו מועיל לו.
- כח. כשהמלך והשר יהיה אכזר. ישוממו העם ויהיו כעפר.
- כט. השוע לגדול מדת כלייתו. יאנה אלוהי אם יהיה ביכולתו.
- ל. מי שבתחילת הרעתו לא נתוכח. תדע כי כן יירע ויאמר האח.

- לא. אין מי שבחכמתו ינצל, ממקרה הזמן והמול.
- לב. אין להתעצב על אברת העושה, כי אין זה קנין הכושר.
- לג. יש מי שמבטיח דבר לחבירו, והנה אין ידו משנת לעשותו.
- לד. עושה פעולותיו בלא תבונה, לא תסתייעא מילתא.
- לה. המשכיל יצפון עצמו מאויביו, ויניחם לעוים וגבורי ויקלו מעליו.
- לו. טורח האדם ועמלו, לפעמים יכנס לחבירו.
- לז. כשהתחלת מלאכה לעשות, אל תעובנה בידים רפות.
- לח. אין להמליך מלך ביופיו, אך לטוב מעשיו וצמח פרויו.
- לט. החכם ישב תמיד למטרה, לעת המצטרך ויהיה לעורה.
- מ. הבסיל כדי להשיג השנה קטנה, ישים עצמו בגודל הסכנה.
- מא. מי שלבושו מעטה בושה, לא יועיל תוכחת לתרופה.
- מב. מי שיש לו כלי ואינו פועל בו, הוא כאילו לעולם לא בא לידו.
- מג. בלכידת העיר ובשבית שללחה, העניים ינוסו והעשירים ילכדו בה.
- מד. רבים מאשר לא שמעו אל דברי חכמי וחידותם, גללו עליהם רע בגלל הילוך אחרי שרירות לבם הרע.
- מה. לפעמים הדברים מועילים נראים ניווקים, והניזוקי לפעמים נראים מועילים.
- מו. יש מרחיק עצמו מנוק הקל, והנה בכבוד ממנו הנו נכשל.
- מז. משלם רעה תחת טובה, בוראו יפרע ממנו בחולי ודאנה.
- מח. יש מי שמחניף לירא מהאויב, והנה טמן רשת אשר בה אויבו ילכד.
- מט. המתפללים הישרים אשר הם החסידים, על הנוק והרע אשר יקבלו מהאויבים יודי לאל ותפלה אליו עורכים.
- נ. אין לרומם דבר לטוב תואר יופיה, אך מצד שלימותה ותמימו' ויזה.
- נא. המבקש לאונות אוהבו, הוא יתחיל לישא בעונו.
- נב. מי שטבעו רע כל הימים, לא יצאו ממנו כי אם רוע מעללים.
- נג. מי שיארום על חבירו רק רע, הוא יפול בפחו ויכשל ויפגע.
- נד. אין להמשך אחד חומר תאות העבירה, כי יצרו הרע יסיתו להרע וימשול עליו להבא.
- 28 נה.
- נו. טבע האדם יאהב הבטלות, והנה הוא איפשרי²⁸ רע והוללות.
- נז. כח הגוף וגבורתו, טובה מזיו פניו ומראיתו.
- נח. כשהאדם בייסורין יצטער, לבו יחזק ואל ימר.
- נט. העושה דבר ועתו עבר, כאוכל פנה ולבישולה לא ישמר.
- ס. עצת אדם תסלף דרכו, ויגלגל עליו רעה כפי דעתו.
- סא. יש בושה ומבטיח לעשות גדולות, ולא יוכל לשמור הקטנות.
- סב. יתחייב לאדם לשלם נמול תודות, למי שעשה לו חסדים וטובות.
- סג. מי שלטוב ולרע לא נתוכח, אהבתו לא ישלם ולא יורח.
- סד. מי שהרגיל עצמו למלאות תאוה, יותר נקל יומת מלשנות רוע טבעו.
- סה. הבסיל לכסלותו לא ינקם מאויביו, ויתרחק כשונאים חבורת אוהביו.
- סו. יש ירא ומפחיד מאויבו, והנה ימצא אוהב אורב לו יותר לרעתו.

- סז. מדינה ועיר בלי יועץ וחכם חרשים, דומים לצאן שאין להם רועים.
- סח. אוהב השקר ודובר הכזב, יחשב בדבריו לטעות כל שומעיו.
- סט. חומר התאיה וגוף החמדה, טורד³⁰ האדם מרעה אל רעה.
- ע. כל המתנאה ולבו עליו יכבד, מיודעיו ירחיקוהו ויבזו ויקל.
- עא. נער ערום מחכמה אין להוכיחו, אך קרוביו אשר היה מוטל עליהם ללמדו.
- עב. מהדברים הקטנים הגדולים ייגלו, ומהמעשים הוודאים הספקים ידעו.
- עג. המניח אומנותו הרגיל בו ועוסק בזולתו, אל יתמה אם ישחית וירע מזלו.
- עד. את אשר יניח מעשות צרכיו בעבור אחרים, כדי יהיה לחוב את עצמו בסכנים (!) גדולים.
- עה. הרבה מהמלמדים דעת במדרשים, יחשבו עצמם לחכמי גדולים, וכאשר יצאו ממסגר לרחובות ושווקים, כסלותם יגלה ולכלום יהיו נחשבים.
- עו. את אשר יתי לחכם טוב ונאות, לכסיל יהיה ראש ומר ולענות.
- עז. רוב האנשים הרודפים זימה, הם בלי חרפה וכלימה.
- עה. יש שיתאב יותר להתענג במעט שלה, מתשע קבין של חבירו.
- עט. האויל בדברי חניפותו, יעשיק חכם ונכון בכסלותו.
- פ. לוחם את לוחמו, חוקים ממשלות ידיו, נבזה יהיה וילכד בפח רגליו.
- פא. את אשר ניהנו להרע בטבע ובהנהגה, אף אם ישנה מקו לא יהיה למכתם רפואה.
- פב. טוב לפעמים לשנות הטבע אשר ערן היה, כפי הצורך מהטובה או מהתחלואה.
- פג. יש אנשים שלכאורה נראים עוים וחזקים, ואם תנסם יגרע כחם ולא ירים.
- פד. אין לדרוף אחר ריוח ממון, כשיסתבן מצרה וכל יגון.
- פה. את אשר נוכח מן המעשה, לעולם יהיה ולא ישתנה.
- פו. הרבה מהכסילים לזרים נראים חכמים, אך כשישמעו דבריהם נתקן לאוילים.
- פז. הפועלים רעה בלבם ובלשונם, הכרת פניהם יענה בם.
- פח. הפורשים רשת ללכד חברים, הם יפלו וילכדו ברשתם.
- פט. מי שהוא אכזרי עם חבריו, לא יועיל הון ומתנה לשנות מדותיו.
- צ. הדברים שהם עמוקים לעשותם, ימציאו כרגילות ובתמידותם.
- צא. מי שירגיש לראשונים שיעלכוהו, לא יבואו עוד אחרים כדברים ויבזוהו.
- צב. יש משמחתו פועל פעולה בלי עצה, והנה משים עצמו בסכנה עצומה.
- צג. אין בעבדים נאח וחדל אישים, כמוליד בנים הרבה וינחילם לאדונים.
- צד. יש מסתכל ברעת חבירו, ומרחיק עצמו והוא יהיה לנס לו.
- צה. יש אנשים סכלים אשר יועילו לאויבים, ויזיקו גם ישחיתו קמת אוהבי'.
- צו. העול המניע מהקרוב ומהאה, הוא יותר מזיק ונאנח.
- צז. מי שידבר דבר ולא יוכל להנסה, לא ישמעו דבריו כי לא נסה בזה.
- צח. יש לו לאדם לשמח בחלקו הווה, מלתור אחר המותרות וילאה.
- צט. אין לעשות פעולה מהפעולות, ולדבר החפץ ושקר הכובות.
- ק. יש אנשים שידם עזה לגבורים, ועליה' יגבר קטני' נבזי' ומאוס'.
- קא. מהאבן היקרה נכיר החכמה, ומהתרנגול חושב הרשע לעשות רעה, כי לא יאהב הרשע דעת בינה, ולא ידע למה יועיל ולמה.

- קב. כמו שנקל מהרה נמצא המקל כדי להכות הכלב, כמו כן הניבור ימצא עילה וסיבה בשירצה להזיק לך ולא רוב.
- קג. הננידים כאשר יתאו כלם למלכות, ישימו עצמם בסכנה ובאלמנו' חיות.
- קד. אין להניח דבר אשר לא יפול עליו ספק, על דבר אשר תכליתו יסתפק.
- קה. הנאמנות לעולם היתה מדה טובה, ולנבורים העוים לעד כן היה, הן אמת טוב להתחבר עם כלם באהור, כי העומר עם העוים ממנו בנבורה, הנו גם ממנו יוציאנו במהרה, ועם בן גילו המשפט יהיה כדון וכשורה.
- קו. את אשר תעשה להנאת כילי וכסיל, הנה אכרת יגיעך כי כל זה לא יועיל.
- קז. יש אנשים אשר תיקר נפשם בעיניך, והם יזיקו לך ויבקשו להאבירך.
- קח. אין לדבר ולעשות נבלות, כשנשמע דבר אשר לא יאות, כי הכסיל ישמח בנילות, כשישמע החכם פורץ נדרות, ונדמה לסוסים כשהכלבים נובחים להם בקולות, מבוים אותם בקלונות ובחרפות.
- קט. העושר נראה לאדם טוב וערב, אך הוא מלא סכנות ורעיון לב.
- קי. אין להאמין דברי כל המדברים, אם לא יהיו נבונים וחכמים.
- קיא. יש אנשים אשר יאהבו האודאות והשבחים, ובחרפתם ישובו ויחברו עם כסלים ואולים.
- קיב. כשמוזלך טוב ותרבה נכסים, אל יתנאה לבך בהבלים, כי אם המזל ישתנה כפי הימים, אשר נזקת עתה ישיבו לך מרורי, וקרב אוהביך לעד ולעולמים כי יהיו לך לנס ולמגינים, אשר לא כן אוכלים בשולחנך למעדנים, כי כשירע מזלך ותאבד יפנו עורף ולא פנים.
- קיג. לא יחשוב אדם מלאכה לעשות. כאשר יראה כי לא נסה עוד בזאת.
- קיד. לפעמים אדם נבור בנבורים, יצטרך לאנשים נכאים ושפלים.
- קיז. הבורא יקשיב לתפילת הצדיקים, ויטרף שאלת ורצון הכסילי.
- קטו. יש אשר לאולתם לא ישאלו עצה, ולא ישמעו ללומדים אותם בינה, וכשהם בסכנה וצרה עצומה, תולים החסרון בסכלות אשר עדן היה, ואומרים זאת המחשבה היתה יותר נכונה.
- קיו. ההמון הרב דומה לדבריהם לצפרדעים, אשר המליכו עליהם מלך שומר אמונים, ואומ' כי הוא נכזה וחרל אישים, ומשבחים³¹ את אשר היה לעולמים, וזה כי ישנאו הדברים ההוו' ויאהבו ויחקרו אתרי הדברים החדשים.
- קיא. כל איש מרוע מזלו מדבר שקר כזבים, ויש מחפש החדש והישן מפני החדש מתאווים.
- קיט. הסתכל שלהשגת מעט טובה לא תאבד שלוח נכונה, ואל תאמין לדברי המדבר בטובה, כי יחניף לך ותוכו מלא מרמה, כי לא לבד ידברו לך דברי נחמה, אך יראו לך פנים טוב מראה.
- קכ. יש אנשים אשר יתנו כוחותם לך נתונים, והנה לא יעשו זה לתועלתך אך לתועלתם הם עושים.
- קכא. אין לירא מדבר בלי סיבה, כי לפעמים היראה קשה מן הסכנה.
- קכב. הרבר היותר נחשק מבני אדם, הוא הטוב ההוה ובריות קיים.

- קבנ. גבורת הנפש בכל דבר יהיה שלטון. והאימנות תתקיים בלי הבטחון. והבטחון על האימנות שליט וארון.
- קבר. ראוי וטוב לבן לשמוע לדבריו הורים, וכמו כן חוייב לשמוע אל דבריו זקנים.
- קבה. המבקש לאימות חבירו ברכילות ובמרמות. אל יתמה אם יעשו לו כאשר זמם הוא לעשות.
- קבו. לכל משקר ומכזב דבריו אל תאמין. והמוחל עלבונו ושותק הוא מדת מאמין. ומי שמשגיח על מעשיו הוא חכם מבין.
- קבו. השחוק והלצנות יגררו דומהו. והצחוק והכסלות ישחיתו בעליות. והעושה מרמה רעה תבואהו.
- קבח. לא יאית לאנשים להתגאה בנאותו יתירה. מאשר הם חיים והולכי' על פני האדמה.
- קבט. כל אדם משיג שביל מהמדות. יש אשר יופייו גדול וגם נאותו. ויש אשר גופו יחזק ויאמץ באילות. ויש אשר השיגה ידו עושר רב והוני'. ומי שהשיג חברים גבורי' אנשי מלחמות. וכל אדם יהיה שמח בחלקו ממה שהגיע לו אלו מהמדות. ואין להלחם עם חבירו בשביל קנאות אשר יקנא אליו מאשר קנה עד הנה מהטובו'.
- קל. הנה שמירת האדם מאויבו הוא דבר נקל. אבל הוא מסוכן שמיר' אוהב אשר לו פנים קלקל.
- קלא. יש אשר בשלוחם מהצניעות לא יזכורו. ובהצלחתם בנדר כילי ושוע יעמודו. ובהתהפכות הזמן הטוב יפלו ויכשולו. וכאשר מולם יהפך ממ[ו]נס ישמרו וישתנו למדת הכילות ולא יעבורו. וטוב מהן אשר בשלוח ערן לא זוכו כי לא יגעו לריק ולא לבחלה יעסוקו. כאלה היום אשר כל מגמתם לקבץ ולא יפסקו.
- קלב. המניח ועווב אוהבו בעת צרתו. לא יזכה לראות בשמחת נחמתו.
- קלג. הקנא' מלאה נזק ולענה ומר'. יריע אף יצריח על בעליו יתגבר.
- קלד. את אשר הוא דבר להתרחק נחפש אותה בשכל ובחכמה. וראוי נתאזהר להגיע אל האושר הטוב מבלי נדע את מקומה. ואין לתמיה אם שלותינו לא תהיה לה תקומה. כאשר לא נרדוף הדרך הטובה והישרה.
- קלה. הסתכל אל אשר תרצה להזיק ולא רוב. כי אם ממך יהיה יותר גבור. לא אליו תזיק. אך עליך הגורל יפול.
- קלו. סכל יקרא מאנשים. את אשר ערן שמר נפשו מאויבים. והנה לסוף נפל ביד מרעים. ויוקדחו לחיותו בלי עוזרים.
- קלז. הסתכל אל אשר תטיב ותועיל. כי יש מרעים אשר קבלו מהם רב להועיל.
- קלח. התקשרות והתחברות יחד האיברים. הוא מוכרח כי כל אבר יתקין עבוד האחרים. וכמו כן כל חבר יצטרך לאוהבים. כי על כן ראוי לעזור עניי דלים. כי לא העושר לבדו האדם ישרים. אך שלימותו הוא חבורת החברים.
- קלט. הרבה הם המוצרכי' האביונים. וגם יש אשר להם העושר עירפים. אבל לא ימצא עשיר בעשירים. אשר מעדפו יעזור ויתן לדלים.

- קמ. בסכנה גדולה יש יגיעה להנצל, כי כשמוזל רע יתחיל על אדם להתגבר לא ירפנו עד סופו אשר יפרד, או עד אשר לא יוכל לפתח פה לדבר.
- קמא. אל תביט אל טוב נעימות הדברים, אך הסתכל אל מעשה המדבריי.
- קמב. הן העני אשר בעושר לא נסה, יהיה חיים נעימים בלי אונס וצרה, אבל אם יתעשר והונו ירבה, לא ישמח בחלקו וימלא תחבולות ומחשבה.
- קמג. יש לוחם נגד דלי הענייות, וכשיגברו עליהם יהיו עבדים לעשירות.
- קמד. מהנשר העשירים הגבירים והגדולים, ידברו נבלה ויפצו פה כנגד עניים, ולפעמים גם הם יבקשו לנקום מהצרים, ויקחו שללם אשר טרפו מידם העשירים.
- קמה. את אשר יילך בעקבות הפועלים רעות, הגם כי הוא נקי ומתור מסוגות, עיניו רב ויענש כפועליו בעונשים רבות.
- קמו. הרשע כשירצה ליסר לך ולהזיקך, נקל ימצא סיבה ולא יירך.
- קמז. העני' הם מעושקי' מן העשירים, בדברי שקרים ועדות כוזבים.
- קמח. אל תאמין לכל פוצה פיו לדבר, כי יש מראה להועיל ולהרע ימר.
- קמט. מי שהרגיל עצמו לשקר, כאשר האמת והנכון גם יאמ', לא יאמינו לדבריו אשר ידבר.
- קנ. יש לו לאדם להתנהג בטבע כפי מסת ידו הצעירה, ולא יעשה את אשר רואה אחריו עושי' נקל מהרה, אך כפי אשר יוכלו כוחותיו להגיע לא יותר ולא רבה.
- קנא. הרבה יש מהאנשים שמעטם לבוש קנאה, ולא יניחו לעשות לאחרים את אשר יוכלו הם להוציא לאורה.
- קנב. לאיש רך הלבב וחכם נבון, נקל יחרפה בחרפה ובכיוון, אך לאיש גבור ועז כרמון אל ישלח ידו בו כסיל ושנעון.
- קנג. את אשר מהנאלקים ניתן נקבל ברצון ובשמחה, כי כל אשר הוא עושה הוא במדה במשקל ובמשורה.
- קנד. במקום אשר יגרע הכח והגבורה, יצטרך למלאות בדעת ובשכל ובונה.
- קנה. הנה דבר קשה להוכיח את אשר הזקינו במדה רעה, כי התיכחה בחיק הבחורים ינוח ויאות לעשותה תכף העבירה, כי יותר נקל ישמעו אז אשר לא נעשית להם עוד כהיותר וכשורה.
- קנו. חייב למקבל חסד וטובה, לשלם למסכבו שבת והודאה.
- קנז. אין שלם בשלמים כמלמד דעת מאחרים.
- קנח. הזמן והמקום יועילו הרבה, לחדל אישים ובניה אשר יבוזה.
- קנט. העבדים יתאוו לבעליהם הראשונים, כאשר מהם ימצאו יותר קשים ורעים.
- קס. את אשר להמון הם נחשבי' שקטיו' הם בהפך דעת החושבים.
- קסא. לא כל אשר ידברו דברים טובים נחשבים איהבים, כי יש מהם אשר תחתיהם יצפנו סם מר כלענים.
- קסב. כל איש ייטב בעיניו יותר חלקו, כאמר' ו'ל חן מקח על מקחו.
- קסג. כאשר אנחנו נעלה בכח ובגבורה, ראוי לזכור מימי הזקנה כי היא חלושה.
- קסד. לאיש נרכא רוח אין לרכאו, ולהוסיף עוד על צעריו.
- קסה. לא תוכיח חברך, במום אשר בך.

- קסו. יש מהמתנאים אשר יחשבו עצמם לפאר ולכבוד, והנם לחרפה ולמשסה בשוק וברחובות.
- קסו. טוב להתנהג ולחיות עם חבר בנוזרה שוה. מאיש גבור יעיר קנאה וישים עצמו בסכנה.
- קסח. אין להלעיג שום אנוש ולבוזותו. כי הטבע נתן לכל אדם מעלה הראויה לו, ומי שאין לו מעלותיו, אולי יש לו אחרת כי לא יגרע ויחסר ממדרגותיו.
- קסט. אין יתר³² תקועה וחזקה כהאחרות. והמחלוקת הוא מוכן לחלשות.³³
- קע. להיות כי יתעצלו האנשים בפעלם בעד אחרים, כשנרצה לפעול פעולה טוב לנו להיות הממצאים.
- קעא. מה יותר רע ושקוף מהכילות, והקנאה סכל שמות והוללות, כי אשר יותר מלאחרים יזיק וישחית, רעה רבה עליו יתאוה ויתמיד.
- קעב. את אשר לא תוכל לעשות בכח ובחזקה, תעשהו בחכמה ודעת ובמומה.
- קעג. כל אדם יש לעשות כל יכולתו, כדי לפאר ולגדל את פעילותו.
- קעד. לפעמים יהיו נאנאים ומוטעים, המורגלים לאינאות ולהטעות אחרים.
- קעה. יש אשר הם כל כך משוגעים, כי בשום חכמה ובשכל לא יוכלו עשות לו תרופים.
- קעו. יש אשר עושים מעשיהם בסכלות ובהלות, אשר מהם נלמד שאין להם השגחה ותחירות.
- קעז. אין לבנות האויב ולחרפהו. הנם שיהיה קטן ושפל מראהו.
- קעה. הנדרים השעמים לא יועילו כאין, כי הבורא לא יטה להם אונים, אבל יצטרך שתעזור אתה בכחך, וכמו כן בוראך יסעדה ויעזרה.
- קעט. לפעמים הבן אשר אינו אהוב מהקרובים, מטהו יציק ויפרח מהנאהב לרחוקים.
- קפ. להיות היטב צריך לעמול בעבודות, כי איש רב שעיומו³⁴ ינתן לתענוג ולרווחות, ולפעמים הרבה יעשה אחרית טוב ונוראות.
- קפא. החפשיות חצי מלכות.
- קפב. האנשים אשר יכאבו מעצמם משוקצים יהיו, ולפעמים שומעים דברים אשר ירגזון ויחשו.
- קפג. המפירים האהבה גם כי הניזוק לא יוכל להתנקם, לא ינוס מנקמת אלקים אשר יכם.
- קפד. המניחים חלקם אשר השיגה ידם, בכטחה שיסגה ריווחם, כסילים יחשבו וחוק מן הרין הבטחתם.
- קפה. יש אשר מראים לעשות חסד גמול לעם, ויועצים אחרים את רצונם וכונתם.
- קפו. הנה הוא הוללות עזר לשאול, מאשר יזיק יותר נקל מהועיל יכול.
- קפז. הרעים יבטיחו לעשות הטובות, ועושים הפך מההבטחות.
- קפח. יש אשר אם לפעמים יועילו לשום אדם, יפעלו בהכרח לא בתמימות ויושר לבם.
- קפט. אין לשמוח מן הדברים, אשר הם ראויים לאיניות ואבלים.
- קצ. התמידית שעבוד³⁵ ועבודה, יוליד אוצר מה מאוד רבה.
- קצא. כל דבר נעשה כראוי לו, כאשר עשוי אל זמנו.

- קצב. את אשר לא יוכל הטבע לעשות, לפעמים יעשה אותה רוע המקרות.
 קצנ. אין לחשוב במחשבה, לרמות שוכן מעונה.
 קצר. המבין דרך המין האנושי ומנהגו, במקרים הפכיים לא יגור רעה לו.
 קצה. הגם שאחר עומד בסכנה גדולה, לעולם לא יבחר לו המיתה.
 קצו. האנשים אשר הם כלים, לפעמים מוּקִים לעצמם ומרעים.
 קצו. לפעמים השכל האנושי הוא כל כך עמום ומעורר בשנאה, כי לא יתפעל מלמות, כשיגוע שונאו קודם בא עליו התחלואה.
 קצה. רוב הצרות אשר אנו נלכדים בהם, הם בסכחינו ולא בסבת המקרה הרע.
 קצט. החכם אשר פעם אחד יהיה מעושק ומאונה, לעולם לא יאמין לחנף ולכסיל מתעה.
 ר. אשר יקרו בסכלותם בצרה ותחלואים, הם יותר משוקצים ומכולם הם נבזים ומאוסים.
 רא. המעטה ערי של אחרים, כשיאבדו יודע מי הוא ולא יערים.
 רב. הכסילים בהצלחתם שוכחים מעצמם, וברעתם ושונם זוכרים את מדרגותם.
 רג. ראוי ליעץ האוחז בעת המצטרף, כי בעת שאין לו צורך הוא כמתלוצץ.
 רד. החכם והמבין אין מניח שום דבר, כדי לנוס מן הסכנה ומהמר.
 רה. הדעתן כשינצל מהסכנה, יוהר ממנה פעם שנייה.
 רו. החכמים בנקל בלי מעיקים, מגלים עצות הרעים.
 רז. אין לאדם למסור עצמו ביד האויב, אם לא יהיה בטוח ממנו להנצל.
 רח. הופי לא ישלם בכמות, אלא בגדולת האיכות.
 רט. עם האנשי' רעי' וחטאים, לא יועיל דין ומשפט ודברי' נאמני'.
 רי. בההצלחה אין לאדם לשמוח כל כך, כדי שלא יפול באיזה מכשול ופח ויאנח.
 ריא. כל דבר שאנו מתאווים נגד האויב, לפעמים יפול עלינו לאורב.
 ריב. הדברים הנעשים חוץ וזמנם, אין להם העמדה ולאין קיומם.
 ריג. כאשר יותר הבורא אוהב הטובים, כמו כן הוא שונא יותר את הרעים.
 ריד. כאשר העולבים הם גדולים, השנאה לא יסור לעולם מן הנעלבים.
 רטו. פרקנים של האויבים לעולם היא מוקת, והוא ראוי להיות משוקצת, כי לעולם לא יהיה אלא נוק, חרפה ובזיון טיט ורפש.
 רטז. איש נבון יש לו לשקץ ולתעוב, הדברים אשר לא יוכלו לשום לאור.
 ריז. הערוע יודע את אשר ראוי לעשות, ואת אשר ראוי לנוס ממנו ולדחות.
 ריח. העושק ומצר לקרוביו, שקוק ומותעב הוא ממידעיו.
 ריט. הרעים החוטאים בין רב בין מעט שיחטאו, אין לרחם ולחמול עליהם אם יאבדו.
 רכ. את אשר לא יתענונו במנוחה ההוה, בכסלותם יאבדו הכל קל מהרה.
 רכא. אין לשקץ העצה היעוצה, מאנשי דעת ומרבי תוכחה.
 רכב. בההצלחה אין לאדם לבטוח ולרבות שמחה, וכמו כן לא ידאג כל כך בבא עליו הצרה.
 רכג. יש לך להבין כאשר איש יפעל אליך טובה, באיזה נפש ודעת עושה אותה הטוב. כי יש רבים אשר מראים לעשות לאחרים שרות ועבודה, ולא להם אך לעצמם יעסקו ויאבדו לב מתנה.

- רכד. לפעמים ימשול יותר מעלה בחיות מכוערות, מאשר יהיה באנשים אשר אין להם שום טוב וזלת השמות.
- רכה. בבית דלי העניים והאביונים, יש יותר חפשויות מבית העשירים.
- רכו. קטני המנוחות והמרגיעות, ראוי להשוותם אל הערכות והתועלות.
- רכח. יאות ליסר אותם אשר להרע מבקשים, לאנשים אשר לא נזקק לשום אדם לעד ולעולמים.
- רכט. אין לעשות שום דבר, גדול מכחינו אשר לנו נמסר.
- רל. אין לירא מהאנשים מרבים דברי לצון, אך מאשר לא יפצו פה ולשון.
- רלא. לנדיב הבורא נותן כמתנה רוב דברים, כי הוא באמונה וביושר לבב ירים, ולא יחשוב כי רוע המרעים, היא נכונה ומומנת לרוע מעשים.
- רלב. את אשר יחיה ממעט שלו, הוא יותר בטוח מאשר יחיה מרוב ממון וזלתו.
- רלג. אין לירא משנות אדונים ומושלים, ובלבד שלא יהיו רעים מהראשונים.
- רלד. הוא יותר בטוח חיות העניים, מאשר היא אותה של העשירים.
- רלה. אין לבעוס עם המזיקים ומצירים, אשר יפעלו בהכרח ואנוסים הם מאחרים.
- רלו. אין להתאונן להיות נולד מכוער, להיות כי היופי לרוב יזיק וסופו לענה ומר.
- רלז. אין לירא מיום המות והפרידה, כי כל הצרות שבעולם יושלמו בתעודה.
- רלח. אחר מיתת הבעל, אהבת האשה עברה ותחתיו מעל.
- רלט. הראות הפנינים והדברים היקרים, לטרף קורא ומעורר הנביים.
- רמ. הרע המגיע לאדם בסבתו, הוא מציק ומזיק לו יותר מזולתו.
- רמא. אין דבר בעולם יותר כלי' להיות שוע, להיות בלתי מתענג מן הטוב אשר הננו הטבע והוא בא למנוע.
- רמב. לנדיב הבורא מנחיל אליו מתנות הרבה, כדי שלעת המצטרך יוכל לציל עצמו ויחיה.
- רמג. ³⁶ אין לנו חפשויות בדבריו ועיני אחרים, כמו שיש להם לבעלים.
- רמד. הבל הוא חבורת הנשים, בעיני האנשים נכונים.
- רמה. האנשים יש להם להדמות כפי מעשיהם ולא לשפוט אותם כפי הגוף מחומריהם.
- רמו. רחקו מהכסילים, וכמה יותר מהם תרחקו, הנה אל החכמים יותר תקרבו.
- רמז. העושר מהירושה, מעביר האנחה, מהאב המת בשפה רפה.
- רמח. בעל הבית רב שעימום ובטל, לפעמים יפעל יותר מהאחר, אשר תמיד עומד ופועל.
- רמט. העושר מקנה חבורת האוהבים, אף אויבים מלובשי' בכנרי אהבים, אשר הם יקיימו כפי שיש[מעו] תועלות ממך מושלחים.
- רנ. לאיש מושנה וחסר לב אין להאמין, ואין למחול לו כשיש לאל ידינו להענישו ולהלשין.
- רנא. אין לשמוח לעולם ממיתת האויב, כי היא כללית לכל החי' ולהם תמיד אירב.
- רנב. יש רבים משבחים פעולות הראויים להעשה, אבל מעטים הם שישימו עצמם לעשותם בכל פה.
- רנג. אין לשים עצמנו בסכנה, בכלי דעת ומחוסר צידה.

- רנד. אין להאמין לחזיונות ולחלומות, קל וחומר לדברים אשר מרצון וחפץ האדם הם באות.
- רנה. כשהאדם הוא מוכנע לשבוח הוא בעצמו, עבור הטובות אשר הבורא חננו כאשר ממנו ישתלשל נאותו וגאונו, ומהרע שהוא סבה ממנו, הוא מסבב אחרים לרעתו.
- רנו.
- רנו. כמה הבחורים פתאים יש להם להיות ערומים, כדי שלא ילכדו בחניפות שקר הזונות והמנאפים.
- רנח. אותם אשר ינקמו הם מעט ניוקים, ויהיו מכובדים מכל עם ולאומים.
- רנט. אנחנו מקבלים יסורינו באהבה, כשאנו רואים אחרים נתוסף עליהם הרוה על הצמאה.
- רס. לנוס מן הסכנה אשר היא הוה, לפעמים נכשל בצרה וצוקה גדולה.
- רסא. יש לנו לתת שבח ועזרה לאשר יוכל להצילנו, אשר הוא לבדו הבורא מעוז מגיננו.
- רסב. אין להרף ולגרף הזקנה, כי נסיונות וחכמה היא מלאה.
- רסג. אין לאהוב ולילך בחבורה, עם האנשים אשר הם משונים לנו במדה.
- רסד. בההצלחה רבים מעשים³⁷ אוהבים, ואם יראו שמולינו יטה לרע הופכים עורף ולא פנים, וימנעו מלילך בחבורתם כימים קדמונים, ועוד לפעמים בכזיונם, ישארו גם הם בצרה נבוכים.
- רסה. כשאדם עושה חטא ואשמה, אין להאשים המזל והשטן בעבירה, אלא אל עצמו יכנה הסיבה.
- רסו. בחצרות וארמיני' יחשבו יותר המזונים, מהחכמים אשר הם נבונים.
- רסז. אין לבזות שום דבר הנם שיהיה בזויה, כי אין דבר עם שיהיה קטנה ושפלה, שלא יהיה טובה לצורך אחד להשתמש בה.
- רסה. טוב למות מהרה בכבוד וחפארה, מחיות זמן רב בחרפה וכלימה.
- רסט. רבים מניחים המדות הרעות, לפי שלא יוכלו אותם עוד עשות.
- רע. כל אדם יש לו לשוש ולשמוח באומנות מלאכתו, כי לכולם יש צרות ומלאות צוקה הם לבאים לידו.
- רעא. החן אשר ינחיל האדם הוא בסבת אשר יחונה, אשר זה לא יקרהו לבד עבור מעשיו אשר יעשה.
- רעב. כאשר יותר מושלים ואדונים יש עלינו, ככל יום עולות וצרות יעלו על צוארינו.
- רעג. אין איש אוהב כ"כ חבירו, שירצה ויתאו למות הוא בערו.
- רעד. יש אשר מתניפים ומראים שמיתת איזה אדם יצר להם, ועם כל זה יתאו אותה ויחפצוה וישר לפניהם.
- רעה. המדה הרעה שבנשים, היא שכל דבר טוב שעושים, עושים מיראה ופחד לא מרצון ואילת אהבים.
- רעו. אין להתכונן באיש כפי ראות פניו, אך ראוי לחקור אחר מעשיו, שלפעמים תחת עור רחלה, יצפון שם זאבה ונסתרה.

- רעו. הרעתן יש לו לישב לעולם למטרה. נגד האויבים אשר יוכלו לגלגל עליו צרה.
- רעח. כשתטיב ותעשה חסד לאויבך, לעולם ישלם רעה אל פיך.
- רעט. שכן רע בכל מיני צוקה. ראוי לרחק מעליו כמלא עינא.
- רפ. אין להקנות חברים אשר לא תוכל לגרשם מביתך, ואשר הם חוקים ואמצים יותר ממתניך.
- רפא. השכל גובר על הקלות והמהירות. ועל הכח מהגוף ברוממות.
- רפב. איש נכון יהיה לבדו יחיד, כשישב בין הכסילים תמיד.
- רפג. האנשים מטבע רע, פעמים מעטים, יסורו מהמדות הרעות אף אם יהיו להם מוכיחים.
- רפד. אין להלחם עם האנשים נכורים, אשר הם מאתנו יותר חוקים.
- רפה. אין כל דבר כל כך נפלא, כי בזמן מה ישתקו ולא יפצו עליו לשון ופה.
- רפו. אין לבטוח אדם כל כך בגדולתו וגאונו, ולעשוק אביונים בשיח פיו ולשונה, בבטחה שלא יוכלו להנקם מאתו.
- רפז. יש לשמוח בחלקינו אשר השיגה ידינו, ולא לחמיד הרברים אשר אינם שוים אלינו.
- רפח. יש לנו לסבול כשהבורא נוטל מאתנו הממון והבנים, כי יש לו חפשות לעשות מעשים מאלו יותר גדולים.
- רפט. המקרה והמזל רע, ינסה האוהב להרע.
- רצ. לפעמים יש אדם אשר ישבח אחר לא לכבודו, אך להכשילו בפח לרעתו וימצא זה אשר שקר שבח אותי, איוו סיכה ועילה אל בריו וכוכו.
- רצא. אין לדון אנשים כפי מלבושיהם, אך כפי המדות מעולות ומדרגותיהם.
- רצב. אין שום אדם כל כך רע ודובר קשות, אשר לא ישתנה טבעו במתנות.
- רצג. איש נכון יש לו לנסות כל ארחות, טרם יבא לשלח ידו אל החרבות וזיינית.
- רצד. הדברים תועלתיים ומועילים, ראוי ללמדם אל הנדיב.
- רצה. יש לנו ללמד לבנינו איוו מלאכה, אשר יוכלו להוציא ממנו איוו פרי מהרה.
- רצו. אין איש כל כך נדבא וחרל מעלה, שלא יהיה טוב לעשות איוו פעולה.
- רצז. כשבמלחמה הם אנשי הערים הרעים, ביניהם מניחים את הטובים.
- רצה. כשהאשה נכנסה בבית אחת, נכנס עמה האש בוערת.
- רצט. לעולם נהיה מוכנים אל טוב המיתה, כי לא נדע יום ושעת הפרידה.
- ש. אין לעשות אוצר הנה בארץ כי אין פה מתצבתינו, אך בשמים אשר לנצח נתענג שם ויוציא לאור צדקינו.
- שא. המזל רע³⁸ לעולם אוהב איש מנוחות, הגם כי הוא לא ירצה יתן לו עושר וטובות, ולעולם הוא אויב העני ונדבא רוחות.
- שב. המחשבה והרצון בקושי יסתה, כי בדברים לפעמים הספר יפר (?) ובמעשה האהבה היא כחמר ביד היוצר.
- שג. אין שום חכם ונכון, מקובל ממולדתו אשר יכון.
- שד. הדברים של החזקי ועזי גבורה, לא ישבחו אותי באמת אך בועת וביראה.
- שה. אין לחרף ולגרף שום אדם, כי לא יהיה כ"כ בלי תועלת ומדע, אשר באיוו צרכינו לא יוכל להצילנו מהרע.

- שו. לפעמים הדברים אשר לנו נזק נראה. הוא תועלת ומועיל הרבה. כי לכן אין להאנח על אשר עלינו יקרה. הגם שלנו נכהל ומהומם יראה.
- שו. העושר לא יקנו אותה לרוב בעליה. אלא עם איבוד נפש ונזק הגוף ותחלואיה.
- שח. לכל בניהם נראים יפים. הגם שהיו מאד מכוערים.
- שט. לאשר נראים מצליחים אין לקנאות קנאה. כי לפעמים המניחה מלאה צרה וצוקה.
- שי. כמה היא קשה טבע הנשים. אשר לא יודו על דבר מעט או מאין עקרים. ולא יחשבו להיות באכזריות הרבה מוכים.
- שיא. הנשך מפתן ונחש. ירא מהלשאה ויפרש.
- שיב. יש לו לאדם להתכונן ולחשוב. איך יהיה יוכל להיות ניוזק מהאויב בארוב.
- שיג. טוב להיות בעניות בהשקט ובבטחה. אשר עם עושר ברתת וביראה.
- שיר. את אשר הם בצרה ובסכנה. האחדות והמתינות יועיל ויעזור כפתע הצוקה.
- שמו. רבים עושים עצמם בחסידים. כדי להיות בלי יגיעות ועמלים.
- שמו. פעמים הרבה עבור הכפוי טובה שיש לאיזה אדם מאיזה תועלת מקובל. יכשל באותו נזק ראשון אשר הוא היה חומד להוציא ממנו מהרה קל.
- שיו. אין לבטוח לעולם מהאנשים. אשר אנחנו נוקנו לימים.
- שיח. את אשר לא ישמעו לקרובים. ילכו לאבדון לעד ולעולמים.
- שיט. השמח מרעת הבאה על אחרים. לפעמים יוכה באותם התחלואים.
- שכ. המבקשים לאונאות אחרים. לא יתרעמו אם הם יהיו נאונאים.
- שכא. החכם יש לו לחניף ככל טעם ותחבולה. כדי לרחק עצמו מחמת הבילי אשר יחרה.
- שכב. אם הבעל עצל לראות את עניניו. אין לו לבטוח שבני ביתו יראו את עסקיו.
- שכג. אין לדון מעלת וחכמת האדם. מגודל הדברים ומהגוף הנדרם.
- שכד. אין ליסד בטחוננו בעניני העולם. כי הם קלים ולאין בטחונם.
- שכה. האדם יש לו לעמוד מזהר. שלא ליפול ביד איש שוה³⁹ ואכזר. אשר לא ימחול ולא הממן והחיים בדבריו. אשר מזה ממציא אבל לו ולאזהביו.
- שכו. הכסילים כדי להסיר מעליהם משא. משימים עליהם אחרת יותר כבדה.
- שכז. אין שום אדם עמל בלי תקוה. משום שכר ותועל' אשר יושב עליו למטרה.
- שכח. יש לנו לירא יותר מהשקטים שותקים. מהמצפצפים ומרכים מאד דברים.
- שכט. אין שום דבר שמעיף ומכחיש השכירים. כתשמיש המטה⁴⁰
- של. כשהאדם מקבל יותר חסד והטבה. אינו יכול לסבול העלבון והקטטה.
- שלא. אשר יקחו נשים יכשלו בסכנות ובמכשולים גדולים.
- שלב. את אשר הכל ירצה. הכל יאבד וילאה.
- שלג. יש לנו ללמד החכמות ספריות. כדי שנהיה מחווקים בגדולות.
- שלה. רוב הפעמים המחילה יזיק אל החוטא. מהנקמה אשר נגדו יחשוב העושה.
- שלה. אין לשאול מהבורא אלא הדברים אשר בעיני יקרו. לפי שלפעמים אנו שואלים דבר שהוא נגדינו במשהו.
- שלו. את אשר ילחמו עם הגדולים מהם. נוסף שלא יוכלו להשוות להם. לפעמים רבית נותנים להתלוצץ ולשחוק ליודעיהם.

- שלו. רבים מבקשים לעשות גמול חסד לאויבים. כדי למצא חן בעיניהם ולהשלים. האדם פעמים בחמדת הריוח והממון. הולך בסכנה מההיות בלי רעיון. יש אשר ירצו לרכוב רגל אחד בתרי רכשי. ולבסוף לא יתקעו רגלם בחד מן תרי.
- שמ. יש אשר ירצו להציל עצמם מסכנה. ונופלים באחרת יותר עצומה. שמא. החופשיות היא על כל דבר יקרה. ומפנינים ומפו היא אהובה. שמב. את אשר בכח הגוף לנו נמנע. ראוי לעשותו בשכל ובמדע. שמג. יש לנו להתרצות מהמתנות נתונות מהבורא. אף מה אשר ינתנו לנו מן הטבע אשר יורה.
- שמד. הרעתן יש לו להתבונן. לא לבד הזמן ההוה. אלא אף הזמן ה⁴³ עתיד אשר יבא זמן יקרה.
- שמה. הרע ר⁴² אוי להתכנה. לאשר הוא סיבה אשר יאונה.
- שמו. ר⁴ע יותר מעט לסבול העלבון מיחידים. אשר בהענישו יע⁴שו לו אויבים רבים.
- שמו. את אשר ירצו לתפוש הרבה מאד. פעמים הרבה לא יתפשו אלא המעט מן התאוות.
- שמח. הבלבלנות מהאנשים. אשר יתקינו דברים חדשים. הגם שיהיו רעים לזקנים.
- שמט. ראוי לסבול מכות המלמדים. כי הם סיבה מטיבוי רבים.
- שנ. חפשיות הגוף היא להשוות לכל העידונים מהעולם הזה ולכבוד.
- שנא. אין לחפש אחר הדברים. אשר מן הטבע בדים ונכובים.
- שנב. אין לרדן היצורים כפי המלבושים. אך כן טוב המעשים. כי לפעמים תחת עור הרחלים. יש זאבים⁴³ טורפי ונסתרי.
- שנג. הדברים הנעשי במהירות רבה. אין להם קיום והעמדה.
- שנד. נכש אחד הוא בסכנה גדולה. אין לו לאבד הזמן בפטפא(?). אבל יש לו לעזור את עצמו יותר שיוכל מהרה.
- שנה. את אשר סבל צרה עצומה. ירא עוד מהתחלואה נוחה וקלה.

תם ונשלם.

THE MEMOIRS OF A SIENNESE JEW (1625-1633)

By CECIL ROTH, London, England

JEWISH literature is notoriously poor in works of autobiography. It is indeed only what might have been expected. In a people so predominantly intellectual, the vicissitudes of worldly existence were of secondary importance by the side of the record of spiritual achievement. The Jew was interested in what a man thought and said, rather than in what he did. Nehemiah indeed had set a classic example in the writing of memoirs: yet the Rabbis condemned the personal touch, asserting that it was for this very reason that his work lost its identity, and was subordinated to Ezra's more modest account.¹ The aping of Hellenic models of autobiography by Josephus was itself not calculated to commend the practise to his more loyal co-religionists. And so, until comparatively modern times, these examples remained unimitated. While no literature perhaps reproduced so vast a body of opinions, none was more backward in the portrayal of the commonplaces of everyday existence. Though Boswell's *Life of Johnson* was confessedly inspired by Rabbinical recommendations,² the Jew himself was less punctilious. If the intimate details of the life of any person were set down, as in the case of the Maharil,³ it was for the *Halachic* importance of his example rather than for the human interest of his doings. It is therefore to the vast uncharted sea of the Responsa literature almost exclusively that we must turn for glimpses of the social history of our people during their long middle age.

This generalization is not, of course, universal. Glückel von Hameln has been called, with a certain amount of justification, a German Jewish Pepys, all the more remarkable considering her sex. A century later, Solomon Maimon gave the world in his autobiography not only an extraordinary human document, but also the best conceivable synopsis of the Mendels-

sohnian epoch. Recently there have been published the memoirs, distinctly inferior to the forgoing in human and general interest, of the Galician Ber of Bolochow. A few minor works from Germany and the neighbouring countries may be added to this list.⁴

Elsewhere, the dearth is all the more remarkable. Italy should assuredly have been foremost in this branch of literature. Her Jewish settlements were of immemorial antiquity: they were deeply steeped in the traditions of their environment: they had before their eyes classical examples: while they were cultured to a degree, and had always been articulate in their literary expression. But the same essentially Jewish outlook, it seems, applied to Italy as well. It is only to be expected that Leone da Modena should have set himself against the current (with somewhat disappointing results) in this as he did in everything else, and his grandson, Isaac the Levite, followed him dutifully in this respect.⁵ These two compositions give an invaluable account of life in the Venetian Ghetto in the seventeenth century—a life, as it would seem, made up largely of bickering and strife. There is also extant the diary of a Roman student of the commencement of the eighteenth century, one Judah Gonzago.⁶ Here, however, we come to a halt. Save for the merest fragments, there is virtually nothing more of this sort extant for the Jews of Italy. Moreover, Jewish life was there so very individual, so strongly localised, and withal so extremely picturesque, that the gap is all the more regrettable from the point of view of the historian. For that reason, the *ricordi* which are here published for the first time are of peculiar interest.

The manuscript in which the original is to be found is a recent acquisition of the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, to the Librarian of which I must here express my deepest gratitude for the generous facilities accorded me. It comprises the ledger of the business house of Jacob b. Eleazar Modena of Sienna, between the years 1562 and 1567. The accounts (as usual, in Hebrew) are of considerable importance from the historical as well as from the economic point of view.⁷ What especially interests us here, however, are the additions made by a later hand on the blank pages of the volume (fol. 44 a-b, 47 b-57 a).⁸

The identity of the author is not clear. His first name was Joseph, as we are once informed. His family name, on the other hand, he never lets slip; and attempts to trace it in the Siennese archives on the strength of the information he gives have proved fruitless. It may be assumed, however, that he was (despite the obvious difference in cultural and economic standards) of the same family as the original owner.

Of Joseph da Modena (as we may tentatively call him) we know nothing apart from what he himself tells us in these memoirs. His family (which as far as is known had no connection with its more famous Venetian namesake) had been settled for nearly a hundred years at Sienna, where he himself was probably born about the opening of the seventeenth century.⁹ He seems to have become the head of his household at a comparatively early age through the death of his father, which left him the sole support of his mother and a not over-astute younger brother. It is this fact, perhaps, which explains his lack of education, for which we find him trying to make up at a later date. He married a certain Anna, daughter of Solomon Milano, who died in child-bed in 1633 after bearing him a number of children, one at least of whom died in infancy. By profession, Joseph was a mere huckster—a dealer in second-hand stuffs and clothing on no large scale, his business carrying him on occasion as far off as Lombardy. On the fly-leaves of the present manuscript there is an inventory in his writing of a variety of objects which no doubt passed through his hands in the course of business, with the prices paid and received. He was apparently especially interested in trading in masks and other objects used at the Carnival season. He makes mention of this in his memoirs; and on the second page of the volume there is to be found a list of such articles as he required for the Carnival of 1635. It seems to have been drawn up for the guidance of an agent—perhaps his feckless younger brother—whom he adjures in a note to drive the best bargain possible.

It would seem curious that a man so occupied should have thought of committing to paper those intimate details of private life which more distinguished and better-educated contemporaries so utterly neglected. The reason, however, is not difficult to

find. Joseph da Modena was a man with a grievance. What he committed to writing was not the personal happenings and impressions which interested a Pepys or a Cellini, but a memorandum of wrongs received. Indeed, so as to be certain not to forget, he made an index of them on the fly-leaf and set the initials of the wrong-doers in the margin of the passages which recorded their perversities. For Joseph was one of those unfortunate individuals who find themselves injured or insulted by all those with whom they come into contact with a fatal regularity, without harbouring the slightest suspicion that their own character may be at fault. If, when the Grand Duke came to Sienna, the articles which he had to contribute for the entertainment of the court were found unsuitable, it must be the machinations of his enemies which were responsible. When he was out of the city, they took advantage of his absence to mislead his brother into squandering the family property. Outside acquaintances were seduced from his friendship before they had been long in Sienna. Even a stranger Rabbi soon treated him in such a fashion that he felt justified in withholding his pay for lessons received. If a person would not lend him money, it must be out of malice, not inability. He could indeed take action against his own father-in-law in order to recover a debt, but if any one—even a helpless widow—took similar measures against himself, he considered it a shameful exhibition of unkindness and ingratitude. He could wrangle even over his son's death-bed. The only persons to whom he could ultimately turn for assistance in time of trouble were his recent acquaintances from abroad (despite their violent quarrel) and an accommodating gentile baker. Yet he was no coward, and belied the traditionally pacific Jewish nature by coming to blows in the open street with his enemies, who were—inevitably—three to one.

Finally, however, his opportunity came. He found himself involved in a case in which, as it seems, he had public opinion on his side against the arch-enemies who were always plotting his downfall. The case is related with a wealth of graphic detail. His widowed sister-in-law, Donna Stella, had the temerity to wish to marry again. Joseph's interests were involved. She had entrusted part of her property to his care, to save it from her rapacious brothers; and besides, he had hopes that she would

adopt his son—her nephew—or at least make provision for him out of her dowry. Moreover, it seems possible that a more intimate consideration was involved: for Joseph had himself just lost his wife, was living on terms of the closest familiarity with the lady, and even went so far on one occasion as to hint darkly that he did not desire his love to be responsible for any ill-feeling. However that may be, he attempted to obstruct the proposed match by threatening to hand over the lady's property to her brothers, and putting forward counter-claims to it on his own account. Worst of all in the civil courts, he diplomatically attempted to win over popular opinion by appealing to Jewish law. The lady had meanwhile obtained from the Rabbinical authorities at Rome a ban of excommunication against any persons who withheld evidence as to the ownership of the disputed property. Confident of success, she committed the strategical blunder of refusing to submit to the decision of any local tribunal. Accordingly, one day, her partisans attempted to have the ban published in the synagogue, under the protection of the civil authorities. The scene that followed was worthy of the pencil of Hogarth, and yields to none in Jewish historical literature for sheer vividness.

It was during the morning service than news was brought to the synagogue that the document was on its way. The superstitious congregants, who detested the idea of an act of such general application, which any man might unwittingly offend, began to pour pell-mell out of the building to avoid hearing the reading. When they reached the outer gateway, they were met by the constables, who tried to drive them back with blows from the flats of their swords and the pommels of their daggers, reinforced without doubt by round curses. Others of the worshippers attempted to escape through the windows. Within the building, utter bedlam reigned. The few men who remained banged on their desks in order to prevent anything from being heard, while the terrified women, on their knees behind their grill, poured forth shrieks and imprecations. Finding the synagogue virtually deserted, the reader took his stand at an open window, and started bawling the terms of the excommunication to the seething mob without. By his side stood his nephew, the

ritual black candle in his hand, with its wax dripping down on the reader's head, while from below he was saluted by a fusilade of stones and garbage from the children grateful of the excuse, coupled with maledictions from their elders.

Where Joseph da Modena was all this time, he does not inform us: but it is to be imagined that he was in the thick of the tumult, openly exulting at the commotion which he had caused. The unique wave of popular sympathy comforted him for the outcome of the suit, which was not wholly in his favour—nor, as it would seem, unjustly. He had a superstitious satisfaction, too, in noting that the launching of the Ban had brought in its train the inevitable trail of disaster. During that year, many members of the community (not excepting himself). Suffered domestic losses of the most severe type. His memoirs end on a note of righteous exultation.

The historical importance of the diary is, it must be confessed, in inverse proportion to its human interest. Joseph da Modena was no Benvenuto Cellini, mixing with the great ones of the earth, nor a Solomon Maimon, in touch with the highest intellect of his generation, nor yet a Glückel von Hameln, delighting in intercourse and intermarriage with those distinguished by their wealth and their piety. He was not even spectator or sufferer in any really notable event which he considered worth his while to record. He was a child of the Ghetto in its worst sense—petty in his interests, limited in his outlook, sordid to a degree in his activities. He did not possess the saving graces of learning, nor, as it would seem, even of peculiar piety. Not only did he himself leave little trace, but barely a single one of those whom he mentions and with whom he habitually consorted is otherwise recorded. Nevertheless, for this very reason an importance of its own may perhaps be vindicated for what he wrote.

Jewish history has tended to be on the whole the history of scholarship, occasionally alternating, and sometimes combined, with the aristocracy of wealth. Save for the broadest of generalisations, the common people have been generally neglected. The reason is obvious enough: for it is precisely the common people who have remained inarticulate, leaving it to their spiritual leaders to bequeath a memorial to future generations. And so it is unlikely

that we will ever know what sort of life the Jewish agriculturalist lived in Spain in the golden age of Moslem rule, or how some poor tailor of Narbonne reacted towards the epoch-making Maimonidean controversy, or what the poverty-stricken artisans of Messina felt at the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish dominions. The poor lived, and suffered, in an obscurity which has few secular parallels. It is not perhaps too much to say that the present memoirs constitute the first wholly *popular* document of Jewish history which has been as yet discovered. It does not inform us of the sublime disputes between the masters of the law, nor of the achievements of those whose wealth or learning had made them the leaders of the community. It tells us of the dregs of the Ghetto—ill-educated, superstitious, quarrelsome, sordid, of the type hitherto unrecorded except perhaps in our martyrologies. We are not introduced into the controversies of the schools or the debates of the council chamber: but we obtain a unique insight into the daily life and daily squabbles of those who remained the vast majority of the people. In Joseph da Modena we see how they thought, we see how they acted, we see how they lived. When the time comes to write the social history of the Jews in Italy, this testimony cannot be neglected.

It is an unfamiliar world to which we are introduced. The houses are cramped and stuffy, so that any idea of privacy is not so much as thought of. The persons to whom we are presented are neither great merchants on the one hand nor pawn-brokers on the other, as one would have imagined, but the merest itinerant hucksters. The state of culture is surprisingly low, and Hebrew books figure principally as security for loans. The days were apparently long past when (according to a proverb still remembered in Italy), "From Sienna came forth the Law, and the word of the Lord from Tuscany." Morality, whether business or social, is none too high. There is gaming, and more than a suspicion of drinking, in the Ghetto tavern. Open robbery does not seem to occasion any great horror, save when the writer is the victim: nor does the immoral purpose to which the proceeds were put call forth a word of blame. Inside the Ghetto, we hear of little but constant feuds and bickering. Writs and distrains are the order of the day. The traditional pacific nature of the

Jew is belied by open brawls in the street, culminating sometimes in the shedding of blood. It is not a pleasant picture. But it was the inevitable result upon a small community of the cruel system which artificially cut off all natural intercourse with the outside world, and drove it back upon itself.

If Joseph da Modena presents to us the type of the Ghetto Jew of the lowest class, his writing is no less characteristic. The script itself indeed is none too bad, leaving room for doubt in only a very few cases. The spelling on the other hand could hardly be worse, outraging even the loose standards of seventeenth-century orthography. There is no idea of consistency, and not much, sometimes, even of phonetics. Words are left out, words put in, with a regal disregard for meaning. The few Hebrew phrases reflect the utter neglect of his early education—surely exceptional, even among the lowest classes, and it needs a careful reconstruction on the basis of the Italian method of pronunciation to make out their meaning. Punctuation is conspicuous by its utter absence, every paragraph forming one inordinately long sentence, but the text has here been broken up to a certain extent (though not quite consistently) in order to facilitate the reading. Even this depressingly low state of literacy is not without its scientific importance. If Joseph da Modena is a typical Ghetto Jew, his language is typical Ghetto speech. In the newly-awakened interest in Judæo-Italian,¹⁰ this is of considerable importance. Relics of the vernacular literature of the Jews in Italy indeed abound, but the majority of them derive from men of culture and attainments, in regular intercourse with the outside world, and composing frequently for gentile eyes, whose writings generally approximate to the accepted standards. In the memoirs of Joseph da Modena, on the other hand, despite his literary pretensions, it seems that we have the Ghetto speech in all of its incongruity and its unloveliness, virtually uncontaminated by outside influence. Care has been taken, therefore, to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, correcting only a few of the most obvious errors. A few notes are appended, but in most cases the English translation will serve as sufficient elucidation of the difficulties of the text.¹¹ In this, the attempt has been made to preserve as far as may be the archaic flavour of the original.

Yet, when all is said and done, the main interest in this fragment is not essentially scientific. The impression that remains is that of the figure of Joseph da Modena, the illiterate huckster of Carnival wear, moving, pack on shoulder, about his squalid native Ghetto looking for bargains and affronts, and rejoicing immoderately, albeit most unbiblically, at the downfall of his enemies. We are little wiser as to the history of the community, but we know more about its personalities and its atmosphere, of the rancours which embittered it and the passions which moved it. It is as a human document of no mean order, rather than as a contribution to the exact science of history, that these memoirs are here presented, for the first time, to the reader.

THE MEMOIRS OF A SIENNESE JEW
(GIUSEPPE DA MODENA ?) 1625—1633 *

A. P. Ricordo che nell' anno 1625 vene il Granduca a Siena, e fu fatto rescotetore de le robì¹² m. Abramo Pesaro, e m. Bona Ventura Galichi, e me imposoro un paro de lenzola, un padiglione, una cuperta, e un capezale, dopia imposta de hogni altro, et io gli diede tutto quello che me imposero et mi fu butatato d.^a roba in mezo de la strada da d.^o Abramo tre volti con gran' desprezzo e bravarij et dirmi che d.^a roba non era ricipiente, e volevano meglio roba, e d.^a roba era di valore più de scudi dieci, e nel med.^o tempo per farmi maggior desprescio e danno mi mandoreno le sbiri, e gli comesero che me dovesero fare il pegnio, e non pigliare d.^a roba del quale recevei più abilità da la corte che da loro, e presero la med.^{ma} roba e non mi fecero pegnio, et volsero una lira, et m.^{ti} volti d.^o Abramo si è avantato de d.^o desprescio. Il tutto ho messo a memoria per tenere a mente piacere e despiacere.

S. P. Ricordo che ne l'anno 1625, comprai da M. Salamone Palagrilli quatro libri chiamati רבנו משה¹³ per prezo de scudi sette, e dopo ch' io me ne andai fora di Siena per causa de li lacri (?)

* Transcription finished in New York, 6 December 1925 (19 Kislev 5686) being the first anniversary of the death of my Father.

che su ne havevo, sud.^o sframoni mio fratello con digli che me aveva dato pegno d.^e libri per scudi tre, e gli le cavò di mano, e gli diede un testone per volta, et una volta per dagli uno scudo insieme, se fece pagare da mio fratello un paio de picioni, e dopo la mia tornata gli ho voluto rendere le med.^{me} denari, e ce mese mezi e non me ha voluti mai rendere. De più dopo la mia tornata, che fu ne l'anno 1629, desiò m.^{ti} volti mio fratello a l'ostaria ¹⁴ e gli prestò un testone sopra un חומש et il משנה, et io lo volsi rescotere se il fece vendere asuluto per poco prezo. Il tutto ho scritto per ricordo.

Ricordo che ne l'anno 1631 fui rechiesto da Donna Violante Galletti che gli dovesse far' servizio de fargli vendere certo horo bruciato e horo rotto, e de essi denari desiderava darmelli nelle mani, il quale non mancai fare il tutto, e fargli vendere d.^a roba, e ne med.^e giorni mi vene l'occasione de comprare una masarizia da un tale M. Lorenzo in Firenze, et tiene camera locante de Tedeschi, ch' importava circa a scudi hottanta, e io andai da d.^a Donna Violante con conferigli q.^{to} negozio, e gli dissi che se lei voleva sborsare tutto il denaro in d.^a masarizia io l'arei messa a mezo guadagno de quello che fusse statto, e lei accettò tal partito, e me diede scudi 30 contanti e una colana con altri hori aciò io l'impegniasi, et erano in circa a quattro honci d'oro, e l'impegniai a Nicolino horefici per scudi 25, e dopo questo andai a contrattare d.^a masarisia, e non fumo da cordo, e tornai a casa, e resi subito a detta D.^a Violante le scudi trenta di contanti dattemi, con digli che non era asortitta la compra, come era la verità, e l'ori che mi aveva dato che impegniai per scudi vinti cinque, gli dissi che se se contentava de lasarmeli nelle mani gli arei usato cortesia de qual cosa l'anno, e così se compiaque. E a capo a l'anno mi chiese scudi dieci di guadagno, e la restotorizione della Roba, et io gli respose che non era dovere de chiedere scudi 10 di guadagno in 25 scudi, perchè arebe auto a rascione di quaranta per cento, ma bensì che gli arei dato satisfazione a pieno con pregarla non me levassi detta roba de mano perchè non ero comido per alora a rescoterla, essendo ch' io in quel tempo avevo pagato una promessa ch' io feci per il marito a M. Antonio Lorenzoni de scudi quindici. E lei respose non mi volere aspetare

nè meno menarmi buono nulla di d.^a promessa che pagai per il marito, e si fece per dotta, e mi cavò la gatura per scudi cento con la restotorizione di d.^a roba, e hotto giorni avanti פורים che fummo ש"צ 1631 mi fece scassare la casa da tre birij, e mi boto-reno l'uscio a tera a hore due di notte dandoli comisione che mi sgombrasero la casa per cento scudi, il quale se a intrapose M. Laudadio Rietti¹⁵ e M. Abramo Meniati acomedere le nostre deferenzie, e condanereno a pagare le spese a famegli, ch' importereno lire sedici, e de le scudi quindici la condanereno a pagarmi scudi seci conforma di ciò ho scritto, e avanti mi cavasse detta gatura mi cavò un' aresto di cento scudi, e mi fece sgombrare la bottega, e promese per me M. Francesco fornaio a Samartino. Il tutto ho messo a memoria che per le benefizi fatogli ne ho recuti q.^{ti} recompenzi.

Io ricordo che ne l'anno 1631 mossi litte a M. Salamone Milano mio sògero, quale per asegurare il mio credito gli cavai un aresto avantj gli movessi la litte: e facendolo eseguire, se chiamò intenuta M. Isache Meniati; e avantj entrassi impromessa, pregai a d.^o M. Isache che non prometese, esendo che se io avesse auto mai sentenza in favore, mi sarebe statto necisità di fare contra a lui, et esendo che a ongniuno dispiace de pagare per altrj, saremo venuti per tal fatto in imicizia, dove che siamo amici. E lui mi rispose « Che piace a Dio che tu abij sentenza in favore, che tu sarei pagato, e non avere sospetto che noj veniamo in tal convenienti », e che non poteva fare di meno a non promettere. Et io andai a trovare Abramo figlio di d.^o M. Isache, e gli dissi le predette parole che dissi a suo padre, e lui me diede la med.^{ma} risposta che me diede suo padre. E dopo che le pregai gran pezo ambe due, cercai de refutare per promessa anco suo padre per giustizia, e non potei fare di meno de non il pigliare. Quale fecci la causa, e ottenni la sentenza in favore di cento piastri. E Salvatore Galichi se ne appellò, quale lui faceva per d.^o Salamone, e io ancora me apelai. E quando d.^o Abramo Meniatj senttj ch' io ebij la sentenza in favore, e che d.^o Salvatore si era apelato, mi venne a trovare, e me richiese ch' io cavase di promessa suo padre, altre.^{te} mi averebe fatto contro in q.^{ta} causa, e in qual se voglia particolare. E io gli resposi che bisognava

penzare a non promettere, se non voleva pagare per altri, maggior.^{te} ch'io glie ne fece scusa avanti che promettesse, holtre che quando io avessi voluto fargli cosa grata di cavare di promessa suo padre, non potevo, essendo che d.^o Salamone Milano era andato a Roma, e in questo modo non ne verai a cavare cosa alcuna. E per fargli vedere che disideravo fargli cosa grata, gli avrei fatto tempo un anno e più se gli fusse fatto di bisogno, fin che lui avesse fatto contro a d.^o Milano, acciò non remetesse di suo. E lui me rpose che lui non voleva abilità nisuno da me, solo ch'io lo cavassi di promessa, altr.^{te} lui si sarebe aitato ne il miglior modo che fusse.

A. M. Ricordo che mentre io ero ne la Lombardia, Abramo Meniati desviò mio fratello che gli vendese roba di botiga e di casa, il quale gli vendè roba per più de ducento scudi, e lo desviò a giocare in casa sua proprio, holtre di q.^{to} gli faceva pigliare stochi a mercanti e gli faceva scialequare e giocare quatrini subito, e di più gli prestava denari a usura sopra il pegnio, e poi comprava il med.^{mo} pegnio a mezo prezo, e dopo ch'io fui tornato a Siene gli chiese de la d.^a roba e gli dette pegnio mio fratello et imparticolare le robì da mascari che teneva pegnio. E lui mi dette roba per vinti hotto scudi che non valeva quindici, e perchè ereno robì di casa antichi, mi covene rescoteli ancor che stavano di più di quello valevano. E per voce publica, e per informazione auto da più personi, ho saputo che guadagniò con mio fratello ducento scudi. Il tutto ho messo a memoria.

E ne l'anno 1630, vene qui a Siena un רובי chiamato רובי Elia da Vigniola, il quale lo conoscevo a Modena, e anco al d.^o paese; e per favorilo me hobligai mentre se pasava qui amparare a legere. Gli arei dato lire quindici l'anno. Mentre però mi avesse dato una lizione a me ho a mio fratello il giorno, holtre che in prencipio de la sua venuta lo menai a l'oste et pagai per lui m.^{ti} volte per fargli cosa grata, et fu messo innanzi da mio socero e mio cog.^{to} Toscano e me, e per diliscenze fatte fu fermato dal קהל circa a due anni. Et in questo tempo prese gran' amicizia con d.^o Abramo Meniati, et a me non mi dava più lizione, nemeno se curava più de mia amicizia, curandosi pocho del fatto mio. E ne la sua partenza gli rimase a dare lire nove, del quale non era la

mia volontà de darglieli per m.^{ti} rascioni, come de sopra si è detto. E d.^o Abramo, avendo lui roba in mano de mio, mi trovò in piazza, e me disse che pagase d.^o רויבֿ altrimenti l'arei pagato con mio desgusto, e harebe fatto pagare lui, e perchè aveva roba in mano de mio, e per suoi me covene cavare da lui proprio lire quattro, e lire cinque gli rimasi a dare. De quali, quando se ne andò via da Abramo se fece dunare d.^e cinque lire. Et esortò a d.^o רויבֿ che facesse rescotere d.^e denari a un Todesco suo descepolo, il qual d.^o רויבֿ così fece. E gli chiese in grazia che usase hogni deliscenza per rescotere da me d.^e denari. E il med.^{mo} Todesco così facendo mi mandò a chiamare m.^{ti} volti menaciandomi di farne bastonare se non gli portavo d.^e denari, e d.^o Abramo hongni giorno gli handava a recordare a d.^o Todesco. E a lungo andare, d.^o Todesco se stracò, e non gli diede un quatrino. Et q.^{to} ho scritto a memoria, giudicando che s'è voluto agratuire più a un forèstiere che non ha visto nè conosciuto per dare desgusto, e danno a me.

Ricordo che quando io arivai a Modena ne l'anno 1625, lì era Salamone e Rafaello Nepi heb. Et apresentandosi la fiera di Sasolo, ce n'andai, e comprai alcuni pelli concì in quel paese per prezo de lire sesanta sette, e le portai a Modena, e li dei a serbare a d.^o Salamone, che mi avesse fatto forte de un pochi de denari fin che me venivano di casa, il quale mi prestaoreno lire cinquanta. E quando gli chiesi le sud.^e pelli datoli in serbo per mandarli a Siena, me disero che havevano venduti per le med.^e cinquanta lire prestatomi, quali ce vene a scapitare lire diciasette, e le vendereno senza mia comisione. E fra pochi giorni andò Rafaello a Sasolo a stare con altri et io il כבוד del med.^o anno me vene hocasione di partirmi dal' alogiamento ch' io ero, et andare in casa un altro ירורי per m.^{ti} desgusti receuti. E facendo le conti gli rimase a dare al mio padrone lire vinti due. Et esendo che d.^o Salamone non stava più con Hosigli¹⁶ e faceva camerata con me, mi se hoferì di farmi forte de dodici lire che aveva, et un zechino che gli mancava per complire le d.^e lire vinti due de andare a trovare Rafaello a Sasolo acìò me le prestase. Il quale così facendo, andamo a trovare Rafaello, e gli naramo il fatto; e gli chiesi in grazia mi facesse forte de un zechino, e perchè non mi poteva dire

che non, avendo lui in quel tempo vinto dieci Toleri senza il salario che avanzava da il padrone, disse che non me le poteva prestare, rispetto che voleva andare a casa dopo כסף, e se voleva de d.^e denari fare un vestito e un coletto. Et io, per mantenere il mio dicoro e dare sadisfazione al mio padrone di casa, hoperai che suo fratello se levase da dosso un gibone di cimbelotino stampato e un paro di calzette di filaticio, et io gli dei un taglio di coletto di pelle di fiore, aciò mi prestase d.^o zechino: e d.^e pelle erano di valuta de lire cinque: il quale ne recevei gran' desgusto per tal azione, e però ne feci memoria.

Fra alcuni giorni vene hocasione, che un de Husigli chiamato Lemacino ce dette a vendere più pezi d'oro che le pigliava in botega sua, e ci guadagnai in più volti incirca a trenta scudi. E perchè d.^o Salamone me prestava quatrini, ce il mese a mezo: e trovandomi io in necesità de denari, mi prevalzi de la sua parte de denari, ch'erano in circa a quindici scudi. E apresentandosi l'occasione, ch' ambe due venero a Siena, me richieseno de un scritto de d.^e denari, il quale non mancaì di farglielo. E subito fatoglielo, se ne venero a Siena, poblicono d.^o scritto, con dire che me le avevano prestati ne la Lombardia di contanti. E per d.^o scritto, mia madre e mio fratello gli fecero m.^{ti} cortesij, con dargli da logiare nel mio letto proprio, perchè ereno in meschinità, che non avevano letto da dormire. E poi mia madre gli diede la casa a piscione per il med.^{mo} prezo che ce la dava il Cristiano, e la piscione a scontiare a d.^e scritto. Il quale venendo io nel 1629 a Siena senza sdegno nisuno, per d.^o di Abramo Meniati mi mandò la poliza a regolatori per lire hotanta quatro; et io, per tal sdegno, gli mandai la poliza a oscire di casa. Del qual non sapendo loro che remegio se pigliare, per non hoscire di casa, facemo pace. E restone le cose, impentino, e fra pochi giorni cercoreno de volermi citare d.^o scritto de denari che gli devo a mercanti, e poi hagiroy a Pesari ciò è Abramo e Chlemente fratelli, ancora che stavano in casa, e gli pagavo la piscione. E nel medesimo tempo, mi hocorse che D.^a Fiore Galetti, gli ero debitore per una peza di musolini lire vinti una, e mi entrò in tenuta Rafaello Nepe. E in q.^{to} tempo. d.^o Rafaello se ne andò a Grosseto, et io gli dei a vendere alcuni robi di botiga a denari cifatti. E quando tornò di Grosseto, gli chiesi le denari de la roba

che mi aveva venduto: et lui me rispose che lui non mi voleva dare nula, se prima non pagava d.^a Fiore, ovvero ch' io l'avesi levato di tenuta. Et io gli rispose che non conveniva a farmi tal affronto a farmi represaglia, essendo ch' ancora non aveva receuto nè dani nè affronto per me: e quando fusse hocorso che lui avesse pagato per lui, stava in casa mia, ch' arebe pututo scontiare a piscione ad hongni modo. Con tutti q.^{ti} rascioni, non mi volse dare cosa nisuna, se primo non pago D. Fiore: il qual mi è parso che q.^{ta} azione me sia statto di gran affronto più de qual se volia altro, e però ne ho fatto memoria.

Ricordo che il dì 25 marzo 1632 שצ"ב, fui gaturato da A. P. M. Abramo Pesaro e fratello, con gran' smaco e disprescio, e diede comisione alli sbirri che dovesero pigliare per tenuta M. Isache Galicho, ho vero M. Rubino Frosolone,¹⁷ altrim.^{te} me sgombrasero la casa. E mi mandò a gaturare per scudi vinti per resto de trenta scudi ch' io gli devo dare, e le medessimi denari fureno per una scritta ch' avevano de mio per scudi dodici: quali scudi dodici sono per lire 30 che devano avere dal M.^{co} Marone Michele in Firenze, e lire vinti sei prestati a mia madre quando io ero fora di paese, e lire vinti hotto prestatomi contanti quando io venij in paese, che sono in tutto scudi dodici; e scudi dodici dovevano avere per un scritto che gli concesero Salamone e Rafaello Nepi, come ne apare memoria nel presente librio indietro; e per esso scritto gli ni dereno tanto cimbelotino bianco a una lira il bracio, e loro il vendereno soldi dodici il bracio; e scudi tre per una gatura cava-tomi per un feraiolo di settino nero che mi diede a vendere, e gli restotorij, e me ne cavò gatura per non potere provare quando gli lo rese; e scudi tre per una peza di mosolino che diede a M. Framinio Galetti mio zio, e io promesi per lui: tal che sono scudi trenta in tutto, e ne remase avere scudi vinti. E mi mandò la poliza tre giorni avanti פורים. La sera di פורים mi trovò fora del portone de M. Prospero, ch' ero in compagnia de M. Rubino Frosolone e M. Moise Saliaro, e mi disse che lui mi voleva fare come fece Papa Sisto, che quando volse caciare le יודים dal suo statto, gli mandò la nova la sera di פורים,¹⁸ e così voleva fare a me, acciò io non avessi il פורים conzolato. Ma per non essere giudicato dalli personi, non esegui q.^{to} gativo pensiero menaciatomi. Ma hotto

giorni avanti פסח, come ho detto di sopra, mi trovò in casa de M. Abramo Meniati, e mi menaciò che mi voleva fare stare priscione per detto debiti hotto giorni, e usare deliscenza che fra dette giorni ci stessi quatro giorni di פסח et altri minaci fattomi. E il giorno seguente, mi fece gaturare in casa per maggior smaco, e acciò io non gli dessi la promessa di sei mesi. Il tutto ho messo a memoria, per avere io receuto dal detto torto et afronto in più modi. Una si è che non mi doveva mandare la poliza hotto giorni avanti פסח: sigonda, non se doveva acordare con Abramo Meniati con digli che mi mandasse la poliza ancora lui per un altro scritto che aveva d.º Abramo contra di me de scudi 20, e mi mandoreno la poliza ambe due insieme: terza, non mi doveva conturbare la sera di פורים come fece: quarta, non mi doveva fare gaturare in modo nisuno, essendo che loro, ciò è d.º Abramo, aveva in mano de mio cento scudi di cervietti di Bolzano, e scudi vinti cinque di ספרהים¹⁹ che non erano segnati ne le scritti: quinta, non mi doveva fare gaturare hotto giorni avanti פסח; e tutti q.^{ti} afronti me le fece perchè io ho messo inanzi la קילה di מתיר הסורים,²⁰ il quale hebero a sdegno, e me fecero d.º afronti. Il tutto ho messo a memoria.

Ricordo che nel mese di luglio 1632, comprai da Chichio straciaiolo più pezi di damasco nero uso alla presenza de Moise Galletti e di Prospero Arcidosso, li quali in quel tempo lavoravano per Abramo Pelagrili nella bottiga di sotto in dove io abito, ch'io glie la pescionai. E d.º Moise e Prospero dissero, che ne volevano parte, non havendo io compro nel mio uscio proprio: et io, per non volere contendere, gli rispose che quando mi avesero reso le denari che mi costava, gli harei dato. Et accettando lui tal partito, rispose ch'io aspetasi d.º Abramo Pelagrile, che mi arebe dato denaro, ho vero me harei preso per me. E così mi contentai, et aspetai, che venise d.º Abramo. E venuto che fu, gli dissi se voleva d.º damasco, e me rispose che il voleva vedere. Et ancor che non era dovere ch'io gli il mostrasse avanti mi desse il denaro che mi costava, per compiacerlo glie il fece vedere. Disse che non lo voleva, e me lo renuziò a me. Di là a alcuni giorni, tagliai d.º damasco nel mio muriciolo di botiga, e d.º Abramo era presente, e me ne rubò un pezo, e ne fece tagliare tanti baretini da un יהודי Romano

chiamato M. Lazaro de Importanza, e a lui gli le fece cuscire. E il giorno de la Madonna di Tor.^e,^{20a} che fummo a li 1632, mi mostrò uno de d.^e baretini belli e fatti del med.^{mo} damasco, e io subito riconoscendo che era robba mia gli dissi, in dove aveva auto d.^o damasco. E lui andò ritroso a non me' l volere dire: et io resposegli ch' in nesun modo gli il volevo rendere se non me diceva da chi haveva auto, perchè nel med.^{mo} tempo mi fu rubato una banda con finemento d'argiento di tafetta, capilino, et altra. Allora me rispose che haveva compro da Prospero Arcidosso: e io gli rispose de volerlo mostrare a d.^o Prospero, e sapere da lui se gli haveva venduto, e gli averei reso d.^o baretino. E trovando io d.^o Prospero, gli domandai se era vero ch'avesse vend.^o d.^o damasco a d.^o Abramo, e lui rispose presente al med.^{mo} Abramo, e disse: « Qui Abramo mi è venuto a trovare, e mi a d.^o ch' io ti dica ch' io gli ho venduto, et io gli o risposto che non vo' dire tal cosa, perchè non è vero, e non gli o venduto nulla: ma io fui presente quando tu tagliavi q.^{to} damasco sopra al tuo muricolo, e lui era in bottiga tua, e te ne vede cadere un pezo, e corse averlo, e ne fece tagliari tre baretini. » Et io, sentendo così, dissi a d.^o Abramo: « Io non ti voglio rendere il baretino, perchè è robba mia, e non è vero che tu habij compro da Prospero come tu dicevi. » E facendo lui forza de volermelo levare di mano per forza, ce atacamo alle pugnìa, e fumo spartiti, e non ebe altrem.^{te} il baretino. E stando in pendente così la cosa, la sera a ora de מנחה mi affrontò d.^o Abramo Pelagrili con suo padre e Giuseppe suo fratello, e mi diedero le mani per dosso con dirmi « Rendimi il mio baretino, ho vero ne voglio tanto sangue ». Et io resposegli « Se fusse il tuo baretino, te harei reso, ma perchè è roba mia, non te la renderò mai ». E vedendomi io tre adosso, mi acostai in bottega de M. Samuello Nisim, e preso un paro de forbeci da homo, e le dei nel petto Abramo, dicendo « Statte adietro, e non mi siate tre adosso! » E lui, setendosi dare le forbici nel petto, gridò, dicendo « So mortto », e si buttò in terra: ma non gli fece mal nisuno. Et io, dubitando de non havere ferito, me volsi retornare a Sam Martino, e me sopragionzero sei bracia lontano di Sam Martino, e Abramo e suo padre mi tenero, e Giuseppe suo fratello mi diede una coltellata ne le reni, et mi firij a morte. E stei a letto 23 giorni, con A. medico e due cerusichi. Et Prospero Arcidosso e Moise Galetti me

se esaminoreno contro, con dire che non era stato nè Salamone nè Abramo suo padre, ma che era statto Moise suo fratello: et q.^{to} il dissero perche Moise era de minore ettà, e non potteva esere condanato. Ma non è vero altr.^{me} che fusse Moise, e se esaminoreno il falzo. E quella feritta mi costò più de scudi vinti.

Ricordo che il ב"ט כסלו שפ"ג, che fu il primo dì 9br 1633, il giorno de hongni samnti,²¹ mi passò a miglior vita mio figliolo chiamato שבתי: e quando l'ebj a sopelire, vene a dire M. Angniolo Semilini se io avevo compro tavoli e tella per sotterare il mio figliolo, e io gli resposi di no, ma che avevo mandato zio אפרים e mio fratello a provvedere di quello faceva bisogno vedendo l'ora tardi, e per esere il giorno de hongni santi, come ho d.^o di sopra, non trovano nesuno aperto. Il qual tornò M. Angniolo, e gli dissi che, per esere festa, non anno pututo avere nulla, e che S. B. dicesero alli ממהונים, ch' erano M. Samuello Blanis e M. Rafaello R. G. Galichi, che mi provedesero loro, come hobligati in q.^{ti} hoccasione. E M. Angniolo me respose a lor' nome che me averebeno provisto del tutto, ma che io gli dese ho pegno ho denari; e io gli respose, che non volevo dargli nè pegnio nè denari, nè meno non intendo che me himpresti la חברה, ma ben si arei voluto come hobligati in giò che d.^e פרנסים de חברה me avesero trovato la roba ch' io arei trovato il denaro, del qual non si impacioreno in cosa alcuna. E mi covene mandare a mio fratello che pregase un mercante che uprise botiga per darmi quello mi faceva de bisogni; e così fece. Il tutto ho messo a memoria, perchè se costuma quando more uno, ho rico, ho povero che sia, le חברים devano provvedere del tutto, e se le parenti del morto non avese pronto il denaro in quel tempo, se devano pigliare dalla חברה, e così sempre si è usato, come apare nel libro de le rescosioni del קילה: ma a me cercono de farmi afronto, però non eseguireno d.^o stile.

Ricordo che il dì 9 Aprile 1634, fui carcerato per scudi diciotto per una promessa che io feci per mio fratello, quale entrò cesonario M. Agustino Franci: e fui carcerato a sua istanza. Del quale, esendo otto giorni avanti פסח, e non avevo ancora compro il grano per le מצות nè altra provisione, e senza alcuno asegniamento di denari ho altro, me arecomandai a Dio, e poi

a Salamone e Rafaello Nepi, con pregarli che volesero promettere per me in forma de sei mesi. E non se aristiando a dirmi di no, me resposano che volevano da me un pegnio equivalente, del qual me richiesero de la חוקה²² di casa sotto in dove io abitto, e acciò gli dovese remanere d.^a חוקה per d.^a diciotto scudi, che non la arei datta per scudi cinquanta, me legoreno ne lo scritto che ancor ch'io avesse tempo sei mesi, e non avesse pagato fra quattro, che d.^a חוקה sia sua, ancor che non avesero pagato niente de loro. Del quale, essendo io carcerato ne le sud.^e giorni, me convene consentire in hongni mio pigior modo, e così gli hobbligai: e andoreno per promettere, e fureno ambj due refutati dal magistrato mentre però non davano un aprobatore. Il quale loro andoreno a recercare per aprobatore M. Francesco, fornaio a S. Martino: il quale lui respose de volere aprobare, e si mese il feraiolo per venire. E trovandosi là M. Rubino Frosolona che sfornava le sue מצות, e in quel tempo era פרנס del קהילה, in cambio de dire qualche parola con solegitare d.^o che mi facesse il servizio, disse (acciò non ce ne andasse) «Se ve ne andate voi, me ne volio andare ancora io». E quando il גוי sentì così, subito possò il feraiolo, e non volse venire. E quando fureno partiti Salamone e Rafaello da d.^o גוי, d.^o M. Rubino gli dise che non prometese, che non gli ne poteva tornare se non danno. Il quale il giorno seguente tornoreno d.^o Salamone e Rafaello da d.^o fornaio, con diglie gli venisse a fare il servizio, gli respose che lui non voleva promettere più, e che se provedese de altro aprobatore. E per le parole de M. Robino, me convene stare sei giorni più in priscione, per non trovare altro probatore. E a capo a sei giorni, per volere uscire, mandai quattro vestitti di bottiga a d.^o fornaio acciò aprobase, e con gran' fatica mi fece il servizio. E q.^{to} ho messo a memoria il tradimento de d.^o M. Rubino, e devo io pigliare esempio da d.^e Nepi che non volsero promettere senza pegnio, e mi legoreno in quel modo nel lo scritto: holtre che mi convene dare le quattro vestitti al fornaio.

Ricordo che l'anno 1633, Donna Stella del già Salamone Toscano rascione de maritare con Salvatore de Isache Galichi: qual matrimonio il trattava Donna Angniola de Moise Rietti. E nel medesimo anno mi morij Anna mia moglie, sorella di d.^a Stella, quale morij di parto, e fece un putto maschio; e feci

d.^a Donna Stella comare, e suo padre (mio sogero) fu compare. E il dei a baglia a Donna Dianora mia zia, che abita incontra a d.^a D.^a Stella, e con q.^{to} hoccasione pigliava cura del mio figliolo, e il teneva in casa tutto il giorno, per affizione grande che portava a me e a mio figliolo suo nipotte, quale diceva più volti ch' avanti lei si maritase, voleva lasare de la sua dote cento scudi a frutto per mio figliolo. Et holtre di questo gli andavo alla liberale in casa sua e in sua camera con hongni domesticheza e afabelità, il quale me dimostrava grande affizione e famigliarità. E un giorno fui chiamato da M. Angniolo Semiline, e mi menò fora de ghette, a mi disse: « Sai, che tua cogniata se tratta de maritare con Salvatore Galico. Però te conzeglio, che se lei a in mano nula di tuo, fattelo restotovire, perchè se confida con Salvatore, durarai fatiga a levargliela di mano. » E io gli risposi per la verità, che ce avevo tutto il momibele de mia moglie, e rami, e ottoni di casa mia: ma io avevo di suo alcuni robi di suo uso che me aveva dato in serbo quando remase vedova, per dubio che non venisero ho mandasero le fratelli del marito a ventariargli la roba, e poi glie la levarono, e però me la diede a serbare a me: quale roba poteva importare da vinti scudi in circa; e anco avevo alcuni polisi di monte che dicevano veste e zimare de suo uso, quali me le prestò che me ne prevalesse, e me rimaseno in mano d.^e polisi acciò ch' io gli le rescotese. E conferij con detto M. Angniolo le sopra detti paroli, dicendoli che se lei mi avesse reso la mia roba, io gli avrei reso la sua: e quando avesi creso ch' avesse fatto il matrimonio con Salvatore come se diceva, io avrei fatto qualsevoglia cosa per conturbalo, e quando non avesi saputo di fargli alcuno dispiacere dopo che avessi receuta la mia roba, volevo mandare la sua alli fratelli del morto, aciò non venise in mano di d.^o Salvatore. De la qual cosa M. Angniolo ne sentiva gran contento ch' io facesi d.^a azione, e conturbasi d.^o matrimonio, per eser che lui voleva male e portava odio a d.^o Salvatore, ancor che gli parlava, e gli faceva l'amico. E l'odio che portava d.^o M. Angniolo a d.^o Salvatore era perchè d.^o M. Angniolo andò a l'acqua bona, lui con tutta sua famiglia, l'anno 1632, e non lasciò nesuno in casa sua. Il quale d.^o Salvatore conzigliò a Angniolo di Donato Semilini che dovese in qualche modo andare in casa suo zio mentre ch' era fora, e gli dovese rubare un pochi di denari. Quale d.^o Angniolo eseguì il

fatto e scassò una cassa di d.^o suo zio, e ce trovò una sachetta con mille piastri, e di essi ne prese cento. Il quale, quando il sepe d.^o Salvatore gli menacciò de fargli la spia: e d.^o Angnio, acciò non gli facesse la spia, gli diede vinti piastri e che il tenesse segreto. E de dette denari ce andava a putani: il quale un sabato sera a ori cinque di notte fu preso in casa la putana con le denari in sacucia: il quale gli fu dato la corda sì a lui come a d.^a putana, e stettero ambe due saldi, e oscireno senza essere condanati per il gran' sciocad שוחד che diede suo padre.²³ E il ladroscino di d.^o Angniolo Semilini si scoprì con ocasion che d.^o Angniolo conferì con un tal Abramo ברקן, marito de Fiore, de le Levantini, e fureno de sconcordio nel spartire d.ⁱ denari, e con tal ocasion se scoprì il fatto: e per questo d.^o M. Angniolo portò odio a d.^o Salvatore, e d.^o M. Angniolo andava intrametendosi con fare imbasciata fra d.^a Donna Stella e me, e sempre se dimostrava d'essere in mio aiuto, a mi fece imbasciata che d.^a Stella mi voleva dare otantta scudi per paregio de nostri contij. E così diede comisio a Abramo Meniati che mi facesse l'imbasciata alla presenza di d.^o M. Angniolo. Il quale d.^o Abramo mi fece d.^a imbasciata e poi me disse che Salvatore non voleva ne facesse altro, e mi fece chiamare avanti il Capitano de Giustizia. Et io comparsi con il mio precuratore, ch' era il dottore Marzochi, e il Capitano de Giustizia mi fece una grande gravata, con dirmi che lui era informato del fatto mio, che non intendevo solo che a robe rubati e a furbarij, e che se io non rendevo tutto quello che domandava d.^a donna, lui mi menaciava di volermi farmi scopare, e mandarmi in una galea. Et io gli risposi che lui era male informato del fatto mio, e ch' erano gente che mi voleva male, e tutto quello ch' io avevo al mondo l'aveva d.^a donna, che glie havevo dato in serbo, per essere lei mia cog.^{ta}, e acciò mio fratello non me le mandasse male. Il quale d.^o Capitano, rebusandomi più che mai, me disse ch' io non avessi ardire di rispondergli in tal particolare, che mi averebe messo in una segretta, e che gli rendesse tutta la roba di d.^a donna, in particolare le polisi di monte. E io gli resposi seconda volta: « Sig.^r Capitano, mentre che non vol ch' io dica le miei rascioni, non posso giustificare la mia noscenza. Et in quanto alli polisi di monte che lei dice avermi dato, ecco qui q.^{to} scatolino di politi di monte quale mi ha datti lei, che non è quindici giorni ch' io gli

le o dati in serbo, come gli ho dato altra roba.» Quale il Capitano me le levò di mano, e disse: «A poi che tu confessi de averli auti da lei, prova tu che gli li abij datti, e che siano tuoi: e se tu non il proverai, te gastigarrò conforma te o detto.» E d.^e polisi di monte fureno lesse alla presenza di d.^a Stella, e lei disse esere tuttj le sue. E il Capitano mi asegniò termine de quindici giorni a provare che d.^e polisi fusero le mia, altrimenti havese restoriati a d.^a Stella: e così fumo licenziati. E voltandomi al mio procuratore, gli dissi che mi dovesse consigliare quello dovevo fare in q.^{to} particolare, e come mi devo difendere, essendo che mi sa deficile a provare sedici ho dicciotto polisi siano le miei, essendo che la maggiore parte de quelle robe che sono contenuti in quelle polisi sono robì antichi di casa. E lui mi rispose che gli era dificile a difendermi, essendo che non posso fare le miei provanzi, e poi ho il Capitano contra: e mi conzegliò che il dovesse remetere in qualcuno. Et io gli rispose che tutti li heb.ⁱ si vogliano vedere male l'uno con l'altro, e nisuno se ne sarrebe voluto impaciare. E lui mi rispose che lui averebe cercato de acomedarla lui con il precuratore de la parte contra, acciò io non dovessi stare a l'impito del Capitano: e a me piaque il consiglio, e dissi che arei rimesso in tutto e per tutto in lui; e così se contentò d.^a Stella de rimetere nel suo procuratore. Il quale fu fatto il compromesso al'ofiziali de la mercanzia. E mentre che si stava per sentenziare, d.^a Donna Stella fece venire di Roma un חרם: e quando fu saputo, vi erano di m.^{ti} che non averebeno voluto che se fusse butatto; ma, per vedere il mio precepizio sotto mano, precurono che se butase: e di essi erano Chlemente a Abramo Pesari. E in quel tempo era ברנם d.^o Chlemente: e per dimostrare sotto mano che loro non volevano che se butase d.^o חרם, mi fecero chiamare in ועדה alla presenza de M. Prospero Semilini, M. Isache del Borgo, M. Chlemente Pesaro, M. Riubino Frosolona, M. Samuello Nissim, M. Isache Gallichi, M. Salamone Milano, padre di d.^a Stella et altri del ועדה, e mi dissero: «Sapete bene che Donna Stelli per le pretenzioni che a con voi e per non avere che mostrare, a fatto venire un חרם di Roma, acciò chi niente il deba revilare. Però, ancor che noj siamo sicuri che tutti diranno quello saperano, e simile voj, per non cascare in un pregiudizio sì grave, con tutto ciò aviamo voluto usare q.^{ta} deliscenza de chiamarvi qui

avanti tutti questi s. s. con dirvi il gran pericolo che si porta quando se comportase che se butase d.^o חרם, essendo che in questa benedetta קהילה non è sucieso mai tal cosa: holtre che, Dio ne guardi, ne potrebe patire tutto il קהל, e, come si suol dire, ne pate il giusto per il peccatore. » Quali mi fecero un sermone con q.^{ti} e altri paroli più ben messi, et ongni uno ce disse il suo parere, del quale stei m.^{to} bene a sentire. E poi, quando ebene fenitto, gli resposi che « Io ringraziavo a tutti voj altri s. s. ch' avete usato tal deliscenza a chiamarmi in q.^{to} santo loco per tal causa: e in risposta ve dico ch' io non intendo di volere nulla di quello di nisuno; et è vero ch' io me ritrovo alcuni robi di Donna Stella, ma lei a m.^{to} più in mano de mio, ma in ongni modo intendo de volere dare hongni sadisfazia, sì a tutto il קהל come a d.^a Donna Stella, acciò non si dica che per l'amore mia sia nato un trasordine tale in קהל. Holtre di questo, ancor' ch' io abij qua se volia rascione, chi vol essere buon יודי conviene stare a דינה ישראל e così so' pronto io remettere hongni differenza a un homo per uno, ho vero che il ועדה cria lui un בית דין, tantto di quello ch' io pretende da me, quanto quello ch' io pretendo da lei: e di ciò, nisuno non credo che mi possa opore. » Del quale quelli che mi volevano male e desideravano che se butase d.^o חרם remaseno stupefatti de la mia risposta, e tutti da cordo resposero « ברוך תהיה, parlate m.^{to} bene »; e si voltoreno a M. Salamone Milano e disero; « Potete dire a vostra figliola che Giuseppe vole stare a דין ישראל ». E lui respose: « Et io acetto in loco de mia figliola. » E così ce partimo tuttj: e andò a dire d.^o Salamone a sua figliola quello si era remasto in וועד, e lei conzentj a quello fece suo padre, e cossì dette la parola alla presenza de M. Prospero, M. Isache del Borgo, e M. Chlemente, uno de le ממנים. E quando Salvatore il sepe, mandò a dire a d.^a Stella ch' ora ch' era venuto il חרם non voleva stare più a דינה ישראל, e che mi sarebe statto necisità per non cascare in חרם de arendeli tutto quello ch' io avevo di suo, e non lei quello ch' aveva de mio: e mandò a dire al וועד che non ne voleva fare altro. Il quale il וועד andò a trovare d.^o Salamone Milano e sua figlia, e gli ributoreno con dire che chi vol essere יודי gli conviene a stare a דינה ישראל in qual se voglia cosa, tanto magior.^{te} che suo padre aveva dato la parola alla presenza de tutto il קהל. E lei respose ch' in q.^{to} paticolare non aveva che fare nulla con suo padre, e che

lei era vedova, e sapeva fare le suoi fatti da se, e non ne voleva farne altro di più. Gli fu risposto a poi che lei voleva butare d.° חרם fusse reciprico, che quanto se intenesse per quello ch' io avevo a dare a lei, quanto per quello che lei deve dare a me. E lei replicò che però non voleva stare a דינה ישראל acciò de dichiarare il דין in favore suo. E tutto il קהל se partì con grande sdegno da lei, per avere mancato di quello che aveva promesso a tutto un קהל, e anco gli dispiaceva che se butase d.° חרם, perchè non era intravenuto mai tal cosa, e per q.^{ti} rascioni gli ne portoreno odii e gli fureno contra. Quale da li a tre giorno a ora de שחרית venne Salamone Milano e Salvatore Gallichi con tutta la sbiraria, e con un precetto del vicario in mano che nisuno dovesse impedire che non se butase d.° חרם. Il quale avanti che venisero a scola se ne avede Abramo Pesaro, e venne a scola avisare al קהל che oscisero da scola acciò che non sentisero leggere d.° חרם. E fu tralasciato il dire תפילה che se diceva עמידה, e cercò tutto il קהל de oscire de scola. E quando fureno a meza scala se incontroreno nela corte e fureno fattj tuttj tornare adietro a forza de piatonati e serono l'uscio per difora. Chlemente Pesaro cercò di fare m.^{ta} difesa per oscire, et arlevò de m.^{ti} piatonati e pomi di pugniali di birij. Parimente Salamone ebe m.^{ti} piatonati da birij. E nel med.° tempo sopra-giunse il Bargiello,²⁴ e glie ne dette m.^{ti} altri a spada inuda. Altri fecero difesa de oscire per le finestri. E nel med.° tempo Bonaventura Gallichi, ch'era חזן in quella matina, prese il חרם in mano, e se mese a legere alla finestra di scola, perchè tutti erano oscitj; e mentre ch' il legeva, Salvatore suo nepotte gli teneva la torcia nera in mano, e la colava tutto in capo a Bonaventura mentre legeva. A scola ve rimase Salamone Milano e d.° Salvatore e d.° Bonaventura e Abramo da Bulogna, e un tal Abramo il romitto, e Sforzo Nissim, e tre ho quatro altri che non mi ricorde: quali quatro batevano le banchi, l'altri ch' erano fora de scola, le donne se posero tutti in ginochione gridando « Per il capo de chi il lege e de chi l'a fatto venire! »: le putti tiravano torzi e sasatti alla finestra a d.° Bonaventura mentre legeva, dicendoli « Per il capo tuo! ». Il quale in quel giorno fu fatto grandi strepidi e pianti: e subito ch' oscireno da scola d.° Milano e Salvatore e Bonaventura, tutti gli gridono dietro, dicendoli, per il capo suo, dicendoli tutti ingiuri nefandi. E a d.^a Stella tutti per una bocie

dicevano « Per quella puttana poltrona sono tutti questi romori »: e per le grandi ingiurij che gli diceva tutto il קהל, gli convenne levarsi dalla finestra, e non poteva più comparire nè a usci nè a finestrij, e per remediare a q.^{to} gli convenne mandare cinque ho sei precetti dal Capitano de Giustizia che nisuno la molestase, ne in paroli nè in fatti, sotto penna de vinticinque scudi. E a me ancor mandò il precetto, e così se quiettò la gente. E tutto il קהל in quel precipio gli ritene la parola a Salamone Milano e a Salvatore Gallichì e a Bonaventura Gallichì che lese il חרם, ma Prospero Semilini non gli rettene la parola, perchè Isache Gallichì era suo parente, holtre che s'era ingerito de farlo venire a Siena nel suo falimento, e gli mandava le suoi figlioli amparare: e per questo lui se ingerì asai in q.^{to} particola, e lui fecero venire le dunzie di d.^o חרם con scusarsi che gli dispiaceva de ingerisi di tal fatto, ma perchè gli era comandato dal רב non poteva fare di meno de fare tutto quello gli veniva in posto: e con q.^{to} occasione metteva incarco di cuscienza alla gente che referise il tutto menutam.^{te} de quello loro sapevano di tal fatto, acciò non cascassero in alcuno pregiudizio, e cometea a tutti che non scrivesero solo chi sapeva che chi avesse roba de d.^a Stella ho io ho altri, ma se sapevano che d.^a Stella avesse auto roba de mio o d'altri, non lo dovesero scrivere, perchè lui non le voleva accettare. E io, conoscendo che d.^o Prospero se mostrava parziale in tal fatto, per scarico de la mia coscienza me ne andai da zio אפרים che il pregai che me dovesse dire quello conosceva in q.^{to} particolare, perchè non ce voglio rimetere d'anima, ancor ch' io fussi seguro de rimeterci tutto quello che ho al mondo. E lui me disse che ce averebe studiato, e mi chiese un libro chiamato il Caro,²⁵ e io gli il portai: e dopo che lui c' ebe studiato, me disse che non mi dubitase, e me ne menase burla, perchè lui non teneva contio di tal חרם per più rascioni. Una si è, che non ci anno fatto le debitti אררהות²⁶ che ce vano fatti: seconda, che tutto il קהל non è statto consente: terza, perchè non è statto inteso dal קהל: quarto, per non vi era מוניח, e ancora ce fusse statto, erano tuttj fra di loro parenti e gente interesati: et altri rascioni ch' a me non se ricordano. E lui io gli replicai che di grazia non mi metese in pregiudizio alcuno, e lui me disse che me ne stesse a lui, e così feci, e non volsi fare denuzi. A capo a tre giorni, fureno presentattj tuttj le denuzi de tutti

homeni e donni e putti in mano di d.^o M. Prospero Semilini, e lui l'apresentò in, mano de l'arbitri che noi facemo il compromesso, come anco gli fureno consegnati tutti le polisi di monte che lasai in mano del sig.^{ri} Capitano de Giustizia. Quali me revereno tutti ne le mani da due in poj che diceva, una, sciugatori e altro, e l'altra, colanini da bracia: e q.^{ti} due sentenzioreno ch' io provase che d.^e robij me fussero statti dattj a conto di dotte fra dieci giorni. E io feci chiamare M. Angniolo Semilini e M. Rubino Frosolona, che loro fureno stimatori di d.^o mobile: quale M. Rubino dise che non si recordava de cosa alcuna, e non se volse venire a esaminare, perchè lui era zio di d.^o Salvatore, e non volse fare contra al nepotte. M.^{da} Fiore del già Laudadio Galetti me se hoferij esaminare in mio favore in q.^{to} particolare, perchè lei se rittrovò quando fu stimato il mio mobile, e in buona cuscienza il poteva riconoscere, per esere d.^o Salamone Milano abitava lì in casa sua in quel tempo: e me dise ch' io la facesse citare, che lei si sarebe esaminata per la verità; e q.^{to} anco se proferiva perchè detto Salvatore gli aveva detto che se andase a vetare la scarzella, e glie la tocò: oltre di q.^{to} gli die un schiafo. E per q.^{to} odio se proferij. Quale la feci citare sì a lei come anco a M. Angniolo Semilini: e dopo ch' io le feci citare, se pentireno ambe due de essersi proferti di farne il servizio, ancor che fecero cosa lecita e giusta. Quale dopo m.^{ti} preghi se esaminoreno, e indusciono tanto che pasò il tempo determinatomi da l'arbetrij: e per l'amore loro l'ofiziali me diedereno la sentenza contra, dicendomi ch' avevo tracorso il tempo che diceva il lodo, e tuttj due le pegni importoro più de scudi hottantta. E q.^{to} ho messo a memorij dicendo che non se trovano in q.^{to} mondo se non homeni finti et traditorj: e ho messo ancora a memoria che nel med.^{mo} anno che fu buttatto d.^o חרם, morse la moglie de d.^o M. Prospero Semilini, M. Amadio Betarbo, giovane di trentacinque anni, M. Arone Emiglio, giovane de diciotto anni, e era חתן con la figliola di d.^o Bonaventura Gallichì, la madre di d.^o Salvatore morse otto giorni dopo il parto che fece un figliolo maschio, a me mi morse un figliolo maschio di dieci mesi, morse la moglie di d.^o Bonaventura che lesse il חרם, se sconiò a un figliolo maschio la moglie de Rubino Frosolona, e anco se sconiò a un figliolo maschio la moglie di Chlemente Pesaro, e morse Abramo Pesaro che in quel tempo era פּרנם, e la

sera che escì la matina s' amalò, e morse fra dicciotto giorni: quale pregarò Dio che me abij lasati bona vitta a me a tutto ישראל, che ce scampi di mano de traditorij אמן בן יהי רצון.

TRANSLATION

I record how, in the year 1625, the Grand Duke came to Sienna, and Messer Abraham Pesaro and Messer Buonaventura Gallichi were appointed to collect the levy.¹² From me, they demanded a pair of sheets, a bed-canopy, a blanket, and a pillow—twice as much as they imposed upon any one else. I gave them everything they asked, but the said Abraham thrice threw what I gave into the middle of the street with great contumely and derision, telling me that it was not enough, and that they desired better stuff. The said articles were however worth more than ten *scudi*. At the same time, in order to increase my dishonour and harm, they sent the constables and ordered them to distrain upon me, and not to accept the aforementioned goods. In this matter I received more consideration from the Court than from them, for they accepted the same articles and did not distrain upon me, though they fined me one *lira*. The aforementioned Abraham boasted many times of this contumely. I have put it all on record, in order to remember both pleasure and displeasure.

I record how, in the year 1625, I purchased from Messer Solomon Pelagrilli four books entitled *Rabbenu Moshe*,¹³ for seven *scudi*. After I left Sienna by reason of the affairs which I had elsewhere (?), the aforementioned Solomon misled my brother, telling him that he had given me the said books in pledge for three *scudi*, and took them from him. He repaid him one *testone* at a time, and on one occasion, when he paid a whole *scudo*, he had my brother buy him a brace of pigeons. On my return, I wanted to give him back his money, but he raised objections, and would not let me. Moreover, after my return (which was in the year 1629) he invited my brother several times to the hostelry,¹⁴ and lent him a *testone* on the security of a Pentateuch with the Targum. I wanted to redeem it, but he

sold it outright for a small price. I have written it all down for remembrance. .

I record how, in the year 1631, I was asked by Donna Violante Galletti to do her the service of disposing of some burnt and broken gold ornaments, and she wished to leave the money received in my hands. I did not fail to do all she asked me, and sold the said articles for her. At about the same time, I had the opportunity of buying some furniture, worth about eighty *scudi*, belonging to a certain Messer Lorenzo in Florence, who kept a lodging-house for Germans. I went to the aforementioned Donna Violante to discuss the affair with her, and told her that if she would contribute all this money to purchase the said property, I would admit her to half the profits, whatever they might be. She accepted the proposition, and gave me thirty *scudi* in cash and a necklace with other jewellery amounting to about four ounces of gold in all for me to pledge. This I did with Nicolino the goldsmith for twenty-five *scudi*. Afterwards, I went to bargain about the above-mentioned furniture, but we did not come to an agreement. I therefore returned home, and immediately handed over to the said Donna Violante the thirty *scudi* in cash which she had given me, telling her (as was true) that the purchase had not gone through. As for the gold ornaments which she had given me, which I had pledged for twenty-five *scudi*, I told her that if she would leave the money in my hands, I would pay her a certain consideration every year. To this, she agreed. At the end of the year she asked for ten *scudi* profit, and for the return of her property. I told her that she ought not ask ten *scudi* profit on twenty-five, because that would be at the rate of forty per cent, but I would give her full satisfaction. As for her property, I begged her not to withdraw it from my hands, because it was not convenient for me to repay at the moment, for I had just paid a guarantee of fifteen *scudi* which I had made for her husband to Messer Antonio Lorenzoni. She replied that she would not wait, nor even shew me any consideration on account of the aforementioned guarantee which I had paid for her husband, which was done on account of the dowry. So she obtained a warrant of arrest against me for

a hundred *scudi*, with the alternative of restoring the above-mentioned property. Eight days therefore before Purim in the year 5391 (11 March 1631) she had my house broken into by three bailiffs. At two o'clock at night, they broke my door down, with commission to distrain upon my property to the value of one hundred *scudi*. Thereupon Messer Laudadio Rieti¹⁵ and Messer Abraham Meniati interposed to accommodate our differences, and they ordered me to pay the expenses of the officers, which came to sixteen *lire*. Of the fifteen *scudi*, they condemned her to pay six *scudi*, in accordance with the agreement. Before obtaining the writ, she obtained a warrant against me on account of a claim for a hundred *scudi*, and forced me to clear out my shop, and Messer Francesco the baker, of San Martino, gave a guarantee for me. I have put it all on record, how for the favours done her I received this recompense.

I record how, in the year 1631, I brought a case against Messer Solomon Milano, my father-in-law. In order to secure my credit, on this occasion I obtained a warrant against him before bringing the case, and, when I had it executed, he asked Messer Isaac Meniati to act as surety. Before he gave his bond, I begged the aforesaid Messer Isaac not to do so, since if the decision were in my favour, I should have to act against him, and (as nobody likes to pay on behalf of another) we would thereby come into enmity instead of being friends. He answered me: "God grant that the decision be in your favour, for you will assuredly be paid. Have no fear that here will be any misunderstanding between us." He added that he could not do otherwise than promise. Thereupon I went to find Abraham, son of the said Messer Isaac, and spoke to him as I had done to his father, and he gave me the same reply as his father had done. After interceding with both for a long time, I tried to get the father's bond refused by the authorities, but finally was unable to escape accepting it. Whereupon I brought my suit, and obtained the decision in my favour for a hundred *piastri*. Salvador Gallichi, who acted on behalf of the above-mentioned Solomon, lodged an appeal and I appealed as well. When the said Abraham Meniati heard that I had obtained the decision in my favour,

and that the said Salvadore had appealed, he came to see me and asked me to free his father from his bond, as otherwise he would work against me in this case, and in every other matter also. I replied to him, that if a person desires not to pay for others, he should think before giving his bond; all the more since I had warned him before he pledged himself. Moreover, though I should have liked to oblige his father, I could not exempt him from his bond, since the said Solomon Milano had gone to Rome, so that hence I would not receive any payment at all. In order to prove that I wished to oblige him, I would have given him a year's grace, or more if it was needed, until he had time to proceed against the aforesaid Milano, so that he would not be the loser. He replied, that he desired no accommodation from me, only that I should liberate him from his bond: otherwise, he would help himself as best he could.

I record how, when I was in Lombardy, Abraham Meniati enticed my brother to sell him property from my shop and from my house, and he sold him wares to the value of upwards of two hundred *scudi*. He enticed him moreover to game in his house, besides making him buy stock from merchants, so that he caused him forthwith to squander and gamble this money away. Moreover, he lent him money on pledge at usury, and then he would purchase the self-same pledge for a half of its value. When I returned to Sienna, I asked him for the goods which my brother had given him in pledge, and in particular for the masquerade wear which he had taken. He gave me, for twenty-eight *scudi*, wares which were not worth fifteen, but, because they were old family possessions, I had to redeem them, though it cost twice what they were worth. From public report, and from information obtained from a variety of persons, I learned that he gained out of my brother two hundred *scudi*. I have placed it all on record.

And in the year 1630, there came here to Sienna a teacher named Rabbi Elijah of Vignola, whom I had known at Modena, as well as at the said place. In order to favour him, I obliged myself to learn to read while he was here, for which I would have paid him fifteen *lire* the year as long as he gave me or my

brother one lesson a day. For my part, I took him to the hostelry when he first came and paid for him several times, in order to please him. Besides this, he was put forward by my father-in-law, and my brother-in-law Toscano, and myself, so that through our diligence he was engaged by the community for two years. At this period, he became very friendly with the aforementioned Abraham Meniati, and stopped giving me lessons, not having the slightest regard for my friendship, and losing all interest in my affairs. When he left, I still owed him nine *lire*, which I did not wish to pay him for many reasons, as specified above. The said Abraham, having property of mine in his hands, came up to me one day in the Piazza and told me to pay the said Rabbi; otherwise, I would do it in spite of myself. His meaning was, that he would pay himself, having wares of mine in his possession. So, by his tricks, I had to borrow four lire from him, still owing the other five, which sum he procured from Abraham when he went away. The latter encouraged the said Rabbi to have the money collected by a pupil of his, a German, which the said Rabbi did, asking him as a favour to use all diligence in collecting the said money from me. The said German, obeying, summoned me several times, threatening to have me beaten if I did not bring him the said money, and the said Abraham went every day to remind the said German. Finally, the German gave up and I did not give him a farthing. I have put this on record, judging that he was the more inclined to favour a stranger whom he had not seen nor known previously, in order to do me offence and harm.

I record how, when I arrived at Modena in the year 1625, the Jews Solomon and Raphael Nepi were there. When the fair of Sassuolo came on, I went there and bought some dressed skins for sixty-seven *lire*; these I brought to Modena, and gave to the said Solomon to keep for me. Now, he had obliged me with a little money until some arrived from home, lending me fifty *lire*. When I asked them for the skins given them to mind, to send to Sienna, they told me that they had sold them for the fifty *lire* they had lent me, so that I lost seventeen lire, and the property was sold without my permission. A few days after-

wards, Raphael went with others to Sassuolo to stay with other persons. About the Day of Atonement of the same year, I had occasion to leave the lodging where I was and to go to the house of another Jew, because of many annoyances received. When we made up the accounts, I owed my landlord twenty-two *lire*. Now the said Solomon was no longer staying with the Ussigli,¹⁶ and he shared my room; so he offered to oblige me with twelve *lire* which he had, and to go to Raphael at Sassuolo to lend me a zecchin to complete the twenty-two *lire*. We did so, and, going to find Raphael, told him what had happened; and I asked him to do me the favour of obliging me with a zecchin. Since he could not refuse, having gained at that time ten thalers without counting the salary which was due from his employer, he told me that he could not make me the loan, as he wanted to go home after the holidays, and he wanted to have a suit of clothes and a collar made with the said moneys. So, in order to preserve my reputation and to satisfy my landlord, I persuaded his brother to take off a jerkin of figured broadcloth and a pair of hose of coarse silk and I gave him a length of collar-material of fine leather, to persuade him to lend me the said zecchin. The said skins were worth five *lire*. I was much annoyed by this action, and therefore have placed it on record.

Some days after, it happened that one of the Ussigli named Lemacino gave us to sell several pieces of gold which he had taken at his shop, and I gained at various times about thirty *scudi*. Since the said Solomon had lent me money, I divided the profits with him; then, being in need of funds, I made use of his half, which was about fifteen *scudi*. Afterwards, occasion arising for them to go to Sienna, they asked me for a note of hand for the said moneys, which I did not fail to give them. Immediately after, they went to Sienna and told everybody about the said note, saying that they had lent me the money in cash in Lombardy. Through the said note, my mother and my brother did them divers favours, lodging them in my own bed, because they were destitute and had nowhere to sleep. Afterwards, my mother let them the house for the same price which she paid the Christian owner and the rent was reckoned against my note of hand. When accordingly I came to Sienna in 1629 without any

ill-feeling, they sent me by the advice of Abraham Meniati a demand for eighty-four *lire*. At such malice, I sent them a demand to clear out of the house. Whereupon, they not knowing what to do in order not to clear out of the house, we made peace. When matters were quiet, they changed their mind and within a few days they wished to summon me before the merchants for the said note of hand for the moneys which I owed them. Moreover, they worked upon the brothers Pesaro, to wit, Abraham and Clement; and this notwithstanding that they lived in my house, and that I paid their rent. At the same time, it happened that I owed Donna Fiore Galletti twenty-one *lire* for a piece of muslin and Raphael Nepi went surety for me. At this time, the said Raphael went to Grosseto, and I gave him some wares out of my shop to sell at fixed prices. When he returned from Grosseto, I asked him for the money for the wares which he had sold. He told me that he would give me nothing if I did not first pay Donna Fiore, or else free him from his surety. I replied that it was not right for him to do such an affront to me and to avenge himself on me, seeing that he had not yet received either harm or insult from me and that, even though he were to have to pay, he was lodging in my house and could anyhow have deducted what he paid from the rent. Despite all of these arguments, he would not give me anything, unless I first paid the said Fiore. Whereat it appeared to me that this action was a great affront to me, more than any other; and for this reason I have placed it on record.

I record how on the 25th March 1632, I was imprisoned for debt by Messer Abraham Pesaro and his brother, with great indignity and affront and they gave the bailiffs orders to take as guarantors Messer Isaac Gallico, or Messer Reuben Frosolone,¹⁷ otherwise to clear out my house. He had me distrained on for twenty *scudi* left over from thirty *scudi* which I owed him; which moneys were for a note of hand of mine for twelve *scudi* which he had, which twelve *scudi* were for thirty *lire* which they had to receive from the illustrious Michael Maroni in Florence, and twenty-six *lire* which they had lent to my mother when I was not in the city, and twenty-eight *lire* lent to me when I returned,

making twelve *scudi* in all; and they had to receive twelve *scudi* for a note of hand which Solomon and Raphael Nepi had given them, as recorded in this present book above (for which they gave them a certain length of white camelot at one *lira* the yard, and they sold it at twelve *soldi* the yard), and three *scudi* for a warrant served upon me for a cloak of black silk which he had given me to sell, and I returned it, and he served a warrant on me because I could not prove when I had returned it, and three *scudi* for a piece of muslin which he gave to Messer Framinio Galletti, my uncle, and I went surety for him. There were therefore thirty *scudi* in all, and he still had to receive twenty. He sent me the demand three days before the New Year. On the eve of *Purim*, he found me outside the gateway of the house of Messer Prospero, in the company of Messer Reuben Frosolone and Messer Moses Salario, and told me that he wished to act towards me like Pope Sixtus, who, when he wished to expel the Jews from his state, sent them the news on the eve of *Purim*.¹⁸ Thus he wished to act towards me, so that I should not pass *Purim* in peace. Because of public opinion, he did not carry out this evil intention which he threatened me. But, eight days before Passover, as I said before, he found me in the house of Messer Abraham Meniati, and threatened to have me put in prison for eight days on account of these debts, and to see to it that I should thus be there for four days of Passover: and he made other threats against me. The next day, he had me arrested in my own house for the greater indignity, because I would not give him an undertaking to pay in six months. I have put it all on record, because I receive from the said person injury and affront in divers respects. Firstly, he should not have sent me the demand eight days before the New Year. Secondly, he should not have come to an arrangement with Abraham Meniati, telling him to send me a demand for the payment of another note of hand which the said Abraham had against me for twenty *scudi*, so that they two sent me the demand together. Thirdly, he should not have disturbed me on the eve of *Purim* as he did. Fourthly, he should not have served a warrant against me under any circumstances, since they (to wit, the said Abraham) had in his hands deer-skins from Bolzano of mine to the value of one

hundred *scudi*, and Hebrew¹⁹ books to the value of twenty *scudi*, which were not reckoned in the accounts. Fifthly, he should not have served the warrant on me eight days before Passover. And all these affronts he did me because I had worked for the confraternity for the Release of Prisoners;²⁰ whereat they were indignant, and did me these affronts. I have put it all on record.

I record how, in the month of July, 1632, I purchased from Chichio the ragman several pieces of second-hand black damask, in the presence of Moses Galletti and Prospero Arcidosso, who at that period were working for Abraham Pelagrilli in the shop beneath my house, which I let to him. The said Moses and Prospero said that they wanted a share, since I had made the purchase in the doorway. So as not to quarrel, I replied that if they gave me the money which it cost, I would let them have it. They agreed, and told me to wait for the said Abraham Pelagrilli, who would either give me the money, or else let me keep it for myself. I was willing, and waited until the said Abraham came. When he arrived and I asked him whether he wanted the said damask, he replied that he wanted to see it first. Although there was no need for me to shew him it until he gave me the money it cost, I let him see it in order to content him. He said that he did not want it, and left it to me. Some days after, I cut the said damask at the bench in my shop. The said Abraham, who was present, robbed me of a piece, and had it cut into a number of caps by a Jew from Rome named Messer Lazaro de Importanza, and had them made up by him. On the day of the Madonna of the Tower,^{20a} on the 1632, he shewed me one of these caps, already made of this same damask. I immediately recognised my stuff, and asked him where he had got the said damask. He refused, and would not tell me; whereat I replied that I certainly would not give it back to him until he told me from whom he had received it, since at the same time there had been stolen from me a tafetta riband worked with silver, a bonnet, and other articles. He then told me that he had bought it from Prospero Arcidosso. I thereupon informed him that I wished to show it to the said Prospero, and know from him whether he had sold it

to him, and that then I would give him back the cap. So, finding the said Prospero, I asked him whether it was true that he had sold the said damask to the said Abraham. He immediately replied to the same Abraham and said: "Abraham here came to find me, and told me to tell you that I had sold it to him, and I answered him that I would not say such a thing, because it was not true, for I have not sold him anything. But I was present when you were cutting up this damask on your counter, and I saw a piece fall down, and he ran to pick it up, and had three caps made out of it." When I heard this, I said to the said Abraham: "I will not give you the cap back because it is my property, and it is not true that you bought it from Prospero, as you said." He tried to force it out of my hand, and we came to blows, and we were divided, and I kept the cap. While matters were at this stage, the said Abraham Pelagrilli with his father and his brother Joseph accosted me in the evening, at the time of the afternoon service, and laid hands on me, saying: "Give me back my cap, or else I will get it out of you in blood!" To which I replied: "If it were your cap, I would have given it back, but, because it is my stuff, I will never do so." Seeing all three of them on me, I backed into the shop of Messer Samuel Nissim, and took from the man a pair of scissors and struck the said Abraham in the breast with them, saying: "Keep back, and do not come all three of you on to me!" Feeling the scissors at his breast, he cried out: "I am a dead man," and threw himself to the ground, but it had not done him any harm at all. Fearing that I had wounded him, I turned back towards San Martino. They caught me up six yards from San Martino, and Abraham and his father held me, and Joseph his brother struck me behind with a knife, and wounded me to death. I stayed in bed for twenty-three days, with a physician and two surgeons. Prospero Arcidosso and Moses Galletti gave evidence unfavourable to me, saying that it was neither Solomon nor Abraham his father, but Moses his brother. They said this because Moses was under age, and could not be punished. But it was in no wise true that it was Moses, and they testified falsely; and that wound cost me upwards of twenty *scudi*.

I record how, on the 29th of Heshvan, 5394, which was the first day of November 1633, being All Saints' Day,²¹ my son Sabbatai passed from this to a better life. When the time came to bury him, Messer Angelo Semilini came to ask whether I had bought boards and linen to bury my son. I told him that I had not, but that I had sent my uncle Ephraim and my brother to provide that which was necessary. The hour being late, and it being All Saints' Day, as I said above, they found nobody open. When therefore Messer Angelo returned, I told him that since it was a holiday, they had not been able to find anything, and that they should tell the Treasurers of the Burial Society (who were Messer Samuel Blanis and Messer Raphael Gallichi) that they should provide for me, as they were obliged to do on such occasion. Messer Angelo replied in their name that they would provide me with everything, but that I should give them either a surety or else money. I answered that I would give them neither surety nor money; nor had I intended that the Confraternity should make me a loan, but I desired that the officials of the Confraternity should find me the articles as they were obliged, and I would have found the money, wherein they would not be in any way troubled. So I had to send my brother to ask a merchant to open his shop and to give me what was necessary. I have put it all on record, because it is customary that if a person die, whether he be rich or poor, and the relatives have not the money ready at that time, they should be provided for by the Confraternity: and so has always been customary, as appears in the account books of the Community. But to me they seek to do affront, however, they did not succeed, as I have related.

I record how, on the ninth day of April 1634, I was imprisoned for a debt of eighteen *scudi* on account of a guarantee which I made on behalf of my brother: in which Messer Agostino Franci had entered as substitute, and I was imprisoned at his instance. Wherefore, it being eight days before Passover, and I not having as yet purchased the grain for the Unleavened Bread, nor made other provision, and being unprovided with money or aught else, I recommended myself to God, and then to Solomon

and Raphael Nepi, begging them to have the goodness to go surety for me formally for six months. Not daring to refuse, they told me that they wanted a security of equal value, for which they asked the *Hazakah*²² of the lower part of the house in which I live. In order to make sure that they should have the said *Hazakah* for eighteen *scudi* (whereas I would not have sold it for fifty) they bound me in the deed in such wise that, though I had six months, the said *Hazakah* should be theirs, if I did not pay within four, even though they should not have paid anything of their own. Being in prison at the said season, I had to consent to my great disadvantage, and so I bound myself to them. They went to give their surety, but they were both refused by the magistrate unless they gave a guarantor. Whereupon they went to ask Messer Francesco, the baker, of San Martino, to come as reference. He replied that he was willing, and put on his cloak in order to come. Now there happened to be there taking his unleavened bread out of the oven, Messer Reuben Frosolone who was at that time one of the wardens of the community. Instead of saying a word to encourage the said gentile to do me the service, he said, in order to prevent his coming: "If you go away, I will go away too." When the Christian heard this, he immediately laid down his cloak, and would not come. After the said Solomon and Raphael had left the said gentile, the said Messer Reuben told him not to promise, since it could not but be to his disadvantage. On the next day, when the said Solomon and Raphael returned to the said baker, asking him to do this service, he replied that he was no longer willing to promise, and that they should find another guarantor. Thus, through the words of Messer Reuben, I had to stay in prison for six days more, since I could not find another guarantor. After six days, since I wished to be released, I sent the said baker four shop-jackets in order that he should act as guarantor, and after a great deal of trouble, he did me the service. I have put on record the treachery of Messer Reuben, and I should profit by the example of the said Nepi who would not give their bond without a surety, and bound me in the manner as I have written, besides which I had to give four jackets to the baker.

I record how, in the year 1633, Donna Stella, widow of Solomon Toscano, intended to marry Salvador, son of Isaac Gallichi. This match was treated by Donna Angela, wife of Moses Rieti. In the same year died my wife Anna, sister of the said Stella who died in child-bed, after bearing a male child. The said Donna Stella was godmother, and her father (my father-in-law) was godfather. I gave the child to nurse to my aunt Dianora, who lives over against the said Donna Stella. By reason of this, she took care of my son, and kept him in her house all day, for the great affection which she bore for me and for my son, her nephew, wherefore she declared many times that before she married, she would leave a hundred *scudi* out of her dowry on interest for my son. Besides this, I went freely into her house and into her chamber with all familiarity and liberty: she shewing me great affection and friendliness. One day, I was called by Messer Angelo Semilini, and he took me outside the Ghetto, and said to me: "You know, that your sister-in-law is in treaty to be married to Salvador Gallichi. I therefore advise you, if she has anything of yours in her hands, to have it restored, because, if she comes to an understanding with Salvador, you will have great trouble to get it out of his hands." I replied, as was true, that she had all my wife's furniture, with the brass and copper ware of my house. I, on the other hand, had some of her household goods which she had given me to mind when she was left a widow, for fear that her husband's brothers would come to make an inventory of his property and would take it away from her; wherefore she gave it to me to mind: which property was worth about twenty *scudi*. Moreover, I had certain pawn tickets for apparel and coats of hers, which she had lent me to use, and the said tickets were left in my hand in order that I should redeem them. All this I communicated to the said Messer Angelo, telling him that if she returned my property, I would return hers. But, if I thought that the match with Salvador would really come about, as he said, I would do anything to impede it, and though I did not desire to do her any annoyance, after receiving my property I desired to send hers to the dead man's brothers, to prevent it from coming into the hands of the said Salvador. Whereat

Messer Angelo was very content that I should act thus and disturb the said match, because he hated and wished no good to the said Salvador, although he still spoke to him, and treated him like a friend. Now the reason for the hatred which the said Messer Angelo bore for the said Salvador was as follows. In the year 1632 the said Messer Angelo had gone to Acquabona with all his household, and left no one at home. Whereat the said Salvador enticed Angelo, son of Donato Semilini, to enter his uncle's house by some means, while he was away, and rob him of a certain sum of money. The said Angelo did this, and broke open a chest belonging to his said uncle, and, finding there a bag containing a thousand *piastri*, took thereof one hundred. When the said Salvador learned this, he threatened to play the spy, and the said Angelo, in order that he should not play the spy, gave him twenty *piastri* to keep the secret. With the said moneys, he went with the wenches: whence it happened that one Saturday night at eleven o'clock he was caught in a wench's house with the money in a purse.²³ Whereat he was given the *strappado*, and the wench as well, but they both remained firm and were released without being condemned, by reason of the great bribe which his father gave. The theft of the said Angelo Semilini was discovered on a certain occasion when the said Angelo was in conversation with a certain Abraham Cohen, husband of Fiore, a Levantine, and they were in dispute about the division of the money; and on that occasion the affair was made known. It was for this reason that the said Messer Angelo hated the said Salvador. And so the said Messer Angelo acted as go-between, carrying messages between the said Donna Stella and myself, and always shewed himself to be on my side. He informed me that the said Stella desired to give me seventy *scudi* in order to settle our accounts, and she commissioned Abraham Meniati to inform me thereof in the presence of the said Messer Angelo. Whereupon the said Abraham gave me the said message, and then he informed me that Salvador would not have it, nor yet do anything else, and he summoned me before the Captain of Justice. I appeared with my attorney, who was Doctor Marzocchi, and the Captain of Justice made a serious charge against me, telling me that he had been informed about my affairs, how I was only occupied with

stolen goods and villainies, and if I did not give up all that the said woman asked, he threatened that he would have me flogged, and send me to the galleys. I answered, that he was ill informed about my affairs, and that they were persons who wished me ill, and that the said woman had all of my worldly property, which I had given her to keep (she being my sister-in-law) in order that my brother should not squander it. Whereat the said Captain, abusing me more than ever, told me not to dare to answer him on that point lest he should clap me into a dungeon, and that I should give up all of the property of the said woman, particularly the pawn tickets. I answered him a second time: "Master Captain, if you will not have me tell you my reasons, I cannot justify my innocence. As for the pawn tickets which she says she gave me, see, here is this box of pawn tickets she gave me which I had given her to keep no more than a fortnight ago, as I gave her other things." Whereat the Captain took it from my hand, and said: "Since you confess that you received them from her, you must prove that you gave them to her, and that they are yours, and if you do not, I will punish you, as I said." Then the said tickets were read before the said Stella, and she said that all were hers. The Captain then gave me a fortnight to prove that the said tickets were mine, and we were thus dismissed. Turning to my attorney, I told him that he should advise me what to do in this matter, and how I should defend myself; for it would be difficult to prove sixteen or eighteen tickets to be mine, since the greater number of the articles specified were old household articles. He replied that it was difficult for him to defend me, since I could not prove my case, and since the Captain was against me, and he advised me to submit it to some one. I replied, that all the Jews wished one another ill, and no one would desire to interfere. He answered that he would endeavour to settle it himself with the attorney of the other side, so as to prevent my bearing the resentment of the Captain. His advice pleased me, and I told him that I would leave it all and in every respect to him. Similarly, the said Stella consented to leave it all to her attorney. Whereupon, an accommodation was made before the officials of the Mercanzia. While they were about to come to a decision, the said Donna Stella obtained a ban of excommunica-

tion from Rome. When this was known, there were many who would not have desired it to be proclaimed, but who, seeing my disaster within their reach, procured that it should be, amongst these being Clement and Abraham Pesaro. At this time the said Clement was Warden; so, to demonstrate underhand that they did not wish the said ban to be proclaimed, they summoned me to attend a meeting of the Council before Messer Prospero Semilini, Messer Isaac del Borgo, Messer Clement Pesaro, Messer Reuben Frosolone, Messer Samuel Nissim, Messer Isaac Gallichi, Messer Solomon Milano, father of the said Stella, and others of the community; and they said to me: "You know full well that Donna Stella, having no proof to shew in support of her claim against you, has procured a ban of excommunication from Rome, so that any one who has any information should be forced to reveal it. We are sure that all will tell that which they know, and you as well, in order not to fall into so grave a sin. Nevertheless, we have thought fit to call you here before these gentlemen in order to inform you of the great danger involved if your conduct should be such that the said ban be proclaimed. For in this blessed community such a thing has never happened before, and moreover (God forbid!) the whole congregation may suffer, and, as the saying goes, the just man suffers with the sinful." Whereat they made me a sermon with these and other better chosen words, and each one gave his opinion, to which I listened attentively. Then when all had finished, I replied: "I thank you all, who have had the goodness to summon me to this holy place on this account. In reply, I tell you that I do not desire aught of the property of any other person. It is true that I have in my possession some wares belonging to Donna Stella, but she has more of mine in her hands. In any case, I desire to give full satisfaction to the whole community as well as to Donna Stella, so that it should not be said that through my love any disorder arose in the community. Moreover, though I have every right on my side, one who wishes to remain a good Jew must obey Jewish law. Therefore, I am ready to submit the whole dispute to two persons, one chosen by each of us, or else to a *Bet-Din* appointed by the Community, with regard to what she claims from me as well as what I claim from her. In this, I do not think that any

body can oppose me." Whereat those who wished me ill and desired that the said ban should be proclaimed remained stupefied at my reply, and all replied with one accord: "Bless you! you speak most well!" Then they turned to Messer Solomon Milano and said: "You can tell your daughter that Joseph here desires to abide by the Jewish law." He replied: "And I accept in the name of my daughter." Thus we all parted, and the said Solomon went to tell his daughter how matters had been left in the Council. She consented to what her father had done, and gave her word to that effect in the presence of Messer Prospero, Messer Isaac del Borgo, and Messer Clement, one of the Wardens. But when Salvador knew of it, he sent to tell the said Stella that, now the ban was arrived, she should no longer abide by the Jewish law; for, in order to avoid falling into excommunication, I would have to give up everything I had of hers, not she what she had of mine. She sent therefore to tell the Council that she did not want to proceed further. Whereupon the Council waited upon the said Solomon Milano and his daughter, and rebuked them, saying that whosoever wants to remain a good Jew must abide by Jewish law in any matter whatsoever, and all the more so since her father had given his word to that effect before the whole congregation. She made answer, that in this she had nothing to do with her father, being a widow, and able to manage her affairs by herself, and that she did not wish to proceed further in the matter. They replied that, if she insisted on having the ban published, it was reciprocal, applying to what I had to give her as well as to what she had to give me. She answered, that none the less she did not wish to abide by Jewish law, since the ban was in her favour. On this, all the congregation left her in great indignation for having failed to do that which she had promised a whole congregation, and they were displeased also that the said ban should be proclaimed, because such a thing had never happened before. For these reasons they commenced to hate her and were against her in this matter. And so it happened three days after during the morning service, Solomon Milano and Salvador Gallichi came with all the constabulary and with an order from the Governor that no one should prevent the said ban from being proclaimed. Before they arrived, they were

sighted by Abraham Pesaro, who came to the synagogue to tell the congregation to leave, in order not to hear the recital of the said ban. And so the reading of the prayers was interrupted (the *Amidah* being then in the course of repetition), and the whole congregation tried to leave the synagogue. When they were half way down the stairs, they were met by the constables, who made them turn back by force of blows with the flat of the sword, and locked the gate from outside. Clement Pesaro tried his hardest to get out, and received many blows from the constables with the flats of their swords and the pommels of their daggers. Similarly, Solomon received many blows from them. At the same time the Bargello²⁴ came up, and laid about many more with his naked sword, while others prevented people from going out by the windows. At this point, Bonaventura Gallichi, who was officiating as *Hazan* that morning, took the ban of excommunication in his hand and set about reading it from the window of the synagogue, because everybody had gone out. As he stood reading it, his nephew Salvador held the black candle in his hand, and it all dripped down on the head of Bonaventura while he was reading. Inside, there were remaining only Solomon Milano and the said Salvador and the said Bonaventura and Abraham da Bologna, and a certain Abraham the hermit, and Sforzo Nissim, and three or four more whose names I have forgotten. These were banging on the benches, while the others were outside the synagogue, and all the women were on their knees crying: "May it recoil on the head of him who is reading it and the person who has procured it!" Meanwhile the boys were throwing cabbage-stalks and stones at the said Bonaventura as he stood reading at the window. Thus on that day there was caused great outcry and uproar. Immediately the said Milano and Salvador and Bonaventura went out of the synagogue, everyone cried after them: "On your own head," adding all manner of opprobrious insults. And everyone with one voice said of the aforementioned Stella: "It is through that shameless hussy that this disturbance has come about." Through the great insults which were addressed to her by all the congregation, she did not dare to show herself either at her doors or windows: and to remedy this, she had to procure five or six precepts from the

Captain of Justice that no one should molest her, one of which was sent to me. Thus the people were quieted down. After this, the congregation would not speak for some time to Solomon Milano nor to Salvador Gallichi nor to Bonaventura Gallichi, who had read the ban. Only Prospero Semilini continued to speak to them, because Isaac Gallichi was his relative, besides having exerted himself to bring him to Sienna when he failed, and sending his sons to him to study. For this reason, he exerted himself considerably in this matter, and it was to him that they had delivered the denunciations made as a result of the said ban. He excused himself by saying that he did not like to meddle in such an affair, but because he was ordered to by the Rabbi, he could not do less than carry out whatsoever he was commanded. Under this pretext, he imposed upon everybody as a point of conscience to report to him in minute detail everything that they knew about the matter, in order not to fall into misdoing. He told the people however that they should write details only of those, whether myself or any other, whom they knew to have in their possession property belonging to the said Stella; but if they knew that the said Stella had some of my property, or any body else's, they should not write about that, as he would not accept their information. Knowing that the said Prospero was acting partially in this matter, for the discharge of my conscience, I went to my uncle Ephraim, and begged him to tell me what he knew about this question, since I did not wish to prejudice my soul thereby, even though I should indubitably lose all that I had in the world. He told me that he would study the matter, and told me to bring him a book entitled "*Caro*."²⁵ When he had studied it, he told me not to fear, and poked fun at me, since he did not think that the said ban was valid, for a variety of reasons. The first was, that they had not given the requisite warnings,²⁶ which are usually given. Secondly, the whole congregation was not in agreement. Thirdly, it was not heard by the whole congregation. Fourthly, there was not even *Minyan* present; and even if there had been, they were all relatives and interested persons. He gave moreover other reasons which I have forgotten. I replied begging him not to prejudice my spiritual welfare, to which he answered that I should rely upon him.

I therefore did so, and refused to make any denunciation. Three days later, all the denunciations were presented by all the men, women, and boys, to the said Messer Prospero Semilini, and he presented them to the arbitrators whom we had appointed according to the compromise, to whom were presented also the pawn tickets which I had left in the hands of the Captain of Justice. All these were returned to me with the exception of two, one for towels and other articles, and the other for bracelets: with respect to which they ordered me to prove within ten days that they had been given me on account of the dowry. I summoned as witnesses Messer Angelo Semilini and Messer Reuben Frosolone, who had valued the said articles. Messer Reuben said that he did not remember anything at all about it, and he refused to come to inspect: for he was uncle of the said Salvador, and did not wish to act against his own nephew. Madonna Fiore, widow of the late Laudadio Galletti, offered to give evidence in my favour in this matter, because she had been present when my property had been valued, and could recognise it in all good conscience, for the said Solomon Milano was living at that time there in her house. She told me therefore that I might summon her, and that she would testify truthfully. The reason for this was that the said Salvador had told her to go to empty her purse(?), besides which he gave her a blow. For this reason, hatred grew up between them. And so I had her summoned as witness, and Messer Angelo Semilini as well. After I had them summoned, both of them changed their minds about doing me this service, although they would have been doing what was both right and just. After many prayers, they consented to give evidence: but they had delayed so long that the time fixed by the arbitrators had passed. So, for love of the opposite party, the officials passed sentence against me, saying that the time allowed me by the award had elapsed. These two pledges together amounted to more than eighty *scudi*. I have put this on record, saying that there are to be found in this world none but hypocrites and traitors. I also place on record how, in the same year that the ban was proclaimed, there died the wife of the said Messer Prospero Semilini; Messer Amadeo Betarbo, a young man of thirty-five years of age; Messer Aaron Emilio, a youth of

eighteen, who was affianced to the daughter of the said Bonaventura Gallichi; the mother of the said Salvador died eight days after giving birth to a male child; a male child of my own died, aged eight months; the wife of Reuben Frosolone miscarried of a male child; and the wife of Clement Pesaro likewise miscarried of a male child; there died also Abraham Pesaro, who was at that time President, who sickened the morning after the night he came out of office, and died eighteen days later. Wherefore shall I pray to God, who has left good life to me and to all Israel, to save us from traitors: Amen, and thus be his will!

NOTES

¹ T. B. Sanhedrin 93^b.

² Cf. Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, *ad princ.*

"I am therefore unwilling that any thing, however slight, which my illustrious friend thought it worth his while to express, with any degree of point, should perish. For this almost supreme reverence, I have found very old and venerable authority, quoted by our great modern prelate, Secker, in whose tenth sermon there is the following passage:

Rabbi David Kimchi, a noted Jewish Commentator, who lived about five hundred years ago, explains that passage in the first Psalm, *His leaf also shall not wither*, from Rabbis yet older than himself, thus: That *even the idle talk*, so he expresses it, *of a good man ought to be regarded*; the most superfluous things he saith are always of some worth."

³ = Jacob b. Moses Molin (c. 1365-1427); cf. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, i, pp. 173-8.

⁴ e.g. *Die Memoiren des Ascher Levy aus Reichshofen (1598-1635)*, ed. Ginsburger (Berlin 1913); *Memoiren eines polnischen Juden* (Moses Wasserzug, d. 1808), ed. Loewe, Berlin 1911; *A Seventeenth century Autobiography* (anonymous), ed. Marx (J. Q. R., N. S., viii, pp. 269-304). All of the foregoing works are in a debased Hebrew. To the list may be added the *טולח ספר* of Jacob Emden, containing an account of his family, as well as of his own life, and the personal notes of Josselman of Rosheim, the greatest of mediaeval *Šadlanim* (ed. Kracauer, *R. E. J.*, xvi, pp. 85-101). The accounts of the various travellers (cf. Eisenstein, *אוצר מסעות*, New York 1926) especially David Reubeni and Hayyim Joseph David Azulai similarly contain much autobiographical material. A few interesting fragments have been published by Dr. Max Grünwald under the title *Die Feldzüge Napoleons nach Aufzeichnungen jüdischer Teilnehmer und Augenzeugen* (Vienna-Leipzig 1913). Neglecting the large outcrop of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g. *The Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore*; *Lebenserinnerungen* of A. H. Heymann [1803-1880]; *Eine Selbst-Biographie David Arnheims*, ed. Grünwald in *Israel-Lewy-Festschrift*) special mention may be

made of Yellin, ירושלם תקע"ד-תרס"ח, with its graphic account of the development of modern Jewish life in Palestine, and Theodor Herzl's recently published *Tagebücher*. In a class by itself stands Uriel Acosta's *Exemplar Humanae Vitae*, unique in literature. The Memoirs of Glückel von Hameln (1646-1719) are now accessible in modern German (ed. Feilchenfeld, Berlin 1913: illustrated edition, 1925). Those of Solomon Maimon have seen the light in English, Hebrew, Yiddish, and even Italian. Ber of Bolochow's were published by M. Vishnitzer in 1922 simultaneously in Hebrew, English, and Yiddish.

⁵ Leon of Modena, ח"י יהודה, ed. Kahana (Kiev 1914); Isaac the Levite, מדרבן תהומות, ed. Blau (הוצאת מאגן הנה, ii-iii).

⁶ Described by Berliner, *Aus den Memoiren eines römischen Ghetto-Jünglings in Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, vii (1904), pp. 110-32. In the possession of the present writer there is the fragmentary diary of an eighteenth century Italian Jew, in Hebrew and the vernacular, consisting largely of reports of sermons.

⁷ Among the persons mentioned are members of the Rieti family—notably Eleazar, grandson of the great Ishmael (see *infra*, note 15).

⁸ The passage relating to Solomon Milano, written on a blank leaf of the accounts (fol. 44 a-b) is here replaced in its chronological position *sub anno* 1631. Mention must also be made of (fol. 57-8) an inventory, not here reproduced, of the property in dispute between Joseph and his sister-in-law.

⁹ No adequate account of the history of the Jews in Sienna is available at present save that of Cassuto in the Russian Jewish encyclopaedia, *s.v.* Cf. also the partial bibliography in Gabrieli, *Italia Judaica* (Rome 1924), pp. 51-2.

¹⁰ A study in this curious byway of philology is in preparation by Professors D. S. Blondheim and Umberto Cassuto. Cf. also Crescenzo del Monte, *Sonetti Giudaico-Romaneschi* (Florence 1927).

¹¹ I must here express my invariable thanks to Professor Umberto Cassuto for the extreme kindness and helpfulness which are native to him, as well as to Professor Bigongiari, of the Columbia University, New York, for his assistance in elucidating some points of difficulty, and to Cav. Liberati for painstaking but fruitless enquiries in the State Archives at Sienna.

¹² The royal prerogative of maintenance had not yet been tried out in Italy, any more than it had in contemporary England, and the Jews especially were expected to make contributions in kind for the reception and entertainment of their sovereign. This duty remained incumbent in Venice as late as the close of the eighteenth century; cf. the *Ricondotta degli Ebrei* of 1777, §§ 38-9. For similar duties at Pesaro at an even later period, see the accounts in *R. E. J.*, xvi, p. 249.

¹³ "Rabbenu Moshe" was the name popularly given in Italy to Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah*; cf. the preface to Moses Capriles' eighteenth century translation of the *Hilchot Deot* (*s.l.e.a.*).

¹⁴ A place of entertainment for strangers, under conditions carefully regulated by the congregational and civic authorities, was necessarily to be found in any Italian Ghetto of any size.

¹⁵ The Rieti family was established at Sienna as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, when David Reubeni was entertained there by an earlier

Laudadio (= Ishmael) da Rieti, brother-in-law of Jehiel da Pisa; additional details as to this important figure may be found in the present writer's *Gli Ebrei a Firenze sotto l'Ultima Repubblica* (Florence 1924). Ishmael's grandson, Eleazar, is mentioned in the accounts in the volume from which these memoirs are copied. A Joseph b. Sabbetai Elhanan Rieti figures amongst the scholars of Sienna earlier in the seventeenth century in the *משניות מלחמות* on the vexed question of the ritual bath at Rovigo. Further references to the family may be found in the study of Cassuto *המשמר הספרדי בסיניא והיהודים* in *Hazofeh* VIII (1924) 36-43.

¹⁶ An Elijah Usigli, Rabbi of Modena, is mentioned in the עקרי הד"ט, p. 90.

¹⁷ Joseph Raphael b. Reuben Frosolone and Solomon Abraham b. Isaac Gallichi (for whom see also the Responsa of Moses Zacuto, § 38) formed with Jehiel David b. Eliakim Ancona the *Beth-Din* of Sienna in 1674; cf. מסקי ריקנאטי § v: they were very likely the sons of the two persons here mentioned.

Of the names found in these memoirs, Gallichi, Nissim Borghi (= Del Borgo), and Pesaro figure in the סדר נטירות ולמוד on the restoration of the synagogue at Sienna in 1786, and the first two also in the local experiences described in the מעגל טוב of Azulai, pp. 5, 68. These families are still represented in the city. Meniati is a variant form of Da San Miniato for which see Cassuto, *Gli Ebrei a Firenze*, p. 224 and *passim*.

¹⁸ Both Pope Sixtus IV (1471-83) and Sixtus V (1585-9) were favourably disposed towards the Jews. The fatal Bull *Hebraeorum Gens* of Pius V, however, expelling those of the minor places of the Papal States, excluding only Rome and Ancona, was dated 26 February 1569—only a few days before Purim, which fell that year on 3 March. It is more than probable that it reached some outlying communities on the eve of the festival, amply explaining Joseph's allusion.

¹⁹ See note 26 as also for other debased Hebrew words.

²⁰ A *חברת מחר אסורים*, or Confraternity for the Release of Prisoners (especially those imprisoned for debt) was to be found in most Italian communities; Joseph's interest in the foundation of one may be readily understood! This association must be carefully distinguished from the *חברת מדין שבויים* for the Redemption of Captives—e.g. prisoners of war, or (at this period) the victims of the Mediterranean corsairs. For the orthography, see note 26 *infra*.

^{20a} "The Tower" was one of the historic *contrade* of Sienna.

²¹ The Hebrew date is manifestly wrong, *Kislev* being written in error for *Heshvan*, and 5393 for 5394: with which alterations the coincidence is exact.

²² The Jew was forbidden to own real estate, and the only protection he had against the rapacity of his gentile landlord was by an adaptation of the ancient regulations of *Hazakah*, or prerogative right, whereby no Jew was permitted to occupy the house of an ejected co-religionist. This tenant-right, Latinised as the *jus gazaga*, became one of the distinctive features of Ghetto life, and was virtually legalised by Pope Clement VIII. Like actual ownership, it could be alienated, bequeathed, or given in dower. Cf. Finzi, *Il diritto di hazakà in Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage A. Berliners*, pp. 93-6; Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, pp. 71-2; and Philipson, *Old European Jewries*, pp. 133-5. For examples of it in practise, see Lampronti's פחד יצחק *ad vocem*:

and, as it appeared to gentile eyes, see the curious legal treatise of Joseph Sessa, *De Judaeis* (Turin 1717), pp. 50-3, 65, 101, &c.

²³ Carnal intercourse between Jews and gentiles, considered almost as an unnatural crime, was punishable by death or mutilation, though later ages were not so severe (cf. Sessa, *op. cit.*, cap. xxiv). In the present case there was apparently no decisive evidence, and the culprits would not confess.

²⁴ Bargello = Governor of the Gaol.

²⁵ i.e. the legal compendium of Rabbi Joseph Caro, the famous *Shulḥan Arukh*.

²⁶ אדרהות represents almost certainly the Hebrew אדרהות, in conformity with the Italian method of pronouncing Hebrew, which renders the א by a hard D and leaves the ה quiescent. Thus we get elsewhere ספרים for ספרים, אסורים for אסורים, קהילה for קהילה, and, repeatedly, ועד for ועד, while a few lines below טניח is apparently written for טנין—the inevitable quorum of ten males. Phonetically interesting, too, is שיוחד for שוחד. The transliteration preceding this last word indicates that it had fully penetrated already into everyday speech.

מכתבי-יד.

טאת יעקב טשה טולידאנו-טאגנר (טארקו).

מִבֵּין קְבוּצַת כְּתוּבֵי-יָד שֶׁכְּרַשְׁתִּי לִי מִקְרֹב, פֶּה בְּמֵאֲרוֹקוֹ, יֵשׁ לַהֲצִיג פֶּה אִיזָה דְּבִרְי־חֶפֶץ, מֵאִלָּה שֶׁעֲדִיין לֹא יָדוּעִים כָּלֵל וְכָלֵל לַהֲבִיבִלְיוֹנֵרִפִּים, וְשֶׁהֲתוֹכֵן שְׂכָהֶם הוּא מַעֲיִן וְחֹשֶׁב.

I

כֶּתֶר שֵׁם טוֹב מִרְבִּי שֵׁם טוֹב בֶּן נִמְלִי מַעִיר טוֹדִילָא דִּי נֶאֱבָרָה, שֶׁהִיָּה אַחַד הַמְּנֹרְשִׁים מִסְּפָרָד. מֵהַסְּפָר הַזֶּה נִמְצָא רַק קִטְעַ מִהַקְדַּמַּת הַסֵּפֶר וְעִמּוּד אֶחָד מִנוֹף תַּחֲלַת הַסֵּפֶר, בִּכ"ז בּו חֲשִׁיבוֹת מְרֻבָּה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבּוּ מִסְּפָר הַמַּחֲבֵר אֶת קוֹדֶרְתּוֹ וּמֵאוֹרְעוֹתָיו בִּיצִיאָתוֹ מִסְּפָרָה, הַקִּטְעַ הַזֶּה כְּתוּב בְּכַתֵּב יָדוֹ שֶׁל הַמַּחֲבֵר בְּעֶצְמוֹ, וְבוֹ אֲרֻבָּעָה דָּפִים בְּפֹרְמָאט 4°, שֶׁהֲנִי נוֹתֵן רוֹבּוֹ פֶּה:

.....

וְלִבּוֹ בּוּ בְּמֵלֶאכְתִּי אֲשֶׁר הִיתָה שֵׁם¹ וִי"י הַשּׁוֹמֵר פְּתָאִים הָעִיר אֶת רוּחַ בְּנֵי הָעִיר אֶת רוּחָם וְלֹא נִתְּנָם הַשֵּׁם לְהִרְעַע עִמָּם וְכָל אֶחָד הֵלֶךְ לְדַרְכּוֹ א' הֵנָּה וְא' הֵנָּה, וְכֹאֲשֶׁר רָאִי שֶׁלֹּא עָלָה בִּידָם אוֹת נִפְשָׁם בָּאוּ אֶל הַבַּיִת וְכָל הַמֵּלֶאכֶה נִמְכָּזָה וְנִמָּס אוֹתָהּ הַחֲרִימוּ. וַיְהִי מִדֵּי שְׁלֹשׁ שָׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁהִיִּיתִי שֵׁם בְּבֵית הַסּוּהָר בְּמִקּוֹם בְּאַלְיִנְסָא בְּיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיט בְּאַתָּה מְנוּחָה וְשִׁלְחוּ בְּשִׁבְלִי בְּעַלִּי הַטּוֹמָאָה וְאִמְרוּ לִי מַה לָּךְ פֶּה וְיָי לָךְ פֶּה כִּי הִצַּבְתָּ לָךְ קֶבֶר בְּבֵית הַסּוּהָר קוֹם קִרָא בְּשֵׁם מַעֲוֹתֵינוּ וְעִשְׂנוּ עִמָּךְ חֶסֶד וְאַמֶּת וְאִם לֹא דַע כִּי מוֹת תָּמוּת כִּי כֵן דִּבֶּר הַמֶּלֶךְ וְאוֹ אִמְרָתִי הֵנָּה נָא וְקִנְתִּי וְשִׁבְתִּי לֹא יִדְעָתִי יוֹם מוֹתִי וְאִיִּכְכָּה אוֹכֵל לְהַשִּׁיב אֶתְכֶם תְּשׁוּבָה וְנִפְשִׁי נִבְהַלָּה מֵאֵד חֲנוּ לִי זִמָּן וְאִשְׁיבָה שׁוֹלְחִי דִּבֶּר וַיֹּאמְרוּ הֵן יְהִי כְּדִבְרֶיךָ אֲבָל שׁוֹב אֶל בֵּית הַסּוּהָר וְאוֹ אִמְרָתִי לָהֶם לְמַה יִּדְבֶּר מַעֲלַתְכֶם כְּדִבְרֵים הָאֵלֶּה וְכִי כֵן הוּא דֶּרֶךְ מַקְבְּלִי מִי הַמְרִים לְקַבֵּלְם בְּצִאתָם מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִים וְאוֹ אִמְרוּ טוֹב הִרְבֵּר אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת, וְאֲבָרְךָ אֶת וִי"י אֲשֶׁר יַעֲצֵנִי אֲשֶׁר הִנַּחֲנִי בְּדֶרֶךְ אֶמֶת אֶף לִילּוֹת יִסְרוּנִי כְּלִיּוֹתִי שׁוּיָתִי וִי"י לִנְגִידִי תַמִּיד וְכִשְׁהַשְׁמֵשׁ נִטָּה לְבֵית מְבוֹאוֹ לִפְנוֹת בְּצִאתָה הַשְּׁבִיט לְקַחְתִּי נֶעַר א' יִשְׁמַעְאֵל וְנִתַּתִּי לוֹ שֶׁכֶר הַלִּיכָתוֹ וְהוֹצִיאֲנִי מִן הַמִּקּוֹם הָרַע הַהוּא וְהִבִּיאֲנִי אֶל כֶּפֶר אֶחָד סְמוּךְ מַעִיר בְּלִינְסִיָּא. וַיְהִי בַּחֲצִי הַלַּיְלָה לְקַחְתִּי יִשְׁמַעְאֵל אֶחָד וְנִתַּתִּי לוֹ שֶׁכֶר וְהִבִּיאֲנִי בְּאִישׁוֹן לַיְלָה סְמוּךְ לְקִשְׁטִילְנוֹב וְדִרְשָׁתִּי עַל בְּנֵי וְעַל פּוֹעַל יָדִי וּמִצָּאֲתִי אוֹתָם אֶחָד הֵנָּה וְאֶחָד הֵנָּה וְאִנְחֲנִי בַּעַת וְבַעֲוִנָּה הָהִיא לֹא נָדַע מַה לַּעֲשׂוֹת כִּי עַת צָרָה הִיא בְּלָתִי לִי"י עֵינֵינוּ וְהַסְכַּמְנוּ לְלַכֵּת לְמִקּוֹם טוֹרְטוּשָׁא לְרֹאוֹת אִם נוֹכַל לַעֲבוֹר דֶּרֶךְ אֲנִיָּה בְּלֵב יָם לִפִּי שֶׁהוּא מַחוּז הָיִם וְלֹא עָלָה בִּידְרֵנוּ וְחוֹרְנוּ מֵאַמְצַע הַדֶּרֶךְ לִפִּי שֶׁבְּכָל הַמִּקּוֹם שֶׁהָיוּ רֹאִים

¹ נִרְאֶה טַחֲטֶשֶׁךְ הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמַּחֲבֵר נָרַב עִיר טוֹדִילָא, וְהָיָה לוֹ בֵּית טֵלָאָה בְּעִיר קִשְׁטִילְנוֹב שֶׁשֵּׁם יִשְׁכּוּ בְּנָיו, וְהֵנָּה לֹא מִצָּאֲתִי לְנַחֵץ לְצִיּוֹן שְׁמוֹת הָעִירִים הַסְּפָרְדִּיּוֹת הַנּוֹכְרוֹת פֶּה, בְּלִאֲמִינִית, מִפְּנֵי שִׁדּוּעֵים הֵם.

אותנו ארץ מתקוממה לנו לאמר אליו היהודים אשר היו מבקשים אבות הטומאה לשרוף אותם באש, ועם כל זה הסכמנו ללכת למקום אלמריאה שהוא ממלכות גרנאדה שאמרו לנו כי שם מחזו הים דרך לעבור גאולים בלילה א' למקום אבהאראן² והוא מקום סמוך לתלמיסן וכאשר הסכמנו כן עשינו אעפ"י שהדרך ארוך יותר ממאה פרסאות, זאת ועוד אחרת שעל כרחנו היה לנו לעבור במקום באלניסאי המקום אשר היו מבקשים אותנו בחקירה ודרישה גדולה, וביום אשר עברנו בה השי"ת וית' עשה למען רחמיו שקם בהלה גדולה בעיר ועברנו גאולים והשי"ת הצילנו והגיענו לשם בשלום בהשקט וכבטחה אין שטן ואין פגע רע, וידו היום ושם באלמריאה יצאנו לראות גלי הים וגאנו ויבא השטן ויען ויאמר מאין אתם לראות את ערות הארץ באתם ונאמר אליו לא אדוני ועבדיך באו לראות אם נוכל לעבור דרך אניה בלב ים למקום תלמיסן אשר יש שם אנשים קרובים לנו מימים קדמונים, ויאמר לא, כי יהודים אתם והכרת פניכם ענתה בכם וישלח ידו ויבא אותנו תפוסים אל שר העיר והשליכו אותנו בבית האסורים בשלשלאות של ברזל ובכבלי עוני והיה שם באותו המקום ישמעאל אחד נכבד ודבריו נשמעים בעיני השרים של גוים כי כן דבר המלכים³, וכאשר שמע הדבר עלה חמתו באפו ויאמר אליהם מדוע עשיתם הדבר הזה והלא אלו האנשים ישמעאלים הם, ומימי קדם קדמתה ידעתי אותם ואת משפחתם ואותם הרשעים הגוים חזקו פניהם מסלע ויאמרו ויהודים הם, והמה בקשו חשבונות רבים ותחבולות ומרמות ולא יאמנו בדבריהם, והישמעאל הנכבד הנקרא סאלימא אלכחו חזר לשאול שאלתו ויען ויאמר הוציאו האנשים מבית הסוהר ואם לאו האמת והאמונה שאלך למלכים להוצאתי ואניד להם את צדקתם ואת יושרם ונראה דבר מי יקום ממני או מכם, ואז השיב שר העיר והנלוים אליו אם האמת אתם שהם ישמעאלים יאמרו התפלה שאתם מתפללים ויען הישמעאל ויאמר כדבריהם כן הוא ואז הוציאו אותנו מבית האסורים וכל אחד ואחד ממנו אמרנו תפלתם בלא טעות ושבוש ואז נסתתמו טענתם. ואז כאשר הראנו השם את ידו ואת גבורתו החזקה והוציאנו מאפלה לאורה הסכמנו ללכת למקום גראנאדה לבקש לנו מנוח אשר ייטב לנו כי לא נוכל לעבור דרך אניה בלב ים ממקום אלמריאה. וישבנו שם ארבעה חדשים ואחר עבור ד' חדשים נראתה שיירא אחת ממאה אנשים איש וביתו שרוצים לעבור למלכות פאס ואמרנו לכו ונלכה באור ה', ולא אאריך בנסיונות הגדולות והנראות אשר ארעו לנו אבל כלל העולה ששם במקום גראנאדה נתנו לנו רשות ופרענו שם שלשים דוכאדוש בשביל המכס. ויהי כאשר התעו אותי אלהים ממקום גראנאדה והגענו למקום וילין מאלניא ואיש בליעל הלשין אותנו שאנחנו יהודים ולא אוכל להאריך את כל התלאה אשר מצאתנו שם אלא דרך כלל נתנו אותנו אל בית הסוהר ותפשו אותנו שבויים ואת חמורינו ואת כל אשר לנו וזאת הצרה קשה על כלם וישבנו שם שני ימים ולילה אחד ולאנשים הישמעאלים הבאים בחברתנו הרעו להם עד מאד באומרם אליהם שהם ידעו את הדבר.

² הוא וזהאן Oran וזכו שטחים שהוא מקום סמוך לתלמיסן Tlemcen.

³ ד"ל שהישמעאל ההוא היה לו יסוי כח מהמלכים שיעשה רצונו, ואולי היה הקונסול של מטשלת

ויהי בחצי הלילה של יום השלישי יהי הנשם על הארץ ובאישון לילה ואפלה הוציאו אותנו מבית הסוהר ולא ידענו מה היה לנו. הוציאו אותנו חבושים אסורים כמו שבויים מהמלכים ידינו אסורות לאחור ויהי הנשם עלינו כל היום וכל הלילה ועברנו מעברה בנהר גדול. וכמעט המים שטפנו נחלה עבר על נפשנו. כלל העולה שאותו האיש הבליעל הוליך אותנו למקום כרמונה שהוא מהלך מ' פרסאות ממקום שתפשו אותנו שבויים. וכרמונה קרוב ממקום שביליאי מהלך שש פרסאות. ושם במקום כרמונה ישבנו אסורים ועבר עלינו צרות רבות ורעות. וישבנו תחת יד ורשות השר דון גואן די שיפֶרֶש והיה מחסידיו אומות העולם ולא אוכל להאריך לכתוב את כל התלאה אשר מצאתנו באומנם אלינו כל היום שנעזב אלהים חיים וישבנו ד' חדשים. ואחר עבור ד' חדשים שלחו המלכים שיחזירו אותנו אל המקום אשר תפשו אותנו והוא מקום ויליץ מלינה ושם ישלחו המלכים כדת מה לעשות וישבנו שם שני חדשים וחצי בבית הסוהר. ופה אשית קנצי למלין ולא אאריך בגלגולים והמאורעות אשר אירעו לנו עצמו מספר. ואחר עבור שני חדשים וחצי שלח המלך בשבילנו שיוכיח אותנו למקום גראנאדה אל המקום אשר היינו שם בתחלה ונתנו לנו את כל אשר לקחו לנו שלשים ליטראש ממשי וי"ד מטבעות מזהב טוב וישבנו שם בבית האסורים חדש אחר. ואחר עבור חדש אחד א' לקחו שני בני הקטנים מחמל נפשי ומחמדי יהושע ויעקב המכונים בן גמיל והחזירום גוים על אפם ועל חמתם ודברו עלינו ארבע מיתות ב"ד לאיים אותנו וכאשר ראו שלא עלה בידם מחשבתם נתנו אותנו במתנה לשלשה שרים לעשות כרצון איש ואיש ועם כל זה לא שכחנו שם אלהינו ונפרוש כפינו לאל זה. והאיש אשר נפלתני אני הוקן בנורלו נקרא גואן די שלאש והאיש ההוא היה מחסידיו אומות העולם ואם הוא בחרו ועבר אותי בסמוך שנפלתני בידו למקום סאפֶי⁴ דרך אניה בלב ים ושם ראיתי מעשה י"י ששלשה פעמים נכנסתי ויצאתי מן הים כי הים הולך וסוער ובפעם הרביעית נכנסנו בשלום ויצאנו בשלום והיהודים הכשרים והצדיקים פדו אותי ונתנו נ' אוקיות כסף בתוך ג' ימים, ישלם המשלם פעלם ותהי משכורתם שלימה. בפ' זאת עשו וחיו את האלהים אני ירא, ואמרתי שם דברי תורה והנושא אשר לקחתי שדי יתן לכם רחמים. וישבתי שם כמשלוש חדשים או יותר לדרוש ולחקור על בני אל חי יצחק ושמואל ו' גמיל הנשארים ביד אדוניי. ויבוקש הדבר וימצא אשר בני בכורי כחי וראשית אוני משכיל וסופר נפל בנורלו של השר ושופט נקרא שמו פידרו די פוריש והוא היה ג"כ מחסידיו אומות העולם, ושם האיש אשר נפל בנורלו בני ידידי רצתה נפשי הנבון וסופר אחיו הנקרא שמואל בן גמיל נפל בנורלו של איש בליעל נכל שמו ונבלה עמו ומהשם יצא הדבר שמכר אותו לשר ונכבד הנקרא לואיש די קורדובא וגם הוא היה מחסידיו אומות העולם. והש"ת אשר לו נתכנו עלילות גדול העצה ורב העלילה אשר ממכון שבתו השנית את כל יושבי הארץ לבקשת ותחנת שמואל בני הנז' האדון אשר הוא קנאו והנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים גם יחד איש באחיו ידובקו יתלכדו ולא יתפרדו וישבו שם ג' שנים בחומר ובלבנים ובכל עבודה בשרה את כל עבודתם אשר עבדו בהם בפרך

⁴ אולי צ"ל ונתנו לנו, או אפשר שנתנו למלך.

⁵ הוא העיר סאפי Saffi במארוקו.

ובאותם שלש שנים לא ידעתי מהם כלום והם ג"כ לא ידעו ממני ועמדנו בין המתים ובין החיים עד השקפה י"י משמים אל ארץ הביט ובא סוחר א' דרך אניה בלב ים למקום צאלי⁶ והיהודים הבשרים היושבים שם נתנו לו אלה נאראבידיש שיוליך שטרות מצדי ומידי לאדון לואיש די קורדובא אשר הם תחת ידו והנה הוא שואל בפדיונם מאתם דוכאדיש על זה אין להוסיף וממנו אין לגרוע וישלחו אותם השטרות למקום אלקאצרי⁷ לפי ששם ישבתי ט' חדשים כלו עיני מיחל לאלהי. ואז כאשר שמעתי השמועה הטובה שמועה טובה תדשן עצם מלאני לכי לבא עם אותם השטרות לקהלות פאם המאושרות כי שם צוה ה' את הכרבה חיים עד העולם נוה צדק הר הקדש פרשת ה' אלהיך מתהלך בקרב מחניך להצילך ואז כאשר שמעני חכמי וראשי עם השמועה הטובה נדיבי עמים נאספו עם אלהי אברהם והיתה הסכמת דעתם שאלך למדינת תלמיסן לנגיד עטרת תפארת ישראל איש תם וישר ירא השם וסר מרע ושם ג"כ נדיבי עמים נאספו והנגיד הרמוז נדיב נדיבות יען והוא על נדיבות יקום, והשם נחני בדרך אמת ואע"פ שהדרכים מסוכנים ויש לשם קרוב ממאה ועשרים פרסאות והדלו אורחות והולכי נתיבות, והשם אלהי הצבאות הנחני בדרך אמת והנעתי לשם פ' דרך י"י לעשות צדקה ומשפט ודברתי שם דברי תורה ובוה הפסוק התחלתי ונתנו לי שם עשרים כפולות.

[כאן חסר מההקדמה דף אחד כנראה, וברף אחר מתחיל].

בעזר השם הטוב אתחיל לכתוב ספר כתר שם טוב. כתיב שם טוב משמן טוב ויום המות מיום הולדו. הודיענו שע"ה בזה הכתוב שאף על פי שכתר שם טוב עולה על כתר תורה ועל כתר מלכות ועל כתר כהונה עכ"ז האיש אשר נקרא שמו בישראל שם טוב לא יפול עליו זה השם אם לא נמצא בו תנאי א' הרמוז בזה הכתוב וזהו אומרו טוב שם משמן טוב ר"ל טוב שם וכיצד השם נופל עליו לומר טוב כשהוא משמן טוב והמם משמש במקום מן שימצאי בו שלימות המדות הן שכליות הן מעשיות, ששלימות אלו המדות נמשלו לשמן טוב בהרבה מקומות אמר דע"ה הנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים גם יחד שבת אחים אלו משה ואהרן שבהם נמצא הטוב האמתי מתורתינו הק' והנעימות והמתיקות לפי שיש דברים יקרים ונכבדים ונחשבים כאבני שוהם ואבני מלואים ואם האדם ישימם בפיו לא ימצא בהם שום מתיקות יותר מתיקות ימצא כמעט צרי ומעט דבש ואם אינן כל כך נחשבים, אבל דברי תורתנו הם יקרים ומעילים ומתוקים מדבש ונופת צופים שכן הכתוב מעיד הנחמד' מזהב ומפו רב וכו' ולפיכך אמר הנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים, ואמר גם יחד לפי שאיש באחיו ידובקו יתלכדו ולא יתפרדו בחיים ובמות כמות זה כן מות זה, ואמר על אהרן הכהן כי הוא כביר ממה לימים והמשילו לשמן הטוב ר"ל שבאמת ובאמונה נופל עליו לומר כשמן הטוב שהנמשל והמשל הנה הם טובים מכל הצדדין וזהו אומרו על הראש לפי שהוא ראש המשוחים ועליו נאמר יורו משפטך ליעקב שוקן ונשוא פנים הוא הראש מה שאין הפה יכול לדבר ולפיכך אמר שיוורד על הזקן ועל השמן אמר כשמן הידוע שהוא המשל ועל הנמשל אמר הזקן הידוע זקן אהרן, והטעם שיוורד על

⁶ היא סאלי Salé במארוקו.

⁷ היא Alcasar במארוקו.

פי מדותיו ר"ל שהיה שלם במדותיו בתכלית השלימות הן במעלות שכליות הן במעלות מעשיות המוניות, ועו"א התנא הו' מתלמידיו של אהרן אוהב שלום ורודף שלום אוהב צאת הבריות. בכאן כולל שלימות המדות מעשיות המוניות, ובמה שאמר ומקרבן לתורה כולל שלימות מעלות שכליות, הנה נראה מזה שהשמן הטוב המרוקח כשהוא יורד על איש שלם במדותיו הן שכליות הן מעשיות אנו קורין עליו טוב שם משמן טוב שכל מין יקרב אל דומהו שכשמו כן הוא, וכן אמר באהרן שיוורד על פי מדותיו כמו שביארנו. והאיש אשר נקרא שמו בישראל שם טוב ולא נמצא בו שלימות המדות הן שכליות הן מעשיות עליו הכתוב אימר זכוכי מות יבאיש יביע שמן רוקח. יקר מחכמה ומכבוד סכלות ידוע הוא שהשמן הטוב המרוקח אין דרכם של זכוכים לנוח ולהתדבק בו אלא על הנכילות המוסרחות או אל אנשים מנוגעים וכאשר ילכו וינוחו באנשים או בדברים מועילים חשובים הנה הוא הפך טבעם ודרכם ואותו השמן המרוקח ריחו ושעמו נפסד, כן האנשים החשובים והמעולים אשר יש להם שם טוב או נקרא שםם בישראל שם טוב ויעשו אפי' סכלות מעט או דבר או דברים שאינם מתוקנים הנה חכמתם וכבודם ושםם הטוב לא יצלח לכל, והמשל בזה הרי שנפל כתם אחר ושחרורית בכגד אחר מעולה מאד מאד ונפל כתם א' מאותו ענין בכגד א' בלוי שזה דינר. בהיכן יעשה רושם יותר באותו הכגד הפחות והכלוי או בכגד החשוב, ידוע הוא שיותר נראה הכתם ההוא בכגד החשוב מן הכגד הפחות אף הכא נמי, ואל זה רמזו ז"ל במ"ש לכו חזו מפעלות אלהים אשר שם שמות בארץ, האי' קרא אוקמוה ואיתמ' אבל לא חזו מפעלות אלהים דאלו הוו מפעלות יו"ד ה"א וא"ו ה"א שם קיום בארץ, אבל בנין דהוו מפעולות אלהים שם שמות בארץ, א"ל ר' הייא השתא דאתערא להאי, לאו הכי אנא אמינא ליה, דבין שמא דא ובין שמא דא כלא שבחא היא, אבל אנא אמינא ליה כמה דאתערו חבריא דשוי שמדן שמות ממש שם בארץ, ואמאי בנין לאשתמשא בהו עלמא ולמהוי קוימא בעלמא, ר' יצחק אמר כלא הוא ואפילו מאי דקאמר ר' יהודה שפיר קאמר דאלו יהא עלמא בשמא דרחמי יתקיים עלמא אבל בנין דיתכרי עלמא כדינא וקיימא על דינא, שם שמות בארץ ושפיר הוא דאלמלא עלמ' לא יכיל עלמא לאתקיימא מקמי חובייהו דבני נשא. ת"ח נח כד אתיליד קרון ליה שמא על נחמא דליהוי שמא גרים, אבל גבי קב"ה לאו איהו הכי, נח איהפך אתון חן כד"א ונח מצא חן בעיני י"י, א"ר יוסי חן היינו נח בצדיקא שמדון גרים לטב, בחייביא שמדון גרים לביש, בנח כתיב ונח מצא חן, ער בכור יהודה אתהפך אתון ליה לביש, ער רע בעיני י"י, מזה המאמר נראה שהשמות מוכיחים על המעשים הן לטוב הן לרע, א"כ יפה אמר שע"ה טוב שם משמן טוב כמו שפי', וסיפא דקרא מוכיח על ראשיתה שאמר ויום המות מיום הולדו, שהאיש אשר אלה לו שכשמו כן הוא יתרון גדול יש לו ביום מותו מיום הולדו כי נמול ידיו יעשה לו, ועוד כי ביום הולדו מי יודע הזה או זה יכשר אבל ביום המיתה הנה שכרו אתו ופעולתו לפניו, וכבר ידעת המשל שאו"ל לספינה שפירשה מן הים ולספינה הנכנסת מיבשה לים זו שנכנסת מרננין וזו שפורשת אין עושים כל עיקר ושומים הם כי הנכנסת מי יודע למה נכנסת אם יהיה סער גדול בים, אבל כשיוצאה בשלום פצחו רננו יחדיו.

⁸ [עיין זהר בראשית (דפוס לובלין 1872) דף נח: ל.]

כך כשנולד ויצא לאויר העולם ראוי לפחד עליו כי לא ידעו אביו ואמו עת עתו. נפטר מן העולם וקנה שם טוב מה נעים חלקו ומה יפה מאד. ירושתי, וכן או"ל כשהצדיקים נולדים אין בריה יודעת בהם וכשמתים הכל מרגישין. נולד מרע"ה לא הרגישו בו וכשמת נסתלק המן והרגישו בו, נולד אהרן כ"ג ולא הרגישו בו, וכשמת נסתלקו עניי כבוד והרגישו, כשנולדה מרים לא הרגישו בה בריה, וכשמתה נסתלקה הבאר והרגישו הכל, הבאר הודיע מיתתה, הוי אימר ויום המות מיום הולדו⁹. . . לכן בני אל חי אנשי השם הטוב והמעשה אלופי רבותי ומיודעי אחי ורעי המעיינים והמוזכרים והמהנים בהקדמת ובענין חבור זה מכתר שם טוב אל תאשימוני ולא תשימו עלי תפלה אם תמצאו שיבושים או טעויות או תוספת לשון או ההפך לפי שאני בן שמונים ושתים שנה ואור עיני גם הם אין אתי וכן הרגש שאר החושים לא נשאר בי אלא העצמות היבשות מליאות יגונות ואנחות וצרות רבות כאשר הם כתובות בהקדמת הספר ועל כלם גם בן ואח אין לי לא נין ולא נכד ולא שום קירוב כשר בארץ הלזו ואפי' אין איש בארץ שיודע אותי ויתן עדות ממני לכן ועל כן חרתי בלבי לב נשבר ונרכה לחבר זה החיבור לקחתי בידי משכיות החמדה מעץ הדעת מכוסה¹⁰ קדישא רשב"י וחביריו הגלויים לנו ולבנינו והנסתרים שלא הבנתי הנחתי להשם אלהינו וברוב הפרשיות אמרתי כוונות המאמרים ולא נשאתי את שמי על שפתי לפי שאפי' השם אין בי כ"ש המעשה, אלא ברוב המקומות נשאתי את שמי בלשון העצמות היבשות ועל עצמי אני קורא לא ימים ידברו ולא רוב שנים יודיעו חכמה, אכן רוח הוא באנוש ונשמת שדי תבינם. תם ונשלם ההקדמה ברוך י"י: בסעיעתא דשמיא אתחיל לכתוב כתר שם טוב שחבר אותו שם טוב בן כבוד הנריב ר' שמואל בן נמיל תנצב"ה המנורש והמטולשל מעיר ואם מורילא די נאברה: אמר שם טוב בן נמיל, גרסינן במס' אבות רש"א ג' כתרם הם וכו', [כאן נמצא עוד עמוד אחד מנוף הספר, שלא מצאתי צורך להעתיקו פה עוד].

הערה כללית.

הקטע הזה של רבי שם טוב ב"ר שמואל בן נמיל, חשוב הוא, כמו שכתבתי למעלה, הן מצד תוכנו, בהספור המענין של יציאתו ומאורעותיו בדרך לכתו מספרד עד אפריקה, והן מצד שמו של המחבר וספרו, שעדיין לא ידועים כלל בספרות ישראל, המחבר רש"ט אינו מוזכר בקטע הזה את הזמן שבו יצא מספרד הוא ובניו, אך לפי הנראה שזה היה בזמן הגירוש הכללי מספרד, זה נראה גם ממה שיוזכר על דבר המאה אנשים איש וביתו שהלך עמם מגרנאדה ללכת לפאס, שכלי ספק אלה היו ג"כ יהודים, וכל מה שסיפר רש"ט על התלאה אשר מצאתם בבואם לעיר ויליץ—מאלניה, נגע כנראה לכל אותה השיירה של מאה אנשים איש וביתו שגם הם התענו בכל אותם העניינים שעונה בהם רבי ש"ט בן נמיל אח"כ ושנמכרו סוף סוף בתור שבויים, אלה שלא רצו להמיר דתם, ולפי הנראה שזו היתה שיירה מאוחרת

⁹ [עיין מדרש קהלת רבה ז', ד'—ל.].

¹⁰ כך הגירסא סה, בטקסס מבוזינא.

מפני שמדברי רש"ט בסוף דבריו ניכר שבכווא לפאם כבר היתה שם קהלה גדולה פורחת, וזה היה רק אחרי בוא המגורשים מספרד אליה, ולפי זה, יהיה שנסיעת רש"ט ובניו ומאה איש וביתו, היתה בחורף רנ"ג, כפי שזכיר, שבעיברם ירד הגשם עליהם כל היום וכל הלילה.

לא נדע הסבה מדוע לא עשו יהודי פאם לרבי שם טוב, נדבתי-כסף, והוצרכו לתלות הדבר בהנניד שבתלמסן? לפי הנראה לי סבת הדבר היה שהמושל של מארוק היה אז מושל גם על תלמסן, והנניד שבו תלוי הדבר נמצא אז עם המלך בעיר תלמסן, ולכן היו צריכים יהודי פאם לשלוח את רש"ט תחלה לתלמסן, בשביל רשיון לקבץ כסף לפדיון בניו, אך, לא ידענו עוד מי הוא הנניד הזה שידבר אודותיו רש"ט ויספר בשבחו.

כן לא נדע מה היה הסוף בדבר שני בניו הגדולים יצחק ושמואל שהיו גם משכילים וסופרים, האם יכול אביהם הוקן שהיה בן שמונים ושתים שנה, להשיג הכסף הדרוש לפדיונם, אם לא, ואמנם מסוף ההקדמה שכותב, "גם בן ואח אין לי... בארץ הלזו" ניכר ברור, שבזמן ההוא שנמר רש"ט את ספורו ואת חבורו זה, לא באו בניו עוד אצלו.

מהמשפחה זו "בן גמיל" מצאנו במאה ה'י"ח בין יהודי טורקיה, שבאו לא"י, מהם היה רבי יצחק בן גמיל מחבר הס' חיים וחסד דרושים שנרפס בקצור בסוף הס' ישרש יעקב לכן בתו ר' חיים אבואלעפיה (אומיר ת"ק). ונזכר גם בשם הגדולים מהאזולאי, ומה יס לי לשער שבניו של רש"ט זה, יצחק ושמואל, עלה בידם ללכת אח"כ – אולי אחרי מות אביהם הוקן – לטורקיה, עם גולי ספרד הרבים שמצאו מקלט להם בטורקיה, ומזרעם היה ר' יצחק בן גמיל במאה ה'י"ח, הנזכר, מי יודע גם אם לא השני הבנים הקטנים של רש"ט, יהושע ויעקב, שהתנצרו בעל כרחם ועל כרחו של אביהם האומלל, יכלו אחרי כן גם הם בגורלם, להמלט מידי קנצריהם, לארצות טורקיה.

לפי המובן מהקדמת המחבר רש"ט, שהעתקנו הס' כתר שם טוב הוא דרשות כסדר הפרשיות מיוסד על פי דברי ס' הוזהר, ולפי הנראה שחוץ מהקטע הזה שבידינו, לא נשאר עוד מהספר הזה בעולם, ואבר כבר.

II

שתי אנרות מחברון על דבר עלילה בשנת תקל"ה.

אגרת א'.

שרי החילים, אשר פרים קרש הלולים, וקורא להם אילי הצדק שרי גדורים, נאמנים ונחמדים. הם העומדים על הפקודים ושפטו את העם משפט צדק, הנה הנם אחינו אנשי נאולתנו יחידים סגולה אשר בעיר תהלה ק"ק ארטיב אשר במארוק יע"א ועל צבאם הנבירים הרחמנים פרנסים וגכאים ממונים וקצינים וכל העוסקים עם הצבור לש"ש ועל ראשיהם מלמעלה החכמים השלימים דיינים מצויינים יהי שלום בחילם כיר"א.

מאחר עלות קול רנה ותפלה, לפני מערת המכפלה למען ירום הודם ישבו בניה שלום משכנות מבטחים ומעגלי צדק, אחינו, שלחו וקראו למקוננות ותבאנה ותשאנה עלינו נהי הגה וקנים כי הן בעון הגזירה על ק"ק עדתנו נזרת שמר מעין דוגמת השמדות אשר היה בימי קדם בזמן גרוש ספרד, והוא הדבר, כי בן השייך הגדול מלך הארץ נסתר ויבקשוהו ולא נמצא וסוף שני ימים נמצא טבוע פגר מת באמת השיפכים הסמוכים לחומת מחוז היהודים ותהום כל העיר ונאספו עלינו להשמיד להרוג ולאבד את כל היהודים אשר בעיר קדשנו ולבלתי השאיר כל נשמה באומנם אתם הרגתם אותנו ומי שלח ידו בבן השיך ונקה הן בהיותו נוי מגויי האדמה וב"ש יהודים אומללים ושלח השיך בחימה שפוכה כי יחם לבבו על בנו והסגיר את כל היהודים במקום אחד טף ונשים לנקום נקם והיתה צעקה גדולה ומרה מן הילדים ויונקי שדים כמזה לא נהיתה ונשארו סגורים כ"ד שעות ושלהנו אל השופטים אשר בארץ למען דעת אם כפי דתם נתחייבו הריגה כל העם מקצה ונשמטו בידי סלע שופטים ובאו אל השיך ויאמרו לו חכמיו לעשות משפט כי לא יאות לאיש כמוהו לנקום נקם אשר לא כרת וסוף דבר נגמר הדין כי השיך יבחר לו עשרה נפשות מישראל ויטביעם במקום אשר נמצא בנו ושאר העם פליטים ותיכף בא השיך ויבחר לו עשרה בחורים מבחר הצאן לעשות בהם משפט כתוב ואמותיהם של אלו היו קורעים בגדיהם ומתגוללים על הארץ בבכי יגון ומתחננים לשיך להרוג אותם תחלה ולא יראו בהריגת בניהם ומי שלא ראה צרה זאת לא ראה צרה מימיו ואנחנו לא נדע מה נעשה ועלתה ההסכמה ללכת להתנפל לרגלי השקרית אשת השיך עם מתן בסתר לבא אל השיך להתהנן לו לקחת כופר העשרה בחורים כאשר ישית עלינו ואל ישפוך דם נקי ועצת ה' היא תקום כי זכות אבות עמהם והטתו ברוב לקחה ורצה לקחת כופר ופסק עלינו חמשת אלפים גרוש עד שיהיו השלוחים יוצאים לפני אחינו שבגולה והעשרה בחורים שבהר הם ערכון עליהם שאם לא יגיעו לידו החמשת אלפים גרוש הנו' ישלח ידו בהם אשר על זה אנו שולחים לקראת מעלתם החכם השלם והכולל כמה"ר משה הכהן סקלי הי"ו ובפיו ידבר מעין המאורע כי אין בכח הקולמוס להגיד דברים כהווייתן לפני רו"מ בשפל קול התחנה כל השומע צרה כזאת יתמלא רחמים על עשרה נפשות מישראל וכל העם מקצה ילבשו קנאה בהתנדב עם יחד עשיר ואביון נרבה לה' וכל הנשים יתנו יקר לה' אלהי ישראל ויורידו את עדים מעליהם לפדיון נפשות כי לא היתה כזאת מימות עולם. גם אלה לחכמים פני העדה הי"ו להחם בהספדא ולהודיע להמון מקרה בלתי טהור ויתנו רשות לשלוחינו הנו' לחזור על הפתחים מבית לבית ויבואו האנשים על הנשים ומדרו איש לו אשר לכסף ודי זהב ולית דין צריך בשש כי חיי הבחורים האלה תלוים לתשועת אחינו ב"י רחמנים בני רחמנים ובטחנו בחסדי רו"ם כי כה יעשו והיה שכרם אתם יאריכו ימים ושנים כשני אליהו שוים לטובה הן ועושר בכיתם וצדקתם עומדת לעד כנפשם הרמה וכנפש המתפללים בעדם התוחמים בעה"ק חברון ת"ו בסדר ושמרו דרך ה' לעשות צדקה שנת התקל"ה ושלם.

הצעיר מרדכי רובין, הצעיר יהודה פאטו, הצעיר אליהו בכמהה"ר מלמר,
יצחק הכהן, רפאל שבתי הכהן, אברהם רובין,
שמואל קארינאל ס"ט.

אגרת ב'.

מלך מהולל בתשבחות, כלול בכל מדות טובות, זרע צדקות מצמיח ישועות לנפשות עצובות, ה"ה הנביר המרומם נשא ורם כהה"ר אהרן בן יוסף בן אלורע ואחריו יאיר נתיב הנביר המרומם משה אחיו וה"ר אברהם אחיו ואת שלאחריהם נברא דמאריה סיעיה הנביר המרומם כה"ר שלמה בן דוד בן אלישע נר"ו.

לפנים האר"ש תכון תפלתנו לפני מערת המכפלה ינטלם וינשאם וכסא כבוד ינחילם בשובע שמחות. האח נפשינו כלנו בני איש אחד נחנו ואח לצרה יולד שא נא עניך וראה באגרת הכוללת את האש הגדולה אשר בערה בקצה מחנה אלהים זה ובחורי ישראל הכריע לתת אותם בידי אבורי להמיתם במיתה משונה אשר לא היתה כזאת מעולם מומן גרוש ספרר עד היום וידינו אסורות ואין די באר את הצרה על מתכונתה וזלת שלוחנו החכם השלם והכולל כמה"ר משה הכהן סקלי נר"ו ההולך קדמת אשור יביע אומר אחת מאלף כי על כל אלה תשתכנה אבני קדש בני אל חי לבקש רחמים צדקה וחסד לפני ר"מ יכמרו רחמיו על עשרה בחורי חמד מכחר הצאן אשר הם מסורים להריגה וייקר פדיון נפשם לפני ר"מ ופתוח יפתח את ידו הרחבה להזיל זהב מכיסו לפדיון נפשות ושקולה מצוה זו ומכרעת מכל מצות שבתורה כי אין לך דבר שעומד בפני פקוח נפש ואף גם זאת ידבר על לב אוהביו ורעיו להחזיק במצוה זו כי עת צרת היא לעדת ישראל החונים באהלי שם המקום הקדוש הוה וישועתם מהרה תצמח כי חק וזמן נתן לפדיון נפשם או ח"ו גורת מות והשמה, לזאת יחרד כל איש וחסמר שערת בשרו וימהר יחישה מעשהו מעשה הצדקה, המתפללים בעדו החותמים פעה"ק חברון ת"ו בסדר ויחשבה לו צדקה שנת התקל"ה ליצירה ושלם.

מרדכי רובי,	יהודה גומיץ פאטו,	יצחק הכהן,
רפאל שבת הכהן,	שמואל קארינאלו	אברהם רובי.

הערה כללית.

המאורע המדובר בשתי האגרות הנ"ל שקרה אז בשנה ה'ל, בשנת התקל"ה, ליהודי חברון, לא נזכר עוד בכל כותבי תולדות א"י, וגם בכותבי תולדות העיר חברון, ראה באוצר ישראל ובאנציקלופדיות אחרות, גם בס' „ארץ ישראל ושכנותיה, להר"א הורוויץ ע' חברון, שכתב בפרוטרוט תולדות ומאורעות העיר הזאת, לא בא זכר כלל להמאורע הזה.

שתי האגרות הנ"ל נמצאו במארוקו, והן כחתומות הרבנים החתומים הנ"ל בעצם חתימות ידם, ע"ד הרבנים הנ"ל ראה להר"א הורוויץ בס' הנ"ל, ובהירושלים של לונץ המצויין שם, אודותם, והראשון ר' מרדכי רובי, הוא מחבר ס' שמן המר שו"ת שנדפס בליוורנו תק"מ.

המשפחה סקלי הכהן שאליה התייחס השד"ר מחברון הנוכח, היא משפחה עתיקה ידועה.

העיר אַרְטִיב שאליה נשלחו שתי האגרות הנזכרות, היא עיר קטנה כעת בדרום מארוקו בחלק המדבר סהרא (Sahara), ושלפי הנראה מהאגרות הנ"ל, היתה או בה קהלה יהודית חשובה, בודאי קוראי דברינו יתפללו איך הגיעו שד"ר ארץ ישראל, עוד או בהמצב המקולקל המדיני וסכנות שלפני מאה וחמשים שנה והותר, עד למקומות רחוקות כאלה, למדבר סהרא, ואמנם, לפי מה שידוע לנו מתוך אגרות רבות אחרות וגם מידועות ברורות, ששלוחי א"י הגיעו עוד יותר לפני המדבר ההוא ויפסנו בנפשם לבוא עד הישובים היותר רחוקים שם, ובכ"ז נכנסו בשלום ויצאו בשלום, מפני שהערביאים המרוקואים, גם במקומות שהם כל כך קנאי־הדת ושונאי־ישראל, גברו את שלוחי א"י ולא נגעו בהם לרעה, כי חשבו אותם בתור „אנשים קדושים“ בשלוחי הארץ הקדושה, ויתנו להם לעבור בלי מעצור גם בדרכים נשמות ובשובים רחוקים כל כך.

הערה נוספת מאת יעקב בצלאל לויטערבאך סינסינטי.

חשודים בעיני דברי שתי האגרות האלו ורואה אני צורך להעיר על איזה דברים שעוררו בלבי ספק גדול באמתת המאורע המסופר באגרות אלו.

א. אמנם אין להתפלא „איך הגיעו שד"ר ארץ ישראל למקומות רחוקות כאלה למדבר סהרא“, כאשר יוכיח בצדק הרב טולידאנו. אך מאד נתפלא על הראשים והמנהלים בחברון כי בעת צרה כזאת שישועה קרובה היתה נחוצה מאד „כי חק וזמן ניתן לפדיון נפשם“ של הבחורים האסורים, בחרו לבקש עזרה מרחוק ולשלוח את השד"ר דוקא למקום רחוק כזה שזמן הנסיעה לשם בלבד יארך יותר מחדש ימים ובלך ושוב הלא יעברו כשלשה חדשים. מדוע לא פנו למקומות יותר קרובים לבקש עזרה מהם. ואם נאמר כי שלחו שד"ר ומכתבים גם למקומות אחרים הקרובים והרחוקים הלא יפלא כי כל המכתבים שנשלחו למקומות אחרים נאכזרו ולא נשארו לפליטה רק שני המכתבים האלו במארוקו. ולא רק המכתבים שנשלחו לשאר מקומות נאכזרו גם המאורע עצמו נשכח לנמרי, ולא נזכר בשום מקום. כי כותבי תולדות ארץ ישראל ותולדות עיר חברון לא ידעו ממנו. והלא הרב חיד"א היה בחברון קרוב לאותו זמן וכששה שנים אח"כ בשנת תקמ"א יצא עוד הפעם משם לחו"ל בתור שד"ר וגם הוא לא יזכיר המאורע הזה באיזה מספריו.

ב. משמות הרבנים הבאים על החתום נודעו לנו רק שנים שהיו בחברון באותו זמן או קרוב להם הרב ר' מרדכי רובין ובנו ר' אברהם רובין שהיה רב בחברון משנת תקמ"ד עד שנת תקס"ו. ואיפשר עוד שלישי אם נאמר כי יהודה פאטו או יהודה גומיץ פאטו כאשר הוא חתום על המכתב השני, הוא הרב חיים יהודה גומיץ פאטו שהיה בחברון באותו זמן. אך שמות הנותרים לא נודעו לנו ולא נזכרו ברשימות חכמי ורבני עיר חברון.

ג. הרב טולידאנו יחשוב כי המכתבים האלו חתומים „בעצם חתימות ידם“ של הרבנים בחברון. אך הלא אין מדרך הרבנים לשנות את שמם בחתימתם ולחתום פעם בשם אחד ופעם בשני שמות או בשני השם. ובמכתבים האלו הרב יהודה פאטו כמכתב הראשון יחתום את שמו רק, יהודה פאטו, ובמכתב השני

יוסף שם אחר על שמו ויחתום יהודה גומין פאטו. והרב שמואל קארינאל במכתב הראשון יוסף תיבות ס"ט (=סופו טוב או, ספרדי מהור?) אחר חתימת שמו. ובמכתב השני ישימט תיבות אלו ומשנה שמו במקצת ותחת קארינאל יחתום קארינאלו. וגם לזר יחשב לנו שבאותו מכתב עצמו שהרב ר' מרדכי רובין חתם את שמו, הצעיר מרדכי רובין, בנו ר' אברהם חותם את שמו אברהם רובין בלא סימן הענוה, הצעיר או הקטן. ובמכתב השני שכחו גם ר' מרדכי גם ר' יהודה פאטו את ענותנותם והשימו תיבת הצעיר לפני חתימתם.

ד. עוד נראה לי כעין יוסף מתוכן בשני המכתבים. במכתב השני הערוך אל הגביר אהרן נ' יוסף ואחיו הכותבים מזכירים את המכתב הראשון שנערך אל נכאי ופרנסי הקהלה בכלל ורומזים אליו בדברים אלו: "שא נא עניך וראה באגרת הכוללת". ובשעה שנכתבו הדברים האלו, האגרת הכוללת לא היתה כתובה עדיין. כי המכתב אל הגביר נכתב בפרשת לך לך "בסדר והאמין בד' ויחשבה לו לצדקה". והאגרת הכוללת, המכתב אל הפרנסים ואנשי הקהלה בכלל נכתב בשבוע שאחר זה. בפרשת וירא "בסדר ושמו דרך ד' לעשות צדקה ומשפט".

מכל הנ"ל יוצא לי כי אם לא נאכה לחשוד מנהלי איזו חברה בחברון, מוכרחים אנו להחליט כי איזה רמאי או שד"ר בלתי נאמן בדה ספור המאורע מלבו. וזיין המכתבים וחתומות איזה רבנים שנודעו לו שהיו באותו זמן בחברון למען יוכל לאסוף נדבות. והלך דוקא למקום רחוק כזה, מקום שאין מכירים אותו וגם לא יוכלו לדעת אם בנים הדברים שהוא מספר להם אם לאו.

תשובה ל"הערה נוספת".

הרה"ח רי"ב לויטרכך נ"י מיהר להטיל חשד בשתי האגרות ההן שלמעלה, ואמנם, במח"כ לא צודק, טעמו השלישי הוא העיקרי שיש לשים אליו לב, היינו השינוי שיש בחתימות, וע"ז צריך אני להעיר, כי האגרות נעתקו שלא בפני, מהמקור, והמעתיק לא הבין החתימות הכתובות בציוורים ותליות כרגיל בחתימות הספרדים, ושינה כרצונו, ואמנם כשראיתי בהמקור, אין שום שינוי, הרב פאטו חתום בשתי האגרות, חיים יהודה גומין פאטו, והרב קארינאל, חתום בשתייהן, שמואל קארינאל ס"ט, ויתכן שזה אחיו של רפאל קארינאל שהיה בניוורק עי' אוצר יש' ע' קארינאל. להקשיא ד', יש להשיב בפשיטות, שדרך מנהלי העדה היה להכין מכתבים לעת צאת השד"ר, מלפני זמן מה, ובעת צאתו כותבים הזמן וחותמים, ולכן, נקל הדבר להיות שהאגרת הכוללת נכתבה תחלה קודם, ובזמן החתימה, נחתמו האגרות האחרות קודם ממנה.

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DIE TELEOLOGIE BEI MAIMONIDES

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I.

Die Bedeutung, die dem Problem der Teleologie bei Maimonides zukommen sollte, ist schon rein äußerlich aus der Stellung dieses Problems in der Philosophie gegeben. Es tritt nämlich überall dort zutage, wo sich zwei Gedankengänge schneiden, die wohl eine Zeitlang unabhängig ihres Weges gehen, doch aber konvergieren und sich schließlich treffen müssen, eben im Punkte der Teleologie. Gemeint sind die naturphilosophische Betrachtungsweise, oder wie auch sonst immer das auf das Sein gerichtete Denken bezeichnet werden mag, einerseits und die wertende, normative, hauptsächlich ethische Richtung andererseits. Eine jede dieser Reihen, solange sie für sich ist, kommt ohne den Zweckbegriff aus; er wird nur dann aktuell, wenn sie beide gezwungen werden, sich auseinanderzusetzen oder gar zu vereinigen: wenn ein naturphilosophisch konstruiertes Weltbild einen Sinn oder wenn Postulate der Ethik eine über das empirisch Menschliche hinausgehende Geltung erhalten soll.

Diese Grenzstellung der Teleologie läßt sich leicht historisch belegen. Das Judentum, solange es im rein Ethischen verblieb, bedurfte keiner Teleologie, zumindest nicht für das Weltganze. Ebenso wenig aber bedurfte es ihrer die vorsokratische Naturphilosophie. Wenn aber Platon, von der sokratischen Ethik herkommend, auf die Naturphilosophie stößt, so ist seine erste Enttäuschung, und speziell bei Anaxagoras, der doch ein geistiges Prinzip einführte, der Mangel einer teleologischen Deutung.¹ Ähnlich, nur in entgegengesetzter

¹ Die Hauptstelle ist Phaidon 98 B, wo der Gegensatz der Teleologie zur mechanistischen Naturerklärung zum ersten Male so prinzipiell klar formuliert wird. Inwiefern speziell die Enttäuschung in bezug auf Anaxagoras berechtigt war — vgl. das Kapitel Anaxagoras bei W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung etc.* 1925 —, mag hier dahingestellt bleiben.

Richtung, war es etwa bei Kant, als er die Kategorien der Erfahrung zu erweitern sich gezwungen sah, wenn auch nicht um eine Kategorie, so doch um die regulative Idee des Zweckes.² Nicht anders verhält es sich bis in unsere jüngste Zeit, wenn die Biologie, in ihrer neovitalistischen Richtung, sich gezwungen sieht, die rein mechanisch-energetische Erklärung des organischen Geschehens durch teleologische Faktoren, „Dominanten“ oder „Entelechien“, zu ergänzen.³

Ist nun aber dies der Charakter der Teleologie, daß sie dort aktuell wird, wo sich Ethik und Naturphilosophie schneiden, so wäre sie gerade bei Maimonides zu erwarten, bei dem das Zusammentreffen dieser beiden Gedankenreihen ein wesentliches Motiv seiner ganzen Philosophie ausmacht. Und dies um so mehr, als er jene Gedankenreihen nicht allein aus sich heraus erst zu erzeugen und ihren Widerstreit zu erfahren hatte, sondern beide abgeschlossen und typisiert — in der „Torah“ und der „Philosophie“ — vorgefunden hatte und seine Aufgabe darin sah, sie nicht allein im Kompromißwege zu „versöhnen“, sondern in ein System zu bringen. So hat es wohl auch Hermann Cohen empfunden, als er, bei der Charakteristik der maimunischen Ethik, in der er das Hauptmotiv seiner Philosophie erblickt, auf die Wichtigkeit der Teleologie mit großem Nachdruck hinwies.⁴ Zu bedauern ist bloß, daß er sich mit der allgemeinen Bemerkung in der Einleitung begnügt, ohne in der eigentlichen Abhandlung auf die Teleologie Maimonides' näher einzugehen.

In der Tat gehört auch dies zu den schwierigsten Partien der maimunischen Philosophie und beweist von Neuem, wie sehr man fehlgeht, wenn man da nur nach einzelnen Stellen urteilt oder die Darstellung seines wirklichen Gedankenganges durch ein bloßes kapitelweises Referieren zu erreichen glaubt. Die Architektonik des „Moreh“ besteht eben darin, daß jeder Abschnitt nur im Zusammenhange mit allem anderen Dazugehörigen und aus dem Geiste des Ganzen heraus richtig verstanden werden kann.

² *Kritik der Urteilskraft* II, §. 65 ff.

³ Vgl. die Partien über den biologischen Zweckbegriff bei R. Eisler, *Der Zweck*.

⁴ Cohen, „Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis“ in *Moses B. Maimon* I, S. 71 ff.

Da gibt es zunächst jene bekannte Stelle, *Moreh* III 13, die sich mit der Teleologie befaßt, und die, dem äußeren Anschein nach, als Hauptstelle für unseren Gegenstand gehalten werden kann. Hier lehnt Maimonides jede Teleologie ab, ja bezeichnet alles Suchen nach einem Zweck in diesem Dasein als vergeblich und sogar irreführend.⁵ Dies gilt insbesondere in bezug auf die Zentralstellung des Menschen, ist aber auszu dehnen auf alles Seiende. Wir müssen uns vielmehr begnügen, dieses Sein in seinem Ursprung, vom göttlichen Willen oder Weisheit, zu erkennen, dürfen uns aber nicht verwirren lassen, außer dem Selbstzweck der einzelnen Geschöpfe noch nach anderen Zwecken zu suchen, die nicht ihre vom Göttlichen ausgehende Existenz an sich enthält.⁶ Ja, einen Zweck für das weltliche Dasein zu suchen, wäre nicht minder sinnlos, als den Zweck für die Existenz Gottes finden zu wollen.⁷

Diese Stelle ist nicht nur auffallend an sich im Verhältnis zu dem, was wir von Maimonides erwarten — sondern befindet sich in Widerspruch zu anderen Theorien im *Moreh*, die auch in die Frage der Teleologie münden. Vor allem *Moreh* I 69. Hier wird es geradezu als Notwendigkeit hingestellt, bei allen Dingen nach ihrem Zweck zu fragen, und auch im Suchen fortzuschreiten nach einem immer höheren Zweck, so daß man in bezug auf die Welt zu einem letzten Zweck, dem Zweck der Zwecke, gelangt, der Gott ist oder eigentlich sein Wille.⁸ Die Notwendigkeit des Zweckes

⁵ Gleich am Anfang: הרבה נבוכו מן [דעות] השלמים בבקשת התכלית זה המציאות מה הוא ואחר זאת ההצעה; והנני מבאר לך איך תבטל זאת השאלה לכל אחת מן הדעות דע שאין דרך לבקש תכלית וכי.

⁶ *Moreh* III 13 g. E.: ... ולא יתבלבלו מחשבותיו ... האדם, כשירע עצמו ... ינוח ולא יבקש תכלית למה שאין לו תכלית (Text korrigiert nach Munk, *Guide* III, S. 98 n. 2). Womit also auch ein generelles Ablehnen (Munk: „en général“) des Zweckes gemeint ist.

⁷ Nachdem schon vorher der göttliche Wille dem Zweck entgegengestellt worden war — הגה בארז שאין שם תכלית אלא רצון לבד —, heißt es dann g. E. ונשקד להאמין שזה המציאות כלו מכוון מטנו יתע' לפי רצונו ולא נבקש לו עלה ולא תכלית אחרת כלל, כמז של א נבקש תכלית מציאותו ית', כן לא נבקש תכלית רצונו.

⁸ *Moreh* I 69 g. E.: וכן עוד הענין בכל תכלית, כי הדבר אשר לו תכלית יש לך לבקש ... בזה הצד נאמר: ואם כן הוא ית' תכלית כל דבר האחרון ... והוא ענין רצונו אשר הוא עצמו ... בו שהוא תכלית התכליות.

als solchen ist hier, im Formalen zumindest ganz aristotelisch, von nicht geringerer Bedeutung als die der anderen drei Ursachen, an deren Gültigkeit doch wohl nicht gezweifelt werden kann. Den Widerspruch zwischen diesen beiden Auffassungen bei Maimonides hat nun Narboni sehr lebhaft empfunden⁹ und er versucht es, in einer längeren Interpretation die beiden Stellen in Einklang zu bringen.

Während aber Narboni auf jeden Fall den Ausgleich im Sinne einer positiven Stellung Maimonides' zur Teleologie durchführt und die Ablehnung alles Zwecksuchens in III 13 als einen besonders erklärungsbedürftigen Spezialfall in die proteleologische Ansicht von I 69, die ihm als die maßgebende gilt, einfügt, finden wir bei den neueren Darstellern die entgegengesetzte Neigung. Für Kaufmann¹⁰ z. B. gilt es als ausgemacht, daß nach Maimonides' Behauptung „bei der Schöpfung nach einem Zwecke nicht gefragt werden dürfe“, dies unter Berufung auf Moreh III 13, dabei aber die Stelle I 69 geradezu als Beleg anführend, insbesondere da am Schlusse des ersten Kapitels auch Wille und Weisheit Gottes erwähnt werden. Dies wohl auch im Sinne Munks, der auch die Unergründlichkeit des göttlichen Willens, für die er auf I 69 hinweist, als Erklärung für die Zwecklosigkeit der Schöpfung anführt.¹¹ Für beide also ist die maßgebende Lehre Maimonides' durchaus antiteleologisch.

Daß aber diese Auffassung unhaltbar ist, wird klar aus verschiedenen Gründen. Zunächst ist das Heranziehen von I 69 für III 13 als Beleg unmöglich. Formulieren wir die Frage einmal prinzipiell, was die Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt betrifft, so lautet die Antwort in I 69, man müsse bei jedem Ding nach einem Zweck suchen, während es in III 13 heißt, man dürfe keinen suchen, da jedes Geschöpf an sich Selbstzweck ist. Und gerade der Schluß von III 13, auf den sich Kaufmann beruft, den er aber nicht wortgetreu wiedergibt, besagt eben, es gebe keinen anderen Zweck als die

⁹ Kommentar ed. Goldenthal zu *Moreh* III 13, S. 51b: אני נבוכתי הרבה על הרב ו"ל איך רב ואמר שהוא יבאר איך תבטל זאת השאלה... ואני רואה כי זה סתירת כל החכמות, כי תכלית כל החכמות לדעת התכלית האחרונה. אמנם דבר זה ברמזים ועל דרך סתר כפי מנהגו באלה הענינים האלהיים... erklären versucht:

¹⁰ *Attributenlehre*, S. 320 Anm. 180.

¹¹ So *Guide* III, S. 91 n. 1.

Eigenexistenz;¹² das ist doch nicht identisch mit der Behauptung, es gebe einen Zweck und dies ist der Wille Gottes. Daß uns aber auch die Unergründlichkeit des göttlichen Willens hier nicht helfen kann, beweist klar eine andere Stelle, wo Maimonides die Meinung der Aschariten bezüglich der Providenz vorträgt, ihre Gottes-Willens-Theorie bis zu ihren letzten Konsequenzen durchführt und als eine der Absurditäten, die sich aus dieser einseitigen Lehre der Unergründlichkeit des göttlichen Willens ergeben, die anführt, daß nach ihr alle Zweckmäßigkeit des göttlichen Handelns aufgehoben wird.¹³ Wobei also die Teleologie als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt und von einer extremen „Willens“theorie als bedroht bezeichnet wird.

Sollte aber noch ein Zweifel über die Grundtendenz Maimonides', wie in den zwei erwähnten Stellen dargestellt, zurückbleiben, so dürfte er vollkommen behoben werden durch eine dritte, die wir wohl auch als Hauptstelle für unsere Frage ansehen dürfen, nämlich *Moreh* III 25. Hier werden unter den Handlungen, mit Beziehung auf ihren Zweck, vier Gruppen unterschieden: die sinnlosen, die spielerischen, die verfehlten und schließlich die zweckmäßigen. Maimonides führt diese Vierteilung an, um jede Annahme, Gott könnte eine andere Handlungsart als die vierte, die zweckmäßige, ausüben, strenge zurückzuweisen.¹⁴ Wobei noch zwei Momente hervorzuheben

¹² Den Satzfuss von *Moreh* III 13, ב"כ, לא נאיה לה אלא : ב"כ, ... או בטוב נאיה לטא לא נאיה לה אלא : ב"כ, ... gibt Kaufmann wieder: „das keines oder nur ein in Gottes Willen oder Wissen begründetes Ziel hat“. Dadurch ist ihm auch die Verbindung mit I 69 erleichtert. Hier ist aber nicht von Gottes Willen oder Wissen als Ziel, sondern von der von jenem Willen etc. abhängigen Eigenexistenz als Selbstzweck die Rede.

¹³ *Moreh* III 17 (הרעת הני), wird als letzte und schwerste הרעה die genannt: ויתחייב לפי זה הרעת ג'כ שלא תהיה תכלית כונה לפעולותיו יתע.

¹⁴ Die Einteilung wird gemacht unter dem Gesichtspunkt: לפי בחינתם. Die Behauptung, es könnte in der Schöpfung auch eine der drei ersten Handlungen möglich sein, wird bezeichnet als בתחלת המהשבה und, nach einer Auseinandersetzung mit Gedankengängen, die darauf führen könnten, abgelehnt mit den Worten: וזה כלו לברוח מטה שצריך לברוח מטה והוא שיעשה הפועל פעולה ולא תכליתם כלל. Dann wird diese Auffassung auch als Absurdität bezeichnet: ודע שאשר סבלו זאת ההרהרה עד שיהיו פעולת השם ית' אצלם כפעולות ההבל אשר לא יכוון בהם תכלית כלל.

sind. Erstens wird hier Zweckmäßigkeit nur im absoluten Sinne verstanden; denn Handlungen, die nur in relativem Sinne zweckmäßig sind — sei es, daß ihr Zweck an sich ein geringerer ist oder daß er nur für einen Teil von Subjekten, wenn es auch die Weisen sind, Bedeutung hat — gehören noch nicht ganz in die Gruppe des Zweckmäßigen.¹⁵ Die zweckmäßige Handlung, die sich auf den notwendigen und bedeutenden Zweck bezieht, ist eben die gute Handlung an sich. Zweitens wird hier, und dies in der entgegengesetzten Richtung zu III 13, nachgewiesen, daß das Leugnen eines Zweckes in den Teilen aus der irrtümlich aufgefaßten Zwecklosigkeit des Ganzen, die als solche noch irgendwie begreiflich wäre, hervorging.¹⁶ Während also früher, bei der Ablehnung der Teleologie, die Selbstzwecklichkeit der Einzeldinge gleichsam konkurrierend zur Annahme eines Gesamtzweckes des ganzen Daseins auftritt, soll hier das gerade Gegenteil erfolgen: Die zweckmäßige Einrichtung des Einzeldings, deren Leugnen eben eine absurde Konsequenz wäre, soll auf die allgemeine Teleologie zurückführen, soll Annahmen, die im Bereiche des Allgemeinen noch manche Berechtigung haben, korrigieren und also, im Analogiewege, die Setzung dieser allgemeinen Teleologie ermöglichen.

Ganz auffallend aber ist die Benützung der auf jeden Fall abgelehnten Auffassung von der kosmischen Zentralstellung des Menschen zu zwei entgegengesetzten Argumentationen.

¹⁵ Die *פעולת השחק* (פעל אלעבט) wird eigentlich nur als eine, gemessen an der höchsten Art, quantitativ geringere Handlung: *הפעולה אשר יכולן בו תכלית פחות* bezeichnet. Und als Übergang zwischen ihr und der vollkommen zweckmäßigen Handlung, aber offenbar noch als zur spielerischen Gruppe gehörig, werden diejenigen Handlungen eingereiht, deren Nutzen nicht evident ist: ... *כהתעטלות הנוף* ... *usw.*; und zwar nur aus dem Grunde, da sie von den Unwissenden als spielerisch angesehen, obwohl sie subjektiv *שחק* *אצל החכמים* *אין* *פעולת שחק* (Munk, III, S. 197: „*mais qui n'est pas frivole*“ etc.). Erst dann wird die reine *טובה* *פעולה*, die also auf eine evidente *נכבדה* *תכלית* gerichtet ist, behandelt.

¹⁶ Bei der Ablehnung der ascharitischen extremen Willenstheorie (III 25, Mitte): *אטנם אלו האומרים שפעולות השם כלם לא כן בהם תכלית כלל, הביאם לזה הכרח ... שהם* ... *אומרים מה תכלית מציאות העולם בכלל ... ומשיבו זה בחלקי העולם כלם*. Vgl. dagegen, oben Anm. 12, den Schlusssatz von III 13, der mit der dort im ganzen Kapitel entwickelten Lehre durchaus im Einklang ist.

In dem einen Falle wird diese überhebliche Meinung vom Menschen als falsch bezeichnet, im Anschluß daran gleichsam als dessen psychologische Konsequenz auch die Ablehnung einer jeden Zweckmäßigkeit gelehrt.¹⁷ Während im anderen Falle eben diese falsche Vorstellung vom kosmischen Zentrismus des Menschen geradezu als Grund dafür angeführt wird, daß in bezug auf die Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt Zweifel auftauchen konnten.¹⁸ Stellt man die beiden Darstellungen gegenüber, so ergibt sich, daß jene Überwertung des Menschen das eine Mal zur Teleologie führt — die aber ebenso wie ihr Ursprung abzulehnen ist — das andere Mal aber von der Teleologie, die bejaht wird, abhält, woraus allein eben die Falschheit dieser Überwertung sich erweisen soll.

Es scheint, als wollte das Kapitel III 25 in allem und jedem — in der Argumentierung nicht weniger als im Grundgedanken — die genaue Umkehrung des Kapitels III 13 sein.¹⁹ Das eine gleichsam ein Gegenstück zum anderen.

¹⁷ In III 13 werden die beiden Fragen als eins, das eben zu verneinen ist, behandelt: *אמנם... יש חושבים שזאת השאלה מחויבת, ה"ל בקשת התכלית לכל זה המציאות, וכן* (Munk, III, S. 89): *En conséquence, on croit usw.* Wodurch die Überwertung des Menschen als Folgerung aus der Annahme eines Weltzweckes erscheint. Dies entspricht nicht dem Gedankengang des ganzen Kapitels, wo doch die Stellung des Menschen psychologisch als primär behandelt wird. Der Widerspruch aber mit III 25, der uns hier beschäftigt, kommt nach der Auffassung Munks noch drastischer heraus. Scheyer in seiner Übersetzung (S. 64) schwächt sogar das Tibbonsche *וכן* noch mehr ab und schreibt „und sind der Meinung“, wonach die zweite Hälfte, die Stellung des Menschen, sich explikativ an die erste, die Idee der gesamten Zweckmäßigkeit, anschließt.

¹⁸ III 25 g. E.: *ידע שרוב הספקות המביאות למבוכה בבקשת תכלית מציאות העולם* (Munk, III, S. 201, übersetzt das *אמנם* noch stärker: *n'ont d'autre source que.*) Dann weiter: *ועפני המעות ההוא יתחדשו הספקות והמבוכה, עד שירדו שקצת פעולות השם ית' שחוק וקצתם הכל וקצתם ריק*.

¹⁹ Dies erscheint notwendig so, wenn man nur referierend diese Kapitel behandelt, ohne den Versuch zu machen, sie durch Interpretation in Einklang zu bringen; eine so gemachte Darstellung muß auch zu Widersprüchen führen. Als Beispiel sei hier Joel angeführt. In seiner *Religionsphil. d. M. b. Maimon* (Ausgabe des Jahresberichtes), da heißt es einmal, S. 19, „daß die Frage nach dem Zweck der Schöpfung unzulässig sei“ — also folgend *Moreh* III 13. Später aber, bei Behandlung der Gebote, also unter Berufung auf *Moreh* III 25, wird, S. 40,

Nur in einem Punkte sind die beiden Darstellungen einig: im Verhältnisse des Teleologieproblems zum Kurationsproblem; in beiden nämlich wird ein direktes Verhältnis zwischen Kuration und Teleologie gelehrt, so daß die Bejahung der ersteren auch die Annahme der letzteren zur Folge hat. Aber auch in dieser Frage ist die Auffassung Maimonides' durchaus nicht einheitlich — vergleicht man diese soeben erwähnte Stellungnahme mit anderen. Daß das Problem einer Zweckmäßigkeit in der Welt mit der Annahme einer vernünftigen Weltordnung und in weiterer Folge mit der Annahme eines der Welt zugrunde gelegten Vernunftplans zusammenhängt, dies war schon in der antiken Philosophie klar, als sich das Teleologieproblem noch in seinen ersten Regungen befunden hatte.²⁰ Bei Maimonides aber, bei dem das Planmäßige des Weltgeschehens notwendigerweise mit der Idee eines welt-schaffenden Lenkers verbunden ist und somit zur Annahme eines Schöpfungsaktes ex nihilo führt — da wäre es zu erwarten, daß das Problem der Teleologie eindeutig mit dem der Kuration so verbunden wird, daß aus diesem, für Maimonides feststehenden Grundsatz sichere Ergebnisse auch für die Teleologie zu erreichen wären. Dem ist aber nicht so. Die Verbindung dieser beiden Fragen variiert zwischen einem Extrem und dem anderen.

Das eine Mal wird die Unabhängigkeit zwischen Teleologie und Kuration behauptet — ja, die Vermischung der beiden Fragen scheint als überflüssige Komplikation angesehen zu werden.²¹ In den weiteren Erörterungen hingegen des Teleologieproblems wird der Zusammenhang als solcher mit Kuration wohl betont und eingehend behandelt, in den Folgen aber, die

jene „die Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in Abrede stellende Ansicht“, die sich auch in der Ansicht der Zwecklosigkeit der Gebote fortsetzt, als falsch zurückgewiesen.

²⁰ Wenn man, mit Theiler *loc. cit.*, S. 13 ff., schon Diogenes von Apollonia als „Begründer“ der Teleologie betrachten will, so hängt dies schon bei ihm mit der Annahme eines einheitlichen Weltprinzips, des $\alpha\lambda\theta$, zusammen, woraus dann, dualistisch gestaltet, „das Walten der Luft im Kosmos... wie das des anaxagoreischen $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ “ folgt.

²¹ *Moreh* I 69, wo von Gott als Weltzweck gesprochen wird, heißt es: ולא תשריר שכלך הנה בענין חדשו לעולם או התחייבו ממנו על דעתם.

aus dem einen für das andere sich ergeben, zeigt sich eine große Diskrepanz. Als von der Teleologie noch im Sinne eines Anthropozentrismus im Kosmos gesprochen und daher abgelehnt wird, da werden die Schwierigkeiten, die sich den Philosophen, die an die Weltewigkeit glauben, aus dieser Ablehnung ergeben, behandelt und eher unsere Auffassung von der Schöpfung als mit dieser Ablehnung der Teleologie übereinstimmend hingestellt.²² Demnach würde die Kreationstheorie und die Ablehnung einer Teleologie sich gegenseitig unterstützen; zumindest eher, als es die Ewigkeitstheorie kann, die sich in schwer zu lösende Schwierigkeiten verwickelt.

Hingegen sind, wie gesagt, die zwei Stellen, von denen die eine (III 13) die Teleologie durchaus ablehnt und die andere (III 25) durchaus bejaht, gerade darin einig, daß Kreation und Teleologie sich gegenseitig begünstigen. In der ersten wird wohl auch, wie in I 69, einleitend behauptet, daß die Ablehnung der Teleologie sowohl für die Ewigkeit als auch für die Kreation in gleichem Maße gilt.²³ Doch wird wiederholt betont, daß die Annahme eines Zweckes für die Lehre der Schöpfung geradezu als Beweis dient, und auch später wird die Leugnung der Zweckmäßigkeit als trotz der Schöpfungslehre notwendig bezeichnet.²⁴ Ebenso wird in III 25 die Notwendigkeit einer Zweckmäßigkeit in der Welt von der Vollkommenheit und Unfehlbarkeit ihres Schöpfers abgeleitet. Allerdings in beiden Stellen verschieden; in der einen wird die Planmäßigkeit besonders auf die Absichtlichkeit, also auf das

²² *Moreh* III 14: מן דבר שזאת השאלה (womit die Ablehnung der anthropozentrischen Teleologie gemeint ist) עיור בה כמה שנאמיננו בחדוש העולם. Auf diese Stelle und ihre Bedeutung werden wir noch später zurückkommen.

²³ Am Anfang von *Moreh* III 13: אחת מן הדעות לכל אחד מן השאלה לכל המציאות, לא לפי דעתנו האומרים בחדוש העולם ולא דע שאין דרך לבקש תכלית לכלל המציאות, לא לפי דעת אריסטו בקיומו.

²⁴ III 13: הדע כי מן הגדולה שבראיות על החדוש העולם ... הוא מה שיעמוד עליו המוסת: אמנם לפי דעתנו בחדוש העולם ... יש חושבים שזאת השאלה טהויה, ר"ל בקשת התכלית. Und schließlich nach der Ablehnung: ותבטל נ"כ שאלת התכלית בכל. (Über den im Anfang betonten Unterschied zwischen der tכלית ראשונה und תכלית אחרונה wird noch später ausführlich zu sprechen sein.)

Willensattribut zurückgeführt,²⁵ während sie in der anderen mehr mit der Weisheit Gottes begründet wird, wobei das Willensmoment allein als irreführend abgelehnt wird.²⁶ Doch ist hier wieder eine noch zu lösende Verwicklung berührt, auf die wir vorläufig nicht näher eingehen können.

Was wir bisher gesehen haben, ist eine durchaus widerspruchsvolle Behandlung des Teleologieproblems. Sowohl die Frage einer Teleologie überhaupt als auch eine Reihe wichtiger Einzelfragen, wie der Anthropozentrismus in seinem Verhältnis zur Teleologie und das Verhältnis zwischen Kreation und Zweckmäßigkeit — alle weisen an den verschiedenen Stellen eine verschiedene und auch entgegengesetzte Behandlung auf. Dies müßte genügen, um uns zu veranlassen, einen ersten Versuch zu unternehmen, der wirklichen Ansicht Maimonides' über die Teleologie auf den Grund zu gehen und sie darzustellen. Mit der einfachen Formel, „es gibt“ eine Teleologie oder „es gibt keine“, können wir hier nicht auskommen — sie führt eben zu den Widersprüchen innerhalb des *Moreh*, ja sogar insbesondere innerhalb des dritten Teiles, der doch sicherlich einheitlich auf einmal vom Verfasser herausgegeben worden war.

Dieser Versuch kann nur darin bestehen, daß alle betreffenden Stellen zusammengehalten und die in ihnen auftauchenden scheinbaren Widersprüche als verschiedene Seiten einer und derselben Grundanschauung gesehen werden. Die extremen positiven sowohl als negativen Formulierungen dürfen nur als antinomistisches, also bewußtes Verfahren aufgefaßt werden, um das sich aus ihnen ergebende Dritte, beiden Formulierungen gerecht und doch von keiner erschöpft,

²⁵ In III 13 wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Kreation-Zweckmäßigkeit auf die *נחמה בנות* zurückgeführt *מחדש רק עם התחדשות נחמה בנות*. Dies ähnlich wie II 19 Einl., wo auch das Willensmotiv wesentlich ist.

²⁶ *Moreh* III 25 wird für die Ansicht *כלל תכלית* *כלם לא כיון בהם תכלית כלל* wohl die ascharitische Theorie verantwortlich gemacht, aber etwas generalisiert: *כמאמר כל מי שיאמר בחדוש העולם שכן רצה השם לא לעלה אחרת ששם מה שנאמינהו שהעולם מתחדש רוב* Die Teleologie wird erst später möglich gemacht dadurch *אבל יאמרו שהכשתו ית' ... חייבה מציאות זה הכמינו ויודעינו לא יאמינו שזה ברצון לבד לא זולתו, וזולתו, אבל יאמרו שהכשתו ית' ... חייבה מציאות זה מעולת הכמה העולם בכלל* und bekräftigt durch das Argument, daß die Naturdinge *העולם הכמה* sind, und mit Bibelstellen, die *הכמה* enthalten, wird dann weiteroperiert.

gleichsam von selbst hervortreten zu lassen. Diese Methode, durchaus dialektischen Charakters, schien von Maimonides als besonders fruchtbar bevorzugt zu sein — wie es sich auch in anderen Teilen der Lehre zeigt²⁷ — allerdings unter der Voraussetzung, daß nicht jede Seite, die ihren Wert nur als Komponente im Ganzen hat, für sich als abgeschlossene „Meinung“ gewertet wird.

II.

Maimonides behandelt nirgends die Teleologie an sich, isoliert, er spricht von ihr nur im Zusammenhange mit anderen, die Hauptsache seiner Untersuchung ausmachenden Fragen, und zwar als eine aus ihnen folgende Konklusion oder als notwendige Einleitung. So sehen wir unsere drei wichtigsten Stellen in folgenden Zusammenhängen behandelt: I 69, prototeologisch, in Verbindung mit dem Attributenproblem, hauptsächlich um für Gott den Vorzug der Bezeichnung מבורך gegenüber פועל zu begründen; dann III 13 als Abschluß der Theodizee (8—12), wo eigentlich, dem ganzen Gedankengange entsprechend, eher eine Bejahung einer Planmäßigkeit des Geschehens und somit einer Teleologie zu erwarten wäre; und schließlich als Einleitung zur Lehre von den Geboten und ihres Sinnes in III 25. Beweist nun das wiederholte Zurückkommen auf dasselbe Problem, wie sehr dieses dem Autor wichtig war, so darf die Anordnung, d. h. die unterlassene selbständige Untersuchung dieser Frage nicht diesen Eindruck abschwächen. Wir werden sehen, daß gerade diese Verquickung der Teleologie mit den anderen Teilen seiner Philosophie es Maimonides möglich gemacht hat, seine wirkliche Lehre in ihren verschiedenen Seiten klarer hervortreten zu lassen. Darum wird auch für uns die Betrachtung in diesen Zusammenhängen eine Erleichterung des Verständnisses herbeiführen.

Beginnen wir nun mit III 13, so wissen wir bereits, daß hier zwei Ansichten vereinigt sind, um in einem abgelehnt zu werden: Der Mensch als Weltzweck und die Zweckmäßigkeit

²⁷ Vgl. meine Abhandlung: „Maimonides' Lehre von der Prophetie“ in *Jewish Studies* (Abraham's Memorial Volume), S. 74 ff. Diese Abhandlung wird im folgenden unter „Proph.“ zitiert werden.

überhaupt oder eigentlich der Mensch als einzige Möglichkeit einer angenommenen Weltzweckmäßigkeit. Im Zusammenhange aber näher besehen, beinhaltet diese Stelle nur die Ablehnung der Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt, der Mensch wird nur als Ausgangspunkt verwendet. Denn die Ablehnung der anthropozentrischen Anschauung ist bereits früher und ausgiebig erfolgt. Den Standpunkt im Mischnah-Kommentar, wo noch der Mensch als einziger Zweck in der sublunaren Welt (und eigentlich in der Welt überhaupt) angenommen wird,²⁸ diesen Standpunkt hat Maimonides in *Moreh* ganz aufgegeben. Er wiederlegt ihn wiederholt, insbesondere aber in der Theodizee, da er in dieser Überheblichkeit des Menschen den Ursprung des Pessimismus Alrasi's erblickt.²⁹ Die Ablehnung geschieht zunächst aus der Betrachtung der geringen Bedeutung des Menschen, verglichen mit den anderen kosmischen Existenzen.³⁰ Während also im Mischnah-Kommentar Maimonides noch ganz dem Gedankengange Saadja's folgte, finden wir im *Moreh* eine Revision und eine Teilung der früheren Ansicht.

Bei Saadja war die Zentralstellung des Menschen dadurch gegeben, daß er zur höchsten sittlichen Leistung befähigt ist — er ist also der „Kern“ der Welt, d. h. ihr Zweck.³¹ Den Ein-

²⁸ In der Einleitung zu Seder Zeraim. Da wird zunächst unter Berufung auf die Alten — דע כי הקדמונים חקרו חקירה עצומה — auf die Bedeutung des Zweckproblems hingewiesen. Dann wird die Ansicht vertreten, daß על דרך כלל יש לדעת, שכל הנמצאים שתחת גלגל הירח נמצאו בשביל האדם לבדו וכאשר נמצאו: שתכלית כל אלו הענינים הוא למציאות האדם, הוצרכנו לחקור כמו כן למה נמצא האדם וכי. Doch scheint die erste Hälfte dieses Satzes wesentliche Voraussetzung zu sein.

²⁹ *Moreh* III 12 (Anf.): וסבת זה השעות בלה היות זה הסכל וחבריו מן החמון לא יבחינו: שלא ישעה: המציאות וכי... וידמה כל סכל, כי המציאות כלו היה בעבורו ויהשוב שהמציאות היה בעבורו לבד; האדם הוא נכבד מכל מה שבעולמנו זה התחתון (vgl. Munk, *Guide* III, S. 70 n. 2), die Wichtigkeit noch mehr eingeschränkt erscheint.

³⁰ *Ibid.*: ואלו כחן האדם המציאות וציריו וידע מעט חלקו ממנו: אשר מין האדם: oder: הנמצאים... הוא דבר שאין לו שיעור כלל בערך אל המציאות כלו הנמשך חמון שבו (במציאות sc.) בערך אל המציאות העליון... איך יהיה ערך... בינו ובינם.

³¹ *Emunoth* IV wird mit der Frage eingeleitet: מה הוא המכוון בכל הברואים: und gleich beantwortet: המכוון הוא האדם. Dies wird durch die konzentrische Anlage der Welt begründet, wie es schon aus der Analogie mit der Frucht ersichtlich ist.

wand, daß doch der Mensch physisch relativ so gering ist, weiß Saadja zu entkräften mit dem Hinweis auf die Bedeutung seines Geistes.³² Dieser Gedankengang ist auch ganz der des Mischnah-Komentars; auch hier folgt Anthropozentrismus aus oder zumindest im engen Zusammenhange mit der Bedeutung der menschlichen Leistungsfähigkeit im Sittlich-Geistigen. Im Moreh wird dies auseinandergerissen. An der überragenden Bedeutung des Menschen, in seiner Leistung, wird weiter festgehalten und auch in ihrer kosmischen Relevanz³³ — hingegen wird der Anthropozentrismus, der aus dieser Bedeutung zu folgen schien, durchaus abgelehnt.³⁴ Und die Ablehnung geschieht erstens, wie gesagt, aus quantitativen Gründen, zweitens aber — und dies bedeutet eine Polemik gegen Saadja und auch gegen den eigenen früheren Standpunkt —, da man die

³² *Ibid.*: שאף על פי שגופו קטן נפשו רחבה מהשמים והארץ usw.

³³ Vgl. oben Anm. 29 über *Moreh* III 12. Hierher gehören auch I 54 g. E. und III 54 g. E. (über den Charakter der menschlichen Leistung in Beziehung zu Gott), und II 30, worauf wir noch später zurückkommen werden.

³⁴ In *Moreh* III 13 wird die relative Bedeutung des Menschen unter den anderen irdischen Geschöpfen hypothetisch zugegeben: ומבואר הוא שהשלם שאפשר עד אם יאמר כי כל הנמצאות טהות גלגל ואל להיות תנועות המשתנה מפני ההיות להגיע השלם היותם בעבור, יהיה אמת מזה הצד, ר"ל להיות תנועות המשתנה מפני ההיות להגיע השלם. Diese Bezeichnung des Menschen als etwaiges Entwicklungsziel dient bloß der hier beabsichtigten Hauptsache: seiner Ablehnung als Zweck. Aber auch das wird dann weiter eingeschränkt: ותדע שהאדם הוא יותר שלם ונכבד מכל מה שיהיה מזה החומר לא זולת זה. Heinemann, *Die Lehre von der Zweckbestimmung des Menschen*, Breslau 1926, sieht den Sachverhalt nicht richtig, wenn er, S. 62 ff., als die maßgebende Ansicht Maimonides' die im Mischnah-Kommentar dargelegte (s. oben Anm. 28) ausführlich zitiert, die doch im *Moreh* durchaus zurückgewiesen wird. Wohl empfindet Heinemann (*ibid.*, S. 72), daß im *Moreh* III 13 sich „ein gewisser Wechsel“ zu vollziehen „scheint“, doch versucht er dies mit dem Standpunkt im M.-Kommentar in der Weise in Einklang zu bringen, daß er im *Moreh* den Schwerpunkt nicht in der Ablehnung des Menschen als Zweck sehen will (darin bestärkt ihn auch die oben angeführte Stelle), sondern in der Ablehnung eines möglichen Sinnes der Welt überhaupt. Er kann aber dann einen Widerspruch nicht vermeiden, wenn er, in einem anderen Zusammenhang, S. 77 erklärt: „Der Nachdruck liegt an der Stelle *Moreh* III 13 unzweifelhaft auf der Abwehr der naiven anthropozentrischen Beschränktheit — nicht auf der Bestreitung eines Weltzweckes überhaupt.“ — In Wirklichkeit hat Maimonides an dieser Stelle beides — sowohl die anthropozentrische Anschauung als auch den analog gearteten Zweck der Welt — in gleichem Maße abgelehnt, im vollsten Gegensatz zum Mischnah-Kommentar.

Leistung des Menschen, seine sittliche Vollkommenheit, nicht als Ziel der Schöpfung ansehen kann, denn Gott bedarf nicht dieser Verehrung;³⁵ die „Größe des Geistes“ vermag also nicht die „Kleinheit des Körpers“ aufzuwiegen.

Dieses aber, die Ablehnung des Anthropozentrismus, war nicht mehr Aufgabe des Kap. III 13. Hier war ein Schritt weiter getan. Die Ablehnung des Menschen als Weltzweck sollte ausgedehnt werden auf die Ablehnung eines Weltzwecks überhaupt, soweit dieser dem Menschzweck in seiner inneren Struktur analog ist.

Aus diesem Grunde läßt Maimonides seine frühere Argumentation für einen Moment fallen. Wenn der Anthropozentrismus nur wegen der relativen Bedeutungslosigkeit des Menschen gegenüber den Sphären abzulehnen wäre, so bestünde noch immer die Möglichkeit, die höchsten unter den Geschöpfen, also die Sphären z. B., als solchen Weltzweck zu betrachten.³⁶ Maimonides will aber die Zweckmäßigkeit dieser Art überhaupt widerlegen. Darum nimmt er wieder das Saadjahsche Argument, die überragende Bedeutung des Menschen könnte davon herrühren, daß er „Gott diene“, also sittlich vollkommen ist, wieder auf. Dann aber wären alle anderen Dinge der Welt zwecklos, da doch prinzipiell die Existenz des Menschen denkbar ist ohne die Existenz anderer Kreaturen.³⁷ Will man daher die Zweckmäßigkeit dieser Kreaturen aufrechterhalten, so muß eben der Mensch als Zweck wieder fallen gelassen werden. Die beiden Ansichten — Zweckmäßigkeit der Welt überhaupt und Mensch als Zweck — die zu Beginn miteinander verbunden waren, sie treten nun auseinander und

³⁵ *Moreh* III 13: וכן יחשבו שתכלית המציאות כלו מציאות מין האדם לבדו לעבוד את ... ויחשבו מה שבו מן השעות ואפילו אם היה הכל מטעם האדם ותכלית: השם ... וזה הדעת ... יתבאר מה שבו מן השעות האדם לעבוד השם ... השאלה קיטת והיא מה התכלית בהיותו עובד והוא יתע' לא יוסף שלמות אם יעבדוהו.

³⁶ Auch Saadja berührt die Frage des Verhältnisses zu den Sphären, doch ist ihm der Mensch, wegen seines Gottesdienstes, immer höher. So *Emunoth* IV Anf., wo auch die גלגלים in den Dienst des Menschen gestellt werden. Ferner *Emunoth* I g. E., wo vom Zweck der Welterschöpfung gesprochen wird: והשלישית: רצה בזה תועלת הברואים, במה שמנהיגם בו ויעבדוהו.

³⁷ *Moreh* III 13: ואם יאמר אומר ושהשם יכול להמציא אדם מכלתי שמים ע"ד: משל, יש לשאול אי"כ מה תועלתו באלה הדברים כלם אחר שאינם התכלית (Das Tועלתו korrigiert nach Munk.)

hebensich gegenseitig auf. Nehmen wir einen Zweck der Welt und in der Form eines bestimmten Geschöpfes an, so werden eben dadurch alle anderen Geschöpfe zwecklos und wir haben eben die Zweckmäßigkeit als solche zerstört. Dies aber gilt ebenso für jedes andere Geschaffene in der Welt. Jedes Ding, und sei es die höchste Sphäre, die als Zweck angesehen werden möchte, würde, da noch andere Dinge existieren, eben als Argument gegen die Zweckmäßigkeit dienen. Mit einem Worte: Der Mensch dient hier als Beispiel, um jede verdinglichte Teleologie zu widerlegen. Welches Argument nun wieder auf den Menschen zurückwirkt, um ihn als Zweck abzulehnen. Denn kein Ding der Welt kann ihr Zweck sein.

Das ist das Neue in III 13, und dazu reichte die frühere Argumentation gegen den Anthropozentrismus — von der Quantität her — nicht aus; denn jene hätte nur den Menschen als Zweck abgewiesen — so aber ist jede Dinglichkeit des Weltzweckes überhaupt ad absurdum geführt. In der Welt der Dinge gibt es nur Selbstzwecke; alles ist auf sich bezogen³⁸ und selbst auch dort, wo es den Anschein hat, daß das eine des anderen wegen existiert.³⁹ Denn ebenso wie es keinen einzigen Ding-Zweck für die Welt gibt — so gibt es auch kein System der Zwecke unter den Dingen, und wo es diesen Anschein hat, daß das eine Ding für das andere, dessen Zweck, ist, da ist es in Wirklichkeit nur die eigene Natur, die aber irrtümlicherweise auf ein anderes Ding bezogen wird.⁴⁰ Wohl gibt es

³⁸ *Ibid.*: אבל יהיו ג"כ שאר הנמצאות כלם מכוונות לעצמן, לא מפני דבר אחר; ebenso g. E. d. Kap., vgl. oben Anm. 12.

³⁹ *Ibid.*: ואפילו לפי דעתנו... שאנחנו נאמר כל חלקי העולם... מהם מכוונים לעצמן ומהם: מפני דבר אחר — האחר ההוא מכוון לעצמו. Den Widerspruch, der sich zu der unmittelbar vorhergegangenen Behauptung der unbedingten Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge zu ergeben scheint, will Maimonides offenbar so gelöst wissen, daß er die beiden zueinander gehörigen Dinge in diesem Sinne als eine Einheit ansieht, und der Zweck des אחר bedeutet dann eo ipso Selbstzweck für das ihm untergeordnete Ding. Das wird wohl auch beabsichtigt sein in der Formulierung, die gleich darauf folgt: וכל נמצא מהם אמנם כיון בו עצם (דאח) הנמצא ההוא.

⁴⁰ Dies wird an zwei Beispielen veranschaulicht: an den Sternen, bei denen es heißt להאיר על הארץ ולמשול וכו', und bei den Fischen des Meeres, bei denen es heißt ורדו ברגת הים, also Geschöpfe, die über dem Menschen sind, und solche, die unter ihm stehen. Doch wird bei beiden der Grund in der Natur der Sache

— im kausalen Sinne — ein Früher und Später in der Natur; manches ist Voraussetzung fürs andere.⁴¹ Aber

רק להניד (אינו רק להניד טבעם) oder des Menschen in seiner Beziehung zu ihnen — טבעו אשר הטבעו השם ית' עליו — und nicht in einer besonderen Zweckbestimmung gesucht. Allerdings wird bei den Pflanzen zugegeben, daß sie für die Lebewesen geschaffen sind — demnach ist der früher behauptete Selbstzweck alles Geschaffenen wieder eingeschränkt.

⁴¹ Es handelt sich hier, III 13, um eine speziellere Form der Abhängigkeit der Dinge voneinander, des *דבר אחר* existierenden Dinges. Hier ist das vorangehende notwendiges Antezedens für die Möglichkeit der Existenz des Darauffolgenden. Als Beispiele werden angeführt Sinnlichkeit und Verstand — *בהקדים* — *בהסתר* ... לכל בעל חיים — und dann auch die Materie: *נמצאות אי אפשר מציאותם אלא אחר מציאות דבר אחר*. Hier wird der Vers (Jes. XLIII 7) herangezogen: *יצרתיו אף עשיתיו*, wobei in *ביציתי* das Gesamte dieser Schöpfung, bezogen auf den göttlichen Willen, ausgedrückt wird; *יצרתיו* bezieht sich auf das Antezedens und *עשיתיו* auf das eigentlich beabsichtigte Ding. Diese Auslegung wird in ihrem ganzen Sinn verstanden, wenn man die an anderen Stellen streng durchgeführte terminologische Auseinanderhaltung der Verba für Schöpfung heranzieht. *Moreh* II 30 g. E. wird den Verben *ברא* und *עשה* (neben *קנה* und *אל*) das Wort *יצר* entgegengestellt; die ersteren vier besagen das Schaffen von Substantiellem, während *יצר* nur Akzidentiell oder künstliche Form (*תאר*) ausdrückt. An einer anderen Stelle, III 10, wird zur Erklärung des Verses *יצר אור ובורא הושך עושה שלום ובורא רע* die Gruppierung anders durchgeführt. Hier wiederum haben *עשה* und *יצר* ein Gemeinsames, und von ihnen verschieden ist *ברא*; die ersteren beziehen sich auf die Setzung des Geschaffenen, während *ברא* auf die Hervorbringung der Steresis anwendbar ist oder auf die Hervorbringung aus dem Nichtsein. Läßt man nun diese beiden Stellen sich kreuzen, so ergibt sich für unseren Fall, daß im *ביציתי* das allgemeine Erschaffen aus dem Nichts, und zwar beider zusammengehöriger Dinge, ausgedrückt wird. In *יצרתיו אף עשיתיו* sind die beiden Schattierungen der bereits gesetzten Gegenstände angedeutet: das Antezedens hat nur *יצר*, da es nicht Endzweck, sondern vorbereitenden Charakters, also, offenbar, akzidentiell ist; nur das eigentlich Beabsichtigte hat *עושה*. Aus dieser terminologischen Erwägung ergibt sich klar, daß die Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge eben so zu verstehen ist, daß im Falle einer Zusammengehörigkeit das Antezedens nicht etwa zwecklos ist, sondern in dem Zweck des Darauffolgenden aufgeht. Und dies ist nicht allein der Fall, wo das Antezedens nur zu verarbeitendes Material ist; es kann dies auch bei sonst selbständig erscheinenden Dingen eintreten. Beide Nuancen werden klar auseinandergehalten: *אחר זה עשיתי בדבר ההוא הקודם או אחריו (פי' דלך אלשי אלמתיקדם או בעדה) מה שהיה כונתי להמציאו*. Munk, III, S. 93: *dans cette chose antérieure, ou après elle*. Hingegen vernachlässigt die Übersetzung Scheyers (S. 68: „und dann habe ich auch das andere, von mir Bezweckte gemacht“) diese Unterscheidung vollkommen. (Weiß berücksichtigt sie wohl, aber falsch.) Sie ist aber wesentlich, denn da wird eben auch das zeitlich vorangehende und selbständige Ding dem unentbehrlichen Antezedens, d. h. etwa dem Instrument oder Material, gleichgesetzt. Vgl. oben Anm. 39.

das ist mit einer finalen Verbundenheit nicht zu verwechseln.

Für diese Beweisführung aber war die Hypothese der Wertschöpfung unerlässlich. Nach der Annahme der Wertewigkeit, wonach alles Geschaffene notwendig da ist, wäre nur jene frühere Argumentation von der quantitativen Minderwertigkeit des Menschen zulässig, woraus höchstens das eine Objekt, der Mensch, als Zweck abgelehnt wäre; woraus aber nicht die aus dieser Annahme folgende Absurdität des dinglichen Zweckes überhaupt erwiesen wäre. Nur wenn wir eine bewußte planmäßige Schöpfung annehmen, kann man bei jedem dinglichen Zweck fragen, wozu denn dann die anderen Dinge geschaffen worden seien und somit jene reziproke Aufhebung von Zweck und Ding-Zweck durchführen. Dies hat Maimonides in III 13 noch nicht so klar herausgearbeitet. Hier wird das mit der Schöpfungstheorie zusammenhängende neue Argument zum ersten Male geltend gemacht, ohne seinen besonderen Vorzug deutlich hervorzuheben. Diese Hervorhebung geschieht erst in der Fortsetzung. Nachdem Maimonides das Quantitätsargument wiederholt variiert hatte, nimmt er es dann mit großer Ausführlichkeit wieder auf,⁴² um die Notwendigkeit seines neuen Arguments erst zwingender vor Augen zu führen.

Während er bisher die Ablehnung der Teleologie für beide Ansichten — für die „philosophische“ sowohl der Wertewigkeit als auch für unsere der Weltkreation — betont hatte, kommt er jetzt auf eine Divergenz in der Argumentation der beiden Ansichten zu sprechen. Wiederum wird ausführlich die dimensionale Überlegenheit der Sphären über den Menschen dargestellt — worauf hauptsächlich das Quantitätsargument beruht.⁴³ Nun aber ergibt sich für die Philo-

⁴² *Moreh* III 14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, gleich der Anfang: *מה שצריך נ"כ שיתבונן בו האדם עד שידע מעלת נפשו ולא יטעה הוא מה שהתבאר משעור הגלגלים והכוכבים ושעור הרחקים אשר בינינו ובינם והשתכל אלו הנמצאות הנשמיות מה עצום שעורם ומה רב מספרם ... מה ערך האדם לכל אלו הנבראות*. Denselben Gedankengang finden wir II 11, auch in bezug auf den Zweck.

weiter kommen, als bis zu einem Gradunterschied, der die Zweckmäßigkeit als solche in ihrem Prinzip nicht erfaßt. Dazu ist nötig die Kreationstheorie und deren Argumentation. Die Kreationstheorie also, und die mit ihr verbundene Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung, die, auf den ersten Blick doch die Zweckmäßigkeit der Schöpfung eher bestärkt als die Ewigkeitstheorie, sie selbst liefert am Ende einen prinzipielleren Beweis gegen die Zweckmäßigkeit, soweit sie dinglich aufgefaßt wird.

In drei Variationen also sehen wir den Anthropozentrismus widerlegt, verschieden in der Betonung des Individuellen und Generellen im Menschen — immer weiter zum Prinzipiellen vordringend. In der Ablehnung des anthropozentrisch orientierten Pessimismus, III 12, da wird noch das reine Quantitätsargument angewandt unter besonderer Betonung des Individuellen im Gegensatze zum Geschlecht; hier reicht es auch vollkommen aus. In der Ablehnung des Menschen

Lösung widerlegen müßte). 3. Nach Ephodi wird der Einwand vom חרוש unterstützt, aber nur hypothetisch, denn nach der philosophischen Lösung, die angenommen wird, wird sowohl der Einwand unhaltbar als auch der חרוש zu einer Konzession gezwungen. Gegenüber diesen Auffassungen scheint doch unsere die einleuchtendste zu sein, daß hier wohl חרוש im Gegensatz zur Lösung der Philosophen angeführt wird, nicht aber da sich der חרוש mit dem Einwand identifiziert, sondern da er ihn von sich aus widerlegt, aber im Sinne des Philosophen. Sachlich also mit den Philosophen übereinstimmend, polemisiert Maimonides nur gegen deren Argumentation. Der חרוש wird hier angeführt nicht wegen des „unergründlichen Willens“, um etwa auch eine den Philosophen entgegengesetzte anthropozentrische Theorie möglich zu machen — sondern wegen des aus dem חרוש und nur aus ihm folgenden Argumentes gegen den Anthropozentrismus. Es ist also nur ein neuer, verstärkter Hinweis auf die Argumentation in III 13. Also nicht ist hier eine Übereinstimmung mit der Argumentation der Philosophen (Narboni, Ephodi), noch verlangt der חרוש auch sachlich auf dem Standpunkt des Einwandes zu beharren (Munk und hypothetisch auch Ephodi) — sondern der חרוש bringt ein neues Argument gegen den Einwand. Gegen die Schwierigkeit des Einwandes wird geholfen durch den חרוש — und dadurch wird natürlich auch der חרוש gestärkt. Die Argumentation der Philosophen muß dann nicht widerlegt werden, da ja Maimonides mit ihrem Ergebnis einverstanden ist und sie nur als schwächer (und also überflüssig) bezeichnet, verglichen mit dem Argument aus חרוש. Daß dies die Hauptabsicht eines besonderen Kapitels bilden kann, ist begreiflich. Allerdings können wir das בזה in unserer Stelle nicht instrumental auffassen, und das מן נעתקדא muß, wie vielleicht nicht ganz üblich, als „im Sinne unseres Glaubens“ verstanden werden.

als Weltzweck und dadurch des dinglichen Weltzweckes überhaupt, III 13, da wird schon das neue Argument — vom Widerstreit des Dinges als Zweck mit der dinglichen Zweckmäßigkeit — eingeführt; daneben aber wird noch das frühere Argument in einer negativen Form zu einem Schluß a minori ad maius umgestaltet:⁴⁸ Selbst die Sphären, da sie materiegebunden sind, sind nicht vollkommen vor Gott, geschweige denn der tiefer stehende Mensch — wobei Mensch als Gattung⁴⁹ betont wird. Hier wären noch beide Anschauungen, sowohl die von der Ewigkeit als auch die von der Erschaffung der Welt, gleich in dieser Beweisführung. Erst dann, III 14, wird das Quantitätsargument in seiner ersten positiven Fassung wieder aufgenommen — wird als nur den Philosophen eigen bezeichnet und auch in seiner letzten Konsequenz — wenn man auch die Gattung nimmt — nur als Gradunterschied dargestellt, der uns nicht genügen kann, da wir, vom Grundsatz der Schöpfung ausgehend, eben die Zweckmäßigkeit als solche widerlegen.

Diese Variationen desselben Arguments wären nichtsagende überflüssige Wiederholungen — führten sie nicht immer weiter, immer zwingender zur Verneinung der Zweckmäßigkeit im Bereiche des Dinglichen. Von der Bestimmung eines Geschöpfes — sei es des Menschen oder auch eines anderen — in der Welt könne nicht auch darauf geschlossen werden, daß dieses Geschöpf für die Welt Bestimmung wird. Im Bereiche des mechanischen, dinglichen Geschehens da gibt es keinen anderen Zweck als den der Eigenexistenz; alles andere ist Täuschung oder Selbstüberhebung.

Aber die Welt ist nicht bloß ein Mechanismus, der die Teleologie grundsätzlich ausschließt, sie ist gleichzeitig auch noch etwas anderes; sie bildet auch eine höhere Einheit, einen Organismus. Mit großem Nachdruck schärft Maimonides ein, daß man die Welt als ein einziges großes Individuum,

⁴⁸ Dies durch Deutung des Verses: הן בעבריו לא יאמין אף שוכני בתי חמר oder ... אף כי נתעב ונאלח איש ... הן בקדושו לא יאמין, wobei עבריו und קדושו als Sphären zu verstehen sind.

⁴⁹ Zur letzteren Gegenüberstellung — הן בקדושו וכי — wird hinzugefügt: ואמרו איש כאמרו אדם, כי פעמים יקרא חסין האנושי איש, מכה איש ומת.

vergleichbar dem individuellen Lebewesen, ansehen muß.⁵⁰ Zunächst wird der Vergleich durchgeführt im äußeren Aufbau des kosmischen, auch die Sphären umfassenden Globus — worauf wir hier nicht näher einzugehen brauchen. Ohne daß wir zunächst auch auf die Herkunft dieses Gleichnisses eingehen, wollen wir hier betrachten, welche Bedeutung dies für Maimonides hatte. Und die bedeutenden Konsequenzen sind in zwei Punkten zu finden.

Erstens in der Beziehung der Welt zu Gott. Diese Vorstellung — nämlich der Welt als Organismus — hält Maimonides für unerläßlich, um die Einheit Gottes zu erkennen, um es zu erklären, daß der Eine das Eine der Welt erschaffen hat.⁵¹ Bedenkt man, wie sehr Maimonides immer wieder davor warnte, die Attribute Gottes zu materialisieren, wie er auch bei der Einheit hervorhob, daß sie nichts gemein

⁵⁰ *Moreh* I 72 Anf.: דע כי זה הנמצא בכללו הוא איש אחד לא זולת זה, ר"ל כי כדור und mit diesem Nachdruck wiederholt im selben Kapitel. Die Anschauung Cassirers, *Erkenntnisproblem* I², S. 207, daß die Betrachtung der Welt als Organismus, bzw. die philosophischen Konsequenzen dieser Betrachtung erst ein Produkt der neueren oder genauer „der deutschen Naturphilosophie des 16. Jahrhunderts“ ist, wird durch die bei Maimonides erfolgte Behandlung dieser Grundansicht wesentlich korrigiert.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*: כי זה המין מן הציור הכרחי מאד, כלומר (אז Munk n.) מועיל מאד בטופס על היות השם אחד... ובוה הציור יתבאר נ"כ שהאחד אמנם ברא אחד Die Einheit, die hier gemeint ist, kann wohl nicht im aristotelischen Sinne (*Phys.* VIII 6; *Metaph.* XII 8: εἷς ἄρα ... τὸ πρῶτον αἰνούμενον ἄλγλητον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰνούμενον ἄρα ... εἷς μόνον· εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος) verstanden werden. Auf diese aristotelische Anschauung, allerdings wie er sie durch Ibn-Sina modifiziert kannte (vgl. Munk, *Melanges*, S. 360), und auf die sich daraus ergebenden Schwierigkeiten für die Vielheit in der Welt geht Maimonides ausführlich in II 22 ein. Aber gerade der Umstand, daß er dort den göttlichen Willen als Lösung für die Schwierigkeiten der Vielheit anführt, zeigt, daß er selbst sich nicht auf eine eigene „Einheits“-Theorie in diesem Sinne berufen kann, was ja der Fall wäre, wenn die Stelle hier, I 72, auch so zu verstehen wäre. Man kann daher Munk, *Guide* I, S. 363 n. 3, nicht zustimmen, daß die Stelle hier eine Anspielung auf II 22 enthielte. Denn nicht bloß die Einheit der Welt, sondern auch die Einheit Gottes muß im II 22 anders als die von Maimonides wirklich gelehrt aufgefaßt werden. Wodurch allein sich der auffallende Widerspruch im Vergleich mit dem Feuer zwischen II 22 und I 53 — wie ihn Schem Tob und Munk, *Guide* II, S. 173 n. 1, empfinden — sich erklären läßt. Es ist eben nur der Standpunkt Aristoteles'-Ibn Sinas, in bezug auf Gott und Welt, den Maimonides in II 22 behandelt, um von ihm aus zu seiner Willenslehre zu gelangen.

haben kann mit unserer, uns faßbaren Einheit⁵² — so muß diese Stelle, wo die sichtbare eine Welt mit der Einheit Gottes in einem Atem genannt wird, befremdend anmuten. Da aber an der absoluten Immaterialität der Einheit Gottes sicher nicht zu rütteln ist, so müssen wir eben die hier gelehrtte Einheit der Welt als Organismus der göttlichen näherbringen und auch diese immateriell und rein als Idee verstehen. Also nicht allein wegen der dem organischen Individuum vergleichbaren inneren Zusammenhänge und Wechselwirkungen wird dieses Bild als so wesentlich eingeschränkt, sondern vielmehr wegen der über jenen Teilzusammenhängen das Ganze ausmachenden idealen Einheit. Der Einheit des Schöpfers steht das Geschaffene als Einheit zur Seite — das eine das andere beweisend und beide ein drittes Existierendes ausschließend, wie es schon Maimonides vorwegnehmend früher behauptete.⁵³ Die Einheit der Welt als lebendiger Makrorganismus, obwohl er ja auch viel „Totes“ in sich einschließt,⁵⁴ die Einheit als Idee, der Gottes korrespondierend, ist die eine Folgerung dieser Vorstellung.

Die zweite Folgerung betrifft die Ordnung innerhalb der Welt. Die organische Einheit der Welt, die als beseelt zu denken ist, bedingt auch eine führende Kraft in ihr, eine Vernunftbegabtheit, die, verschieden von der sonstigen in der Welt erscheinenden Vernunft, die ihren Weg durch die Vermittlung der Sphäre nehmen⁵⁵ muß — direkt von Gott herkommen

⁵² Besonders *Moreh* I 57, wo eben zwischen der Einheit des Geschaffenen und Gottes strenge unterschieden wird, da die Einheit beim Geschaffenen immer akzidentiell ist — *כי האחדות והרבו מקרים קרו למצא באשר הוא רב או אחד* — während bei Gott *אין האחדות ענין נוסף על עצמו אבל הוא אחד לא באחדות* und weiter die Fortsetzung des Einheits-Attributes als eines negativen.

⁵³ *Moreh* I 71: *וכבר הודעתך שאין זולת השם יתע' זה הנמצא ואין ראיה עליו יתעלה*. Ähnlich I 34: *אלא מזה הנמצא מכלל וסמטי כי אלו הענינים נקשרים קצתם בקצתם והוא שאין*. Ähnlich I 34: *במצוה וזלתי השי' ומעשיו כלם והם כל מה שכללה אותו המצוה בלעדיו ואין דרך להשיגו אלא מטעמיו*.

⁵⁴ *Moreh* I 72: *כן זה המציאות כלו הוא איש אחד חי... ואע"פ שבו גופים רבים נחים*. *וטתים* (אנפם כתר'ה סאכנה ט'תה) Als Gegenstück im Organismus des Lebewesens werden Knochen und Knorpel als *נחים* angeführt, die allerdings nicht tot, sondern empfindungslos sind; das *נחים* also im Makrorganismus ist wohl ebenso zu verstehen, daß sich die betreffenden Teile der Zugehörigkeit zum Ganzen unbewußt sind.

⁵⁵ Vgl. *Moreh* II 10 und 12.

irrelevant: wenn man nur den Menschen anführt, so ist es eine Analogie, ein Bild, und hat nur etwa metaphorischen Wert; sagt man aber Organismus, so ist das nicht etwas, dem die Welt bildlich gleicht, sondern etwas, das die Welt ist. Sieht man näher zu, so wird man unterscheiden, daß, wo der Mensch herangezogen wird, dies nur in der Form eines Vergleiches geschieht, „wie der Mensch“ usw., dort aber, wo der Organismus generell angeführt ist, dies in Form einer Prädikation geschieht; die Welt ist ein lebendes Individuum.⁶⁰

Dies wird noch klarer durch die Erörterung des Begriffes Mikrokosmos, die Maimonides in diesen Zusammenhang einschaltet. Er betont, daß wenn wir den Menschen Mikrokosmos nennen, wir dies nicht etwa als Umkehrung des Vergleiches der Welt mit dem Menschen nehmen dürfen; denn dieser Vergleich — oder wie wir sahen, die Aussage — läßt sich durchwegs bei jedem Lebewesen durchführen.⁶¹ Warum aber wird nur der Mensch so bezeichnet und nicht etwa der Esel oder das Pferd? Wegen seiner ihn besonders auszeichnenden Eigenschaft der Vernunft.⁶²

⁶⁰ Vgl. die Beispiele vom Menschen oben Anm. 58. Beim allgemeinen Individuum heißt es: כדלך הוא אלגור במלתה הו שפך ואחד, ebenso später אלגור כדלך הוא אלגור במלתה הו שפך ואחד. כלל הו שפך ואחד. Diese Stelle übersetzt Munk (I 362): „de même tout cet univers est un seul individu“; hingegen die gleich darauffolgende Stelle שתצויר כל זה הכדור איש usw. (Tibbon: שפך ואחד ואחד הו) übersetzt Munk (I 363): représenter l'ensemble de cette sphère comme un seul individu, vivant, etc. Also nicht eindeutig identifizierend, etwa mit doppeltem Akkusativ, sondern vergleichend, wie wir es beim Menschen finden. Dies entspricht nicht dem Original. Gemeint ist eben als (engl. *as*), nicht wie (engl. *like*). Darauf kommt es uns hier an.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*: ודע כי זה שאמרנוהו כלו טמעות העולם בכללו באיש טבני אדם, לא טבני זה נאמר באדם: שהוא עולם קטן, כי זה הדמיון כלו נמשך בכל איש מאישי בעלי חיים השלם באבריו (Munk, I 369: d'un organisme complet).

⁶² *Ibid.*: ואשם נאמר באדם זה טבני הדבר שיוחד בו האדם והוא הכח המדבר... אשר זה: וזלחו ודבריו טובים ונכונים אבל אפשר להבין כלשון אריסטו כי יש לובר שהטעם: שנקרא האדם עולם קטן בעבור שהאברים נוצרים ומנוחים ביצירת זה העולם וקוטחו ישרה. Was nun die Ursprünge dieser Vorstellungen Mensch als Mikrokosmos und Welt als Makranthropos betrifft, so kann vorderhand darauf nicht näher eingegangen werden; Mikrokosmos wird von Aristoteles, de respir. 4, schon Demokritos zugeschrieben, und der Makranthropos wird als philosophischer Vergleich bekanntlich bei Plato durchgeführt, hängt aber mit viel älteren Vorstellungen zusammen.

Also: um die Vernünftigkeit der Welt zu beweisen, müsse sie nicht gerade 'mit dem Menschen verglichen werden, hingegen könne nur der Mensch, wegen seiner Vernunft, mit der Welt verglichen werden. Soll hier nicht ein grober Denkfehler an dieser so pointierten Stelle vorliegen, so muß sie eben so verstanden werden, daß hier drei Wege zurückgelegt werden. 1. Die Welt ist ein Organismus wie jeder andere, auch nicht vernunftbegabte. 2. Die Welt als Organismus — wie wir bereits sahen: als Idee — ist vernünftig; was nicht bei jedem organischen Individuum zutreffen muß. 3. Der Mensch, da ein vernunftbegabter Organismus, wird zur Welt rückverglichen. Bezüglich der Vernunft also ist nicht die Welt dem Menschen ähnlich — dazu reicht ihr organischer Charakter aus —, sondern er ihr. Wenn die Welt mit dem Menschen verglichen wird, so ist es eben bloß bildliche Veranschaulichung. Zusammenfassend sehen wir nun zunächst, daß die Welt als Organismus: 1. eine absolute Einheit als Idee darstellt; 2. als organisch auch vernünftig ist; 3. als solche eine Zwecks-Rich-

Für unseren Zweck vgl. Munk, *Guide* I, S. 354 n. 1. Auch die Verbindung beider Vorstellungen zu einer Art Korrelation war gegeben, vgl. Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber*, S. 162 ff. und weitere Belege bei Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, S. 210 Anm. 188. Worauf es uns hier ankommt ist, daß Maimonides eben diese Korrelation Mikrokosmos-Makranthropos durchbricht, um an Stelle des Makranthropos den Makrorganismus zu setzen. Klarer wird uns dies durch einen Vergleich etwa mit Jehudah Halevi. Auch Halevi (*Kusari* IV 3) führt an: וכבר דמו הפלוסופים העולם באדם גדול והאדם בעולם קטן ואל יקשה בעיניך דמות אדם (dies geschieht aber nur als eingeschaltete Bemerkung im Zusammenhange mit dem Versuch einer Rechtfertigung der anthropomorphen Bezeichnungen für Gott) und dem Bestreben, dies auch von philosophischer Seite zu belegen. Darum muß Halevi den Vergleich so auffassen, daß er mit dem vollkommensten der Menschen gedacht ist, der für die anderen führend ist: ועל שני הדמויות (d. h. sowohl der prophetischen als auch der philosophischen) לא יתכן שיחיה דמותו אצל הדמויות אלא צורת הגדול שבבני אדם, ששטנו יצאם התוכן והסדר לשאר בני אדם. Da eben der Vergleich in Wirklichkeit nicht für die Welt, sondern für ihren Gott gelten soll. Das genaue Gegenteil sehen wir bei Maimonides: selbst der gewöhnliche Mensch ist ihm für den Vergleich zu viel — es genügt vollkommen jeder fehlerlose Organismus. Und es ist eben kein Vergleich, sondern eine Aussage. Denn nicht der bewußte Führer ist hier gemeint, sondern die durch den organischen Charakter der Welt implicite enthaltene vernünftige Plan- und Zweckmäßigkeit. Also mehr als in der Anwendung des landläufigen Vergleichspaares Mikrokosmos-Makranthropos liegt die Bedeutung unserer Stelle in der korrigierenden Umdeutung dieser Vergleiche.

tung hat in ihrem Erzeugen. So ist die Welt der idealen organischen Einheit — zum Unterschiede von der Welt als Mechanismus der vielfältigen Wirklichkeit.

Daß diese Auffassung der Welt als einheitlichen Organismus nicht allein bildlich und als Analogie zu nehmen ist, beweist die Tatsache, daß Maimonides diese Anschauung auch der Beweisführung für die Einheit Gottes zugrundelegt. Was in I 72 nur angedeutet wird, ist später, unter den Beweisen für die Einheit Gottes durchgeführt: aus der Einheit der Welt folgt die Einheit Gottes.⁶³

Und in diesen Zusammenhang gehört auch die Darstellung in I 69, wo Gott als Zweck bezeichnet wird. Hier wird zunächst die Frage behandelt, welche Bezeichnung adäquater ist, Agens oder Causa. Gegenüber Agens, das wohl deutlicher den Kreator ausdrückt, zieht Maimonides Causa vor, da dieses eben den Zweck inbegreift, als causa finalis, obwohl es das kreatorische Moment nur nach einer Überlegung, also schwächer, mit zum Ausdruck bringt. Causa in ihrer vierfachen Bedeutung — enthaltend auch Agens, Form und Zweck —, die bei Gott eins sind, drückt das Gesamte der göttlichen Stellung aus. Daß diese Darstellung mit der Auffassung der Welt als Makroorganismus innerlich zusammenhängt, werden wir später, bis wir den Charakter des Organismus bei Maimonides besprechen, noch näher sehen. Hier sei nur auf folgendes hingewiesen. Bei allen vier Arten der Causa sind zu unterscheiden nahe und weitere Ursachen. So auch Form und Zweck. Gott ist also letzter Zweck, ebenso wie letzte Form.⁶⁴ In dieser Bezeichnung als Letzter liegt aber nicht bloß das Moment der Progression bis zu einem letzten, mit den vorangehenden gleichartigen Gliede, sondern das eines Bedeutungswandels. Der Ausgangspunkt sind zwar die vier physikali-

⁶³ *Moreh* II 1, der Abschnitt beginnend בידוד בדרך, der ganz auf dem in I 72 dargelegten Gedankengang basiert. Wiederum wird von der Einheit des Geschaffenen auf die des Schöpfers geschlossen: הנה כבר התבאר לך ג' בזה הדרך: שהיות הנמצא בלו אחד הורנו על שטמציאו אחד (כי הנמצא בלו כאיש אחד). Auch hier wird nur vom allgemeinen Individuum, nicht vom Makranthropos, geschlossen.

⁶⁴ *Moreh* I 69: יהצורה האחרונה ההיא בכל המציאות הוא השי' ובוה הצד נאמר בו שהוא: ואם כן הוא ית' תכלית כל: הצורה האחרונה ושהוא צורת הצורות דבר האחרון... בזה הצד נאמר בו שהוא תכלית התכליות.

schen Formen der Ursachen, dann werden auch Zwecke in einer Reihe aufgezählt, als wären alle vom selben Charakter,⁶⁵ in Wirklichkeit aber ist der letzte Zweck ein Sprung in eine andere Sphäre.

Dies wird uns klarer durch eine Betrachtung von III 13. Hier wird ausdrücklich zwischen einem letzten Zweck und dem Zweck im physikalischen Sinne ein Unterschied gemacht.⁶⁶ Der physikalische Zweck wird ohne weiteres zugegeben; was bestritten wird, ist nur der letzte Zweck für das gesamte Dasein. Soweit der Zweck *causa finalis* bedeutet — soweit ist er bloß nächster Zweck, nicht letzter.⁶⁷ Zumindest nicht letzter in unserem Sinne. Denn während wir bezüglich der ersten Zwecke mit Aristoteles zusammengehen, sie nämlich als *causae finales* bezeichnen, wird auf eine *Divergenz* zwischen unserer Auffassung und der aristotelischen in bezug auf den letzten Zweck klar hingedeutet. Auch bei ihm mag es einen letzten Zweck geben; er ist aber wesentlich nicht verschieden vom ersten. Während der erste die Vollkommenheit des Individuums, bezogen auf sein Genus, bedeutet, ist der letzte Zweck eben nichts anderes als die Vollkommenheit des Genus, wieder bezogen auf sein Nächsthöheres, auf die Kontinuität seiner Form, und ist schließlich erfüllt in der Kontinuität des Entstehens und Vergehens.⁶⁸ Auch der letzte Zweck also bleibt bei Aristoteles im Bereiche des Physischen und unterscheidet sich vom ersten nur quantitativ oder graduell — denn beim natürlichen Prozeß des Entstehens und Vergehens macht er Halt. Nach einem letzten Zweck in unserem Sinne be-

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*: וכן עוד הענין בכל תכלית, כי הדבר אשר לו תכלית יש לך לבקש לתכלית ההיא תכלית, dazu wird das Beispiel vom Stuhl angeführt, dessen Zweck das Sitzen ist, der Zweck des Sitzens ist die Erhebung des Sitzenden usw.

⁶⁶ *Moreh* III 13: ואע"פ שהחכמה הטבעית תחקור על תכלית כל נמצא טבעי, אבל אינה. התכלית האחרונה אשר דברנו בזה הפרק בה.

⁶⁷ Nach der Anführung der Identität der *causa efficiens*, *formalis* und *finalis* bei den natürlichen Dingen wird hinzugefügt: וזה כלו התכלית הראשונה.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*: ואשר יראה לי מדברי אריסטו, שהתכלית האחרונה אצלו לאלו המינים הוא התמדת והתכלית האחרונה למין התמדת. זאת הצורה בהמשך ההויה וההפסד ואשר יראה לי מדברי אריסטו, שהתכלית האחרונה אצלו לאלו המינים הוא התמדת והתכלית האחרונה למין התמדת. Wir sahen in I 72 (vgl. oben Anm. 57), daß auch die nicht aus dem organischen Charakter der Welt hervorgehenden und daher nicht zweckbestimmten Geschöpfe ihren Ursprung haben im טבע ההויה וההפסד הכולל.

steht für ihn nicht einmal eine Frage. Diese Frage nach einem letzten Zweck, der nicht nur graduell, sondern essentiell vom ersten Zweck verschieden ist, besteht nur für uns, d. h. für die Anhänger der Kreation.⁶⁹ Allerdings wird sie hier, innerhalb des natürlich-dinglichen Daseins, negativ beantwortet.

Nun wird uns auch der Gedankengang in I 69 verständlicher. Gott wird hier als letzter Zweck, Zweck der Zwecke, genannt — als eben derjenige Zweck, der später abgelehnt wird. Und zwar wird er auch hier als *causa finalis* bezeichnet — dies aber in einem spezifischen Sinne. Denn nicht allein deswegen ist *Causa* vor *Agens* als *Attribut* vorzuziehen, weil *Causa* bei Gott auch alle anderen *causae* — also auch die *causa formalis* und *finalis* — mit inbegrift.⁷⁰ Dies, die Vereinigung aller drei *causae* in Eins, finden wir bei allen natürlichen Dingen und dennoch bleibt die *causa finalis* nur im Bereiche der ersten Zwecke. Das Spezifische ist, daß eben hier Gott zugleich *causa finalis* und doch *Endzweck*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; als Schluß der Zweckabstufung: וְכֵן הָיָה מִבְּחֹר כִּי לִפְנֵי דַעַת הַקְדָּמוֹת תִּשְׁמַט שְׁאֵלַת הַתְּכֵלִית הָאֲדָרִיכָה לְמַצִּיאוֹת בְּכֻלָּם... אֲמַנָּה לִפְנֵי דַעַתָּנוּ בְּהִרְשׁוֹת הָעוֹלָם בְּכֻלָּם... יֵשׁ חוֹשִׁים הָעוֹלָם בְּכֻלָּם (לְזֹדֶר בְּאֶמְרָה) לְמַצִּיאוֹת בְּכֻלָּם. Sogar die Ausdrücke (אֲמַנָּה) sind nicht zufällig, da es sich beim ersteren nur um ein Fortschreiten in der Reihe Individuum — Genus handelt, während beim Begriff der Kreation der Begriff Welt eine neue, mehr als bloß quantitative Bedeutung hat. Allerdings ist es fehlerhaft, von der Erschaffung der Welt ausgehend einen Zweck für die Welt zu suchen, darum heißt es auch gleich darauf (לֵכֵל הוּא מַצִּיאוֹת) in der Reihe Individuum — Genus. Über diese terminologische Frage wird noch später ausführlicher zu sprechen sein.

⁷⁰ Es möchte so den Anschein haben an der Stelle I 69: לזה אמרו שהוא ית' עלה וסבה שיכלול אלו השלש סבות והוא שיהיה פועל העולם וצורתו ותכליתו. Diese Identität wird aber auch von allen Naturdingen behauptet in III 13, wo es sich dennoch nur um den nächsten Zweck handelt; vgl. oben Anm. 67. Sal. Maimon, *Gibeat Hamoreh* z. St., betrachtet diese Identifikation als solche für entscheidend in unserem Zusammenhange, weshalb es ihn wundert, daß Gott nicht auch als letzte Materie bezeichnet wird — und dies durchaus vom Standpunkte Maimonides', nämlich der Kreation *ex nihilo*, ausgehend (obwohl er einleitet יש להסלא בי אם נניח היותו יתעלה הפועל הצורה והתכלית לבד, indem er argumentiert: מולת היותו גם כן הסבה ההשגית, נצטרך בהכרח להניח מציאות חומר קדמון... זה סותר ציור השם יתעלה. Daß nicht diese Identifikation an sich für Maimonides die Hauptsache hier war, sondern ihre Interpretation in seinem eigenen Sinne, sagt er ja selber: וכונתי בזה הפרק שאבאר לך על איזה צד נאמר בו יתבי' שהוא הפועל וכי' während die Identifikation selbst von Maimonides nur geduldet wird: ומדועות אשר S. Neumark: *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie* I, S. 395.

ist. Hier wiederum wird die Bedeutung der „Letztheit“ an der *causa formalis* ausführlich erörtert, das aber ebenso für die *causa finalis* gilt. Gott wird auch als letzte Form bezeichnet. Dabei aber hält es Maimonides für nötig, eindringlich zu betonen, daß er unter letzter Form nicht die aristotelische meint, d. h. nicht diejenige, die im Regressus der natürlichen Formen als letzte, ungeworden und unvergänglich, gilt. Denn jene Form ist natürlich und der Materie inhärent — während unsere letzte Form separat ist und transzendent.⁷¹ Was hier unter der letzten Form bei Aristoteles verstanden werden soll, können wir dahingestellt lassen;⁷² eines ist sicher, daß auch sie beim Entstehen und Vergehen Halt macht und auch sie im Naturhaften bleibt. Also nicht anders als der aristotelische letzte Zweck, wie er III 13 beschrieben wurde. Es ergänzen sich also beide Darstellungen in der Weise, daß wir die Trennung zwischen erstem und letztem Zweck und die Charakteristik des letzteren III 13 entnehmen können, diesen aber analog der Darstellung der letzten Form in I 69 behandeln dürfen — schon gestützt auf die gleiche Charakterisierung der aristotelischen Auffassung sowohl vom letzten Zweck als auch von der letzten Form, die beide in beiden Kapiteln abgelehnt werden.

Der Zweck also, als welcher Gott bezeichnet wird, ist ebenso jenseits des Naturhaften und Materiellen, ebenso separat, wie dies von der Bezeichnung Gottes als letzte Form gilt. Der Begriff der Zweckursache, der für die natürlichen Dinge nur den ersten Zweck bedeutet, bekommt für Gott einen anderen Sinn, ebenso wie die Formursache. In beiden ist er nicht allein letztes Glied einer wesensgleichen Kette — sondern ein Neues, Wesensverschiedenes. Und dieses Neue, der separate Zweck, der in der dinglichen Welt wohl gesucht werden mag,

⁷¹ *Moreh* I 69: ולא תחשב שאמרנו בו שהוא הצורה האחרונה לכל העולם הוא רצו לצורה האחרונה אשר יאמר אריסטו עליה... שהיא בלתי חוזה ולא נספרת כי הצורה ההיא הנזכרת שם טבעית האחרונה אשר יאמר צורה לחומר לא שכל נספר.

⁷² Auf das Schwierige hier hat zuerst Narboni, *Kommentar*, S. 14, hingewiesen. Vgl. auch Munk, *Guide* I, S. 319 n. 1. Besonders aber hat Neumark diese Stelle zum Ausgangspunkt seiner weitgehenden Untersuchungen genommen; vgl. *loc. cit.*, S. 284 ff. (bes. S. 285 Anm. 3) und S. 398. Es würde von unserem Thema weit abführen, wollten wir auf diese Gedankengänge näher eingehen.

Diese terminologischen Unterschiede müssen genau berücksichtigt werden, um das Ganze richtig zu beurteilen. Charakte-

אלצורה אלאחירה לגמיע אלעאלם (ע"ש, Guide I), dann צורה אלעאלם ורו גאיתא, ונאיתא oder אלמגור בנ טלחה (I, ע"ש b). In I 72 wechselt אלעאלם, das in der Regel gebraucht wird, mit einem ihm gleichkommenden Ausdruck ab: נטלה בנ טלחה oder אלמגור בנ טלחה (I, ע"ש a), נטלה היה אלכרה (I, ע"ש b), אלכרה בנ טלחה (I, ע"ש b). Dieses so konsequent im ganzen Kapitel verwendete *חמלה* hat seinen wohl begründeten Sinn. Das vieldeutige Wort *חמל*, das gleichzeitig Summe und verschmelzen und schmücken heißt, ist wohl am besten geeignet, das geordnete, zu einer Einheit verschmolzene Dasein unter besonderer Hervorhebung seiner Einheitlichkeit zum Ausdruck zu bringen und kommt daher dem Worte עאלם, das eine Einheit bedeutet, gleich; ja durch die Nebenbedeutung von „schmücken“ enthält es noch eine Nuance mehr: die von *κόσμος*, das von *κοσμεῖν* herkommt. Oft aber wird das *חמל* noch mit עאלם verbunden, und wir haben in I 72 wiederholt den Ausdruck אלעאלם בנטלה (Guide I, ע"ש b, ע"ש b, ע"ש b, ע"ש b), worin die Verbindung beider Worte die erwünschte einheitliche Geordnetheit noch klarer betont. Und bei diesem so überwiegenden Gebrauch ist wohl auch so zu verstehen der vereinzelt vorkommende, etwas schwächere Ausdruck כלל היה אלמגור (I, ע"ש b), das aber weiter unten ersetzt wird durch das noch prägnantere אלמססתקך היה אלמגור (Tibbon: זה המציאות המיושב אשר דברנו בו, Munk, I, S. 363: cet être bien constitué dont nous parlons). Hingegen wird III 13 gleich eingeleitet mit der Frage nach dem Zweck (Guide III, ע"ש b; Tib.: זה המציאות) (זה המציאות) ohne jeden Hinweis auf die einheitliche Gesamtheit des Daseins, und auch weiter אלמגור (III, ע"ש b u. v. a.) oft unter Betonung des היה, also des empirisch gegebenen; nirgends, mit Ausnahme von einem Male für Aristoteles, wird das Wort עאלם verwendet. Nur einmal kommt das Wort נטלה vor — III, ע"ש b: אלמגור בנטלה, — aber auch nicht in der stärkeren Form אלמגור בנטלה, wie es in I 72 vorkommt, und auch dies nur in der einleitenden Bemerkung im Zusammenhang mit dem etwas schwächeren לבקש אלמגור. Sicher ist Folgendes: In den Kapiteln, in denen die Teleologie bejaht wird, liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Einheitlichkeit der Welt — auf עאלם oder נטלה, das die Verbindung zu einer Einheit ausdrückt — während bei der Ablehnung des Zweckes nur das empirische Dasein — היה oder אלמגור — vorwiegt. Dazu ist zu erwägen, daß נטלה (מציאות) für Maimonides immer etwas Akzidentiell war, im Gegensatz zum טהותא אמתת טהותא einer Sache, wie es im I 46 ausgeführt, aber an mehreren anderen Stellen (I, 33, 36, 57 u. a.) behandelt wird. Darum wird ja auch in I 69, wo von Gott als der letzten separaten Form die Rede ist, gesagt, daß das Dasein, das durch ihn verliehen wird, eben nicht akzidentieller Natur ist, sondern אמתת טהותא der Sache ausmacht. (Vgl. Neumark, *loc. cit.*, S. 399.) Demnach kann sich אלמגור nur auf das empirische, nicht das in seinem wahren Wesen sich repräsentierende Dasein beziehen. Darum war es auch nötig, sowohl in I 69 als auch in I 72, wenn vom Dasein gesprochen wird, hinzuzufügen, erklärend oder aussagend, daß es sich um das einheitliche, als Welt geordnete Ganze handelt; so I 69: אלעאלם יעני אלמגור אלכרה אלכרה (Guide I, ע"ש b) und I 72: ויעלם אן היה היה אלמגור אלמססתקך וגוריה בלא שך — וידע שזאת היא צורת:

ristisch für den Sprachgebrauch ist die Stelle, wo die letzte Form zuerst als Regression, die von den empirischen Formen ausgeht, behandelt wird — und wo von der „gesamten Existenz“ die Rede ist; hingegen gleich darauf, wo die Reservation in bezug auf den wahren Sinn der letzten Form hier — daß sie eben nicht mehr Fortsetzung des Empirischen ist — gemacht wird, da wird gleich das Ganze der Welt eingeführt.⁷⁵

קד ב' (I, 1) — זה הנמצא המיושב המציאות בלא ספק. Es darf also als erwiesen betrachtet werden, daß der Sprachgebrauch an der antiteleologischen Stelle (III 13) und den proteologischen (I 69, 72) eben auf zwei verschiedene Gesichtspunkte der Betrachtung des weltlichen Daseins hinweist; über III 25 weiter unten. Wenn daher Munk (*Guide* III, S. 82, 84, 89 u. a.) das Wort וְנֹד mit „univers“ übersetzt, es also terminologisch gleichsetzt sogar dem עֲלָם besonders in I 72 (vgl. z. B. mehrere Male *Guide* I, S. 361, 362 u. v. a.), das er auch mit „univers“ übersetzt — so trägt das sicherlich bei, den, wie wir sehen, wesentlichen Unterschied im Sprachgebrauch zu verwischen. Vgl. *Guide* III, S. 78, n. 1, wo Munk über die Grundbedeutung des Wortes אֱלֹהִים, als trouver = finden, spricht und die Stelle dort wörtlich so deutet und nicht in seinem philosophisch-technischen Sinne „d'être ou d'univers“. Wenn man „être“ und „univers“ eben nicht gleichsetzt, so kommt וְנֹד dem ersteren näher, gerade von trouver ausgehend, als dem letzteren. Munk verfährt auch ganz frei und nicht einheitlich in der Terminologie; während er z. B., wie gesehen, in der Regel וְנֹד und ebenso I 71 אֱלֹהִים (נמצא) (*Guide* I, צ"ח) wiederholt mit „univers“ (*Guide* I, S. 353) übersetzt — lautet die oben erwähnte Stelle I 72 g. E.: הָאֱלֹהִים הֵיאָה הַצֹּרֵחַ הַזֶּה בְּמִנְיַת הַיְיָ (I 374): que telle est la forme de cet être dont l'existence est... constituée. Also eben וְנֹד nicht mit dem die Einheitlichkeit der Welt enthaltenden univers, sondern mit dem schwächeren Sein und Existieren ausgedrückt. (Auch Scheyer übersetzt III 13 im Anfang „Zweck des Universums“; nur Weiß, III, S. 62, hat zwar richtig: „Zweck des Seienden“, spricht aber gleich in Anm. 1 zum Kap. vom „letzten Zweck des Universums“...)

⁷⁵ *Moreh* I 69, in der Regression, heißt es (*Guide* I, ב' ט"ו): וְתֵלֵךְ אֶלְצוּרָה אֱלֹהִים: וְהַצֹּרֵחַ הָאֲחֵרֹנָה הֵיאָה בְּכָל הַמַּצִּיאוֹת — וְהַצֹּרֵחַ הָאֲחֵרֹנָה הֵיאָה בְּכָל הַמַּצִּיאוֹת, während es dann, als der spezifische Charakter Gottes als letzter Form betont werden soll, heißt: אֱלֹהִים — אֱלֹהִים לְנִימֵי אֱלֹהִים — אֱלֹהִים לְנִימֵי אֱלֹהִים (wobei Tibbon hier das נִימֵי nicht berücksichtigt, wie im vorigen). Hier hat Munk die Nuancierung genau durchgeführt (*Guide* I, S. 318), das erstmal übersetzt er: „cette forme dernière de tout l'être“; dann aber „la forme dernière de tout l'univers“. Ähnlich, wenn auch nicht so charakteristisch, ist es in III 13. Wenn von der Ablehnung des Zweckes vom Standpunkte der Ewigkeit der Welt gesprochen wird, heißt es (*Guide* III, ב' ט) אֱלֹהִים אֱלֹהִים לְעוֹלָם בָּאֵסֶרָה — הַתְּכֵלִית הָאֲחֵרֹנָה לְמַצִּיאוֹת בְּכָלֵהוּ (b, ט) während die sich aufwerfende Frage vom Standpunkte der Kreation gleich im Sinne dieses Kapitels formuliert wird für אֱלֹהִים. כל הָאֱלֹהִים (b, ט) Munk (*Guide* III, S. 89) übersetzt dies „tout cet univers“ ebenso, wie er zwei Zeilen vorher für אֱלֹהִים auch „univers“ gebraucht. Hingegen ist Scheyer (S. 64) hier genauer: im ersten Falle,

Und so hat jedes Geschaffene seine Stellung sowohl als Ding als auch als Teil der Welt. In seiner ersteren Stellung kann wohl auch von einer Art letzten Zweck gesprochen werden — aber so kann es nur der Selbstzweck des Dinges sein. In seiner letzteren Stellung aber da ist Gott der letzte Zweck. Und daß beide Zweckmäßigkeiten zugleich und nebeneinander bestehen, hat Maimonides in der Möglichkeit der Doppeldeutung des Bibelverses, Prov. XVI 4, Gott hat alles für sich geschaffen, erklärt. Für „sich“ heißt beides: für das Ding, also Selbstzweck, und für Gott.⁷⁶ Es ist hier keine Umdeutung, wie oft bei Maimonides, sondern der Hinweis auf die Duplizität des Zwecks.

Diese Doppelstellung aber, die von allen Dingen behauptet wird, gilt nicht weniger vom Menschen. Daß er als Zweck der Welt, auch der sublunaren, abgelehnt wurde, haben wir bereits gesehen. Er war ja auch der Ausgangspunkt für die Ablehnung aller Zwecklichkeit in der Welt der Dinge. Jene zweite Zwecklichkeit aber, die in der Welt als Organismus, bekommt für ihn eine noch gesteigerte, neue Bedeutung. Denn sie ist ihrer Natur nach, um in neuerer Terminologie zu sprechen, nicht explikativ, sondern *normativ*.⁷⁷ Wo die Erklärung Gottes als letzten Zweck der Welt gegeben wird, da wird in einem Atem auch die normative Bedeutung dieser Zwecklichkeit betont. Gott ist der letzte Zweck, und Zweck alles Existierenden ist es auch, sich ihm in seiner Vollkommenheit anzugleichen.⁷⁸ Wobei die zweite Hälfte des Satzes nur als explikative Ergänzung der ersten zu verstehen ist. Hier aber, wo der Zweck als Sollen zum Vorschein kommt, ist es der Mensch, dem er in erster Reihe aufgegeben ist. Als Objekt ist er geringfügig, gleich allen anderen Dingen,

im Zusammenhange mit der Ewigkeit der Welt, übersetzt er: „nach dem letzten Zweck des Universums“, dann aber für *הוא אלוקים* „Daseyn“ oder „Schöpfung“. Vgl. vorige Anmerkung.

⁷⁶ *Moreh* III 13: *אמר כל פעל די למענהו — אפשר שיהיה זה הכניי שב אל הפועל; ואם יהיה פרושו למען עצמו יתע' hin, auf das Ding und auf Gott.*

⁷⁷ Vgl. Eisler, *loc. cit.*, S. 68 f.

⁷⁸ *Moreh* I 69 g.E.: *ואם כן הוא ית' תכלית כל דבר האחרון ותכלית הכל ג"כ ההדמות בשלמותו כפי היכולת*

als Subjekt aber steht er zur Zweckhaftigkeit der Welt in einem besonderen Verhältnis.

Denn auch die Doppelstellung des Menschen tritt bei Maimonides klar zutage. Sie drückt sich am besten aus im Verhältnis Individuum — Genus, das wir bereits früher, bei Behandlung des Anthropozentrismus, gestreift haben und nun näher besehen wollen. In der Widerlegung des Pessimismus Alrasi's wird zunächst als Argument angeführt die irreführende Betrachtung nur des menschlichen Individuums (und die damit verbundene Ansicht von seiner zentralen Wichtigkeit).⁷⁹ Der Mensch müsse als Geschlecht betrachtet werden, dann erweisen sich die Leiden des Individuums als irrelevant, im Verhältnisse zum Geschlecht. Ja, die Voraussetzung dieser Leiden, die Körperlichkeit des Menschen, gibt unserst die Möglichkeit, überhaupt die Menschen als Genus zu betrachten.⁸⁰ Es ist also nicht nur akziden-

⁷⁹ *Moreh* III 12 Anf.: לא יבחינו המציאות רק באיש טבני . . . היות זה הסכל וחבריו . . . אדם לא זולת זה ודמה כל סכל כי המציאות כולו היה בעבורו Tibbon gibt das Moment des Individuellen in der zweiten Hälfte, im בעבורו, nicht so genau wieder; denn im Original wird es betont: לא יתברר אלוהד אלא בשכך אנסאן (Guide III, י"ח; Munk: pour sa personne). Dies wird wiederholt betont: ואמנם תלך מחשבתם כלם לקצת אישי מין (b) (b) III י"ח; Munk: pour sa personne). Dann weiter: שכל בני האדם הנמצאים (Tibbon wieder nicht prägnant genug; Munk: tous les individus de l'espèce humaine). Dann: ולא יגלש ויטף אלוהד מן אהל (ibid.), Tibbon nur allgemein: ושלא ימעה ויחשוב שהמציאות היה בעבורו לבד (ibid.), Tibbon nur allgemein: ושלא ימעה ויחשוב שהמציאות היה בעבורו לבד; dann: הרוב הרעות הנפולות באישי הם מעצמם ר"ל מאישי בני אדם החסרים: dann: ולולא זה ההספד האישי לא תהיה הוה נמשכת ההויה (ibid. (המין האישי)).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* (המין האישי) heißt es: „und das aus ihm Gewordene konnte wohl et was, aber nicht das Einzelwesen einer Gattung sein“, so gibt er das Moment hinzu, und zwar besonders mit Rücksicht auf die Genusbildung.

tiell und erklärbar, wenn das menschliche Individuum leidet, sondern diese Beschaffenheit ist geradezu eine Notwendigkeit für sein Genus. Als in ein Genus zusammenfaßbar also ist der Mensch ein Ding wie alle anderen, an die Materie gebunden. Daher ist er auch als Genus nichts anderes als die anderen. Die Einheit von Agens, Form und Zweck, die wir etwa bei ihm antreffen, bleibt eine Einheit im Genus⁸¹ und nicht

⁸¹ *Moreh* III 13: כבר באר אריסטו, שבענינים המכונים יהיה הפועל הצורה והתכלית אחד, — ר"ל אחד במין. Als Beispiel wird die Zeugung eines Menschen angeführt, wie es auch in der bezüglichen Stelle der aristotelischen Physik II 7 geschieht: ἀνθρώπου μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Maimonides fügt nur erläuternd hinzu: — ר"ל אחד במין. אע"פ ואדרא באלמות. Was soll damit gesagt sein? Die allgemeine Auffassung geht dahin, daß sich dies auf den Charakter der Einheit der Ursachen bezieht: sie, die Ursachen, seien gleich in der Art; so Scheyer und Munk in ihren Übersetzungen. Was aber durch diese Gleichheit in der Art ausgeschlossen werden soll, ist doch nicht zu ersehen. Munk (*Guide* III, S. 86 n. 3) führt die Stelle aus dem Kommentar Ibn-Roschds an, der auch einschränkend interpretiert: unum secundum subjectum et plures secundum definitionem; also unterschieden zwischen dem realen Subjekt und der logischen Stellung. Dies aber auch als die Absicht Maimonides' aufzufassen, wie Neumark, *loc. cit.*, S. 395 Anm. 1, will, ist doch nicht gut möglich. Wie soll die Einheit der Ursachen, „die Einheit in der Art“ gerade besagen: „die einzelnen Momente sind trotzdem logisch auseinanderzuhalten“? Ist doch die Art gerade die Grundlage der Definition, und durch Betonung der Art kann unmöglich die Ausschließung der Definition beabsichtigt sein. Wohl konnte es Ibn-Roschd, der auch gleichzeitig und folgerichtig zwischen generatio und generabilia unterscheidet, also zwischen tatsächlicher Zeugung (wo die Einheit stattfindet) und potentieller Zeugbarkeit, wo die drei noch getrennt sind. Doch diesen Unterschied macht Maimonides, wie Neumark richtig bemerkt, nicht. Mit dem Wegfall aber von dieser Unterscheidung wird auch die andere haltlos. — Dieses *אחד במין* bekommt aber einen Sinn, wenn man es nicht als Charakteristik der Einheit und auf die Ursachen bezogen auffaßt, sondern das *במין* als auf die Naturdinge, auf die *ענינים טבעיים* bezieht. Das heißt dann so, daß die Einheit der Ursachen nur vom Gesichtspunkte des betreffenden Genus aus gesehen stattfindet; nicht aber etwa vom Gesichtspunkte des individuellen Trägers aus. Auch Ibn-Roschd hat eine leise Andeutung dafür, wenn er hinzufügt et generatio est ab aquali in specie. Dies hat aber nichts mit seiner früheren Unterscheidung zwischen Subjekt und Definition zu tun. Wenn daher Neumark dieses „ab aquali in specie“ als Vergleich zum *אחד במין* heranzieht, hätte ihn gerade dieses — und insbesondere die Fortsetzung „verbi gratia: quum homo generatur ex homine“ — belehren sollen, daß auch das *אחד במין* sich eben auf die Naturdinge bezieht. Und in dem Sinne ist auch weiter von den Individuen gesagt, daß es für alle, soweit sie Arten angehören, gilt: — כי השלש סבות בהם במין אחד — מאן אלמלאהא מסבאם סיהא מן כו' ואחד (Scheyer: Dieselbe Gleichartigkeit der

anders als bei allen anderen Naturdingen. Und die Grenze aller Teleologie ist das Entstehen und Vergehen wie bei allem Naturhaften. Einen letzten Zweck in unserem Sinne kann er so, sei es als Individuum, sei es auch als Genus — und nicht allein wegen der quantitativen oder qualitativen Minderwertigkeit⁸² — nicht bilden.

Der Mensch hat aber auch eine andere Seite, die dem genusbildenden Materiellen entgegengesetzt ist und so seine Genushaftigkeit durchbricht: es ist sein intellektuelles Vermögen, das sich besonders in der Providenz auswirkt. Hier wird das vernunftrealisierende Individuum dem Genus gleichgesetzt. Wenn Maimonides hier die Unwirklichkeit des Genus im Vergleich mit dem Individuellen betont, so ist dieser Nominalismus nicht so allgemein zu nehmen, wie es Munk auffassen will.⁸³ Wäre es so, dann müßte es ja für

wirkenden Ursache etc.; Munk vernachlässigt das *מין* ganz und hat: „ne forme qu'une seule“. Das heißt: auch beim Individuum sind die drei Ursachen eins, vom einheitlichen Genus ausgehend. Daß dieses *מין* sich auf die Naturdinge bezieht, geht ja auch aus dem ganzen Zusammenhange hervor. So wird bei der *causa formalis* betont, *הוא נתינת צורה ממינה*, dann wird von *מאשי המינים* *איש מאשי המינים* gesprochen, während einleitend nur allgemein von *הענינים הטבעיים* die Rede war, die eben dann durch das *מין* präzisiert wurden. Besonders wird dies aber geklärt durch die Fortsetzung: *וזה כלו הוא תכלית הראשונה, ואמנם מציאות תכלית אחרונה לכל מין (אמא וגד באוה אכירה לכל נוע)*. Aus dieser Gegenüberstellung ist ja klar, daß ebenso wie die *תכלית ראשונה* auch die *תכלית אחרונה* bezogene *מין* auf Frühere bezogene *מין* sich auf das *מין* bezieht. Denn daß das *מין* hier terminologisch von Wichtigkeit ist (obwohl Scheyer allgemein „bei allen Naturgegenständen“ übersetzt), ist ja aus dem weiteren Gedankengange — wo von der Stufenfolge Individuum — Genus usw. die Rede ist — außer jedem Zweifel. Das *מין* also im ganzen Abschnitt bezieht sich auf ein und dasselbe: auf die Naturdinge. Und die von Aristoteles zitierte Einheit der Ursachen wird eben nur insoferne zugegeben, als man die Dinge und auch die Menschen von ihrer Zusammenfaßbarkeit in Genera aus betrachtet.

⁸² Die im *Moreh* III 14 durchgeführte Beweisführung gegen den Anthropozentrismus ist ja ausdrücklich auch gegen das Genus gerichtet, wofür — für die *מינים* — die Philosophen den qualitativen Gradunterschied einführen müssen, während vom Standpunkte der Welterschöpfung die Argumentation eine andere ist. Vgl. oben Anm. 44 — 47.

⁸³ Im Gegensatz zur „aristotelischen“ Ansicht von der Providenz, daß sie sich in der sublunaren Welt nur auf Genera erstreckt, lehrt Maimonides bekanntlich, *Moreh* III 17, daß beim Menschen eine Ausnahme stattfindet: *שאני אמתן שההשגחה האלהית אמנם היא בזה העולם התחתון... באישי מין האדם לבד וזה המין לבדו הוא* *אשר כל עניני אישיו וכו'*; also beim Menschen gibt es eine individuelle Differen-

alle Genera gelten und eine Providenz müßte nur beim individuellen Menschen stattfinden. Daß Maimonides so nicht denkt, beweist die Tatsache, daß er sich bezüglich aller anderen Geschöpfe der „aristotelischen“ Ansicht anschließt, wonach für ihre Genera eine Providenz besteht.⁸⁴ Es ist also nicht allein

zierung. Wenn es auch später begründet wird damit daß, *הטין אשר נדבק בו השפע*, so darf es nicht so verstanden werden, daß dadurch die Menschen untereinander, da sie demselben *טין* angehören, gleichgestellt sind. Das wird wiederholt betont und insbesondere III 18 begründet, und zwar durch eine zweifache Einleitung: 1. daß die Universalien nur intellektueller Natur sind, nicht wirklich, und 2. daß *השכל האנושי אמנם הוא מה*. *שנמצא מן השכלים האישיים*. Diese beiden Momente verbunden — nämlich die Realität des Individuellen und die Individualität des menschlichen Intellektes, beide zusammen geben erst die Basis ab für die maimonische Anschauung, daß sich innerhalb des menschlichen Genus eine Abstufung der Providenz je nach der intellektuellen Vollkommenheit ergibt. Entscheidend ist eben das zweite Moment, wodurch der menschliche Intellekt dem den Sphären innewohnenden Einzelintellekt gleichgesetzt wird. Weshalb eben der Einzelmensch, wenn intellektuell vollkommen, ebenso wie die Sphäre, gleich den Genera der Providenz teilhaftig ist. Das erste, nominalistische, Argument zum Hauptmotiv zu machen, wie Munk, *Guide* III, S. 137 n. 1, ist daher, selbst für den Menschen, nicht richtig: denn dies allein würde für die Sonderstellung des Menschen unter den anderen Genera in bezug auf seine Individuen gar nichts beweisen. Es ist auch noch fraglich, ob der hier so kategorisch vorgetragene Nominalismus, „sans réserve“ (Munk), nicht auch nur in diesem Zusammenhange begründet ist, denn I 51 wird die nominalistische Anschauung mit *כאשר* angeführt. Im *Miloth-Habigajon* X, das Munk (*Guide* I, S. 185 n. 2) anführt, ist von Nominalismus nichts zu lesen. Auch Scheyer, III, S. 111 Anm. 1, der ursprünglich diese Stelle als ein nominalistisches, antiplatonisches Bekenntnis auffaßt, bemerkt dann, daß „sich ihm Zweifel erhoben“ haben. Dies insbesondere mit Rücksicht auf II 6, wo die platonische Ideenlehre im positiven Sinne angeführt wird. Wie konnte übrigens eine Stelle, deren Schwerpunkt in der völligen Ausschaltung des Genus-Begriffs liegen soll, eingeleitet werden mit: *ואחר מה שהקדמתי טהיות ההשגחה מיוחדת בטיין האדם לבדו משאר מיני ב"ח*?

⁸⁴ *Moreh* III 17, als Maimonides seine eigene Theorie vorträgt, fügt er hinzu: *אבל שאר בעלי חיים*... דעתי בהן דעת אריסטו: das heißt ja nur die Providenz für die Genera. Dasselbe geht klarer hervor später g. E., wo die Bibelstellen, in denen von der göttlichen Fürsorge für die Tiere gesprochen wird, erklärt werden: *ואין בהם דבר פוטר דעתי זה, כי אלו כלם השגחה מינית לא אישית*... ולולא זה היה הטין אבר. Dies wieder unter Berufung auf Aristoteles. Ja selbst der Mensch, von seiner materiellen Seite gesehen, darf nur, auch in Fragen der Providenz, als Gattung betrachtet werden. In der allgemeinen Einleitung zum Providenz-Problem III 16 wird geradezu auf III 12 rückverwiesen, wo die Beurteilung des Menschen nach seinen Individuen als schwerer Fehler bezeichnet war: *ואמנם מכלותם*... הוא בחיותם. *ואמנם מכלותם*... הוא בחיותם. *ואמנם מכלותם*... הוא בחיותם. *ואמנם מכלותם*... הוא בחיותם.

⁸⁵ Da doch dies die Sphären charakterisiert und sie nach Aristoteles der Providenz teilhaftig macht, daß sie in ihrer individuellen Existenz fortdauern. Diese Begründung, der Maimonides durchaus nicht widerspricht, führt er in zweifacher Form vor, *Moreh* III 17, (הדעת הב'), heißt es: וּמִנִּי זֶה ... שֶׁהֵשִׁי מְשַׁגֵּחַ בְּגִלְגָּלִים. und etwas später: הַהִשְׁגָּחָה הַזֶּה כְּפִי טַעַם הַמִּצְוֹת, אִם כֵּן אֵלּוּ: התמידו אישיהם על מה ששם עליהם הגלגלים ומה שבשם, אשר אישיהם מתמידים, ענין ההשגחה בהם הוא התמדתם... Nach der ersten Formulierung erscheint die Providenz primär und die individuelle Fortdauer die Folge; nach der zweiten ist die Fortdauer das Primäre, weswegen dann die Providenz, da sie sich nach dem טַעַם הַמִּצְוֹת richtet, eben in dieser Fortdauer besteht. Diese zweifache Formulierung soll nur die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit von beiden zeigen. Beim Menschen, soll er in der Providenz den Sphären gleichgesetzt werden, mußte eben III 18 dieses Moment, daß sein Verstand מן השכלים ist, hervorgehoben werden (vgl. oben Anm. 83). Wozu aber noch ergänzend bemerkt werden muß, daß diese Stelle, III 18 Anf., verschiedentlich unrichtig aufgefaßt wurde. Sie lautet: וַיְהִי נִדְרַע גִּבֹּר, שֶׁהִשְׁפַּע הָאֱלֹהִי הַנִּמְצָא טְרֹבֵךְ בְּמִין... האדם, רִ"ל השכל האנושי, אִמָּנָם הוּא מֵה שֶׁנִּמְצָא מִן הַשְּׂכָלִים הָאִשִּׁיִּים, והוא מה ששפע האדם, והוא (השכל) האנושי, אִמָּנָם הוּא מֵה שֶׁנִּמְצָא מִן הַשְּׂכָלִים הָאִשִּׁיִּים. על ראובן ושטען וכו' אנטה וו (הו) erscheint wörtlich korrekt. Aber schon Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh* S. 130, verwandelt die im Original gegebene Koordination (הו... והו) in eine relative Abhängigkeit: אִמָּנָם הוּא זֶה שֶׁנִּמְצָא מִן הַשְּׂכָלִים הָאִשִּׁיִּים (הו... והו) in eine relative Abhängigkeit: אִמָּנָם הוּא זֶה שֶׁנִּמְצָא מִן הַשְּׂכָלִים הָאִשִּׁיִּים. Schon diese kleine Abweichung ermöglichte den Anfang eines Mißverständnisses. Narboni nun, *Kommentar* S. 55, betritt, wenn auch nicht ganz sicher, den Weg einer Interpretation, wonach die Sphären als die Intellekte der menschlichen Individuen zu verstehen sind: הַשְּׂכָלִים הָאִשִּׁיִּים, כִּי הֵם הַנִּמְצָאִים בְּאִשִּׁיִּים, והוא מה ששפע על האישים. Diese Interpretation ist dann durch Schem-Tob fortgeführt und eindeutiger ausgedrückt: רִ"ל לשכל האנושי, אַחֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה לָא נִמְצָא, אִמָּנָם הַכּוֹזֶנֶת בּוֹ הוּא מֵה שֶׁנִּמְצָא מִן הַשְּׂכָלִים הָאִשִּׁיִּים.

nicht von zwei Gesichtspunkten aus gesehen. Der Mensch als

וְהוּא רֹאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי... וְשֵׁנִי הָאִשִּׁים. Das Motiv ist klar: es soll diese zweite Behauptung als Fortsetzung der ersten, der nominalistischen, verstanden werden oder eigentlich nur jene nominalistische Theorie auf den Spezialfall des menschlichen Intellectes angewendet oder an ihm exemplifiziert. Auch Scheyer will über diese „so ganz dunkle“ Ausdrucksweise dieser Stelle so hinwegkommen und übersetzt III S. 114: „die göttliche Gabe... nämlich die menschliche Vernunft keine andere ist als die, welche bei den einzelnen vernünftigen Wesen vorhanden ist, bei Ruben, Simon“ etc. Also שְׁנֵי wird mit „bei“ übersetzt, שְׁנֵי אִשִּׁים wird verstanden als שְׁנֵי אִשִּׁים, und der koordinierte, selbständige Satz: וְהוּא טָה שֵׁנִי wird zu einem Komma verflüchtigt: „bei Ruben...“ Da ist nun Munk (III, S. 137) genauer, indem er die שְׁנֵי אִשִּׁים als das auffaßt, was sie bei Maimonides und insbesondere in diesem Zusammenhang, nach III 17, einzig bedeuten können, als „Intelligences individuelles“, nämlich die sphärischen Intelligenzen. Womit er also die Richtung Narbonis zwar verläßt — ohne jedoch für die so wichtige Stelle eine einleuchtendere Lösung zu finden. Er übersetzt: „que l'épanchement divin... je veux dire l'intellect humain est une chose qui n'a son existence que par les Intelligences individuelles à savoir par ce qui s'est épanché (de l'intelligence divine) sur Zeid, sur 'Amr“ etc. Dies erscheint jedoch unhaltbar. Durch welche Intelligenzen (im Plural) bekommt der menschliche Intellect seine Existenz? Wir wissen nur, daß es einen Aktiven Intellect gibt, der die menschliche Erkenntnis ermöglicht. Dann ist ja der Aktive Intellect eine separate Intelligenz, während doch unter den שְׁנֵי אִשִּׁים die Eigenintellecte der Sphären zu verstehen sind, die auch erst von den ihnen zugeordneten separaten Intellecten geleitet werden. (So ist es in III 17 zu verstehen; vgl. II 4 und 6.) Ferner wurde schon im vorigen Kapitel, 17, die Bedeutung des שֵׁנִי אִלֹּהִים deutlich genug hervorgehoben — welches neue Moment tritt hier hinzu, daß es als Grundlegung an die Spitze gestellt wird? Aber abgesehen vom Sachlichen mußte Munk eben dem Text Gewalt antun. Das מִן übersetzt er durch par, also instrumental, den folgenden koordinierten Satz וְהוּא טָה שֵׁנִי setzt er ganz unbegründet um in „à savoir par ce qui s'est épanché“, wohl um das erste „par“ zu halten. In Wirklichkeit ist das מִן nicht anders als partitiv zu verstehen, und die Stelle besagt nichts anderes als daß die dem Menschengeschlechte verliehene göttliche Influenz, d. h. der menschliche Intellect, eben eine der individuellen Intelligenzen ist (d. h. eine Art Sphärenintelligenz) und daß dieser menschliche Intellect wieder auf die Individuen Ruben etc. influirt. Somit sollte hier nur die Stellung des menschlichen Intellectes, nach der er den Sphären gleich ist, hervorgehoben werden; was auch der Lehre Maimonides vollkommen entspricht (s. meine Abhandlung *Proph.* S. 96). Und nach der ersten Vorbemerkung, vom Nominalismus, ist diese zweite, von jener unabhängige, eine wichtige Ergänzung. — Bemerkenswert ist diese Stelle noch von einer anderen Seite. In der Regel wird in der Erkenntnislehre nur vom „Menschen“ und dem „Aktiven Intellect“ gesprochen, der letztere als Mittler zwischen Gott und Menschen (s. bes. III 51) — im Bereiche des Menschlichen aber wird keine Differenzierung gemacht. Die Formulierung hingegen an unserer Stelle läßt eine Abstufung auch innerhalb des Menschlichen

empirisches, passives Wesen,⁸⁶ in der Welt der Dinge, ihnen gleich und ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeit unterworfen, und der intelligible Mensch, der im Individuum das Genus ausmacht. Man darf zweifellos diese Terminologie anwenden, ohne sich einer Modernisierung schuldig zu machen, und man ist ebenso berechtigt, diese zweite Ansicht des Menschen auch auf die Teleologie zu übertragen.

Denn auf diese zweite Ansicht des Menschen hat seine Benennung „Mikrokosmos“ Anwendung. Da diese keine Umkehrung des Vergleiches von der Welt als Makrorganismus ist, wie bereits gesehen,⁸⁷ bedeutet der Vergleich des Menschen mit dem Kosmos eben, daß er Organismus ist plus jener vernünftigen Zielstrebigkeit, die sich uns bei der Welt aus ihrem organischen Charakter ergeben hat. Er ist somit nicht bloß ein höheres oder höchstes Lebewesen, sondern dadurch ein Geschöpf *sui generis*. Und die Beweisführung dafür ist: daß, während die anderen Lebewesen kraft ihrer Genusnatur leben und für das Genus leben, der Mensch eben sich individuell seinen Lebensweg erst bahnen muß und auch dann nicht im Genus aufgeht.⁸⁸ Diese so hochwichtige Beschaffen-

durchblicken: es wird vom „Menschlichen Intellekt“ (אלעקל אלאנסאני — השכל) gesprochen, der mit der göttlichen Influenz identifiziert wird, und von dem erst eine Influenz auf das menschliche Individuum ausgeht. Da darunter doch sicher nicht der Aktive Intellekt verstanden werden kann, so ist hier eine neue Zwischeninstanz eingeschaltet — zwischen der Influenz des Aktiven Intellektes und dem erkennenden Individuum: es ist der übergeordnete, etwa dem Menschengeschlecht angehörende Intellekt. Diese Theorie vom Intellekt, der aller empirischen Einzelerkenntnis vorangeht und sie ermöglicht (der übrigens lebhaft an die Kantsche Transzendente Apperzeption erinnert), ist von Maim. weiter nicht entwickelt worden. Daß dies aber keine zufällige Stilisierung, sondern eine in die Philosophie Maimonides' sehr gut hineinpassende Formulierung ist, ist außer Zweifel. — Die Verbindung hier עלם ה' סקר עלם, die bei Tibbon (יהיה נדע גם כן) als eine Art Folgerung des zweiten aus dem ersten verstanden werden kann, ist in der Übersetzung Falaqueras (כבר נדע) sinnent-sprechender.

⁸⁶ Vgl. oben Anm. 80 über seine Bezeichnung als מעשה.

⁸⁷ Siehe oben Anm. 61.

⁸⁸ *Moreh* I 72. Während ילך ויעשה לפי טבעו ... כל איש טאיש בעלי חיים... יחמיד בזה איש ו המדה אשר יחמיד ויטשך מציאות מנין, muß der Mensch individuell von anderen Individuen angeleitet werden, wozu aber der individuelle Intellekt Voraussetzung ist. Darum wird hier am

heit, die Maimonides geradezu als *Mysterium* ansieht,⁸⁹ ist es, die dem Menschen, also nicht seinem Genus, sondern dem menschlichen Individuum, soweit es vernunftentwickelnd ist, die kosmische Bedeutung gibt — die vernünftige Zweckmäßigkeit.

Während nun der Mensch in seinem empirischen Dasein als Weltzweck abgelehnt werden muß, ebenso wie alles andere Dingliche, und als Genus noch um so mehr abzulehnen ist, da seine Genushaftigkeit eben erst durch seine Körperlichkeit ermöglicht wird — so ist, von der anderen Seite gesehen, doch eine besondere Teleologie für ihn vorhanden. Von der Seite aus, wo er vernünftig ist, wo er auch als Individuum den Sphären und Genera, in der Providenz, und dem Kosmos, in der Zweckmäßigkeit, gleichgestellt wird, dort ist auch für ihn eine Zweckmäßigkeit gegeben. Es ist dies die im selben Satz, in dem Gott als letzter Zweck genannt wird, angeführte „Angleichung“ — es ist die moralische Zweckmäßigkeit. Nicht der Mensch ist ein Zweck, sondern dem Menschen ist ein Zweck gegeben, aufgegeben.

Und dies ist der Sinn der Teleologie, die in III 25 so emphatisch bejaht wird. Es ist die Teleologie des moralischen Gebotes, wie es im darauffolgenden Kapitel ausführlicher behandelt wird. Hier ist zunächst bemerkenswert, daß das Agensmotiv stärker betont wird,⁹⁰ während es doch in I 69

Individuum exemplifiziert: *אמנם האדם לבר אלו ישוער איש טמנו לברו*, dann wäre er verloren, da ihm die Hilfe der Gesellschaft abgehen würde; dann aber wird diese Hilfe eben auf das individuell-intellektuelle Vermögen zurückgeführt: *ובעבור זה אילו דמית בנפשו אחד מבני אדם (שכצא מן אלנאם) נשלל זה הכח (הדברי sc.) מונח* עם הכח החיוני לבר, היה אובר לשעתו. Also beide, Lebewesen und Mensch, hängen von ihrem Genus ab; nur ist die Abhängigkeit beim Lebewesen eine instinktiv-natürliche und also bezogen auf das Genus als solches, während der Mensch als Individuum auf die individuellen Erfahrungen seiner Geschlechts-genossen angewiesen ist — wobei bei allen die Erfahrung durch die individuelle Vernunft zustande kommt.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*: *לא חובן* (Munk: *très occulte*) *מאד* (הוא ג"כ נעלם מאד). וזה הכח נכבד מאד. . . אמנתו בתחלת הדעת המשתתף כהבנת שאר הכחות הטבעיות.

⁹⁰ *Moreh* III 25 wird wiederholt von *פועלה תכלית* gesprochen. Auch die spätere Alternative bezieht sich auf *פועל* oder *עשאה* *הפועל* *הפועלים*. כל *פועל* *פועלה* אחת. In der Terminologie ist noch zu bemerken, daß auch hier durchwegs von der Welt, als Einheitsbegriff, nicht bloß vom empirischen Dasein die Rede ist; so *אלעאלם במלחה* (*Guide* III 21); *גוד* *אלעאלם* *במלחה*.

vor Causa zurückgestellt worden war. Beides war zugunsten der Teleologie — nur zeigt sich uns durch die Nuancierung der Motive auch eine Nuancierung im Zweckbegriff. Für die organische Welt bedeutet er, wie bereits erörtert, das Prinzip der teleologischen Ordnung, im Bereiche des Moralischen aber das Prinzip des teleologischen Gebotes. Daher war dort Causa vorgezogen, da es auch Agens, Form und Zweck mitenthält und so die identische Einheitlichkeit zum Ausdruck bringt; hier aber ist Agens allein mehrsagend, da es dem normativen Charakter gerechter wird. Natürlich aber sind es wiederum nur Nuancen eines und desselben Zweckes.

Und so ist es auch verständlich, daß, während vorher⁹¹ der Anthropozentrismus als Ausgangspunkt der Zwecksetzung bezeichnet wurde, die aber abzulehnen ist, hier derselbe Anthropozentrismus als Hindernis für die wahre Erkenntnis des Zweckes, der zu bejahen ist, hingestellt wird. Vorher hat es sich eben um den Menschen als Geschöpf, als Ding unter den Dingen, gehandelt, der selbst Zweck sein sollte; hier handelt es sich um den normativen Zweck für den Menschen. Darum werden hier als Fehlerquelle drei Irrtümer, als zusammenhängend, aufgezählt: die Überschätzung des Menschen, die Unkenntnis der Natur der Materie und die Unkenntnis der ersten Absicht.⁹² Diese drei Irrtümer, die Eins bilden, werden vom Autor nicht näher erklärt; sie bedeuten aber nichts anderes als die Ablehnung des Menschen als dinglichen Zweck, soweit er infolge seiner Materialität — und nur durch sie — zu einem Genus zusammengeschlossen werden kann — um die Setzung eines normativen Zweckes für ihn, soweit er über sein materiebedingtes Genus hinausragt, zu ermöglichen. Nur so kann die Einführung des Irrtums in der Natur der Materie hier einen Sinn haben.

(*ibid.* נ"ב). Hier übersetzt Munk (III, S. 199) das גמלא אלודר bei der Anschauung der Ascharia, durch l'ensemble de l'être. Vgl. oben Anm. 74.

⁹¹ *Moreh* III 13, siehe oben Anm. 17 und 29.

⁹² *Moreh* III 25: רוע שרוב הספקות... אמנם שרשם טעות האדם בעצמו ודעותו שהמציאות כזו. כלו בגללו לבד, והסכלות בטבע זה החומר השפל, וסכלות הטכונן הראשון. Daß diese drei in ihrem Zusammenhange hier maßgebend sind, beweist die Wiederholung: וטעני הטעות הזאת וסכלות שני הענינים האלה יתחדשו הספקות.

Sicher beziehen sich die Gebote auf beides: auf die Vervollkommenung des Körpers und die der Seele; und die erstere ist nur in seiner kollektiven Erscheinung möglich, etwa im Staate, nicht aber im einzelnen.⁹³ Dies aber darf uns nicht irreführen, denn nicht worauf sich das teleologische Gebot richtet, ist ausschlaggebend, sondern die Stellung des Menschen, die es ermöglicht. Und die Vollkommenheit des Körpers — beziehungsweise aller gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Tugenden, die mehr das Genus Mensch betreffen — sind ja auch nur propädeutische Vorarbeit zu jener letzten Vollkommenheit (denken wir an den letzten Zweck), die im Geistigen liegt und den Zweck des dauernden Lebens (also nicht bloß des Entstehens und Vergehens der Genera) bildet.⁹⁴ Die Torah ist eben nicht Normenwissenschaft, sondern eine normative Wissenschaft.⁹⁵

Auf einem Mißverständnis dieser Doppelstellung des Menschen — und des Unterschiedes zwischen seiner Wertung als Zweck und als Erfüller eines Zweckes — beruht die Polemik Crescas' gegen Maimonides. In zwei Punkten setzt Crescas seine Polemik an:⁹⁶ daß Maimonides der Torah meh-

⁹³ *Moreh* III 27: תקון הגוף והוא הנחמת המדינה לתקון עניני אנשיה. Dies ist die notwendige Voraussetzung für תקון הנפש. Wir haben etwas Ähnliches auch in I 72 gesehen. Auch dort wird bei Besprechung des spezifisch-menschlichen intellektuellen Vermögens zunächst die soziale Abhängigkeit des Einzelnen hervorgehoben — aber auch diese letzten Endes auf die individuell-intellektuale zurückgeführt (vgl. oben Anm. 88). Dort ist keine Abstufung erwähnt; die Stelle hier, wenn auch in einem anderen Zusammenhang, kann beitragen zum Verständnis dort. Auch hier wird in bezug auf תקון הגוף gesagt: זה לא ישלם לאיש אחד לבדו כלל, איא להגיע כל אדם אל זה השער אלא בקבוצת המדיני.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*: Der תקון הגוף bringt nur השלמות הראשון. Und als zweite Stufe אפשר להגיע אל השלמות האחרון אשר הוא הנכבד בלא ספק והוא סבת החיים המתמידים לא וזולתו. Die Identifizierung von letzter Vollkommenheit und letztem Zweck wird auch gleich durchgeführt: והקדים הנה השלמות האחרון לפי מעלתו כמו שבארנו שהוא התכלית האחרון.

⁹⁵ Vgl. Eisler, *loc. cit.*, S. 75. Der Begriff „normativ“ wird hier nicht im Sinne Simmels, *Einleit. in die Morawissenschaft* I, S. 321, gebraucht, wonach eine normative Wissenschaft „nur kausal, nicht teleologisch“ ist. Vgl. dagegen Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900, I, S. 27.

⁹⁶ Im ersten Punkt liegt keine ausgesprochene Polemik gegen Maimonides vor, bezieht sich aber auf seine Lehre, *Or-Adonai* II, 6, 1. Vgl. Heinemann, *loc. cit.*, S. 75f. Hingegen ist er im zweiten Punkt sehr deutlich. Schon die

rere Zwecke statt einem zuschreibt und daß er den Menschen, der doch Träger und Verwirklicher der Torah ist, als Zweck ablehnt. Sein Gefühl sagt ihm wohl, daß Maimonides den Weltzweck nicht ganz ablehnt,⁹⁷ doch scheint ihm seine Polemik am Platze. Nach der obigen Darstellung erledigen sich beide Einwände von selbst. Die scheinbare Vielheit der Zwecke der Torah läuft letzten Endes auf eine Einheit im Prinzip hinaus. Und die Annahme einer Zweckhaftigkeit der Torah für den Menschen als Träger und einer Zweckhaftigkeit der Welt stehen mit der Ablehnung des Menschen als Zweckes und somit alles dinglichen Zweckes nicht in Widerspruch, sondern ergänzen und beleuchten sich gegenseitig.

So nun gelangen wir zum Ergebnis, daß die Welt als Organismus und die Welt der ethischen Aufgaben durch das Gemeinsame der Teleologie gleichgesetzt werden, dies hat

Einleitung von II 6 geht von der Annahme aus, Maimonides lehne jeden Weltzweck ab, in offener Anlehnung an *Moreh* III 13 (ebenso III Einl.). Dann wird II 6, 3 erklärt, daß der Zweck der niederen Welt und der Torah אחר באיש אחד sind und יתבאר בקלות למה שהתבאר... שהתכלית בעולם השפל הוא הטיב האנושי והתכלית שלמות האנושי בואת התורה. Also ähnlich wie bei Saadja, nur eingeschränkt auf den Zweck der Torah. Bei beiden folgt aus dem Range der Torah der Mensch als Zweck. (Darum glaubte auch Crescas weiter, III 6, 5, die von Maimonides angeführten Zitate für die Minderwertigkeit des Menschen durch eine gezwungene Interpretation entkräften zu müssen.) In bezug auf die Stellung des Menschen also bedeutet die Lehre Crescas' keinen Fortschritt gegen Maimonides, sondern eher das Gegenteil. Als Analogie möge hier erwähnt werden die Entwicklung, die die Teleologie genommen hat in der Stoa. Auch dort war der Ausgangspunkt anthropozentrisch — so bei Seneca und Epictet. Die römische Stoa hingegen gelangte zur Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge; dies unter Berücksichtigung der „schaffenden Kraft des Ganzen“ (Marc-Aurel). Vgl. P. Barth, *Die Stoa*, S. 43 f.

⁹⁷ *Or-Adonai* III Einl.: כי עם הנח יראה שדעת הרב אמנם הוא בבקשת התכלית, שנגזר מציאותו בקשתו כבדה. Er spricht auch weiter im Sinne Maimonides' nur von der Einheit des Zweckes (nicht von der Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt) die Anschauung von der Welt als Organismus nimmt — mit Berufung auf *Moreh* I 72. Hätte er diesen Gedanken in seiner ganzen Weite durchgeführt, so hätte er es nicht nötig gehabt, die oben angeführten proteleologischen Momente gerade in *Moreh* III 13 hineinzudeuten. — Auf andere Auswirkungen der maimonischen Teleologie, in positiver und negativer Beziehung, insbesondere etwa bei Spinoza, einzugehen, würde, wenn dies nicht flüchtig geschehen soll, den Rahmen dieser Arbeit ganz sprengen.

Maimonides klar durchgeführt.⁹⁸ In beiden wird die Teleologie bejaht — im Gegensatz zur Welt der Vielheit der empirischen Dinge, und dazu gehört auch der Mensch in seinem empirischen Dasein, in dem es nur Selbstzwecke der Dinge gibt, aber keinen übergeordneten gemeinsamen Zweck.

Sehen wir nun ab von der *causa finalis*, die innerhalb der Weltmechanik für das einzelne kausale Geschehen angenommen wird, und fragen wir nach einem Gesamtzweck, so können wir aus dem Gesagten folgendes übersichtlich ersehen:

1. Biologisch, d. h. im System des mechanischen Daseins, in der Welt der Dinge, wird ein Zweck abgelehnt. Da gilt nur Kausalität und Selbstzweck des Geschaffenen.

2. Kosmologisch, in der Welt als organischer Einheit, wird der letzte, separate Zweck, in Gott, bejaht.

3. Ethisch, in der Welt der intelligiblen, handelnden Person wird der göttliche Zweck bejaht.

Es gibt also keinen dinglichen letzten Zweck; es gibt bloß Zweck als Sinn im Kosmos, gesehen als Makrorganismus, als Idee, und als Aufgabe im Bereiche des Sittlichen.

Das heißt, wie bereits angedeutet, nicht, daß es zwei Zwecke gibt, und der früher erwähnte Parallelismus ist nicht als wirklicher zu denken. Vielmehr wurzeln die sich im Organischen und Ethischen offenbarenden Zweckmäßigkeiten in einem einheitlichen Prinzip und sind eins in ihrem Wesen. Bevor wir zur Klarstellung dieses Punktes gelangen, müssen wir noch den Charakter der Teleologie — im Organischen sowohl als auch im Ethischen — etwas näher untersuchen.

III.

Um zur genaueren Kenntnis des Charakters der maimonischen Teleologie zu gelangen, wollen wir nun anknüpfen an

⁹⁸ *Moreh* III 26; deutlicher aber III 32 Anf.: ר"ל כשתבונן בפעולות האלהיות, ר"ל הפעולות השבעיות, יתבאר לך מהם ערמת השם וחכמתו בבריאת בע"ח והדרגת תנועות האברים ושכונתם קצתם אל קצתם וכן יתבאר לך חכמתו ותחבולתו בהדרגת עניני כלל האיש ענין אחד ענין. Also werden die organisierten Lebewesen und der Charakter des Gebotes parallel auf ein Grundprinzip zurückgeführt. Diese Parallele wird dann in ihren Einzelheiten durchgeführt.

den bereits erörterten Zusammenhang zwischen der Zweckmäßigkeit und der Auffassung der Welt als Organismus. Die Ordnung der Welt, die Zuordnung ihrer Teile, sahen wir, spricht für die Annahme einer vernünftigen Planmäßigkeit und ergo einer innewohnenden Zweckmäßigkeit. Maimonides spricht auch vom Problem des Zweckes als von einem aus dieser Zuordnung resultierenden.⁹⁹

Wenn aber diese Zuordnung eine organische sein soll, dann genügt das Charakteristikum des Zusammenhanges allein nicht. Die Welt als einheitlicher Organismus besagt mehr als bloß das Zusammenstimmen seiner Teile. Es muß sich da auch ein besonderes Verhältnis zwischen Teil und Ganzem darstellen. Zunächst ist es nun die Unterordnung der Teile unter das Ganze; da das einheitliche Ganze gleichsam der Zweck ist und die Teile nur zu ihm führende Mittel. Ihre Existenz richtet sich also nach der sie umfassenden Einheit. Dies ist ja schon in der Vorstellung des organischen Individuums enthalten und, in Anwendung auf die Welt, in der Darstellung ihrer konzentrischen Struktur, der durchgängigen Systematik ihrer Existenzen, gebunden an zentrale Kräfte, zur Genüge zum Ausdruck gebracht. Maimonides aber scheint diese eine Seite des Verhältnisses im Organischen nicht zu genügen; er hebt wiederholt und gerade im Zusammenhang mit der Teleologie die Bedeutung des Teiles hervor. Es macht den Eindruck, als ob es ihm um die Hervorhebung dieses Punktes besonders zu tun wäre.

Das Einzelding hat nicht bloß seine Existenz durch das Ganze und für es, was ja die Zweckmäßigkeit zunächst bedingt, sondern der Teil, und gerade als Teil einer Welt, hat Eigenbedeutung. Und dies nicht allein im Wissen Gottes, worauf besonderes Gewicht gelegt wird,¹⁰⁰ sondern auch in seinem

⁹⁹ *Moreh* I 34 (dritte Ursache); bei Aufzählung der letzten Dinge, die jedem wissenswert erscheinen müssen: וְאֵיךְ נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם כֻּלּוֹ (אֲלֵעֲמָלָם בְּחִסְדָּהּ) וְזֶה תְּכַלִּיתוֹ: Munk I, S. 120: à la disposition réciproque de ses parties. Daß in demselben Zusammenhang mit Schöpfung und Zweck auch nach der Natur des Himmels und der Engel gefragt wird, wird uns später noch verständlich werden.

¹⁰⁰ Dies im Zusammenhang mit der Providenz, *Moreh* III 16 g. E., der für Maimonides ein wesentlich notwendiger ist. Den Vertretern der Anschauung,

schöpferischen Tun. Zweimal wird dies im Zusammenhang mit der Teleologie betont: das eine Mal bei der Ablehnung der dinglichen Zweckmäßigkeit, wo in Verbindung mit der Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge auch hervorgehoben wird, daß jeder einzelne Teil der Welt erschaffen ist.¹⁰¹ Das zweite Mal, im stärksten prototeleologischen Kapitel, wo Gott als Zweck der Zwecke bezeichnet wird, wo aber als Hauptabsicht des ganzen Kapitels die angegeben wird, daß Gott alle in der Welt vorkommenden Einzelwirkungen ebenso bewirkt, wie er die Welt als Ganzes in dieser ihrer Form schafft.¹⁰² An dieser zweiten Stelle scheint die Hervorhebung der Schöpfung im einzelnen, gleichgestellt der, als Voraussetzung angenommenen, Schöpfung des Ganzen als besonders wesentlich in der Lehre der göttlichen Zweckmäßigkeit. Ebenso wird bei Behandlung der Irrtümer der Menschen bezüglich der Zweckmäßigkeit in einem Atem gesprochen vom „Zweck der Existenz des gesamten Universums oder vom Zweck einer jeden seiner Teile“.¹⁰³ Maimonides geht aber noch weiter. Als Abschluß des Kapitels I 72, wo er die Lehre vom Weltorganismus darstellt, kommt der Satz, daß die göttliche Leitung und Providenz sich auf jeden einzelnen Teil der Welt bezieht und

Gott kenne und berücksichtige nicht die Teile, da sie nur sinnlich erfassbar seien etc., wirft Maimonides Inkonsistenz vor — סבלותם במה שהיו מעירים אותנו עליו תמיד — indem gerade sie beim Menschen, in Fragen der Theodizee, vom Einzelnen ausgingen. Er bezeichnet auch die Anschauung von den Teilen als Verlegenheitsgriff, um die Auffassung vom Menschen gutzumachen: וכאשר יסדו הפנה: הוואת הסותרת לכל פנה טובה... התחילו אחר כן לחסיר נגותה.

¹⁰¹ *Moreh* III 13: כל חלק מחלקי העולם זכר שהוא המציאו ושמצויאותו היה נאות לכונה: וזהו הנודע. Zu bemerken ist, daß an dieser Stelle im Kapitel, wo durchwegs von גודל (כלל) und זולתו (אלעולם) gebraucht wird. Ein Beweis mehr, daß die Terminologie nicht zufällig ist. Vgl. oben Anm. 74 und 75.

¹⁰² *Moreh* I 69: ואמנם הכונה הנזהר היתה ית' פועל לפרשי השפלות הבאות בעולם, כמו שהוא עושה העולם כלו כמות שהוא. Munks (I, S. 317) Ici on a seulement pour but... drückt das Ansehen des Originals in der Hervorhebung der Wichtigkeit dieses Satzes noch besser aus. Ephodi z. St. hebt hier die Kontinuität hervor — שתמיד — העולם כלו — was uns weiter unten klarer werden wird.

¹⁰³ *Moreh* III 25: שרוב הספקות המביאות למבוכה בבקשת תכלית מציאות העולם בכללו: (וגוד אלעולם בנשלחה) או תכלית כל חלק מחלקיו. Munks (III, S. 201) „soit... soit“ ist abschwächend und nicht begründet.

selbst auf den geringsten und minderwertigsten.¹⁰⁴ Dies heißt noch viel mehr als das früher erwähnte noetische und kreato-rische Verhalten Gottes zum einzelnen Welteil. Es steht ja auch in offenbarem Widerspruch zur späteren, eigentlichen Providenzlehre.¹⁰⁵ Welcher Widerspruch uns hier aber weiter nicht aufhalten soll, da der Ausspruch hier ja doch nur zur besonders eindeutigen Hervorhebung der Welteile in ihrem Zusammenhang mit Gott dienen soll.

Der organische Charakter der Welt im Lichte der Teleologie bedeutet daher viel mehr als die bloße Unterordnung des Teiles, als Mittel, unter das Ganze, als Zweck; er besagt gleichzeitig die Unmittelbarkeit der Beziehung zwischen Teil und Gott als Zweck, wodurch also auch der Teil etwas vom Zweck an sich hat. Alles in der organischen Welt ist Mittel und Zweck zugleich.¹⁰⁶ Wodurch eben die Zweckmäßigkeit eine organische ist, zum Unterschiede von der mechanischen, wo der Teil mit dem Zweck nur mittelbar, durch das Ganze, als dessen Mittel, in Verbindung ist. In gewissem Sinne haben wir hier ein Analogon zu jenem Hervortreten des Menschen aus seiner Genusexistenz, die wir im vorigen Kapitel besprochen haben. Dort hat die intellektuell-ethische Stellung den Menschen, das menschliche Individuum, den Genera gleichgestellt; auch hier tritt das Einzelding, im Lichte der Gesamtzweckmäßigkeit, aus seiner Subordination zum Ganzen hervor, tritt in direkte Beziehung zum einheitlichen Weltzweck (der in Gott enthalten ist),

¹⁰⁴ Dies wird als bewiesen betrachtet; והטופות יעמוד על מציאות טעשה הנחמיו והשגחתו בכל חלק מהלקיו ואפילו הדק הספחות והנהגתו יתע' והשגחתו מחוברת לעולם בכללו. Vgl. Tibbons Erklärung der Fremdwörter unter השגחה, da wird das Moment der wertenden Beachtung (Beispiel: לא משגיחין ביה) hervorgehoben.

¹⁰⁵ *Moreh* III 17, (הדעת הה'), wird in bezug auf alle Geschöpfe, mit Ausnahme des Menschen, die philosophische Lehrmeinung akzeptiert אבל שאר בע"ח בכל שאר בע"ח דעת אריסטו, לא אמתין כלל שזה העלה נפל בהשגחה בו ולא שזה וכ"ש הצמחים וזולתם, דעתי בהן דעת אריסטו, לא אמתין כלל שזה העלה נפל בהשגחה בו ולא שזה וכו' und mehrere andere Beispiele. Wie Munk, I, S. 373 n. 2, gerade von jenen in der vorigen Anmerkung zitierten יעמוד auf III 17, wo das Gegenteil gelehrt wird, offenbar belegend verweisen konnte, ist unverständlich.

¹⁰⁶ Diese Kantsche (*Kr. d. Ur.* II § 66) Formulierung der Zweckmäßigkeit im organischen Wesen darf hier verwendet werden, obwohl es sich hier keineswegs um eine Naturzweckmäßigkeit handelt.

ohne daß diese Vielheit der Einzelbeziehungen etwa eine Zersplitterung der göttlichen Zwecktätigkeit nach sich ziehen würde.¹⁰⁷

Nun bewegt sich dieser ganze Gedankengang auf aristotelischem Boden; da ja eine durchgebildete und bis ins einzelne seiner Philosophie eindringende teleologische Lehre bei Aristoteles gegeben ist, während, wie bereits bemerkt, in der jüdisch-traditionellen Gedankenwelt eine teleologische Philosophie so gut wie gar keinen Platz hatte. Darum ist auch dies eine jener Partien in der Philosophie Maimonides', in denen er ausschließlich aristotelische Philosophie zum Ausgangspunkt nehmen mußte und in denen er auch immer wieder sich auf Aristoteles ausdrücklich beruft. Es erscheint daher unerläßlich, in einigen wesentlichen Punkten auf die eigentliche teleologische Lehre Aristoteles' einzugehen und ihnen die Ergebnisse Maimonides' vergleichend entgegenzuhalten. Dadurch allein können wir zur klareren Erkenntnis dessen gelangen, worin sich Maimonides von seiner aristotelischen Grundlage abhebt, d. h. wozu er die ihm gegebenen Elemente der Teleologie umgestaltet hat. Wobei bei der Fülle der Ausstrahlungen dieser Frage in alle philosophischen Gebiete darauf zu achten ist, daß der Rahmen, der durch unsere systematische Absicht hier gegeben ist, nicht allzusehr überschritten wird.¹⁰⁸ Der Vergleich soll nur so weit gehen, als er uns zur deutlichen Erkenntnis des Spezifischen bei Maimonides zu verhelfen vermag.

Es zeigt sich nun gleich in der hier behandelten Frage des Verhältnisses Teil-Ganzes eine wesentliche Verschiedenheit.

¹⁰⁷ Diese Anschauung des Kalam weist ja Maimonides ausführlich, und für sein System grundlegend, zurück. So *Moreh* I 73, VI Präim. ff., dann I 74 bes. V Methode u. v. a.

¹⁰⁸ Die Einschränkung muß in zweifacher Richtung stattfinden. Es kann, erstens, nicht quellenkritisch auf den arabischen Aristotelismus, besonders Alfarrabi und Ibn Sina, eingegangen werden, da bei ihnen für unser Problem wenig Eigenes anzutreffen ist; sie waren hauptsächlich logisch oder psychologisch orientiert und die Teleologie nahm keinen zentralen Platz ein, vgl. de Boer, *Gesch. d. Phil. im Islam*, S. 125. Andererseits aber kann hier bei Berührung Aristoteles' das entwicklungsgeschichtliche Moment der aristotelischen Philosophie — das W. Jäger, *Aristoteles*, großzügig ins Licht gerückt hat — nicht berücksichtigt werden, da wir uns ja mit dem der Nachwelt vorliegenden, als einheitlich angesehenen Aristoteles, wie ihn Maimonides kannte, auseinanderzusetzen haben.

Wohl hat Aristoteles die Bedeutung des Zweckes mit dem organischen Charakter des Weltgeschehens, im Gegensatz zu den materialistisch-mechanistischen Lehren der Vorsokratiker, begründet.¹⁰⁹ Aber der Begriff des Organischen erschöpft sich bei ihm nur in dem früher erwähnten ersten Moment: in der Subordination der Teile unter das Ganze. Das ist auch der eigentliche Sinn der aristotelischen Teleologie, daß der Zweck mit dem jeweiligen Ganzen identisch ist und die Teile nur Organe, Mittel sind, die zu ihm führen.¹¹⁰ Von dem zweiten Moment, wonach durch die Zweckmäßigkeit die Teile eben aufhören, bloß Mittel zu sein, und zwischen ihnen und dem Ganzen ein teleologisch reziprokes Verhältnis besteht, davon ist bei Aristoteles nichts zu finden. Diese grundlegend vorausgesetzte Notwendigkeit der Unter- und Überordnung im Teleologischen führte ihn auch zur Annahme, daß auch dort, wo ein Ganzes, das als Zweck gelten könnte, nicht zu sehen war, ein Teil, wenn er als besser betrachtet wird, von den anderen herausgehoben wird, diesen gegenüber die Stelle des Ganzen einnimmt und somit ihr Zweck wird.¹¹¹ Wohl

¹⁰⁹ *Phys.*, 198 b 14 ff. wo der Begriff der Zweckursache für die Natur begründet wird, schickt eine Kritik der vorsokratischen Lehren, besonders der des Empedokles, voraus. Ebenso *de part. anim.* 640 a 22, bezüglich des Werdeprozesses im Organischen. Obwohl anderseits ein gewisses „Streifen“ des Form- und Wesenbegriffes bei Empedokles und Demokritos zugegeben wird. (*Phys.* 194 a 20: ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι μέρος.) Ähnlich *Met.* 993 a 17 f. Vgl. Hans Mayr, *Natur und Kunst bei Arist.*, S. 34.

¹¹⁰ *de part. animal.* 641 a 7—32; 645 a 30 f. (Vergleich mit dem Holz, Stein etc. im Verhältnis zum Ganzen des Hauses); ebenso *Met.* 1035 b 22: τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνόλου πρότερα ταῦτ' (sc. μορία) ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δύναται χωριζόμενα. Vgl. weitere Belege bei Siebeck, „Die Lehre des Aristoteles von dem Leben etc. des Universums“, *Zeitschr. f. Phil. u. phil. Kritik*, Bd. 60, S. 4; er gelangt auch zum Schluß: „Es ist augenfällig, daß dieses Erfordernis (nämlich, daß „Teile ... doch nur als Glieder des aus ihnen bestehenden Ganzen wahre Existenz haben und somit ... nicht früher sind, als das Ganze“) mit den Bestimmungen übereinkommt, worin Aristoteles das Wesen des Organismus setzt.“ Das gilt auch im Staate; *Pol.* 1253 a 20: τὸ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. Vgl. Mayr, *Der Entwicklungsgedanke bei Aristoteles*, S. 96 und 99.

¹¹¹ *de gener. anim.* 732 a 5: βέλτιον τὸ κεχωρίσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον τοῦ χείρονος. Ähnlich *de part. anim.* 672 b 20; bes. *Pol.* 1333 a 21: αἰὶ τὸ χείρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἐστὶν ἔννεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. Vgl. Eucken, *Die Methode der aristotelischen Forschung*, S. 85.

spielt das Besondere einmal eine bevorzugte Rolle gegenüber dem Allgemeinen — dies gilt aber nur für die Herausbildung des Gattungstypus,¹¹² was aber wieder nichts anderes bedeutet als das Allgemeine gegenüber dem Individuellen. In der aristotelischen Teleologie gibt es eben nur diesen einen festen Punkt: das Genus; ihm gegenüber verschwindet das Einzeldasein, von ihm aber führt auch kein richtiger Weg zu einer alle Genera umfassenden Zweckmäßigkeit.¹¹³ Während wir also bei Maimonides einen einzigen Zweck sahen, der alles umfaßt, und somit auch die geringsten Teile, sind es bei Aristoteles viele, relative Zwecke, hauptsächlich die Genera, denen die Teile, also alles Individuelle, nur dienen, aber keinerlei unmittelbare Beziehung zu einem, auch dem Ganzen übergeordneten Zwecke behaupten können.

Dies hängt aber mit einer zweiten Divergenz zusammen. Wir sahen bei Maimonides die Zulässigkeit des Zweckbegriffes immer in zwei Formen: erstens als Selbstzweck der Einzelexistenzen, was als nächster Zweck bezeichnet werden mag; dies in der Welt der Dinge der Vielheit; zweitens aber als letzter, alles umfassender Zweck, in der Welt, die einen einheitlichen Organismus bildet. Charakteristisch hierfür ist der eine Satz in dem beides hervorgehoben wird: sowohl die Ablehnung der Fremdzwecklichkeit unter den Dingen als auch die Entstehung der kleinsten Teile aus einer einheitlichen Zweckabsicht.¹¹⁴ Das genaue Gegenteil haben wir bei Aristoteles

¹¹² *de gener. anim.* 736 b 2: οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γίνεται ζῶον καὶ ἀνθρώπος οὐδὲ ζῶον καὶ ἕπτος ... ὕστερον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τέλος, τὸ δ' ἴδιον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκάστου τῆς γενέσεως τέλος. Ähnlich *de part. anim.* 685 b 15; *de inc. anim.* 704 b 15 (ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχωμένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζῶου τὸ ἄριστον); dann 708 a 9. Allerdings ist bei den verstümmelten Arten auch dieses Prinzip durchbrochen, darüber Eucken, *loc. cit.*, S. 82.

¹¹³ Die Zweckmäßigkeit zeigt sich nur im Bau einzelner Gattungen im Verhältnis zu anderen (so *de part. anim.* 696 b 24 f.) oder im Bau der Individuen mit Rücksicht auf ihre Gattung, ohne individuellen Nutzen. Von den vielen Beispielen seien erwähnt: *hist. anim.* 502 b 21; *de part. anim.* 689 b 2; ferner 669 b 28 (über die Milz); *de gener. anim.* 750 b 6. Daß aber eine Reihe individueller Züge, wie etwa Augen und Haarfarbe, nichts mit Zweckmäßigkeit zu tun haben, wird ausdrücklich erklärt *de gener. anim.* 778 a 30 f.; b. 13.

¹¹⁴ *Moreh* III 13; aus der Torah ist zu ersehen מהם שיחיה שלא באר כלל בדבר מהם שיחיה. Die בעבור דבר אחר אלא כל חלק וחלק מחלקי העולם זכר שהוא המציאו ושמיצותו היה נאות לזכור.

teles. Die Teile haben nichts vom Zweck an sich, sie sind nur für ihn da. Hingegen muß Aristoteles, um die vielen in der Welt vorkommenden Zwecke zu einer Einheit zusammenzuschließen, sich eben desselben Mittels bedienen, das wir oben in bezug auf die Beziehung Teil-Ganzes sahen. Wo es kein Ganzes gibt, da wurde ein Teil, infolge seiner relativen Wichtigkeit, zum Range des Ganzen erhoben. Auch in der Welt muß diese pars-pro-toto-Methode angewendet werden. Als Ersatz des einzigen Weltzweckes werden die Genera in ein System einer Zweckabstufung gebracht, wonach das eine Genus, das höhere, dem niederen als Zweck dient. Bei Aristoteles geschieht diese Subordination innerhalb der Genera in zweierlei Form: einmal als Norm, da ist das Höhere dem Niederen Zweck im Sinne eines zur Nachahmung hinanziehenden höheren Wesens; danach ist in der sublunaren Welt der Mensch der Normgebende, im Universum aber tritt er vor den Sphären zurück.¹¹⁵ Denn selbst die Möglichkeit, seinen eigenen Zweck zum Ausdruck zu bringen, ist auch nur den höheren Genera verliehen und steht in direktem Verhältnis zur Höhe des betreffenden Genus.¹¹⁶ Aber nicht allein in diesem, mehr formalen

Verbindung mit אלך drückt deutlich aus, daß sich die beiden Ansichten anschließen. Bei Schem-Tob z. St. noch prägnanter: והוא שכל נמצא כיון בו הנמצא והוא מבלתי שימצא דבר בעבור דבר אחר.

¹¹⁵ Die Tiere sind nur zwergartige Geschöpfe gegenüber dem Menschen *de part. anim.* 686 b 2. Sowohl sein Körperbau, der allein der naturgemäß richtige ist — *ibid.* 656 a 10 —, ist ein Maßstab für alles Tierische als auch besonders das Psychische, indem alles im Tier vorkommende Seelenleben nur als Spur des menschlichen anzusehen ist; *hist. anim.* 588 a 18: ἐνεστι ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἵχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων; ebenso 608 b 4; auch in der Lebensart πολλά ἂν θεωρηθεῖν μίμηματα τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς, 612 b 18. Daß es allerdings im Kosmos ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θεϊότερα τὴν φύσιν gibt, wird *Eth. Nic.* 1141 a 34 hervorgehoben, ebenso bezüglich der Höherstellung der Gestirne *de caelo* 290 a 32.

¹¹⁶ Dies wird *Meteor.* 389 b 29 f. an Beispielen genau ausgeführt, (35: τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἐνεκα ἥκιστα ἐνταῦθα δῆλον ὅπου πλείστον τῆς ὕλης). Ebenso *Phys.* 199 b 9: καὶ ἐν τοῖς πυτοῖς ἐνεστι τὸ ἐνεκά του, ἥττον δὲ διήρθρωται. Ist dies nun ausgesprochene aristotelische Lehrmeinung, so konnte Maimonides, *Moreh* III 13, gut als תבנית הנבונה אשר בחכמה נאך בחכמה אחרת auch anführen daß: (sc. תבנית הנבונה) עבדו כחכמתו, da ja die meisten Genera eben die tieferstehenden sind. Munk, III, S. 85 n. 1, der diese Ansicht bei Aristoteles nicht vorzufinden glaubte, will an Stelle von והוא, wodurch dies als Ansicht Aristoteles' gedacht ist, נאך lesen,

Sinne, auch in einer niedereren, praktischen Beziehung will Aristoteles manchmal die niederen Arten für die höheren existieren lassen, für deren Nutzen; demnach die Pflanzen für das Tier, das Tier aber für den Menschen, wobei natürlich der Mensch die höchste Stufe bedeutet.¹¹⁷ Die Zusammenschließung der vielen Zwecke zu einer Einheit wird also hier nur durch die Fremdzwecklichkeit erreicht. Was aber gleichbedeutend ist mit der Verdinglichung des Zweckes.

Bei Maimonides wissen wir, daß er, um eben die Reinheit des Zweckbegriffes zu erhalten, weder die Sphären als höchsten Zweck noch auch den Menschen in der sublunaren Welt gelten lassen will — selbst im Sinne einer Norm.¹¹⁸ Schon gar nicht aber möchte er dies zulassen im Sinne des Nutzens.¹¹⁹ Die Verschiedenheit der Auffassungen bezüglich der Teile greift also hinüber auch auf die Auffassung bezüglich der Dinglichkeit des Zweckes und der Fremdzwecklichkeit.

Dazu kommt noch ein Drittes. Wir haben gesehen, daß Maimonides wohl die Welt mit einem Menschen vergleicht, von ihr aber die Einheit als Makroorganismus aussagt. Sie als Makranthropos zu betrachten, hält er nicht für nötig.

womit eine eigene Hinzufügung Maimonides' gegeben wäre. Diese Korrektur ist, wie gesehen, überflüssig, aber auch aus dem Grunde unmöglich, da doch Maimonides, wäre es seine eigene Behauptung, dies auch begründen müßte. Daß alle Genera im Entstehen und Vergehen ihren Zweck haben, spricht nichts gegen die Behauptung, der Zweck sei in den meisten nicht genug sichtbar (יָסֵי — תעֵלָם). Das Tibbonsche התכלית הסבה ויואת etc. muß daher, dem ואתן ואתן entsprechend, richtig heißen ושותא oder ואתן ואתן.

¹¹⁷ Schon unter den Elementen wird die Stufenfolge, verbunden mit Zweckzuordnung, durchgeführt, *Meteor.* 389 b 26. Bei den organischen Wesen τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν ἐνεκὲν ἐστίν, *de part. anim.* 646 b 11. Dann aber *Pol.* 1256 b 15: ... οἷητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἐνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, worauf sich offenbar *Moreh* III 13 (s. *Guide* III, S. 85 n. 3) bezieht, und bezeichnend als Schluß: εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μὴτὲν μῆτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιημένα τὴν φύσιν, womit dies mit der eigentlichen Teleologie enge verknüpft erscheint. In dem Sinne schließt auch *Phys.* 194 a 35: ἐσμὲν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος.

¹¹⁸ Dies wäre die III 13 als irrig zurückgewiesene Meinung שתכלית המציאות השם בלוי מציאות מין האדם לבדו לעבוד את השם Anm. 35, 36.

¹¹⁹ Wiederholt in III 13, s. oben Anm. 17, 29 und weiter unten Anm. 235—236.

Andererseits wiederum will er den Ausdruck Mikrokosmos nur für den Menschen, nicht aber für jedes Lebewesen zulassen.¹²⁰ Das Gegenteil bei Aristoteles. Die organische Einheit der Welt selbst wird bei ihm nur insofern zum Ausdruck gebracht, als er ihren zweckmäßigen Aufbau mit dem Kunstwerk vergleicht, sie als Werk eines guten Wirtschafters oder vernünftigen Menschen ansieht.¹²¹ Nicht ausgesagt wird ihre Einheit, sondern verglichen ihre rationelle Organisation. Hingegen wird die Bezeichnung Mikrokosmos unbedenklich auch auf jedes andere Lebewesen angewendet,¹²² wodurch also die innewohnende Vernunft, die das Zweckmäßige in der Welt ausmachen soll, nicht mehr als für dessen Charakter wesentlich angesehen wird. Während also bei Maimonides allein aus der organischen Beschaffenheit der Weltzusammenhänge das sie durchwaltende Vernunftprinzip hervorging und dadurch eben nur das vernunftbegabte Wesen, der Mensch, als seine Miniatur bezeichnet zu werden verdient, wird bei Aristoteles die Welt nur als ein vernünftiges Werk angesehen, was ja auch für jedes Lebewesen zutreffen mag.

Es ist dies aber nicht bloß ein Unterschied in Metaphern, sondern in der Grundvorstellung. Aus ihr resultieren die drei angeführten Züge in der Teleologie des Aristoteles: die einseitige Subordination des Teiles zum Ganzen, die dingliche Fremdzwecklichkeit innerhalb der Genera, die bloß zweckmäßige, einem Kunstwerk gleiche, aber nicht zweckdurchdrungene und von einem einheitlichen Zweck getragene Ordnung der Welt; all dies ist Ausdruck für die technistische

¹²⁰ Beleg s. oben Anm. 62.

¹²¹ *de gener. anim.* 744 b 16 ff.: ὡπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν ἐβόηεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαι τι χρηστόν. (Ähnlich *de part. anim.* 675 b 20 ff.) *de part. anim.* 687 a 10—12: ἡ δὲ φύσις αἰεὶ διανέμει καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι. Dann *ibid.* 694 a 20 f., 661 b 28 f. Bezeichnend ist bei beiden angeführten Stellen, daß sich die Vernünftigkeit der Natur mit der richtigen Ausnützung und nützlichen Verteilung begründet wird. Vgl. Hardy, *Der Begriff d. Physis etc.* I, S. 195 ff. Daß aber die Welt, obwohl sie belebt ist, doch nicht ein einheitliches ζῶον im Sinne Platons darstellt, weist nach Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* II³, 2, S. 423 Anm. 1.

¹²² Von mehreren allgemein gehaltenen Vergleichen sei als besonders bezeichnend angeführt *Phys.* 252 b 26: εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ (bezogen auf das vorhergehende: εἰ δ' ἐν ζῳῳ) γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ.

Grundauffassung bei Aristoteles. Technistisch als Überwindung der mechanistischen; technistisch als Grundvorstellung auch dann, wenn einzelne aristotelische Aussprüche versichern, daß die Kunst die Natur, nicht die Natur die Kunst nachahme.¹²³ Denn nicht vom Rang ist hier die Rede, sondern von der ursprünglichen Konzeption. Und diese technistische Konzeption ist es eben, in allen Teilen, der Maimonides entgegentritt.

Bei Maimonides war es die Einheit des Kosmos, entsprechend der Einheit Gottes, die die Einheit des Weltzweckes gewährleistete. Für Aristoteles konnte es eine solche Einheit, zumindest für die Teleologie, nicht geben. Die architektonische Einheit, der konzentrische Aufbau, bedingt dies noch lange nicht notwendig. Abgesehen von der Vielheit der Zwecke, die die technistische Grundanschauung mit sich brachte, waren es in in der aristotelischen Welt zwei voneinander notwendigerweise wesentlich verschiedene Zweckarten: die in der Sphärenwelt und die im sublunaren Entstehen und Vergehen. Da sich die Notwendigkeit des Zweckes zunächst aus dem Begriff der Kinesis ergeben hat — da die Einzelbewegung zu irgendeinem Ende, Telos, führt¹²⁴ —, so war der eigentliche Platz des

¹²³ *Phys.* 194 a 21: ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν. Bald darauf aber, an der Hauptstelle, 199 a 15 f., wird derselbe Ausspruch — ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ... τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται — ganz klar als Ausgangspunkt benützt, um von der Technik auf den Zweck in der Natur zu schließen: εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἕνεκα του, ὁῦλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν; woran sich dann mehrere Gedanken dieser Art anschließen. Ebenso *de anima* 415 b 16: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκα του ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτῇ τέλος. Allerdings schließt der ähnliche Gedankengang *de part. anim.* 639 b 19 ff. damit ab, daß μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα... ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. (Vgl. Meyer, *Natur und Kunst*, S. 62 f., 85 f.) Wenn Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 75 Anm. 2, nach der (als aristotelisch agnoszierten) Proptetikos-Stelle μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἢ φύσιν etc., die faktische Priorität der Natur gegenüber der Kunst hervorhebt, so ist damit noch immer die vielfach belegte logische Priorität der Kunstzweckmäßigkeit gegenüber der der Natur nicht aus der Welt geschafft — und darauf kommt es ja bei der Grundvorstellung des Philosophen an.

¹²⁴ Beispiele für das Schreiten zum Ziele gibt es mehrere, so *Phys.* 193 b 13, wird vom ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν gesprochen, dann 16: τὸ φερόμενον ἐκ τινὸς εἰς τὸ ἔρχεται; 257 b 7 f.: τὸ δὲ δυνάμει εἰς ἐντελέχειαν βαδίζει, ἔστι δ' ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινήτου ἀτελής. *Met.* 1048 b 28: πάντα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής (Beispiel: βάδις); 1050 a 7: ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος. *De coelo* 310 a 34 f. (εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος φέρεσθαι). Klar ist die Bezeichnung des τέλους als ἔσχατον in *Met.* 1055 a 14. Über den Zweck als Grenze, vgl. Eucken, *loc. cit.*, S. 110 f.

Telos, in seiner Zwitterbedeutung Ende-Zweck, ursprünglich nur in derjenigen Bewegung, die geradlinig verläuft, also in der sublunaren Welt.¹²⁵ Es war nur gleichsam im Wege des Schlusses, daß auch in der superlunaren Welt, wo die Sphärenbewegung die vollkommenste, die kreisförmige, die u n e n d l i c h e ist, daß auch da ein Telos angenommen wurde — das aber nichts mehr vom E n d e an sich haben konnte und nur reiner Zweck war, der ὡς ἐρώμενον, ὡς ὁρεκτόν wirkt.¹²⁶ Es ist dies der erste unbewegte Bewegter. Und wenn innerhalb des einzelnen Geschehens eine Art Synonymie¹²⁷ unter den Ursachen besteht, so mag hier bei der Anwendung desselben Terminus für beide grundverschiedene Bewegungsarten eine Homonymie vorliegen.

Denn die beiden Hälften der Welt, die sphärische und die irdische, dürfen in keinem Punkte verglichen, noch auch nach denselben Prinzipien behandelt werden.¹²⁸ Wie sollen sie nun in der wichtigsten der Ursachen, in der Zweckursache, ein Gemeinsames haben? Die Welt hängt wohl zusammen. Aber die Einwirkung der Sphären auf die sublunare Welt ist uns bei Aristoteles nur in zweierlei Beziehung bekannt: in der m e c h a n i s c h e n, indem die Drehungen der Gestirne auf das

¹²⁵ *De coelo* 288 b 29 f.: ἅπασαν δὲ (sc. κίνησιν) φάμεν ἔκ τινος εἶς τι εἶναι καὶ ὠρισμένην. *Phys.* 241 a 26: μεταβολή... ἅπαντα γὰρ ἦν ἔκ τινος εἶς τι, καὶ ἡ ἐν ἀντιφάσει καὶ ἡ ἐν ἐναντίοις; 261 a 32. *Met.* 1069 b 13: εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ' ἑκάστον αἱ μεταβολαί; auch 1012 b 28. Vgl. *de gener. et corr.* 331 a 14 ff. Die Bewegung von Punkt zu Punkt, die als Gegensätze anzusehen sind, war also die Grundvorstellung. Das konnte für die Sphäre nicht gelten; *Phys.* 241 b 2: ἡ δὲ πορὶ οὗτω μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πεπερασμένη· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσα ἐν ἐναντίοις.

¹²⁶ *Met.* 1072 b 3, 1074 a 23. Weiters vgl. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 375 Anm. 2 und 3.

¹²⁷ Die darin besteht, daß „das neu entstehende dieselbe Form an sich trägt wie das den Werdeprozeß einleitende Prinzip“. Meyer, *Natur und Kunst* S. 60; Belege s. *ibid.* Anm. 4 („eine Ausnahme findet nur statt beim ersten Bewegter“).

¹²⁸ *Met.* 1075 b 13: διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ' ἀφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. *De coelo* 306 a 9: δεῖ ἴσως... τῶν δ' αἰδίων αἰδίων, τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν φθαρτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅπως δ' ὁμογενεῖς τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις; auch 279 a 18 (daß das Überirdische über Raum und Zeit erhaben ist). Gegenüber dem Sublunaren aber ist das Superlunare als das Normale maßgebend, was ausführlich *Met.* 1010 a 25, 1063 a 11 behandelt wird. Dieser Mangel an Einheitlichkeit innerhalb der Welt wird nicht gutgemacht durch die verschiedenen Beweise, daß es nur eine Welt gibt, nicht viele, worüber Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 446 f.

Werden in der irdischen Welt Einfluß haben,¹²⁹ und in der *μίμησις* der letzteren. Die *μίμησις* ist es eigentlich, die im irdischen Entstehen und Vergehen, die in jedem Sonderfalle doch geradlinig verlaufen, eine Art von Kreislauf, also der Bewegung der Sphären gleich, erblicken läßt.¹³⁰ Dies steht dem Teleologischen etwas näher — doch reicht ja sicher das Verhältnis der *μίμησις*, das Aristoteles in verschiedenen Beziehungen verwendet,¹³¹ nicht aus, um eine teleologische Verbundenheit darzustellen, die doch in der Vorstellung des Organs wurzelt. Wie könnte, im teleologischen Sinne Aristoteles', auch nur die entfernteste Möglichkeit einer Konstruktion bestehen, wonach etwa das Entstehen und Vergehen, selbst als kyklische Bewegung gesehen, Mittel ist, die zum Kreislauf der Sphären irgendwie führt? Andererseits ist *μιμούμενος* doch keinesfalls gleichwertig mit *ἐρώμενος*.

Demnach ist weder die Möglichkeit gegeben, aus dem sublunaren Entstehen und Vergehen auf den unbewegten Bewegten zu schließen,¹³² noch auch diesen, wenn auch erwiesen,

¹²⁹ Belege s. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 468f., bes. S. 471 Anm. 1 und 2. Diese feste Beziehung zwischen der Ekliptik und der irdischen *γένεσις* ist der Grundzug der Schrift *de gen. et corr.* Hinzuzufügen wäre noch *Phys.* 194 b 13: *ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος...*, dazu ergänzend *Met.* 1071 a 13, worin bei der Entstehung des Menschen gleichgestellt sind *πατήρ* mit *ἥλιος* und *λοξὸς κύκλος*. Weitere Stellen, wo als *πρῶτον κινεῖν* für das Werden die Kreisbewegung der Planeten zu verstehen ist, *Met.* 1070 b 27, b 34 u. a.

¹³⁰ *Meteor.* 346 b 36, wo der Kreislauf des Wassers *μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον*. Allgemeiner *Met.* 1050 b 28: *μιμεῖται τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα; de gener. et corr.* 337 a 2: *καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλλα... μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν* (veranschaulicht am Kreislauf der Elemente) ... *ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα φορά μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχῆς ἐστίν*. Auch *Phys.* 223 b 23 ff.

¹³¹ So z. B. *hist. anim.* 612 b 18, wo im Leben der Tiere *πολλὰ μίμηματα* zum Leben des Menschen gefunden werden, oder *Poet.* 1449 b 9, wo vom Epos ausgesagt wird, es sei eine *μίμησις* der Tragödie. In beiden Fällen wird wohl eine Wertung damit ausgedrückt, doch auf keinen Fall eine wirklich teleologische Beziehung.

¹³² In der Jugendschrift *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* hat Aristoteles wohl einen Gottesbeweis auf ontologisch-teleologischer Basis unternommen: Auf Grund der Stufenfolge im Seienden wird auf ein Höchstes, Vollkommenstes geschlossen. Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 161. Doch hat dieser Gedankengang, wie auch Jäger S. 162 andeutet, nichts Gemeinsames mit seinen aus den Lehrschriften bekannten Gottesbeweisen aus der Ewigkeit der Bewegung etc. Den „teleologischen“ Gottesbeweis, den Elser, *Die Lehre des Aristoteles über das Wirken Gottes*, S. 9f.,

in irgendeine wirksame Beziehung zur sublunaren Welt zu bringen. Er bleibt Gott und Zweck der Sphären — und selbst da nicht der einzige, wie in der ursprünglichen Konzeption.¹³³ Er mußte auch da vieles von seiner Existenznotwendigkeit an die sich später ergebenen¹³⁴ 55 Sonderbeweger der einzelnen Sphären abgeben, die aber wiederum nicht mehr ganz „unbewegt“ bleiben konnten, wodurch sich Aristoteles in Schwierigkeiten begeben mußte, die ihm später von Theophrast und Plotin¹³⁵ vorgeworfen wurden, die er aber auch selbst empfunden zu haben schien.¹³⁶ Ist nun die Vielheit selbst in die Region der unendlichen Kreisbewegung eingedrungen, welche Wirksamkeit soll da noch dem einzigen unbewegten Beweger in der Welt des endlichen, geradlinigen Entstehens und Vergehens vorbehalten sein? Es handelt sich hier nicht allein um die Schwierigkeit Immanenz-Transzendenz, die sich aus dieser Dualität der Bewegung und der Zwecke er-

anführt, bezeichnet er selbst, wegen seiner „populären Haltung“, als für die eigentliche Gotteslehre Aristoteles' nicht maßgebend. Vgl. auch A. Boehm, *Die Gottesidee bei Aristoteles*, S. 86.

¹³³ Die ursprüngliche reine Fassung des πρώτων κινούν im Jugenddialoge περὶ φιλοσοφίας stand noch ganz im Zeichen des platonischen Einflusses. Er hat bloß an Stelle der sich selbstbewegenden Weltseele für den πρώτος οὐρανός den unbewegten Beweger angenommen. Reste dieser ursprünglichen Anschauung sind noch im Buche A der *Metaph.* erhalten. Darüber ausführlich Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 143, 231, 373 f.

¹³⁴ Dies geschieht *Met.* A 8, wo die Frage der Sphärenbeweger enge mit der fachlichen Astronomie, insbesondere mit der des Kalippos, verbunden wird. Durch diese Verbindung ergab sich die Annahme einer Mehrzahl von Sphärenbewegern als Konsequenz des πρώτων κινούν. Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 366 ff., bes. S. 379. (Über die Bewegtheit dieser Sphärenbeweger S. 386.)

¹³⁵ Die Kritik Theophrasts, *Metaph.* p. 310 f. Br., gipfelt darin, daß sich aus der aristotelischen Annahme die Konsequenz ergibt, daß der erste Beweger keinerlei Wirkung auf die sublunare Welt ausüben kann. Plotin, *Enn.* V, I, 9., hält durch die Annahme der vielen Beweger — deren Verhältnis zum ersten Beweger nicht geklärt werden kann — die Einheitlichkeit des Kosmos gefährdet.

¹³⁶ Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 377, weist auf *Met.* 1074 a 31 ff. hin, wo die Einheit des Himmels, mitten im Kap. 8, bewiesen wird — welche Stelle als von Aristoteles selbst empfundener Einwand zu erklären ist. Dann *Phys.* 258 b 10: ... ἀνάγκη εἶναι τι ὁ πρώτων κινεῖ, εἴτε ἐν εἴτε πλείω. Welche Ausdrucksweise, s. Jäger, S. 383, auf eine Unsicherheit bei Aristoteles selbst — im Kap. 6 des Buches VIII, wo die Notwendigkeit der Annahme eines ersten Bewegers bewiesen wird — schließen läßt.

gibt.¹³⁷ Denn selbst als transzendenter Zweck ist der einzige Beweger in der sublunaren Welt ganz unbegründet und unhaltbar. Das aristotelische Bild, daß die Welt an Gott „hängt“ (ἡρτηται), entspricht gut diesem unbestimmten Verhältnis zwischen dem ersten Beweger der Sphärenwelt und einem hypothetisch einheitlichen Kosmos.¹³⁸ Zumindest ist dadurch ausgedrückt, daß er weder die Welt durchdringt, noch aus sich emaniert.¹³⁹ Soll aber die Zweckmäßigkeit nicht bloß homonymen Natur oder Metapher sein, sondern ein wirklicher Faktor, eine *causa finalis*, so mußte der teleologische Zusammenhang zwischen der super- und sublunaren Welt hergestellt sein, und es mußte in Gott oder von ihm aus der Zweck des Ganzen, ein Zweck, gefunden werden können. Bei Aristoteles aber gibt es weder einen Zweck, noch eine teleologisch geeinigte Welt.

Für Maimonides war die Einheit der Welt, und somit ihre einheitliche Zweckmäßigkeit, gesichert durch zwei wesentliche Grundlehren: die Kreation ex nihilo und die Stellung des Aktiven Intellektes; oder, bei einer allgemeinen Fassung des zweiten Punktes, durch die neue Deutung der Funktion

¹³⁷ So z. B. Cassirer, *loc. cit.*, I², S. 216, der als inneren Widerstreit bei Aristoteles den zwischen seiner Naturansicht und der Metaphysik empfindet: „Der Weltbegriff hat seine Selbständigkeit an den Gottesbegriff verloren.“ Ähnlich Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, I 7, S. 64, der die teleologische Immanenz als Pantheismus ansieht und ihr die „transzendente Gottesidee“, die dem „echt aristotelischen Gedanken“ vom unbewegten Beweger entspricht, gegenüberstellt.

¹³⁸ Siebeck, *loc. cit.*, S. 29, will zunächst den Schluß vom αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν auf die Annahme eines aus der sublunaren Welt, dem Himmelsgebäude und dem unbewegten Beweger bestehenden, „einen lebenden und beseelten Organismus“ als berechtigt erklären, muß aber selbst, S. 36 u. bes. S. 38, die Unhaltbarkeit dieser Anschauung, infolge der unüberwindbaren Schwierigkeiten im System, zugeben. „Wenn es nur mit der Einheit dieses ζῶον besser bestellt wäre!“ Die „Beseeltheit“ der irdischen Welt kann nur als ἀνάλογον zur eigentlich beseelten Sphärenwelt angesehen werden. (S. 37.) In seinem späteren *Aristoteles*, S. 53, sieht Siebeck „bei näherer Betrachtung“ diese Auffassung der Einheit der Welt (mit Einbeziehung des πρώτον κινεῖν) als eine „Vereinigung von Gegensätzen“, die „mehr behauptet als bewiesen“ ist.

¹³⁹ Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 411. „Die Einheit Gottes mit der Welt“ — „er ist ihre Einheit, obgleich er nicht in ihr ist“ — ist in diesem Bilde, aus dem wohl nur die zweite Hälfte des Satzes hervorgeht, schwerlich zu finden.

der Sphären im kosmischen Geschehen. Wir werden sehen, daß gerade dieser Punkt der aristotelischen Lehre, wo, im Lichte der Teleologie, die Welt für ihn auseinanderfiel und nur, schwer vereinbar, an seinem unbewegten Bewegten „hängen“ blieb — daß es dieser Punkt war, wo Maimonides ansetzte, um das erschütterte aristotelische Gebäude durch sein eigenes zu ersetzen. Und es wird sich auch zeigen, daß die vielzitierte Konzession, die Maimonides der aristotelischen Lehre in der sublunaren Welt einräumt,¹⁴⁰ und sogar die Verbindung dieser Konzession mit einer scheinbaren Teilung zwischen dem himmlischen und irdischen Bereich¹⁴¹ nicht wörtlich zu nehmen sind. Für beide ist, durch den einschränkenden und betonten Zusatz der Unrichtigkeit der aristotelischen Lehren, insbesondere bezüglich der separaten Intelligenzen,¹⁴² in der Gültigkeit dieser Lehren, auch im sublunaren Geschehen, eine wesentliche Restriktion gegeben, die, prinzipiell gesehen, einer Aufhebung gleichkommt.

Ist dies doch schon der Fall in der Frage der Kreation. Kreation aber und Stellung und Funktion der separaten Intelligenzen hängen enge zusammen und sind gleichsam gegenseitig bedingt. Die Kurationslehre glaubt Maimonides nicht anders stützen zu können als durch die präzisierende Lehre von

שכל מה שאמרו אויסמו בכל הנמצא אשר מתחת גלגל הירח עד טרכו הארץ: *Moreh* II 22: ¹⁴⁰ הוא אמת בלא ספק.

¹⁴¹ Moreh II 24, wo auf die Stelle II 22 bezug genommen wird und nur noch unsere Unwissenheit in den superlunaren Dingen hervorgehoben: ואמנם כל מה שבשמים לא ידע האדם דבר בטנו אלא בזה השקור המסודר המטע יל' שהשם לבדו ידע אתה השמים... אמנם מה שתחת השמים נתן יכולת: אצל נעמור אצל היכולת ונתיח הענין; Und als abschließende Mahnung: לאדם לדעתו במה שלא יושג בחישה למי שבהוה השם ה' אל' העצום.

¹⁴² *Moreh* II 22 als Fortsetzung des oben Zitierten: כל שכן בזה שיאמרו ב סדר השכלים לקצת אלו הדעות האלהיות אשר יאמינו ובהם ההרחקות העצומות וההפסדים הנראים המבוארים. Daß schon darin, entsprechend der maimunischen Lehre über den Zusammenhang zwischen der sphärischen und der sublunaren Welt, eine eingestandene wesentliche Abschwächung des Vorherigen enthalten ist, ist klar. Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 106, findet den Widerspruch schon im Vordersatz allein — וכמעט אומר שדבר לשון הבאי —, da doch die aristotelische Lehre von der Ewigkeit der ersten Materie sich auf die sublunare Welt bezieht und Maimonides I 74, Methode IV, die Kreation davon abhängig macht, שיחבאר בטופס היות החומר הראשון והיצורה הראשונה הוות נפסדות.

den Sphären,¹⁴³ da ja der Haupteinwand gegen die Kreation, der vom Verhältnis Potentialität — Aktualität und ihrer Stellung im Zeitlichen, durch das Heranziehen der Wirksamkeit des Aktiven Intellectes entkräftet wird.¹⁴⁴ Andererseits aber ist auch zur richtigen Auffassung der separaten Intelligenzen, schon in ihrer Wirksamkeit auf die Sphären, die Kreationstheorie als Grundlage nötig.¹⁴⁵ Wie nun beide zu-

¹⁴³ *Moreh* II 2: לא יתאמתו ולא יתבאר אלא (sc. על חדוש העולם). Entgegen dem Einwande Munks, II, S. 48 n. 4, scheint die Lesung und Übersetzung Tibbons richtig zu sein, wenn es das אסתביל als I. Pers. futur. act. (אֶסְתַּבִּיל) und nicht als perf. pass. (אֶסְתַּבֵּל) auffaßt und also אביא (nicht הביא wie Charisi) übersetzt. Denn nur so hat es einen Sinn; da ja aus der hergebrachten philosophischen Lehre von den separaten Intelligenzen sich für die Kreation nichts ergibt, sondern erst aus der maimunischen eigenen Interpretation und Ableitung derselben. Es entspricht auch der im Kapitel vorhergegangenen Bemerkung, daß er die Theorien der Philosophen ergänzen (שואלים דעת החילוסטים), Munk: achever) will, indem er ihre Beweise mit dem Wörtchen יסוד, der Engellehre, in Einklang bringt. Auch die darauffolgende, mit besonderer Feierlichkeit eingeführte הקדמה spricht dafür: der Autor verwahrt sich dagegen, daß seine Absicht eine naturwissenschaftliche sei, auch soweit dies mit der Weisheit Gottes zusammenhängt, oder die Frage etwa von der Natur oder Anzahl der Sphären oder der Anzahl der separaten Intelligenzen etc. Diese hauptsächlich physikalischen Fragen überläßt er anderen — er verfolgt einen ganz anderen Zweck. Damit ist deutlich genug gesagt, daß er wohl nicht bloß eine Wiederholung der philosophischen Beweise für die separaten Intelligenzen vorhat. Über die Stellung des מציאותם, אביא ראייה על מציאותם ואיך Ephodi (auch Schemb-Tob) zwei Möglichkeiten zur Wahl: entweder verbunden mit dem Vorhergehenden, wie hier zitiert, oder in Verbindung mit dem Darauffolgenden ואיך מכלתי הקדים לפני זה. Im ersteren Falle sieht auch er den Sinn des אביא ראייה ואיך in der spezifischen Beweisführung Maimonides': ולהעמיד בנכח איכות הבאת הראייה על מציאותם. Doch ist dies als מושג nicht notwendig; beide möglichen Auffassungen sind sehr gut vereinbar. Wie wir sahen, bilden alle drei: die Existenz der separaten Intelligenzen, die spezifisch maimunische Ableitung und die verwahrende הקדמה — eine gedankliche Einheit. Das אביא ראייה bildet das Verbindungsglied.

¹⁴⁴ *Moreh* II 18, Methode I. Wichtig ist, daß Maimonides das Heranziehen des Aktiven Intellectes nicht etwa als Vergleich mit Gott verstanden wissen will — ואילו עשיתו זה הייתה השגחה — sondern es ihm auf die prinzipielle Möglichkeit einer Tätigkeitsaufnahme beim Separaten ankommt, ohne daß dies eine zeitliche Aktualisierung bedeuten müßte. Doch wäre dies ohne das gemeinsame Charakteristikum der Separatheit nicht möglich.

¹⁴⁵ *Moreh* II 19 g. E., wo abschließend über die Frage der Verschiedenheit der Sphärenbewegungen (worüber noch später) gesagt wird: אמנם החלומים הנמצאים בנלגלים ובנוכחים מי הוא מיוחד כי אם השם, ואם יאמר אומר השכלים הנפרדים לא היווה בזה המאמר

schen sogenannten νοῦς ποιητικός bei Alexander-Farabi, bewußt oder unbewußt, übersehend. Auf jeden Fall aber hat Maimonides, sogar gegenüber Farabi, die Stellung des Aktiven Intellekts noch mehr herausgestrichen. Charakteristisch hierfür ist vor allem der Versuch, von unten aus die Existenz, ja die logische Notwendigkeit des Aktiven Intellekts zu beweisen.¹⁴⁸ Betrachtet man diesen Beweis näher, so ist es nicht bloß eine neue Zutat zu dem bereits von Aristoteles-Farabi rezipierten Weltbild, wonach der Aktive Intellekt der zehnte der separaten Intelligenzen ist und seine Wirksamkeit sich auf die Erde erstreckt. Es soll eben gezeigt werden, daß alles formbildende Geschehen in der sublunaren Welt ohne diesen separaten Intellekt (der ihr zugeordnet ist wie die anderen separaten Intelligenzen ihren Sphären) logisch gar nicht denkbar wäre. Der Vergleich mit dem Tischler und der Idee des Schrankes, die dem wirklichen Schrank vorausgehen muß,¹⁴⁹ berührt aber gerade diese Art von Zusammenhang des Realen

S. 571 Anm. 2. Die Hauptabsicht unseres *Moreh*-Abschnittes ist die Beweisführung für das genaue Gegenteil: daß trotzdem der Aktive Intellekt keine zeitliche Aktualisierung erfährt, er dennoch seine Tätigkeit aussetzt. Darum auch wird diese Ansicht Farabis durch ein wörtliches Zitat belegt. Während also Maimonides die allgemeine Lehre vom Aktiven Intellekt als aristotelische Ansicht ansieht, führt er diese zusätzliche Lehre Farabis, vom Aussetzen der Tätigkeit, ins Treffen gegen Aristoteles. In der Mitte steht das *אשר הוא נפרד*, das sowohl für Aristoteles gilt, aber auch gleichzeitig den Stützpunkt bildet für die Lehre Farabis. Eine Übersetzung daher, wie die Weiß', II 118: „Dies beweist nach Ansicht Aristoteles' die aktive Vernunft“ etc. die, der extremste Gegensatz zu Munk, gar die ganze Beweisführung auf Aristoteles gründen will, ist nicht nur dem Original nicht treu, sondern auch sachlich ganz irrig.

¹⁴⁸ *Moreh* II 4; vgl. meine Abhandlung *Proph.*, S. 97.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*: *וצריך שיהיה המוציא ממיין המוצא, כי הנגר לא יעשה האוצר באשר הוא אומן אבל מאשר בשכלו צורת האוצר וצורת האוצר אשר בשכל הנגר היא אשר הוציאה צורת האוצר לפועל*. Wird nun hier die Idee geradezu als die erzeugende Ursache bezeichnet, so ist es scheinbar anders in III 19, wo auch ein technisches Gleichnis angeführt wird: *מבואר הוא שכל פועל כלי מן הכלים לולא שהפועל הנעשה בכלי הוא* und als Beispiel wird der Nadelerzeuger angeführt, der auch vom Nähen eine richtige Vorstellung besitzen muß, um die Nadel richtig zu machen. Doch muß diese Variation keine Änderung des im ersten Gleichnis Ausgedrückten bedeuten. Form und Leistung fallen eben zusammen; die Erzeugung, um richtig, d. h. der Idee entsprechend, zu sein, setzt also auch die richtige Vorstellung der Benützung voraus. Die Idee ist, anders ausgedrückt, der Zweck.

mit dem Idealen, den Aristoteles gewöhnlich, im Gleichnis des Hausbaues, für die Charakteristik des Zweckbegriffes verwendet.¹⁵⁰ Diese logische Ableitung bekommt also von Haus aus teleologische Färbung. Die aristotelische Entelechie, die ein Zweck-Innehaben bedeutet,¹⁵¹ und deren Verwirklichung nur durch die Steresis stimuliert wird, sie wird hier gebunden an einen Akt der Leitung, von oben her erfolgt, durch den Mittler zwischen Gott und Welt.¹⁵² Die Entwicklung des Organismus aus dem Keim, die für Aristoteles das Urbeispiel für seine Teleologie war, sie wird hier noch einen dazukommenden oberen Faktor, dem Engel, zugeschrieben, der, wie Maimonides durch eine Parallelisierung deutlich zum Ausdruck bringt, mit der immanenten Tendenz des Keimes als solchen nicht identisch ist.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ So z. B. *Phys.* 199 a 7f., *Eth. Nic.* 1097 a 14f., *de part. anim.* 639 b 14f. u. v. a.

¹⁵¹ Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 409: „Das Eidos mit Bezug auf die Bewegung heißt ἐν-τελ-ἔχεια, insofern jedes Ding im Eidos das verwirklichte τέλος der Bewegung innehat.“

¹⁵² *Moreh* III 51 wird der Aktive Intellekt als Band zwischen Gott und uns bezeichnet אשר בינו ובנינו (אלהים) הדבור (Munk: le lieu). Ebenso III 52: והמלך הוא הדבק המחוץ הוא השכל השוטף עליו, שהוא הדבור אשר בינו ובין השׁיׁת.

¹⁵³ *Moreh* II 6 wird von allen Naturkräften als von מלאכים gesprochen; gegen die mißverständene Ideenlehre wird betont בריאת ער שפילו חלקי המציאות. האברים מבעלי חיים כפי מה שהם עליו כל זה באמצעות מלאכים שהשׁיׁת שם בורע כח מצייר יעשה תכונת אלו האברים. Dann bei Ablehnung der grob-materialisierenden Auffassung vom Engel werden dieser folgende zwei Auffassungen entgegengestellt: או שהצורות כלם טפועות השכל הפועל והוא המלאך והוא שרר של עולם. Von diesen zwei voneinander unterschiedenen Anschauungen entspricht die erste der echt aristotelischen, immer noch der materialistischen vorzuziehen, die zweite aber ist die eigentliche maimonische, wie überall gelehrt. Munk, II, S. 71, betont die zweite Hälfte des Satzes durch die Übersetzung des או mit ou bien. Ephodi z. St. erklärt אז הנה הוא הטבע — זה הכח הוא הטבע — אז שם בורע וכי — אז שהצורות כלם וכי. Dagegen Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 88, will beide Auffassungen zugleich gelten lassen: וכלל שתי הדעות בדבריו, דעת האומרים כי המצייר החמרים כח מבעי דעת האומרים שכל נבדל. Diese Interpretation, beträchtlich übertrieben, vertritt Schem-Tob z. St. Auch er will beide vereinigen: אם שיהיה המהות כח נפשי הנמצא בורע... והוא האמת... כמו שבאר אריסטו כי מהשטע, או יהיה המלאך והוא השכל הפועל, כנאן כלל הדעת השנית שהוא דעת ב"ם. Um nun diese Vereinigung — möglichen — והאמת כי הרב סובר שתי הדעות בהיות העברים — zu machen, muß er, aus eigenem, eine Rollenverteilung zwischen המצייר הכח והשכל הפועל vornehmen, die nichtssagend ist. Daß hier Ephodi, in der Aus-

wie auch sonst der Ton dort, entbehren sicherlich nicht einer leisen Ironie über die astronomische Akribie bei Aristoteles gerade in diesem Zusammenhange.¹⁶¹ Viel eingehender aber wird diese Frage behandelt in der großen Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles, in deren Zusammenhang Maimonides insbesondere die Komplikationen, in die sich Aristoteles durch seine Sphären-Motoren-Theorie begeben hat, indem er sie allein aus der natürlichen Bewegung ableiten will, nachweist und insbesondere betont, daß Aristoteles nicht einmal seine eigenen, aus der Verschiedenheit der Sphärenbewegung sich ergebenden Schwierigkeiten befriedigend zu lösen imstande ist.¹⁶² Es war nicht die Vielheit, die Maimonides hier anfocht, wie es die früheren Angreifer dieser Lehre taten¹⁶³ — eine Mehrzahl von separaten Intelligenzen nimmt ja auch er an —, sondern es ist der Punkt, wo sich bei Aristoteles die klaffende Diskrepanz ergibt zwischen der teleologischen Absicht, die doch auf das Dasein der Sphärenbeweger führt, und dem Mangel

(s. vorige Anmerkung), wo das einleitende *אם הענין כן* dem aristotelischen: *τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαίρων ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε...* wörtlich entspricht; wie ja auch Munk sogar den ganzen Ausspruch unter Anführungszeichen bringt. Eher wäre die maimonische Zahl 50 zu erklären durch die von Aristoteles selbst unmittelbar vorher offengelassene Möglichkeit an Stelle der 55 Sphären, nach Ausschluß von Sonne und Mond und ihrem Anhang, 49 anzunehmen. Genau ist es aber auch so nicht.

¹⁶¹ Dieses Kap. 8 hat allen Aristoteles-Kommentatoren, vom Simplicius bis Lasso, Schwierigkeiten bereitet, weshalb es manche in *de coelo*, manche auch in die Physik verlegen wollten. Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 369 ff., hat klar dargelegt, daß dieses, den Zusammenhang zwischen Kap. 7 und 9 zerreißen- de Kap. 8 ein späteres „astronomisches Einschiebsel“ in das Buch A der *Met.* ist.

¹⁶² *Moreh* II 19 ist dies das Kernstück des Angriffes auf Aristoteles. Maimonides ist es besonders darum zu tun, daß auch Aristoteles die Unlösbarkeit empfunden hat: ואין להצתו זאת הקושי בלא ספק והשתדל לצאת מטנה בדברים לא עזרוהו עליהם; dennoch aber: לא נשלם לו זה ולא ישלם לעולם; dann wiederholt: שאלוהו בלא ספק ידע חולשת מאמרו. Die Theorie der Sonder-Beweger wird als Auskultversuch infolge dieser selbstempfundenen Schwäche bezeichnet: יראה לי כי אשר אמרו בספר מה שאחר הטבע מהניח שכל נפרד לכל גלגל אטנם הוא מספני זה הענין ג"כ, עד שיחיה דבר ייחד כל גלגל בתנועה אחת, והנה אבאר שהוא לא הריח בזה מאומה. (Vgl. oben Anm. 136 über die von Jäger nachgewiesene Unsicherheit.) Der Widerspruch richtet sich natürlich nur gegen diese Ableitung, denn zur Sache wurde ja II 4 u. 6, die Zuordnung von separater Intelligenz und Sphäre und die Gleichheit der Zahl beider vollkommen akzeptiert.

¹⁶³ Siehe oben Anm. 135.

So ist es nun die vermittelnde-leitende Funktion der separaten Intelligenzen — für die sublunare Welt der Aktive Intellekt —, die die Einheit der Welt in ihrem Geschehen, und der Akt der Kreation, der sie in ihrem Entstehen gewährleistet; denn dieser gilt für Sphäre und Erde zugleich. Beide aber sind nur Ausdruck eines und desselben Prinzips, das im Teleologischen wurzelt. Wohl hat auch Farabi die leitende Funktion des Aktiven Intellekten gelehrt,¹⁶⁷ und Gazali lehrte auch die Bedeutung des Teiles und das Einzelwissen Gottes,¹⁶⁸ aber erst mit Hinzutreten des Kurations-Moments hat das Ganze seine Grundlegung erhalten. Die aristotelische Steresis hat Maimonides zu einer „speziellen“ Steresis umgedeutet,¹⁶⁹ der er die „absolute“ Steresis,¹⁷⁰ nämlich die der Kreation vorangegangene, hinzufügt oder entgegenstellt. Aber durch dieses Hinzutreten der absoluten Steresis, und also der zweckstrebigen Kreation, hat auch die „spezielle“ eine Wandlung erfahren, indem ihre Form-Realisierung auch erst mit dem leitenden Einwirken des Sphären-Intellekts ermöglicht wurde.¹⁷¹ Denn letzten Endes war ja auch jene Beweisführung für die כִּוְנַת מַכְּנֵן von der Verschieden-

¹⁶⁷ Siehe Alfarabi, *Hatchalath-Hanimzaim* ed Philipowski S. 2 f., 43.

¹⁶⁸ Vgl. de Boer, *loc. cit.*, S. 145.

¹⁶⁹ *Moreh* II 17 wo, nach Aristoteles, die drei Prinzipien des Seienden הוֹמֵר (אלעם אלטטצוין) genannt werden. Im selben Sinne auch I 55, als notwendig für die Aktualisierung: הוֹמֵר הוֹמֵר בְּהִכְרָח. Und als notwendig für die Aktualisierung: הוֹמֵר הוֹמֵר בְּהִכְרָח. Und als notwendig für die Aktualisierung: הוֹמֵר הוֹמֵר בְּהִכְרָח.

¹⁷⁰ *Moreh* II 13 (הדעת השני) wird als Meinung der Philosophen das Leugnen an einem העדר גמור (עדם טחץ) angegeben, während wir auch vom Himmel annehmen, daß er entstanden ist (אלעם אלטטצוין). Auch III 17 wird von (אלעם אלטטצוין) gesprochen. Andererseits aber konnte Maimonides dem Kalam nicht zustimmen, daß es nur einen העדר gebe und daß diesem Realität zukomme, III 10 auch I 73, Präim. 7. Maimonides wollte nicht die aristotelische Steresis verabsolutieren, sondern sie für das Werden nach der Schöpfung als spezielle erhalten. Und wenn auch III 22 das negative Prinzip, der שטן = Steresis — vgl. Ephodi z. St. und Munk III S. 165, n. 1 — tiefer steht als die anderen האלהים, weswegen auch von ihm nicht להחיות, d. h. die beabsichtigte Dauer ausgesagt wird, so ist er doch in der sublunaren Welt, wenn auch בלתי טחץ, nicht erläßlich. Indem Munk das eine Mal, im aristotelischen Sinne, „privation“ übersetzt, bei der Schöpfung aber „neant“, kommt der terminologische Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Formen des העדר nicht ganz klar zur Geltung.

¹⁷¹ Siehe oben Anm. 153.

heit der sphärischen Bewegungen nur hypothetischen Charakters — indem sich Maimonides auf den Boden Aristoteles' stellte, um ihn von hier aus zu widerlegen. In Wirklichkeit war ja der Sinn der Kreation — wir können es hier nur andeutungsweise berühren — ein ganz anderer. Maimonides hat die Kreation nicht nur nicht beweisen können, sondern auch nicht beweisen wollen, er hat sie postuliert.

Gegen alle Einwände, die sich aus den Begriffen der Zeit und der Naturwissenschaft gegen die Kreation ergeben,¹⁷² verteidigt sie Maimonides mit der prinzipiellen Ablehnung aller Induktion. Nicht vom System der Natur, nicht vom empirischen Dasein aus soll die Schöpfung bewiesen werden, das wäre eben unmöglich.¹⁷³ Aber eine Widerlegung wäre nur dann gültig, wenn sie von der Gottesidee deduziert werden könnte.¹⁷⁴ Die Möglichkeit einer Beweisführung wird also dadurch in eine ganz andere Sphäre gehoben. Wiederum tritt uns hier entgegen die strenge Auseinanderhaltung von empirischem Dasein, aus dem sich kein strikter Gegenbeweis ergeben kann, und der Idee der Welt, als Einheit — es ist dieselbe terminologische Auseinanderhaltung, die wir früher bezüglich der Teleologie gesehen haben.¹⁷⁵ Fürs Dasein

¹⁷² *Moreh* II 14; im דרך ראשון wird die Beweisführung für die Weltewigkeit auf Grund der Bewegung und der Zeit besprochen; im letzten דרך (VII) die Argumentation mit der in der Natur vorhandenen Ordnung und Ökonomie, woraus, auf der Basis einer Identifikation הנצח = עצמו, die Ewigkeit des Naturdaseins, gleich der Ewigkeit der הנצח, abzuleiten ist.

¹⁷³ *Moreh* II 17, wo die Hauptwiderlegung gegen Aristoteles sich gegen seine ראיות מטבע המציאות הנח השלם ההוה בסופו richtet, was, wie für die anderen Argumente, auch für die Bewegung gilt, daß ein Beweis מטבע התנועה, d. h. ראיות מטבע המציאות הנח השלם ההוה בסופו nichts besagen kann. Maimonides selbst verwahrt sich dagegen, daß er beweisen wolle על יורה על ראיות מטבע המציאות הנח השלם ההוה בסופו.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* g. E. Wenn nur die Möglichkeit gegeben ist, נכרית דעת ההדוש. Die Beweisführung hierfür kann vom Erschaffenen nicht ausgehen. Eine Unmöglichkeit könnte erwiesen werden לא מטבע המציאות אבל מטה שיחייבו השכל. Beim השכל gibt es nämlich auch keinen Weg שיחייבו השכל, er müßte denn der der Induktion sein und die gilt nicht.

¹⁷⁵ Siehe oben Anm. 74. Auch hier wird bei der, unzulässigen, Beweisführung Aristoteles' מביעה אלגור (Guide II, ב' ל"ה, א) oder מביעה אלגור (a ל"ה) gebraucht; während im Zusammenhange mit der Kreation ausschließlich von אלגור (a ל"ה) die Rede ist. Charakteristisch

läßt sie sich nicht beweisen; in der Welt als Einheit muß sie gesetzt werden.

Und da die Kreation postuliert und ihre Beweisführung nur die Deduktion von Gott zur Basis haben kann, steht sie auch in unlösbarer Verknüpfung mit der normativ formulierten Zweckmäßigkeit, mit der Torah. Charakteristisch für dieses Verhältnis ist der Gedankengang, wo zunächst von einer Übereinstimmung zwischen dem Berichte der Torah und der Krea-tionslehre die Rede ist, was nicht wesentlich entscheidend¹⁷⁶ ist, dann zur Erklärung der Beschaffenheit der Torah im Sinne der Kreation übergeht, am Schlusse aber darin gipfelt, daß die Torah als solche ihre Möglichkeit durch die Grundlegung der Krea-tionslehre erhält; die Torah steht und fällt mit der Kreation.¹⁷⁷ Oder jenes eigentümlich anmutende Kapitelchen über den Sabbat und seinen Zusammenhang mit der Befreiung aus Ägypten, die zum Symbol der allgemeinen sittlich-

ist die Entgegenstellung des bereits zitierten הנה המציאות הזו, von dem eine Kreation nicht ausgesagt werden kann, und טענתו שהעולם בכללו טענתו שהעולם כולו נמנעם לנו בענין החדש העולם אבל היה אפשר לנו לפרשם לא שערי הפרוש סתומים כפינו ולא נמנעם לנו בענין החדש העולם אבל היה אפשר לנו לפרשם אחר ההעדר הנציאחו השם אחר ההעדר. Munk ist auch hier in der Übersetzung nicht konsequent; während er wiederholt (II S. 133) das טבעו אלגור mit „nature de l'être“ übersetzt, heißt es ein anderes Mal (S. 137), für denselben Ausdruck, „nature de l'univers“.

¹⁷⁶ Moreh II 25 wird mit der vielzitierten Reservation eingeleitet, daß der Krea-tionsglaube nicht infolge des Haftens am Wortlaut der Torah statuiert wird, denn לא שיערי הפרוש סתומים כפינו ולא נמנעם לנו בענין החדש העולם אבל היה אפשר לנו לפרשם אחר ההעדר הנציאחו השם אחר ההעדר (את הכתובים sc.). Doch wird hier (הסבה השנית) die allegorische Auslegung vermieden, da die Ewigkeit der Welt prinzipiell unzulässig ist: אבל אמונת הקדמות... הנה היא סותרת הדת מעיקרה... ומבטלת כל מה שתחל בו התורה וכ'. Während es aber hier noch mit dem אוח enge verbunden erscheint, wird es später erweitert: ודע כי עם האמת החדש העולם יהיו האמות כלם אפשריות ותהיה התורה... אפשרית ותפול כל שאלה... למה צוה באלה המצוות... ומה כוונת השם באלו התורות... Munk II 198 übersetzt den Anfang dieses Zitats: tous les miracles devenant possibles, la (révélation de la) Loi devient possible aussi“ etc. Durch diese eigene Hinzufügung in der Klammer wird auch die Frage der Torah auf die des אוח reduziert — was aber aus den nachher aufgezählten Gesichtspunkten, wo Torah und Wunder getrennt erscheinen, widerlegt ist. Vgl. unten Anm. 270.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. g. E.: וכן אלז התאמת להם מופת (על הקדמות) על דעת אריסטו תפול התורה... בכללה ויעקף הענין לדעות אחרות. Auf den inneren Zusammenhang zwischen Torah und Kreation wird noch später zurückgekommen. Aber schon diese Stelle erscheint ausreichend, um eine Auffassung Cohens, Charakteristik etc. S. 134, daß „auch die Welterschöpfung als ein metaphysisches Problem in der Ethik Maimunis zurücktritt“, zu widerlegen.

intellektuellen Freiheit erhoben und dieses Symbol mit dem vollendeten Werk der Kreation zu einer Einheit verbunden wird.¹⁷⁸ Am entscheidendsten für unsere Auffassung ist aber jene Auslegung des biblischen Wortlautes, die mit viel Reservationen auf ihren mystischen Charakter eingeleitet wird,¹⁷⁹ jene Unterscheidung zwischen תחלה und ראשית, zwischen dem Ersten in der Zeit und dem Ersten als Grund. Die Schöpfung, die mit בראשית berichtet wird, bedeutet den Anfang ohne Zeit, den Anfang als umfassenden Grund — „das ist die richtige mit der Weltkreation übereinstimmende Interpretation.“¹⁸⁰ Was aber anders kann dieser mit der Torah eng verknüpfte, auf die Vervollkommenheit hinweisende, dieser zeitlose Anfang, das Gefäß der Welt, bedeuten — als ihre teleologische Grundlegung? Das Sein ist enthalten in seinem Sinn.

Greifen wir nun auf einen früheren Gedankengang zurück, so zeigt es sich jetzt, daß dieselbe Kurationslehre, die als

¹⁷⁸ *Moreh* II 31 g. E.: לקבץ שני הענינים, האמת דעת, וצונו בתורת השביתה... וכאלו הוא חסד כולל ברעת האמת אמתו והוא הרוש העולם... וחור חסדי השם עלינו... וכלל ברעת האמת. העיוני. Vgl. Munk II 259 n. 1. Heranzuziehen ist noch I 67, wo der Sabbath, vom verbum וינה ausgehend, die Vollendung der Naturordnung, „הנחה והמשך“, bedeutet, dies aber ergänzt durch וינמש, unter Hinweis auf I 41, das dieser Vollendung ihren Sinn gibt: בענין הכונה והרצון (sc. נפש). ויהיה ענינו נשלם רצונו והיות כל המצו

¹⁷⁹ *Moreh* II 29 g. E., wo von diesen Erörterungen des בראשית als מעשה גשמי gesprochen wird.

¹⁸⁰ Gleich *Moreh* II 13 הדעת הראשון wird die Zeitlosigkeit der Schöpfung betont: ולזה לא תהיה המצאת הבורא לעולם בהתחלה וזמנית, כי הזמן טלל הנבראים. Wichtiger ist aber II 30, wo zugleich mit der Ablehnung der Zeitlosigkeit doch die besondere Bedeutung des Prinzips — ראשית — als wesentlich hervorgehoben wird. Die einleitend gemachte Distinktion in bezug auf die Zeitlichkeit zwischen ראשית (אשון) und תחלה (אלמברא), die dem hebr. Gebrauch des תחלה und ראשית entsprechen, ist nicht streng durchgeführt, wie es Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh* S. 155, für אלמברא und Narboni z. St. für אלמברא begründen. Vgl. Munk II 230 n. 2, 231 n. 1. Doch sicher gilt für die Schöpfung als zeitloses Prinzip: לא נברא והעולם לא נברא וזמנית... ולזה אמר בראשית והבי"ת כבי"ת כלי ופרוש זה הפסוק האמת כן, בהתחלה וזמנית... השם העליונים והתחתונים, זהו הפרוש המסכים לחדוש העולם באשר דבר אחר נמצא תוך דבר מאמרנו (Crescas: בראשית als lokales Enthaltensein) — Charisi führt auch in der Übersetzung das arabische في an — dieses Umfaßtsein der Welt durch sein Schöpfungsprinzip, das ist noch ein ganz neues Moment, das zur Zeitlosigkeit hinzugefügt wird.

Argument gegen die Teleologie im Bereich des dinglichen Daseins angeführt wurde¹⁸¹ — dieselbe bedeutet die Grundlegung der teleologischen Auffassung in der idealen Einheit der Welt. Und auch die Sphäre, da ihr Wirken nicht allein ein natürliches sein kann, von der Bewegung abhängig und sich ausschließlich auf Entstehen und Vergehen beziehend, sondern auch ein zweckbewußtes, leitendes ist, muß darum auch in diesem Wirken nur teleologisch gerichtet sein: auf das Gute und nur auf das Gute.¹⁸²

Der erste Beweger Aristoteles', obwohl nur νόησις νοήσεως, ist doch nur das Höchste im System der Natur, ist, da ihm Leben zukommt, ein ζῷον, ein Lebewesen, wenn auch das vollkommenste.¹⁸³ Maimonides hingegen hebt wiederholt hervor das Verhältnis Gottes zur Welt als ihr Lebensprinzip, als ה' העולם, unter besonderer Betonung des status constructus; er wiederholt es in zwei Zusammenhängen: einmal als Abschluß der Betrachtung über die organische Einheit der Welt und das andere Mal im Zusammenhang mit der Bezeichnung Gottes als Form-Zweck der Welt.¹⁸⁴ Diese Wiederholung und die ausdrückliche Bezugnahme einer Stelle auf die andere¹⁸⁵ genügt wohl, um auf das innere Zusammengehören beider Gedankengänge hinzuweisen. Bedenkt man, daß unmittelbar vorher Leben als Attribut zurückgewiesen und der status constructus in Verbindung mit Gott, ה' ד', gegen ה' ד'

¹⁸¹ Siehe oben Anm. 47.

¹⁸² *Moreh* II 7: אבל השכלים והגלגלים... יעשו הטוב לעולם ואין אצלם כי אם הטוב: II 11: וישפיעו טן הגלגלים כחות וטובות.

¹⁸³ *Met.* 1072 b 28 f.: φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀίδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζῶν ἀπὸ συνεχῆς καὶ ἀίδιος ὑπάρχει: τῷ θεῷ, τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. Ebenso *de coelo* 286 a 9 f.: θεοῦ δ' ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ζῶν ἀίδιος.

¹⁸⁴ Einmal *Moreh* I 72; der Mensch wird Mikrokosmos genannt, da er ein leitendes Vernunftprinzip in sich hat, ה' העולם, בלשוננו ה' העולם, wobei Welt bedeutet, nicht Ewigkeit wie Dan. XII 7, auf den sich die Deutung bezieht. Dann I 69: וזכרנו כי בלשוננו ה' העולם, ענינו שהוא ה' העולם. Es müßte schon diese Verschiedenheit allein genügen, um einen Satz wie Schmiedls, *Studien* S. 269, Maimonides hätte „die aristotelische Anschauung (sc. bezüglich der Definition Gottes und seiner Stellung zur Welt) ganz zu der seinigen gemacht“ zu widerlegen.

¹⁸⁵ I 69 ist hinzugefügt כמו שיתבאר, beziehnehmend auf I 72.

zurückgestellt wurde,¹⁸⁶ so wird erst der Sinn klar: nicht Lebewesen ist Gott, sondern Lebensprinzip. Gott lebt, nicht indem er Leben hat, sondern indem er Leben ist: für die Welt, als ihr Zweck.¹⁸⁷

IV.

Wir sind nun der Wesensbestimmung des Zweckes näher gekommen und wollen sie zunächst bei Aristoteles betrachten. Bei ihm, vom Bewegungsbegriff ausgegangen und von diesem unabtrennbar, war der Zweck in der Grundvorstellung vor allem das Ende der Bewegung, da jede Bewegung ihren Endpunkt haben muß.¹⁸⁸ Die Vorstellung war daher eine räumlich-zeitliche. Aristoteles spricht von einem Schreiten zum Telos hin, von einem Weg zu ihm,¹⁸⁹ da sich der Zweck als der „natürliche Ort“ (οἰκεῖος τόπος) darstellt, wie etwa für das Feuer und das Wasser das Oben und das Unten.¹⁹⁰ Auch die Sphären haben ihren Endzweck; nur erreichen sie, in ihrer unendlichen

¹⁸⁶ *Moreh* I 68, mit der Begründung: וְכֵן הָיָה דְּבַר זֶה וְלֹא יִשְׁתַּדּוּל, vorher bei der Begründung der negativen Attribute I 57: וְכֵן הָיָה לֹא בְּהֵימִן. Ebenso Acht Kap. VIII; *Jesode Hatorah* II 10. Vgl. Munk I S. 232 n. 2.

¹⁸⁷ Diese Formulierung will zeigen, daß die Unterscheidung des Seins Gottes vom Leben noch nicht bedeuten muß, daß „Maimonides die Verbindung zwischen Gott und Natur im Sein entzweischneidet“, wie Cohen, *Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie* S. 46, darstellt. Gott als Lebensprinzip der Welt heißt für Maimonides noch immer nicht Pantheismus; die absolute Separatheit Gottes und die Durchdrungenheit der Welt von ihm, beides gleich bejaht, bildet eben jenes Mysterium, worauf er Ende I 72 hinweist.

¹⁸⁸ Die Auffassung vom τέλος als Grenze hat Belege in den verschiedensten Formen; so *de gen. anim.* 715 b 14: ἡ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον · τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀτελές, ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος; *de anima* 416 a 17: ... πέρασ καὶ λόγος; *Met.* 999 b 8 f.; 1055 a 14: [τὸ τέλος] ἔσχατον ἐν παντί; *de coelo* 277 a 26; 288 b 29 f.; *de part. anim.* 646 b 8: τὸ τέλος ἔχει καὶ τὸ πέρασ. *Meteor.* 353 a 17; *Pol.* 1257 b 28 (πέρασ γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις).

¹⁸⁹ Vgl. oben Anm. 124.

¹⁹⁰ *De coelo* 279 b 1: πάντα παύεται κινούμενα, ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον; 310 a 31 ff.: ... τὸ δ' εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ τόπον φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τὸ εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος ἐστὶ φέρεσθαι; 312 a 15. *Phys.* 255 a 2: ταῦτα γὰρ εἰς μὲν τοὺς ἀντικειμένους τόπους βίᾳ κινεῖται, εἰς δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους... φύσει. *De gen. et corr.* 335 a 20: ἕκαστον δὲ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν φέρεσθαι · ἡ δὲ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἀπάντων ἐν τοῖς ὅροις.

Bewegung, ihr Ziel niemals.¹⁹¹ Mit der räumlichen hängt auch die zeitliche Vorstellung zusammen, und das Natürliche wäre hier, daß eben der Zweck zeitlich das Spätere ist, da es das Zuerreichende darstellt, was auch von Aristoteles gelehrt wird.¹⁹² Hier aber greift schon hinüber die erweiterte oder gar übertragene Bedeutung des Telos, nämlich seine Auffassung als Substanz oder Form (οὐσία, εἶδος), und erfordert neben dem Vorangehen des Zweckes an Bedeutung auch ein Vorangehen in der Zeit.¹⁹³ Woraus sich ein Widerspruch ergibt; nicht der einzige in der aristotelischen Teleologie. Diese primäre Zweckauffassung ist zu verstehen als ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Anfang und Ende der Bewegung; sie wurzelt, soweit dies die geradlinige, sublunarisches Bewegung betrifft, im Gegensätzlichen der beiden Endpunkte.¹⁹⁴ Die Gegensätze aber dürfen nicht als etwas Separates gesehen werden, sondern haben ihre Existenz nur in der Verbindung mit einem Substrat.¹⁹⁵ Daraus ergibt sich die notwendige Verbundenheit des Zweckes mit einer Materie, wobei der Zweck diese sich unterwirft. Und zur Veranschaulichung dessen wird die Übertragung vom Individuum gebraucht, das in sich die Materie bereits mit dem Zweck verbunden hatte, wie der

¹⁹¹ *De coelo* 279 b 2.: τοῦ δὲ κύκλου σώματος ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅθεν ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃν τελευτᾷ; *de gen. et corr.* 320 a 22 f.: τὰ μὲν γὰρ (μόρια) ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τόπῳ μεταβάλλει τοῦ ὅλου μένοντος. (Vgl. Bergson, *Quid Arist. de loco senserit* S. 63, 65.) Über die Notwendigkeit der ewigen Bewegung vgl. *Phys.* 151 a 16 ff. b 9 f. bes. 267 a 24 ff. Vgl. oben Anm. 125.

¹⁹² *Met.* 1077 a 14 f., wo die Wesenhaftigkeit des Körpers verglichen mit Fläche und Linie auch aus ihrer Entstehungsweise abgeleitet wird, 26: εἰ οὖν τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον, τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἂν εἴη επιπέδου καὶ μήκους. *de part. anim.* 646 b 5 f. (das Verhältnis der Elemente zu den Homoiomerien). *de coelo* 310 b 33: ἡ φορά — γενέσει ὕστᾳτη τῶν κινήσεων, ὥστε πρώτη ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὕτη κίνησις. Besonders *de gen. anim.* 736 b 3: ὕστερον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τέλος.

¹⁹³ *Met.* 999 a 13: ὅπου τὸ μὲν βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, αἰεὶ τὸ βέλτιον πρότερον; *de coelo* 286 a 18: ὕστερον τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. Besonders *Phys.* 265 a 22 (auch auf die zeitliche Reihenfolge der Bewegungsarten angewendet, im diametralen Gegensatz zur in der vorigen Anmerkung zitierten Stelle *de coelo*) — πρότερον δὲ καὶ φύσει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ χρόνῳ τὸ τέλειον τοῦ ἀτελοῦς.

¹⁹⁴ Siehe oben Anm. 125.

¹⁹⁵ *Met.* 1087 a 36 ff.: ἀλλὰ μὴν γίνεται πάντα ἐξ ἐναντίων ὡς ὑποκειμένου τινός ... αἰεὶ ἄρα πάντα τάναντία καθ' ὑποκειμένου, καὶ οὐδὲν χωριστόν.

Mensch, der den Menschen erzeugt.¹⁹⁶ Aber auch „das Verhältnis des Zweckes und der Form zur Materie ist kein ganz klares und festes“¹⁹⁷ — da manchmal eben auch die Materie gegenüber dem Zweck bestimmend wird, wie der Körper z. B. bezüglich der Seele.¹⁹⁸

Nun ist es diese physikalische Grundvorstellung (die sich aus der Bewegung und ihrem Spannungsverhältnis ergeben hat und in der noch immer Telos mehr Endpunkt bedeutet), verbunden mit der Reflexion über den Vergleich mit der Kunsttätigkeit (aus dem die Beziehung des Teiles zum Ganzen hervorging und in dem Telos eher Endabsicht bedeutet), die beide zusammen zum biologischen Telos-Begriff Aristoteles' führten, der als der eigentliche, seine gesamte Lehre beherrschende zu bezeichnen ist. (Wobei natürlich nicht an eine chronologische Reihenfolge bei Aristoteles gedacht ist.) Hier ist der Punkt, wo sich die Verschmelzung von Zweck mit Wesen und Form endgültig vollzieht,¹⁹⁹ und auf dieser Basis ist der vielzitierte Satz geprägt: Das Wesen ist Zweck für das Werden und nicht das Werden Zweck des Wesens.²⁰⁰ Das Wesen also einer jeden Sache ist Ende und Zweck, alles andere ist nur Mittel und Weg zu ihm. Als Paradigma dient der Keim, aus dem nicht alles Mögliche entstehen kann²⁰¹ sondern nur ein bestimmter,

¹⁹⁶ Vgl. *Phys.* 200 a 13; *de somno* 455 b 26; *de part. anim.* 646 a 30: πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν ... ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον καὶ φυτὸν γεννᾷ φυτὸν ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἑκάστων ὑποκειμένης ὕλης; *de anima* 413 a 4: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος.

¹⁹⁷ Eucken, *loc. cit.*, S. 73.

¹⁹⁸ Beispiele hierfür: *de part. anim.* 651 a 12, 667 a 11 — daß der Körper auf das ἔθος der Lebewesen bestimmend wirkt. Siehe *de gen. anim.* 762 a 24. Über die notwendige Abhängigkeit vom Körperlichen s. ausführlich Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 483, bes. Anm. 4.

¹⁹⁹ Siehe Belege bei Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 328, Anm. 1. Über die Konkurrenz zwischen φύσις, dem Grundbegriff der Teleologie, als Bewegungsprinzip, ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως und als εἶδος = τέλος s. Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 91.

²⁰⁰ *de part. anim.* 640 a 18: ἡ γὰρ γένεσις ἐνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἐνεκα τῆς γενέσεως. Ähnlich *de gen. anim.* 778 b 2 f. *Met.* 1034 a 31 f. Diese Formulierung ist gut platonisch; *Phileb.* 54 B.

²⁰¹ Belege dafür vielfach in *de gen. anim.* (bes. 736 a 27 ff., auch 737 b 17 u. a.) und *de anima*. Vgl. ausführlich Meyer, *Entwicklungsgedanke* S. 52 f. 98. Gegenüber Empedokles macht Aristoteles geltend, daß der Keim οὐ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ vorhanden ist, *de part. anim.* 640 a 24. Den Wider-

von vornherein in seiner Wesensidee feststehender Organismus. Diese Zweckauffassung ist in ihrem Charakter biologisch, ob sie nun auf bereits durchgeführte biologische Theorien fußt oder nicht.²⁰²

Dieses Zweck-Wesen aber — und hier wirken wiederum Bewegungsmoment und Technikvergleich zusammen — besteht in nichts anderem als in einer spezifischen Tätigkeit, in einer Funktion. Die Form im Organismus und also sein Zweck ist seine Spezialleistung, sein ἔργον.²⁰³ Hier erst verliert τέλος seine Bedeutung als räumlich-zeitliches Ende und wird zum reinen ἕνεκα του, nicht wovon, sondern wofür etwas geschieht. Das Vermögen ist der Zweck des Organs, das Sehvermögen der des Auges.²⁰⁴ Es bleibt aber nicht beim

spruch zwischen dieser auch zeitlichen Voranstellung des Zweckes zu den später (646 a 24 ff.) entwickelten Gedanken, daß τὰ ὑστερα τῇ γενέσει πρότερα τῇ φύσιν ἐστί, καὶ πρῶτον τὸ τῇ γενέσει τελευταῖον, will Meyer, *Natur etc.*, S. 99, Anm. 1, als von zwei Gesichtspunkten gesehen erklären, wobei die letztere Behauptung „ohne Berücksichtigung der synonymen, den Werdeprozeß einleitenden Ursache“ zu verstehen sei. Vom Gesichtspunkte des „Gesetzes der Synonymie“ fielen πρῶτον τῇ φύσει und πρῶτον τῷ χρόνῳ zusammen. Daß diese Schwierigkeit bei Aristoteles durch diese Erklärung allein nicht behoben ist, beweisen die oben, Anm. 192 und 193, angeführten Stellen, bei denen die Erklärung durch die „Synonymie“ keine Lösung herbeizuführen vermag.

²⁰² Über Aristoteles' Stärke in der Biologie in bezug auf seine Zwecklehre vgl. Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, 2. Aufl., S. 354. Dennoch kann Jäger recht behalten, daß Aristoteles nicht eine bewußte Nachbildung spezialbiologischer Ergebnisse vorgenommen hat.

²⁰³ Schon in Protreptikos bei Jamblich nimmt der ἔργον-Begriff eine hervorragende Stellung ein. Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 66 f. Das ist das von den anderen als eigentümliche Leistung sich abhebende ἔργον. Hier ist auch schon die Abstufung durchgeführt und die Hervorhebung jenes ἔργον, das mit der ἐνέργεια zusammenfällt, also nicht ein von der ἐνέργεια verschiedenes Objekt darstellt, wie dies im Seelischen der Fall ist. Dies wird vielfach später wiederholt. *Met.* 1050 a 21: τὸ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον; b 2; *de coelo* 286 a 8: ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὅς ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου; *de part. anim.* 655 b 20: ἐκ τῶν ἔργων γνωρίζειν; *Pol.* 1253 a 23: πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥριται; *Meteor.* 390 a 10: ἀπαντὰ ἐστὶν ὥρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ; ebenso *Met.* 1035 b 16; u. v. a.

²⁰⁴ *de part. anim.* 694 b 13: τὰ ὄργανα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἔργον πρὸς τὰ ὄργανα. Das Verhältnis des ἔργον zum Organ entspricht dem der Seele zum Körper; 645 b 19: καὶ τὸ σῶμα πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον; *de anima* 415 b 18: πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα. Darum unterscheidet sich das mit dem Sehvermögen begabte Auge vom bloß homonym mit ihm so benannten toten; *Meteor.* 390 a 10; *de*

Vermögen, sondern dies löst sich noch weiter auf in die Aktivität des Vermögens; das Sehvermögen hat seinen Zweck im Sehen.²⁰⁵ Das ἔργον, die Spezialleistung mit dem Vermögen eng verbunden, wird als προᾶξις, als Ausüben verstanden und vielfach wird eben προᾶξις, als eigentlicher Zweck erklärt.²⁰⁶ Dies wird manchmal auch im Sinne von Gebrauch, Nutzenanwendung (χρήσις) verstanden, wie etwa das Sägen von der Säge.²⁰⁷

Auf jeden Fall zeigt es sich, wie der Begriff des Ganzen oder des Wesens als Zweck sich in ein Dynamisches immer mehr auflöst und so vom „Ganzen“ des Vermögens wieder bis zu seiner jeweiligen Teilausübung zurückgeht, so daß wiederum der Einzelakt das eigentlich Teleologisch-Reale zu sein scheint. In diesem Sinne der funktionellen Bestimmung ist auch die vielfach gebrauchte Wendung zu verstehen, die Natur, oder Gott, mache nichts umsonst,²⁰⁸ welcher Satz, wie Aristoteles an einer Stelle angibt, sich ihm auf induktivem Wege, aus der Beobachtung empirischen Geschehens, ergeben hat.²⁰⁹ Dies alles aber läuft auf Eines hinaus: auf die Immanenz der Teleologie. Im Funktionellen war die Immanenz, dieser Hauptzug der aristotelischen Teleologie, am

part. anim. 641 a 1; *Pol.* 1253 a 20 u. a.; *de anima* 412 b 18: εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῶον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις.

²⁰⁵ So *Met.* 1050 a 9: τέλος ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τοῦτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχουσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῶα, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν. Diese Relation zwischen ὄψις und ὁρᾶν ist ebenso formuliert, wie die zwischen ὄργανον und ἔργον; ; s. vorige Anm.

²⁰⁶ Manchmal mit ἔργον zusammen, so *de part. anim.* 646 b 11: τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν ἐνεκὲν ἐστὶ· ἐκείνων γὰρ ἔργα καὶ πράξεις εἰσὶν; vorher 645 b 15: τὸ οὗ ἐνεκα προᾶξις τις; auch 662 a 23 (ἐργασία); *Meteor.* 390 a 18.

²⁰⁷ Als Fortsetzung der früher zitierten Stelle *de part. anim.* 645 b heißt es 17: οὐ γὰρ ἡ πρίσις τοῦ πρίονος χάριν γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ὁ πρίων τῆς πρίσεως· χρήσις γάρ τις ἡ πρίσις ἐστίν. Ähnlich auch im Werte des Reichtums für den Menschen, *Rhet.* 1361 a 23: ὅλως τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μάλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κερτῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλουτοῦς.

²⁰⁸ Belege für diesen so bekannten, sehr häufig vorkommenden Ausspruch s. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 424 Anm. 3.

²⁰⁹ *de incessu anim.* 704 b 12: ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως ὑποθήμενοις οἷς εἰώθαμεν χρῆσθαι πολλάκις πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον τὴν φυσικὴν, λαβόντες τὰ τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον ἐκ πᾶσι, τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις· τούτων δ' ἐν μέν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην. Ähnlich *de gen. anim.* 788 b 20 f.

besten geborgen. Mit ihr aber war zugleich die Relativität und Vielheit der Zwecke gegeben und, wie bereits gesehen, führte die Vielheit zu Unterordnungen und Fremdzwecklichkeit, welches gerade der Tendenz der immanenten, also eigenen Zwecklichkeit zuwiderläuft. Aber abgesehen davon führt diese funktionelle Immanenz, an sich selbst besehen, zu Unklarheiten und unlösbaren Schwierigkeiten.

Die erste ist schon im Begriffe der *πρᾶξις* enthalten. Von ihr ausgehend und sie als Formzweck betrachtend, gelangt man leicht zur Anschauung, daß etwa im Verhältnis zwischen einer Kunst und ihrem Gegenstand die erstere die Form (Zweck) des letzteren ist. Was auch Aristoteles wiederholt behauptet; die Heilkunst ist die Form der Gesundheit.²¹⁰ Es wäre dies so zu deuten, daß sich die Gesundheit erst durch die Heilkunst auswirkt und daher in ihr ihre *πρᾶξις* hat. Nun aber unterscheidet Aristoteles sehr scharf zwischen *πρᾶξις* und *ποίησις*, und zwar in deren Beziehung zum Zweck. Die *ποίησις* hat den Zweck außerhalb sich selbst, die *πρᾶξις* schließt den Zweck in sich ein, ist Selbstzweck.²¹¹ Eine Kunst aber ist als *ποίησις* anzusehen.²¹² Sie ist ihrer Natur nach auf ein zu erreichendes Ziel, auf ihren Gegenstand, gerichtet. Im Falle der Heilkunst etwa geht die *ποίησις* auf die Gesundheit, die als Idee-Zweck ihr voransteht.²¹³ Es ergibt sich also im teleologischen Verhältnis zwischen Kunst und Gegenstand ein Zirkel:

²¹⁰ *de gen. anim.* 740 b 28: ἡ δὲ τέχνη μορφή τῶν γιγνομένων ἐν ἄλλῳ; *de part. anim.* 640 a 31 (bezugnehmend auf die ἀνδριαντοποιητική): ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ὃ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἔστιν; *de gen. et corr.* 335 b 33; *Met.* 1032 b 13: ἡ γὰρ λατρική ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς οἰκίας.

²¹¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1139 b 2 f.; 1140 b 6 f.: τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστιν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. *Met.* 1025 b 22: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις. Auch diese Unterscheidung ist gut platonisch. (So *Charm.* 163 B f.)

²¹² *Eth. Nic.* 1140 a 16: ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πνέξεως εἶναι. Darin liegt auch der dort erörterte Unterschied zwischen τέχνη (als ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆ) und φρόνησις. Weiters vgl. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 199 Anm. 2; S. 764 Anm. 2.

²¹³ Deroben, Anm. 210 zitierten Stelle *Met.* 1032 b geht voran a 32: ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; dann: ἡ δ' ὑγίεια ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ; schließlich: εἴτα ᾗδῃ ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται, ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὀφθαλμίζειν.

das eine ist Form des anderen; und dies nicht etwa an verschiedenen Stellen, sondern beide Bestimmungen stehen dicht nebeneinander in *Met.* VII, Kap. 7. Es sei denn, man gibt der Heilkunst eine Doppelstellung: zur Gesundheit als Idee und zur bereits verwirklichten Gesundheit. Das würde durch die Betonung der Immaterialität im Anschluß an die Bezeichnung der Heilkunst als Zweck²¹⁴ eine gewisse Möglichkeit finden. Auf jeden Fall ist zumindest eine und dieselbe Heilkunst einmal *πρᾶξις*, somit selbst Zweck, das andere Mal *ποίησις* und erst auf einen außenliegenden Zweck gerichtet.

Eine zweite Schwierigkeit aus der Relativisierung des Zweckes ergibt sich in der Frage des Einfachen und Differenzierten. Dies greift schon beträchtlich ins Gebiet des Ethischen hinüber. Vom Funktionellen ausgehend ist die Tätigkeit je höher im Werte, je differenzierter und verfeinerter sie ist. Darum ist das nicht unmittelbar Existenznotwendige, das Überschüssige, höher als das Notwendige²¹⁵ — eigentlich sei dieses über das Notwendige Hinausgehende das, wo das Gute und Schöne anfängt.²¹⁶ Darum ist auch der Mensch gegenüber den anderen Lebewesen höher, da bei ihm die Differenziation die höchste Stufe erreichte, körperlich sowohl²¹⁷ — wobei wiederum die größere Geschiedenheit in den räumlichen Gegensätzen, wie rechts und links usw., von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung sind — als auch im Seelischen.²¹⁸ Andererseits aber wird wiederum das Einfache und Unveränderliche dem Diffe-

²¹⁴ So in der angeführten Stelle *Met.* wenn gesagt wird, die Gesundheit entstehe aus Gesundheit: *τῆς ἀνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην*. So auch *de part. anim.* 640a 31.

²¹⁵ *Pol.* 1252b 29; 1278b 20f.

²¹⁶ *Top.* 118a 6: *τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίω, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ αἰρετώτερα· βέλτιον γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον*. Vgl. *de anima* 434b 20f.

²¹⁷ *de inc. anim.* 705a 26ff.; 706a 18f.; *hist. anim.* 497b 21; 494a 26; *de part. anim.* 672b 20.

²¹⁸ *Hist. anim.* 588a 18; 608b 4: *(ἴχνη τῶν ἡθῶν) μᾶλλον δὲ φανερώτερα ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι μᾶλλον ἥθος καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτελεσμένην, ὥστε καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις εἶναι φανερωτέρας ἐν αὐτοῖς*. Über das schärfere Wahrnehmungsvermögen *de gen. anim.* 781b 17ff.; *de part. anim.* 655b 37f.; *de coelo* 292b 2f.: *ἐνταῦθα αἱ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πλεῖσται πράξεις· πολλῶν γὰρ τῶν εὖ δύνатаι τυχεῖν, ὥστε πολλὰ πράττει, καὶ ἄλλων ἕνεκα*.

renzierten gegenüber viel höher gestellt — mit Rücksicht auf dessen Abgegrenztheit und Bestimmtheit.²¹⁹ Die Sphären sind deshalb höher, weil einfacher, das höchste Wesen ist das Einfachste.²²⁰ Alle Veränderung und Differenziertheit bedeutet Verfall.²²¹ Der Mensch also, der wegen seiner Differenziertheit den anderen Lebewesen gegenüber höher steht, ist infolge derselben Differenziertheit den sphärischen Wesen gegenüber tiefer. In einem Falle ist die Feinheit der Funktion das Kriterium, im anderen das Moment der πέρας²²² — beide aber als Gesichtspunkte der teleologischen Qualifikation.

Schließlich wird diese Relativität des Zweckmäßigen auch im Ethischen maßgebend. Ein allgemeines, das platonische ἀγαθόν, wird grundsätzlich abgelehnt.²²³ Da das Gute mit

²¹⁹ *Eth. Nic.* 1170a 19, das Leben gehöre zu den Gütern, ὀρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὀρισμένον τῆς τάχα τοῦ φύσεως. *Phys.* 201b 25: αἱ ἀρχαὶ διὰ τὸ στερητικαὶ εἶναι ἀόριστοι. Über die Veränderung *Eth. Nic.* 1154b 28; μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δοσμένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. *Meteor.* 361b 34.

²²⁰ *Eth. Nic.* 1154b 20: οὐκ αἰεὶ οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν... ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦ ἡ φύσις ἀπλῆ εἴη αἰεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται· διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν. *de part. anim.* 641b 18: τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλλον. *de coelo* 270b 13.

²²¹ Siehe oben Anm. 219. *Eth. Nic.* 1106b 28: τὸ μὲν ἀμικρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν... τὸ δὲ καθορθοῦν μοναχῶς. *de coelo* 286b 16: πρότερον τῇ φύσει ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει τὸ ἐν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν τῶν συνθέτων. *de part. anim.* 665b 14: ἀρχὴν τούτων ἀναγκάζον εἶναι μίαν· ὅπου γὰρ ἐνδέχεται, μίαν βέλτιον ἢ πολλὰς. In dem Sinne auch *Anal. post.* 86a 4, *Rhet.* 1356b 31.

²²² Siehe oben Anm. 188.

²²³ Die Hauptstelle gegen das platonische ἀγαθόν ist *Eth. Nic.* I 4. Das Objekt auf das der menschliche Wille (oder Begierde) gerichtet ist, ist wohl ein ἀγαθόν, aber kein absolutes, sondern das erreichbare, das πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν; *Eth. Nic.* 1095a 16, 1139a 13f.; *de anima* 433a 27f.: διὸ αἰεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ...πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχει. (Vgl. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 609, 3.) Anders verhält es sich wohl im Kosmos, der sein ὀρεκτόν in sich selbst behält und somit sein ἀγαθόν eher als absolutes erscheint. Vgl. Siebeck, *Die Lehre des Aristoteles* S. 33. Doch gibt es auch hier Belege genug, daß „Gott und das Gute doch bei Aristoteles nicht gleichbedeutende Begriffe sind“, Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 371 Anm. 1. In der Ablehnung des Guten, als Wurzelpunkt für Natur und Sittlichkeit zugleich, liegt jener für Aristoteles wesentliche „Unterschied zwischen Metaphysik und Ethik“ mit all seinen Folgen, insbesondere in der Teleologie, s. Cohen, *Charakteristik*, S. 72.

dem Zwecke gleichzusetzen ist, gibt es eben so viele Arten des Guten, als es Zwecke gibt.²²⁴ Wie in der Natur, so im menschlichen Handeln, ist das jeweilige zum Endzweck Führende das jeweilig Gute.²²⁵ Darum gibt es auch terminologisch ein „gut“ und ein „besser“; so gehört einmal das Sein zu dem an sich Guten, ein andermal ist es „besser“ als das Nichtsein.²²⁶ (Es gibt auch ein „Bestes“, was dasselbe wie das Gute bedeutet.)²²⁷

Wenn daher Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 85 Anm. 1 diese verlorengegangene Einheit von Sein und Wert im Gottesbegriff wieder vereint findet: „das höchste Sein ist zugleich das höchste Gut“ — so muß er doch die „völlig verschobene Perspektive“ und auch die Tatsache zugeben, daß „der Zusammenhang dieser Metaphysik mit der einzelnen *πραξις* zu locker“ ist.

²²⁴ *Rhet.* 1393 a 13: ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερόν ὅτι δι' ἐκείνων ληπτέων τὰς ἀδείξεις πᾶσιν; *de anima* 414 b 21. Der Zweck als Gut, *Phys.* 194 a 32 f. 195 a 23 f.; doch: ἐκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα, *Top.* 149 b 37 f. *Anal. post.* 95 a 6 f. *Eth. Nic.* 1170 a 21: τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. *Rhet.* 1362 a 24: ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοίῃ... τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθόν. *Eth. Eud.* 1218 a 30: τὸ φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἐνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὁρέγεται, ὀφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγείας, οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου. *de part. anim.* 645 a 21, *de gen. anim.* 742 a 20 f. In dem Sinne auch *de anima* 415 b 1, *Pol.* 1288 b 37.

²²⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 34: ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον; 1176 a 3: δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ζῳῇ καὶ ἡδονῇ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν; 1173 a 4: ἴσως καὶ ἐν τοῖς φάσιν ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν χρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ; *Phys.* 246 a 13: ὅταν λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον. Über den „Zirkelbeweis“, der sich auch hier ergibt, vgl. Eucken, *Meth.* S. 90. Entscheidend ist die Wandlung in der Anschauung über das Verhältniß der βίοι zu den ἀγαθά. Während im *Protreptikos* und besonders in der *Eud. Eth.* die drei typischen Lebensformen auf drei Grundwerte im Menschen — φρόνησις, ἀρετή, ἡδονή — zurückgeführt werden, ist es in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* umgekehrt: die βίοι bleiben; aber erst „aus den βίοι soll erkannt werden, was die Menschen als ἀγαθόν ansehen“, Jäger, *loc. cit.*, 245 f.

²²⁶ *Eth. Nic.* 1170 a 19: τὸ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων; b 1: φύσει ἀγαθὸν ζωὴ (auch *Pol.* 1278 b 24). Hingegen heit es *de gen. et corr.* 336 b 27: ἐν ἅπασιν αἰεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὁρέγεσθαι φαμεν τὴν φύσιν — βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι; *de gener. anim.* 731 b 30: βέλτιον... τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοῦ μὴ ζῆν; *Pol.* 1333 a 21. *Phys.* 260 b 22: τὸ βέλτιον αἰεὶ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν.

²²⁷ Siehe die oben, Anm. 224, zitierten Stellen *Top.* u. *Anal. post.* (ἐκάστου τὸ βέλτιστον); *de coelo* 288 a 2: ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον; ebenso *de part. anim.* 687 a 15; *de vita et m.* 469 a 28: τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν... ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον; *de inc. anim.* 704 b 17: τὸ ἄριστον; *Eth. Nic.* 1099 b 20: εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον... εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν.

Dabei wird wiederum die Nuance von Ende bei Telos unterdrückt — polemisierend gegen Euripides will Aristoteles den Endzweck des Lebens nicht im Tod erblicken, obwohl dieser sein Ende ist.²²⁸ Daneben gibt es allerdings eine vereinzelte Stelle, wo vom Guten als ewigem Unveränderlichen ganz im platonischen Sinne die Rede ist.²²⁹ Diese Wendung hat sich aber nirgends als grundlegende Ansicht in der Philosophie Aristoteles' ausgewirkt. Auch das oft angeführte Gleichnis vom Heer und Feldherrn, wonach die Ordnung des Heeres sowohl in einem immanenten Prinzip als auch in einem transzendenten „Feldherrn“ zu suchen sei²³⁰ — auch dies sollte in seiner Bedeutung für die Lehre Aristoteles' nicht überschätzt werden, obwohl sicherlich darin, wie in vielem anderen, bewußt gewordene Regungen, die Immanenz der Teleologie überschreiten zu müssen, sich zum Ausdruck durchringen.

Das Hauptgewicht der Teleologie bleibt ja doch in der Immanenz, d. h. in ihrer physikalisch-biologischen Orientierung. Und wir haben nun gesehen, welche Folgen sich aus ihr ergeben haben für das zeitliche Verhältnis zwischen Mittel und Zweck, für das Verhältnis des Zweckes zu seinem notwendigen Substrat, zur Materie, für die erweiterte Anwendung des Funktionsbegriffs, für das Wertverhältnis zwischen dem Einfachen und Differenzierten; und schließlich auch in der Relativisierung des ethischen Begriffes des Guten.

Die wesentliche Abweichung Maimonides' von dieser Theorie ist die, daß bei ihm die eigentliche Teleologie im Transzendenten anfängt. Da er aber auch auf die aristotelische immanente Naturzweckmäßigkeit nicht verzichtet, müssen wir diese seine Gedankengänge und Andeutungen bis ins Detail untersuchen, um auf den wahren Sinn zu kommen. Diese doppelte Teleologie, die natürliche und die „letzte“, die bereits oben ausführlich besprochen wurde, soll hier auf ihren tieferen Grund geprüft werden.

²²⁸ *Phys.* 194 a 27 f.

²²⁹ *de met. anim.* 700 b 32: τὸ δὲ αἰδίων καλόν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ πρῶτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ μὴ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δὲ μὴ, θειότερον καὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὥστ' εἶναι πρὸς ἕτερον. Daß aber dieses „oberste Prinzip praktisch in der Naturbetrachtung keine Rolle spielt“, vgl. Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 95.

²³⁰ *Met.* XII 10. 1075 a 1 f. (Vgl. Siebeck, *Arist.*, S. 45.)

Das Verhältnis dieser beiden zueinander wird klar, wenn man sieht, daß Maimonides ein typisch aristotelisches Beispiel — vom zweckmäßigen Bau des Auges für seine Funktion — als Argument gegen eine aus der Kreationstheorie sich ergebende *antiteleologische* Lehre anführt.²³¹ Dies ist gerichtet gegen die ascharitische Verquickung von Kreation mit der zur Atomisierung führenden göttlichen Willenslehre. Ebenso war die „Natur des Unmöglichen“ unbedingt aufrechtzuerhalten, um die Lehre von der göttlichen Absicht bei der Kreation nicht in ihr Gegenteil umschlagen zu lassen.²³² Denn in diesem Falle wäre die Teleologie, als ein einheitliches, der Weltordnung zugrundeliegendes Prinzip, nicht weniger bedroht als durch die materialistischen Lehren. Kreation und Schöpfungsabsicht konnten nur dann ihren richtigen Sinn bekommen, wenn mit ihnen eine feste Naturordnung in Verbindung war. Darum ist es auch verständlich, daß die natürliche Zweckmäßigkeit, ganz im aristotelischen Sinne, als „stärkster“ Be-

²³¹ *Moreh* III 25. Der Fehler der ascharitischen extremen Willenslehre besteht darin, daß sie nicht bei der Kreation als solcher bleibt *העולם הזה בחלקי העולם*, und der zweckmäßige Bau des Auges gilt für sie auch als spezieller Willensakt, *בן רצה השם אע"פ שהיה הראות אפשר בחלוקה זו*. Dem widerspricht nun Maimonides. Ziehen wir aber heran III 19, wo ebenso vom Bau des Auges gesprochen wird, als von einer zweckmäßigen Organisation, so bleibt es hier nicht allein bei der immanenten *כונה מן הטבע*, sondern wird auf die *כעל שכל* zurückgeführt und das Ganze bezweckt die Erklärung von Gottes Wissen der sinnlichen Einzeldinge. Gott sieht und hört die Einzeldinge, indem er beim Schaffen des Auges und des Ohres ihr Sehen und Hören mitbegrift und dies wissend weiß er ergo auch alles durch diese Erfaste. Diese beiden Stellen, an derselben Tatsache illustriert, ergänzen sich: während III 25 mehr zur natürlichen Immanenz neigt (die allerdings abhängt von *הכח וההנהגה*), ist der Ausgangspunkt in III 19 die natürliche Intention, die notwendigerweise zur schöpferischen und mit der Providenz enge verbundenen *הנהגה* zurückführt. Während also III 25 die Organisation des Teiles gleichsam gegen die Argumentation vom Ganzen aus geltend macht, wird in III 19 die letzte Verbundenheit des Teiles mit dem Ganzen betont.

²³² *Moreh* II 19 Anf., wo die *כונה* bei der Welterschöpfung eingeschränkt wird: *מבלתי שאעמום עלי טה שהתגברו עליו המדברים בטבול*; *לא כל כונה בסתם, כי יש שם טבע הנמנעות קים א"א בטולו*. In diesem Sinne III 15: *אינו מטעול פועל וטעני זה: טבע המציאות*. Dies als Axiom angenommen, läßt nur noch eine Diskussion zu, was zum *טבע* oder zum *אפשר* gehört.

aristotelische Auffassung des natürlichen Zwecks dargestellt, aus der hervorgeht, daß die Dinge „eines für das andere“ existieren; hier wird die Darstellung durch zwei Bemerkungen unterbrochen: erstens, daß aus dieser natürlichen Ordnung auch seitens Aristoteles' ein göttliches Prinzip abgeleitet wird, und zweitens, daß von den natürlichen Existenzen aus die Kreation bewiesen werden kann, da ein jedes einen Zweck hat „und das eine für das andere existiert“.²³⁵ Dies von der Kreation ist nun sicherlich nicht mehr als referierten Aristoteles anzusehen — und doch wiederholt sich derselbe Wortlaut bezüglich der zweckhaften Zuordnung der Dinge zueinander. Als Meinung Maimonides' aber steht es im krassesten Widerspruch zur eine Seite später im selben Kapitel einsetzenden Beweisführung, daß die Dinge nicht Zwecke sind das eine fürs andere. Und in beiden Fällen dieselben Beispiele, insbesondere das der Pflanzen.²³⁶ Der Sinn kann nur der sein, daß hier, bei Besprechung der natürlichen zweckmäßigen Zuordnung, dies „eine für das andere“ nicht als eigentliche Zweckmäßigkeit anzusehen ist. Auch der Zusammenhang bestätigt dies: vorher, als Maimonides in seinem eigenen Sinne spricht,

²³⁵ *Moreh* III 13. Von den beiden parenthetischen Sätzen, zwischen וְכִי נִבְרָא בָּאֵר אֵרִיסְטוֹ שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר בְּמִקְצֵת הַנִּמְצָאוֹת וְכִי נִבְרָא בָּאֵר אֵרִיסְטוֹ שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר בְּמִקְצֵת הַנִּמְצָאוֹת und der Wiederaufnahme des Hauptgedankens, ist ein jeder mit דָּע besonders eingeleitet. Bei der דְּהַלָּה שְׂכָלִית des Aristoteles wird hinzugefügt וְשׁוֹה מִפְּנֵי זֶה, und zwar יֵעָשֶׂה זֶה מִפְּנֵי זֶה, ebenso auch bei der Kurationsansicht: וְשׁוֹה מִפְּנֵי זֶה וְהָיָה רְאוּיָהּ עַל כּוֹנֵן מִכּוֹן.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*: zuerst: שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר בְּמִקְצֵת הַנִּמְצָאוֹת; שׁוֹה מִפְּנֵי זֶה; unter den נִמְצָאוֹת sind wohl die Tiere, die für den Menschen sind, zu verstehen, dies im Sinne des vorangegangenen וְכִי נִבְרָא בָּאֵר אֵרִיסְטוֹ שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר בְּמִקְצֵת הַנִּמְצָאוֹת, vor allem aber im Sinne der aristotelischen Stelle — *Pol.* I 8 — die hier vorgeschwebt haben muß und wo nach der Aussage über die Pflanzen folgt: καὶ ὅτι ἡ ζῶσα ἔχουσα ἄνθρωπον ἔχει. Dann bei Darstellung unserer Meinung, im Sinne der Kreation, wird als irrig in Einem bezeichnet: אִם הַנִּבְרָאִים. Erst gegen Schluß des Kapitels führt Maimonides eine Scheidung zwischen Tier und Pflanze durch: das Tier ist nicht für den Menschen — wie zu זֶה וְכֵן בָּאֵר אֵרִיסְטוֹ שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר בְּמִקְצֵת הַנִּמְצָאוֹת erklärt — die Pflanzen dagegen. הִנֵּה בָּאֵר אֵרִיסְטוֹ וְזוֹלָתוֹ וְכֵן נִרְאָה שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים אֵינֶם נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר אֵרִיסְטוֹ שֶׁהַצִּמְחִים נִבְרָאוּ בַּעֲבוּר בִּ"ח וְכֵן בָּאֵר בְּמִקְצֵת הַנִּמְצָאוֹת. Auf jeden Fall aber ist die in der ersten Argumentation gemachte Erwähnung der Pflanze sicherlich gegen die vorher zitierte Meinung Aristoteles' über die Pflanze gerichtet gewesen, um zunächst auch für diese zu beweisen, daß sie nicht für den Menschen geschaffen sein muß. Im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles verbleibt Maimonides nur in bezug auf die Tiere.

ist nur von einem „gewissen Zweck“²³⁷ der Dinge die Rede; dann aber folgt die bezeichnende Wendung: „ich komme auf das Thema des Kapitels zurück, das ist die Frage des Zwecks“²³⁸ — dies unmittelbar nach der Erwähnung der Zuordnung des einen für das andere. Daraus ist klar ersichtlich, daß diese Zuordnung wohl für Aristoteles in seiner natürlichen Teleologie bereits Zweck bedeuten mochte, sein „letzter Zweck“ ist ja auch der Kreislauf des Entstehens und Vergehens — nicht aber für uns, die wir auf dem Standpunkt der Kreation stehen. Da wird unter dem letzten und für uns eigentlichen Zweck eben der verstanden, der eine solche Zuordnung ausschließt. Innerhalb dieser Teleologie sind auch die Teile Selbstzweck.

Nun haben wir bereits gesehen, worin sich der letzte Zweck vom natürlichen unterscheidet — in Anlehnung an die Erörterung der letzten Form als Gegensatz zur natürlichen in I 69.²³⁹ Der letzte Zweck ist charakterisiert durch seine Separatheit. Dieses Moment der Transzendenz betont auch Maimonides im Anschluß an den Vergleich des Kosmos mit dem Menschen. Daß die Welt ein Makroorganismus ist, wird in keinem Punkt eingeschränkt; nur soweit sie mit dem vernunftbegabten Menschen verglichen wird, da bedarf es einer Einschränkung in drei Punkten, deren dritter darin besteht, daß die hier waltende Vernunft nicht, wie im Menschen, an eine Materie gebunden ist, sondern als absolut separat gedacht werden muß.²⁴⁰ Hier allerdings erwächst eine Schwier-

²³⁷ *Guide* III, מ"ג א: אן לכל שי טנהא נאיה טא (Munk: une certaine fin), das Tibbon'sche אחר חכמית ist unrichtig (es sei denn, wenn man אחר lesen wollte).

²³⁸ *Ibid.*: ואשוב אל כוונת הפרק והיא הדברים בתכלית. Munk, III S. 86, übersetzt hier das אלאהי טי אללאם טי mit „qui traite de la cause finale“, wodurch wohl eine Nuancierung gegen das in der vorigen Anmerkung erwähnte „fin“ gegeben ist. Doch fehlt diese beabsichtigte Nuance im Text (wo es heißen müßte אלאהי טי, אלאהי טי, gegen das frühere טא נאיה, läßt die Hauptabsicht besser hervortreten).

²³⁹ Siehe oben Anm. 71, 73.

²⁴⁰ *Moreh* I 72: והשם יתי אינו כח בנות העולם אבל נפרד מכל חלקי העולם והנחותו. Während die ersten zwei Unterschiede — über das Verhältnis des ראש אבר zu den anderen und über die Lage des לב im kosmischen Organismus — noch gut aristotelisch sein konnten, ist dieser dritte Unterschied eine Betonung der wesentlichen Abweichung. Charakteristisch ist dies durch die

rigkeit aus dem organischen Charakter des Kosmos, welcher allein zweckmäßige Gleichstellung der Teile begründet. Der Organismus verträgt nur eine immanente Zweckmäßigkeit. Das aber hat Maimonides empfunden und als unbegreiflich, aber doch unleugbar, hingestellt. Separatheit der leitenden Vernunft und zugleich Zweckbedeutung der Teile — das ist das Mysterium.²⁴¹ Es erinnert an die Schwierigkeit, die sich bei Aristoteles im Gleichnis des Heeres offenbart²⁴² — dort aber ist die immanente Heeresordnung entscheidend und nur der hinzutretende Heeresführer problematisch.

Hervorhebung der Abgesondertheit von allen Teilen der Welt — *מפאק לטמיע* — und anderseits die Durchdringung der Welt als Gesamtheit — *אזוא אלעמאלם* — *ללעאלם בנמלחה* — Wir wissen bereits, daß die Durchdringung der Gesamtheit auch auf die Teile zurückwirkt — doch soll diese Gegenüberstellung den primären Charakter der Beziehung Gottes zur Welt hervorheben. Es gibt keinen Teil der Welt, auch nicht die höchste Sphäre, der in einer näheren Lage zu Gott sich befände als ein anderer; die Frage einer etwaigen „Lokalisierung“ oder der, bei Aristoteles so problematischen, *ἄφη* fällt von vornherein weg. Munk, I S. 373 trennt auch hier die mit einem Binde-waw verbundenen Teile (*וחדריה*) und beginnt mit dem zweiten Teil einen neuen selbständigen Satz. Dadurch geht der Charakter der Gegenüberstellung verloren. Falaquera, *Moreh Hamoreh* S. 54, zitiert *לעולם מהותית* ohne *בכללו*, wodurch auch das Wesentliche weggelassen erscheint.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*: der *חבור נעלם* besteht in der Antinomie: *כי המוסות יעמוד על הברדלו יתעלה מן העולם והנקותו מוטו והמוסות יעמוד על מציאות מעשה ההנהגות והשגחתו בכל חלק מחלקיו ואפילו חלק הפרות*. Der erste Teil des Satzes weist zurück auf I 70, wo die Frage der Separatheit auch gegenüber der ersten Sphäre — *עריבות* — behandelt wird; dort werden als Konsequenzen der Separatheit, die im Bilde *עריבות* gesehen wird, nicht bloß *הנרכב מוטן* der *שאר הנרכב מוטן*, sondern auch die zwei Lehren angesehen: 1. das Gott nicht in der Welt ist, ein Teil von ihr — *והסתכל אמרם* — *שוכן עליו ולא שוכן בו שאלו אמרו שוכן בו, היה מחייב לשם מקום* — oder später unter Anführung von Ber. Rab.: *הוא מען עולמו ואין עולמו מענו*; 2. daß die Separatheit nicht Passivität bedingt, sondern die Welt als Instrument bedeutet *והיא כלי לו*. All dies wird als ein, im Innern sich bedingender, Gedankenkomplex betrachtet; nur so sei Gott als *מניע הגלגל* zu verstehen. Ephodi z. St., I 72, sieht die Antinomie so, daß aus der Separatheit — *והנקותו מוטו* — folgt *השגחה לעולם בכל חלקיו*, während aus der *הקיות* *בכל חלקיו* *מניע גלגל עריבות* Satz, sich erst ergibt, daß Gott den *גלגל עריבות* bewegt. Dies, offenbar doch auf I 70 bezogen, stimmt jedoch mit den Darlegungen dort nicht überein, wie gezeigt. Die Antinomie hier besteht in der Beziehung Gottes zum Ganzen des Kosmos und zu den Teilen, zu allen auch den geringsten.

²⁴² Siehe oben Anm. 230.

Die Separatheit bedeutet aber nicht bloß ein Negatives. Wohl ist dadurch die Zweckidee, da losgelöst von allem Materiellen, von vielen Komplikationen, die sich bei Aristoteles aus der Materiegebundenheit ergeben, frei. Dazu aber kommt noch ein Positives. Schon bei jener dritten Einschränkung im Menschenvergleich, worin die Weltvernunft von der Menschenvernunft sich durch ihre völlige Beziehungslosigkeit zur Materie charakteristisch unterscheidet, schon da wird noch ein Hinweis auf ein Neues gegeben. Es wird dennoch die Möglichkeit eines Vergleiches nahegelegt mit dem menschlichen akquirierten Intellekt.²⁴³ Dieser aber ist zwar auch als separat gedacht, jedoch ist nicht die Separatheit sein wesentliches Merkmal — sondern der Realisierungsakt, der in ihm impliziert ist. Auf diese Weise kommt zur Separatheit auch in der Weltvernunft noch dieses neue, aktive Moment hinzu. Bei Aristoteles sehen wir als die letzte Stufe in der teleologischen Reihe die ποίησις; als nächste, d. h. die eigentliche bei jeder immanenten Zweckmäßigkeit, war die πράξις; für Gott aber konnten beide Arten nicht gelten, er kann bloß νόησις sein.²⁴⁴ Irgendwie mußte das πρῶτον κινουὺν ἀκίνητον als separat gedacht werden²⁴⁵ — nirgends aber hatte diese Separatheit eine positive Auswirkung im System, am wenigsten in der Teleologie, wo sie ja die aristotelische Immanenz von Grund aus umgestürzt hätte. Bei Maimonides hingegen war es gerade die Separatheit, die die Teleologie, d. h. die Lehre vom letzten Zweck ganz auf den Boden der ποίησις gestellt hat. Die funktionelle πράξις hatte im letzten Zweck

²⁴³ *Moreh* I 72: רדע שראוי היה שנדמה יחס האלוה ית' לעולם יחס השכל הנקנה ... ושופע עליי, הנמצא לאדם אשר אינו כח בנף והוא נבדל מן הנוף... Umgekehrt wird wieder, I 1, im ייחוד האדם בענין שהוא — nur dem Menschen eigentümliche — reine Erkenntnis mit der göttlichen — verglichen. — אשר אינה בכלי — יד בני טאר

²⁴⁴ Die Hauptstelle ist *Met.* XII, 7. „Daß der Gottheit weder eine ποίησις noch eine πράξις beigelegt werden könne, sagt Aristoteles öfters mit aller Bestimmtheit,“ Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 368, Anm. 1 (wo auch Belege); bes. S. 374, Anm. 2.

²⁴⁵ Schon *Met.* 1060 a 7 ff. wird die Frage des Gegenstandes der Metaphysik behandelt, und ganz im platonischen Sinne, als αἰδῖος οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ καθ' αὐτὴν bezeichnet. Vgl. ausführlich Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 219 f. Dann *Met.* 1073 a 4 wird vom ersten Beweger als οὐσία κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν gesprochen; (ähnlich wie *Phys.* 198 a 36: ὧν (αἰσθητῶν) ἢ ἑτέρα οὐ φυσικῆ).

keinerlei Berechtigung; es mußte daher, mit Hilfe der absoluten Immaterialität, das Pojetische ermöglicht werden.

Diese für Maimonides wesentliche Grundlegung seiner Teleologie wird an allen bezüglichen Stellen nachdrücklich hervorgehoben. Von III 25 haben wir bereits gesehen, daß dort der ganze Gedankengang auf das Agensmotiv eingestellt ist. Auch III 13 beginnt mit der Vorbemerkung, daß das planmäßige Handeln mit der Zweckfrage verbunden ist, daß es daher für Gott, der nicht geschaffen ist, keine Zweckfrage geben kann.²⁴⁶ Damit ist die Basis gegeben; dann erst, „nach dieser Vorerörterung“, beginnt die eigentliche Abhandlung über den Zweck des Daseins. Man sieht gleich, die spätere Ablehnung des Daseinszwecks hat doch noch anderen Charakter als die in der Vorbemerkung ausgesprochene grundsätzliche Unmöglichkeit einer Zweckfrage beim Nichtgeschaffenen. Aber auch in I 69, wo ja Agens gegen Causa zurückgestellt wird, geschieht es nur aus zwei Gründen: erstens, wie bereits gesehen, da Causa auch den Zweck mitinbegrift, zweitens aber, und dies wird ausdrücklich vom ersten Grund unterschieden, da das Attribut Agens die Möglichkeit gibt zu einer mißverständlichen zeitlichen Beziehung zwischen dem Wirkenden und dem Werk²⁴⁷ — dessen Ausschaltung für Maimonides wesentlich war. Hier wird es zwar nur mit der notwendigen Kontinuität der Erhaltung der Welt begründet, wir haben aber bereits gesehen, daß auch für die Schöpfung das zeitliche Moment ausgeschaltet wurde — eben wegen der Reinheit des Zweckprinzips. Aber auf den pojetischen Charakter des Weltzweckes wird hier keineswegs verzichtet; ausdrücklich

²⁴⁶ *Moreh* III 13 Anfangs: כל פועל שיעשה בכונה אי אפשר לדבר שהוא אשר עשה מבלי: und gleichsam als Stütze für diese erste Prämisse wird die dritte unbezweifelbare angeführt: שהמחויב המציאות ... לא יצטרך לפועל ... ולהיותו בלתי ... und gleichsam als Stütze für diese erste Prämisse wird die dritte unbezweifelbare angeführt: שהמחויב המציאות ... לא יצטרך לפועל ... ולהיותו בלתי ... und gleichsam als Stütze für diese erste Prämisse wird die dritte unbezweifelbare angeführt: שהמחויב המציאות ... לא יצטרך לפועל ... ולהיותו בלתי ...

²⁴⁷ *Moreh* I 69 g. E. wird resumierend wiederholt: ולזה קראוהו סבה ולא קראוהו פועל; dann erst kommt das Argument gegen die Anschauung des Kalam, daß die Welt auch bestehen bleiben könnte, wenn ihr Schöpfer aufhörte zu existieren: ואשר זכרוהו הוא אמת אלו היה פועל לבד ולא היה לדבר שהוא הפועל צורך אליו בזה משך עמידתו.

wird ja betont, daß Causa durchaus nicht mit Ewigkeit der Welt verbunden sein muß.²⁴⁸

Nun war Maimonides die Schwierigkeit, die mit der ποίησις für Gott verbunden ist, gut bekannt. Die aristotelische Auffassung, daß alle ποίησις auf einen außenliegenden Zweck gerichtet ist,²⁴⁹ mußte berücksichtigt werden. Wir sehen auch z. B. Ibn Zaddik das Vorhandensein eines Planes bei der Weltschöpfung ablehnen, und dies nicht allein deswegen, da man dann einen neben Gott existierenden Behelf annehmen müßte,²⁵⁰ sondern auch, da man daraus notwendigerweise auf eine Zweckursache schließen würde,²⁵¹ was nicht anders zu verstehen ist als auf einen außenliegenden Zweck. Dieser Gedankengang, wesentlich entnommen der die Zeit so vielfach beeinflussenden neoplatonischen Theologie des Aristoteles,²⁵² konnte auch von Maimonides nicht vernachlässigt werden. Während also die Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung ein so wichtiger Stützpunkt der Teleologie war, drohte es nun, daß gerade aus den teleologischen Konsequenzen die Schöpfung selbst bedroht würde.

Aus diesem Grunde fixiert Maimonides den Terminus des „transeunten Zwecks“ und erklärt ihn nur möglich bei Willensakten materieller Subjekte.²⁵³ Nur bei diesem ist der Zweck

²⁴⁸ Selbst nicht für die Philosophen, *ibid.*: ואשר הביאו הס' לוסוסים לקראו ית' : עלה וסבה ולא יקראוהו טועל אינו טפני דעתם המפורסם בקדמות העולם.

²⁴⁹ Siehe oben Anm. 211.

²⁵⁰ *Mikrokosmos*, ed. Horovitz S. 56; nachdem alles abgelehnt wird, was וכן ג'ם אין לוטר שברא במהשבה ועיון wird fortgesetzt: נוסל תחת כלי האומנות אבל הבורא ית' ברא בראויו בלי עיון ומהשבה וכלי (das fehlt wohl im Ms. Parma, doch kann der Sinn nach dem Zusammenhang nicht anders sein).

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*: ועוד שאין לוטר שברא לדבר שהדברים הנבראים היו אז עלה מתטמת לאותו דבר. Über מתטמת als Zweckursache vgl. Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 315 Anm. 166; dieser Stelle will Kaufmann, S. 320 Anm. 180, so einen Sinn geben, indem er שלדברים und dann באותו דבר liest, was jedoch für unseren Zweck weniger wichtig ist, da die Ablehnung einer Zweckursache (in dem שברא לדבר) gleichgestellt mit der Ablehnung eines Instruments, auf jeden Fall gesichert ist.

²⁵² Siehe Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 319 und 320 Anm. 178, 179. Vgl. auch Horovitz, *Einl. zum Mikrokosmos*, S. IX, Anm. 36.

²⁵³ *Moreh* II 18, Methode II: Der Begriff תכלית יוצאת — גאיה מא בארגא — כשיהיו הפעולות טפני דבר אחר הוץ לגוף הרצון. Dies erscheint beim materiebedingten Subjekt sogar eine notwendige Folge: ואם היה הרצון ההוא : לבנעל הוטר עד שיבוקש בו (חתי יטלב בה) תכלית אחת יוצאת.

vom Subjekt räumlich getrennt, äußerlich, und infolgedessen ist auch der auf den Zweck gehende Willensakt eine Veränderung, also in der Zeit. Das alles gilt nicht für den separaten Willen, der nur Namensgemeinschaft hat mit unserem materiegebundenen Willen.²⁵⁴ Durch die Separatheit also konnte gleichsam die Immanenz des Zweckes im Göttlichen erklärt und dadurch die ποιησις ermöglicht werden. Durch die Immaterialität des göttlichen Willens ist sein zweckmäßiges — und dennoch von Raum und Zeit unabhängiges — Wirken möglich. Diese Stelle im Moreh ist von grundlegender Bedeutung, denn sie bildet den Schlüssel zu all den ineinandergreifenden Fragen. Die Fixierung des transeunten Zweckes und seines Bereiches ermöglichte die Lehre vom letzten Zweck. Dadurch ist die Zulässigkeit des Willensattributes in seiner teleologischen Bedeutung gerettet.²⁵⁵ Auf

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.* als Gegensatz zum רצון בעל חומר wird der רצון נפשי genannt אשר אינו רצון הנפשי אמנם יאמר עליהם: רצון בשותף ואין דמיון בין שני הרצונים. Die beiden sind im Wesen verschieden: מפני דבר אחד. Das Gemeinsame besteht darin, daß beide ein Eintreten des Aktes darstellen, denn dies macht das wahre Wesen des Willens aus: שאמדת הרצון ומחלתו זה ענינה, שירצה ולא ירצה; in diesem Punkte ist wohl die Gemeinsamkeit nicht bloß homonymer Natur, בשותף. Nur während beim materiegebundenen Willen, die Spannung zwischen Passivität und Aktivität von den טבעיים bedingt wird, ist sie beim separaten Willen im Inneren begründet. Veränderlichkeit und transeunter Zweck bedingen sich gegenseitig; Veränderung ist aber nicht identisch mit Entscheidungsakt. Ephodi z. St. scheint dieses Moment des transeunten Zweckes zu übersehen und spricht wiederholt vom תכלית allein (etc.), darum ist es begreiflich, daß ihn diese Lösung nicht befriedigen kann: ואילו השני תירוצים צריכים עין. Denn nähme man es in dieser allgemeinen Fassung und verstünde man die Stelle nicht als רצון לבד, כי הפעל הזה נמשך לרצון לבד, an die Ephodi anknüpft, wörtlich, so wäre es ja der krasseste Widerspruch zu dem III 25 durchgeführten Gedankengang. Die Unterscheidung hier entspricht wohl dem in I 69 betonten Gegensatz in Bezug auf die letzte Form.

²⁵⁵ Dadurch sind auch die Gefahren beseitigt, die sich aus dem Willensattribut für Cohen, *Charakteristik* S. 97, ergeben und die er so formuliert: „Die Schöpfung macht das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Mensch transeunt, während es immanent sein muß. Die Erkenntnis begründet diese Immanenz; der Wille bedroht sie; und die Schöpfung scheint die Drohung auszuführen.“ Wir sehen, daß gerade der Wille in seiner Immanenz — Maimonides empfindet wohl, daß היות זה הפעל כבדה והיא דקה מאוד — verbunden mit der Schöpfung, als sittliche Grundlegung für die Begründung der maimonischen Teleologie unerlässlich sind.

dieser Basis aber bedeutet es dasselbe, ob wir sagen, Gott ist der Zweck, wie I 69, oder Gott will einen Zweck, wie III 25; es ist dies kein Widerspruch, da in beiden Fällen der Zweck in Gott immanent bleibt, indem er den Zweck bildet.

Ist nun aber der teleologische Weltgrund, als weltschöpferisches Prinzip, gesichert, so greifen die Konsequenzen auch in den Bereich der Naturteleologie hinüber. Da die Lehre vom letzten Zweck, wie gesagt, nicht bloß ein transzendenter Überbau über die immanente Naturzweckmäßigkeit ist, sondern, durch das kreatorisches Moment, ihre Grundlegung bildet, müssen auch die natürlichen Zwecke im Lichte des einen letzten Zweckes ihre richtige Deutung erhalten. Führt nun die Naturteleologie zu einer Vielheit und Relativität und Vergleichbarkeit der einzelnen Zwecke, so wird diese Vielheit durch die sie konsumierende Einheit des letzten Zweckes aufgehoben. Das $\text{o}\tilde{\nu}\ \xi\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ bei Aristoteles hat ja die Relativität bis ins Innere des einzelnen Zwecks hineingetragen — es kann auch der eine Zweck eine doppelte Beziehung haben;²⁵⁶ von der Vergleichbarkeit und verschiedenen Bewertung der einzelnen Zwecke wurde bereits oben gesprochen. Durch die Aufhebung des $\text{o}\tilde{\nu}\ \xi\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ als letzter Frage war für Maimonides die Relativität der Zwecke beseitigt.

Die Kreaturen sind Selbstzwecke und sie sind es, weil sie vom letzten Weltzweck, Gott-Wille oder Gott-Weisheit abhängen.²⁵⁷ Denn ihre Zwecke, vom letzten Zweck getragen,

²⁵⁶ So *de anima* 415 b 2: $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta'\ \text{o}\tilde{\nu}\ \xi\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$, $\delta\iota\tau\tau\acute{o}\nu$, $\tau\acute{o}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \text{o}\tilde{\nu}$, $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\epsilon\ \tilde{\phi}$; ebenso *Phys.* 194 a 35 (*Met.* 1075 b 2, wozu vgl. Bernays, *Dialoge des Aristoteles* 169). Das $\text{o}\tilde{\nu}$ bezieht sich etwa auf die Herstellung der Gesundheit, das $\tilde{\phi}$ auf die Heilung des Kranken — je nach dem Gesichtspunkt.

²⁵⁷ *Moreh* III 13 g. E. wird das irrige Zwecksuchen zwiefach ausgedrückt: לבקש תכלית למא שאין לו תכלית ה היא (למא לים לה תלך אלנאיה) או לבקש תכלית למא שאין לבקש תכלית למא שאין לו תכלית (אלא למא לא נאיה לה אלא...) מציאותו הנחלת ברצון האלהי וכו' (Text ergänzt nach Munk III S. 98 n. 2). Jetzt ist uns klar, daß der zweite mit ו verbundene Satz nicht nur eine allgemeinere Fassung des ersten — wie Munk: *ou* (en général) — ist, sondern auch explikativ zum ersten steht, denn das irrige Suchen eines speziellen, außenliegenden Zweckes eines Dinges ist begründet im Irrtum der dinglichen Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt und beide, in Einem, werden behoben durch das Verlegen des Zweckes in Gott. Das ו wäre vielleicht besser zu übersetzen: oder eigentlich. (Scheyer zieht beide ganz zusammen, was der Sache

sind untereinander nicht meßbar. Und eben dieselbe Zuordnung, die, bloß von der Naturseite gesehen, ein „Eines fürs andere“ erscheint,²⁵⁸ wird, vom letzten Zweck aus gesehen, ein „Jedes für sich selbst“. Die kreatorisches aber zugleich zeitlose ποιησις konsumiert die τράξις. Und jene Doppeldeutung des למענהו, der Zweck im Geschaffenen und im Schöpfer, die, wie wir sahen,²⁵⁹ nebeneinander gut bestehen können, erweist sich uns jetzt als mehr, als voneinander abhängig, wenn nicht gar als identisch. Denn der Selbstzweck der Kreatur ist der kreatorisches Gott-Zweck von einer anderen Seite gesehen. Und ein Schritt weiter: die Unmöglichkeit eines dinglichen Einheitszweckes, in III 13 dargelegt, da er ja nur in einer Über- und Unterordnung relativer Zwecke bestehen müßte, ist begründet durch die Setzung jenes göttlich-immanenten Zweckes, der alle relative Zuordnung als Teleologie nicht zuläßt. Daß im Lichte dieses letzten Zweckes die Unterschiede von Einfachheit und Differenziation in der dinglichen Funktion alle Relevanz, die sie bei Aristoteles haben, verlieren, ist nun auch selbstverständlich.

Hier, in der göttlich-immanenten Teleologie, ist der Punkt gegeben, wo Welterschöpfung und Weltordnung zusammenkommen und Eins werden — der Punkt, wo nun von der aristotelischen Teleologie nichts mehr zurückgeblieben ist. Die immanente Funktionsteleologie, die Maimonides akzeptiert,²⁶⁰

auch nicht gerecht wird.) Beide zugleich sind begründet in der Erkenntnis von כל נמצא כפי מה שהוא.

²⁵⁸ Siehe oben Anm. 235.

²⁵⁹ Siehe oben Anm. 76.

²⁶⁰ *Moreh* III 25 kommt der aristotelischen Naturteleologie außer im bereits erwähnten Gleichnis vom Auge auch in der Formulierung am nächsten, wenn dort als Teleologie beschrieben wird שחלקי הפעולות הטבעיות כלם מתוקנות במטרתן נקשרות קצתם בקצתם וכלם סבות ומסובבות חלקי הפעולות. Wenn auch der Ausdruck חלקי הפעולות nicht diese Betonung hat, die ihm Munk III S. 201 — jusqu'aux moindres détails — gibt, so soll doch das Zusammenstimmen der natürlichen Teilfunktionen im Kausalen als Teleologie verstanden werden; die Grenze zwischen Kausalität und Teleologie wird verwischt. (Vgl. Cohen, *Logik*, S. 356). Bezeichnend ist auch das weitere שם יתיר מתוקנים ומסודרים כשי"ב בטבע הגלגלים, als ob die Sphären mehr Zweckmäßigkeit infolge ihrer höheren Ordnung aufzuweisen hätten, was zwar hier als מילוטסי angeführt, aber auch vollständig akzeptiert wird, während gerade in diesem Punkte in

erweist sich als bloß unumgänglicher Argumentationsbehelf, um die Teleologie vor der Gefährdung durch die ascharitischen absurden Konsequenzen zu schützen, d. h. Maimonides führt die empirische Naturzweckmäßigkeit ins Treffen, um nicht, auf dem Boden der Natur, von ihr bedroht zu werden — um sich aber gleichzeitig die eigentliche Teleologie für eine andere Basis zu retten. Denn für seine eigentliche Philosophie war auch das Weltgeschehen von derselben Zweckmäßigkeit getragen wie das Weltentstehen. Denn da die Schöpfung nicht zeitlich gedacht ist, im Anfang, hört sie auch nicht auf in der Dauer. Die Vereinigung vollzieht sich im Terminus שפע. Die Separatheit des Willens, durch die der Zweck als göttlich-immanent in der Kreation ermöglicht wurde, wird als kontinuierlich gesetzt. In diesem Terminus scheint all das zusammengefaßt zu sein, was das Spezifische der maimonischen Teleologie ausmacht.

Wir haben bereits gesehen,²⁶¹ daß Maimonides die Bezeichnung Agens auch aus dem Grunde zurückstellt, da daraus nicht die Kontinuität der göttlichen Führung, im Sinne der Teleologie, eindeutig ersichtlich wäre. In diesem Zusammenhang wird nun diese Kontinuität als Emanation bezeichnet.²⁶² Diese Emanation aber wird an anderer Stelle so bestimmt, daß sie nicht Ausstrahlung, sondern eine Handlung bedeutet, nicht etwa eine Funktion, eine πράξις, Gottes, sondern eine ποιήσις.²⁶³ Somit ist das Agensmoment auch im שפע er-

III 14 die Darstellung so ist, als sei der מפרש במעלת העצם der Sphären in bezug auf die Teleologie wohl ein Argument der Philosophen, mit dem wir uns aber nicht identifizieren. (Vgl. oben Anm. 47.)

²⁶¹ Siehe oben Anm. 247.

²⁶² *Moreh* I 69: במציאות הנבואה הכל נמצא והוא מתמיד עמידתו בענין אשר יבונה: בשפע אמנם בחיותו יתע' צורת העולם ג"כ: worauf am Schluß Bezug genommen wird: כמו שבארנו והוא ימשכהו העמידה וההתמדה תמיד.

²⁶³ *Moreh* I 58: ואין זה כהשפעת החום מן האש ולא כחייב האור מן השמש אבל השפע מן השמש ימשך להם תמיד עמידה וקיום וסודו בהנהגה מתוקנת שפע (יין) durch „action divine“ (sonst gewöhnlich: épanchement), dadurch ist die beabsichtigte Kontrastierung deutlicher gemacht, doch müßte vielleicht dieses Moment der „action“ zugleich mit dem der Emanation festgehalten werden. Die Interpretation Narbonis (und ebenso Ephodi und Schem-Tob): ובכלל כחייב מהשכל hebt dieses Moment der Aktion auf und relativiert das abgelehnte מהשכל (worin wieder Narboni und Ephodi auseinandergehen). —

Hier, im שפע, das wir auch bei der leitenden Funktion der Sphärenintelligenzen verwendet sahen,²⁶⁷ kommt nun die göttlich-immanente Zwecktätigkeit am konzentriertesten zum Ausdruck — hier sind vereinigt, in der wahren Teleologie, Schöpfung und Erhaltung der Welt. Von hier aus ist die Kreation eben nicht abgeschlossen, sondern kann — auf dem Gebiete des Sittlichen, das ja das Gebiet der Teleologie ist — immer wieder manifest werden wie in der Prophetie.²⁶⁸ Das ist der Sinn der maimonischen planvoll handelnden Emanation; es ist die Sicherung der Dauer des letzten Zweckes. Die Natur und ihre immanente Zweckmäßigkeit ist nicht ein Zustand, der nach Abschluß des Schöpfungsaktes diesen abgelöst hat, wie Maimonides vielleicht einmal gedacht haben mag;²⁶⁹ sondern alles mechanisch-funktionell Zweckmäßige, mit Vielheit und Relativität belastet, wird vom letzten Zweck getragen, im ewigen Schöpfungs-Führungsakt, und hat in ihm seinen Sinn. Es ist dies analog der sittlichen Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, die doch im Akt des göttlichen Urwillens verankert ist.²⁷⁰ Der gegebene Natur-

nichts nach dem abwechselnden Gebrauch und der vollkommenen terminologischen Gleichstellung von סבה und עלה zu Beginn von I 69. (Ibn Roschd erklärt: הסבה והעלה שני שמות נרדפים; s. Munk, I S. 313, n. 1.) Demnach wäre man beinahe berechtigt, das סבה hier, II 12, von vornherein mit Zweck zu übersetzen und das סבתו הפועלת etwa: „der in der Welt wirkende Zweck.“ Aber das ist für den Sinn gar nicht nötig, denn auch als Causa wird es sicher nur mit Rücksicht auf den mitenthaltene Zweck gebraucht. Für die schöpferische und erhaltende Emanation Gottes sind demnach die drei Prämissen angeführt: Die Separatheit, das Handeln, die Stellung Gottes als Zweck. (Der Einwand, den Wolff, *Acht Kapitel*, 2 Aufl. S. 10, Anm. 2 gegen die Identifizierung von סבה und עלה macht, ist durch den Gebrauch in I 69 widerlegt.)

²⁶⁷ Siehe oben Anm. 156.

²⁶⁸ Vgl. meine Abhandlung *Proph.* S. 124 ff.

²⁶⁹ So noch in den *Acht Kapiteln* VIII.

²⁷⁰ *Moreh* III, 17: שטרצונו הקדום מאין תחלה, שהיה כל בעל חי מתנועע להצונו ושהיה האדם בעל יכולת על מה שירצהו או יבחרהו מטה שיוכל עליו. Diese doppelte Verwendung des יכל, am Anfang und am Ende, bringt klar den Charakter der hier betonten יכולת zum Ausdruck. Daß der Mensch die Macht hat — (דא אפחשעה) בעל יכולת — über alles, was er will oder wählt von den Dingen, die in seiner Macht sind מטה שיוכל עליו (מנא יסתעע עליה), kann sich auf nichts anderes beziehen, als auf das dem Willen noch übergeordnete Entscheidungsvermögen, während der Wille unter den Dingen wählt, die dem Ausführungsvermögen des Menschen entsprechen. Es handelt sich also um die sittliche

zweck ist aufgegeben vom letzten Zweck. Die transzendente Teleologie ist immanent — von einer höheren Warte gesehen.

Entscheidung, die im göttlichen Urwillen verankert ist. Klärend ist ein Vergleich mit I 73, Präm. VI, auf die Munk, III 124 n. 1, offenbar als identisch mit unserer Stelle, hinweist. Dort handelt es sich um die Sicherung der Kausalität, hauptsächlich gegen die Ascharia. Beim Beispiel der Bewegung der Feder und den vier anzunehmenden Akzidenzen ist die Reihenfolge: der Wille zur Bewegung, die Fähigkeit (אלקדריה) zu bewegen, die Bewegung selbst etc. Es wird also nur vom Ausführungsvermögen, das dem Willen folgt, gesprochen; von den drei Momenten, die III 17 behandelt werden — Entscheidung, Wille, Ausführung — sind hier nur die letzten zwei verwendet. Für die Kausalität war ja auch nicht mehr nötig; dagegen war bei der Behandlung der gerechten Providenz, die Herausarbeitung des Moments der verantwortlichen Entscheidung von wesentlicher Bedeutung. An I 73 erinnert wohl die unserer Stelle vorangehende Erklärung von יכולה beim Menschen, doch mit anderem Schwerpunkt: I 73 soll die Kausalreihe begründet werden, die Fähigkeit der Ausführung ist vom Willen nicht mehr abhängig als etwa die Bewegung von der Fähigkeit; hier aber liegt der Schwerpunkt im Moment der Wahl: שהוא בשבעו ובבחירתו וברצונו יעשה כל מה שיוכל האדם לעשותו, also ein besonderes Moment in der Beziehung Wille — Ausführung. — Freilich wird hier die Entscheidungsmacht, die rein sittlichen Charakters ist, auf eine Stufe gestellt mit der freiwilligen Bewegung der Tiere; auch das früher erwähnte בשבעו könnte angeführt werden, daß diese יכולה als bloße Naturfunktion zu verstehen wäre. Daß aber dies nicht der Fall ist, kann mehrfach belegt werden. Vor allem, ganz allgemein, die Hervorhebung der menschlichen individuellen Vernunft als Gegensatz zum טבע bei den anderen Lebewesen in I 72, worüber oben Anm. 88. Dann II 25, wo der notwendige Zusammenhang zwischen Kreation und Torah behandelt wird, da wird als eine nur durch die Kreation lösbare Frage auch die angeführt, daß das von Gott beabsichtigte moralische Gesetz nicht in die Natur des Menschen verlegt wurde: ולמה לא שם אלו הענינים המצווה בהם (vgl. auch Munk, II S. 198 n. 4). Wozu Narboni, *Komment.* S. 36 b: כי התורה ואם יש לה טבוא בענין הטבעי אינה טבעית; was aber offenbar Schem-Tob z. St. zur Übertreibung angeregt hat: כי כל התורה נסים (של בני אדם sc.) אינם ענינים (vgl. oben Anm. 176). So ferner III 19: טבעיים לבד אבל נמשכים ג' לחיות אדם בעל יכולת והשתכלות. Da ist also die Eigenschaft als יכולת — בעל אסתמאע — (Ephodi: מצד בחירתו) der bloß natürlichen entgegengesetzt. Oder III 11, daß die sittliche Einsicht mit der natürlichen Funktion nicht vereinbar ist: ואילו היה שם חכמה אשר יחסה לצורה האנושית כיהם: הכח הרואה אל העין, היו נספקין נוקי כלם. Diese Stelle ist wohl nicht anders denn als allgemeine Bemerkung zu interpretieren, u. zw. so: gäbe es eine Weisheit, die sich zur menschlichen Form als so notwendig eintretende Funktion verhielte wie die Sehkraft zum Auge, dann wären alle Schäden behoben; in Wirklichkeit aber verhält es sich nicht so. Allgemein wird der Satz so aufgefaßt: gäbe es dort, d. h. besäßen sie (sc. בחות בני אדם) die Weisheit, die sich zur Form so

Die aristotelische Teleologie, die in ihrem Wesen Funktionsvollkommenheit und Ökonomie der Mittel bedeutet, hat

verhält etc. So Munk, III 65: „S'ils possédaient la science, qui est à la forme humaine“, etc. Ebenso Scheyer, III S. 46. Diese auf den ersten Blick auch naheliegende Auffassung würde dann das genaue Gegenteil von unserer Interpretation besagen: die Gleichheit der Relation zwischen Weisheit — menschlicher Form und Sehkraft — Auge wäre als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt. Nun empfindet schon Scheyer *ibid.*, Anm. 1, daß „dieses Gleichnis etwas Auffallendes hat“; die darauf bezogene Belehrung von Weiß, III S. 50 Anm. 4, kann die feingefühlte Bemerkung Scheyers nicht entkräften (daß doch die Sehkraft das Wesen des Auges ist, was die Weisheit zur menschlichen Wesenheit nicht ist). Aber abgesehen von diesem Einwand, sprechen für unsere Interpretation folgende Momente: 1. Schon in III 8 wurde der Zusammenhang zwischen der sittlichen Weisheit und der menschlichen Form und die Tatsache, daß alle sittlichen Mängel von der Materie herrühren, sehr ausführlich behandelt und belegt; dies im Zusammenhange mit der der Materie inhärierenden Privation. Es wäre demnach das ganze Kap. 11 nichts anderes als eine matte Wiederholung dessen, was schon in Kap. 8 gründlicher nachgewiesen wurde. 2. Um zu sagen, die menschlichen Parteien besäßen keine Weisheit, wäre der Ausdruck שם אילו היה הם (*Guide* III, b) sehr verschwommen und dies könnte viel einfacher und prägnanter durch ein Personalpronomen ausgedrückt werden. Dagegen gibt es eine Menge von Belegen im Sprachgebrauch Maimonides', daß er שם הם dem verbum anfügt, nicht um „dort“ auszudrücken, sondern daß etwas überhaupt ist oder nicht ist (wie das engl. there is). Ich greife aus der Fülle der Beispiele nur einige heraus: II 18 g. E. שמן שם ראה — אן לים הם דליל — לא איהתה (II 144): $\text{qu'il n'y a pas de preuve}$; II 39 Anf. $\text{לא איהתה תבון שם תורה ולא תהיה}$ — $\text{לם תבון הם שיעוה ולא תבון}$ (II 301): $\text{il n'y a jamais eu et il n'y aura jamais}$; *ibid.* später: שיהיה שם שומט — אן יבון הם קאן — לים הם אשתקאן — שאן שם גורה (II 43 a); III 18: לם הם שישמטם (III b), besonders *ibid.* weiter unten: לם הם אלהים (III a), die auch Munk alle im Sinn von „es gibt“ übersetzt. Interessant ist, daß Maimonides diese Wendung auch im hebräischen gebraucht; so z. B. *Hil. Jesode-Hatorah* I, 1: ידעו שיש שם מצוי (vgl. *Kesef Mischneh* z. St.); *Hil. Teschubab* I, 3: $\text{בטון הוה שאן בית המקדש קיים}$. 3. Wäre von der bereits wiederholt behandelten Weisheit, deren Beziehung zur Form als so bekannt vorausgesetzt wird, die Rede, so müßte sie ja den bestimmten Artikel haben: besäßen sie die Weisheit, die usw. Es heißt aber הכמה — עלם — ohne Artikel; (Munk, freilich, fügt, logisch genötigt, aus eigenem hinzu: *la science*). All dies scheint unsere Interpretation der Stelle zu rechtfertigen. Dann bekommt aber auch das Kapitel einen richtigen Sinn. Vorher, III 10, wurde der Begriff der Privation an der Blindheit illustriert; dieses Gleichnis wird auch zu Beginn von Kap. 11 wiederholt, die Unwissenheit, eine Privation, richte ebensoviel Schaden an wie die Blindheit. Während aber der Blinde ein vereinzelter Ausnahmefall ist, ist es bei der Unwissenheit Regel, daß $\text{כחות בני אדם כל איש כפי סכלותו יעשה בעצמו ובחולות רעות גדולות}$. Der

ihren treffenden Ausdruck in der vielfach variierten Formel gefunden, daß die Natur nichts umsonst mache. Wenn dieser Satz, aus der Erfahrung induktiv gewonnen,²⁷¹ das Verbum ποιεῖν enthält, so darf das nicht als Anerkennung der ποιήσις für die Natur aufgefaßt werden,²⁷² sondern eher als Anspielung auf den Technikvergleich, mit dem ja die aristotelische Teleologie eng verbunden ist. Dieser Satz war späterhin sehr verbreitet²⁷³ und je nach Bedarf angewandt. Bei Ibn Zaddik z. B., der, wie gesehen, eine Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung aus Furcht vor der Teleologie nicht zulassen konnte, findet sich dieser Satz in Verbindung mit der göttlichen Güte und in der Form, Gott hätte nichts fehlerhaft gemacht,²⁷⁴ was ja auch einmal bei Aristoteles als Variation vorkommt,²⁷⁵ aber sicher nicht mehr jenes ökonomisch-funktionelle Moment rein enthält, dessen Sinn doch ist, das nichts da ist, das nicht seinen Funktionszweck hätte. Nun hat auch Maimonides den Satz verwendet, und zwar einige Male, von denen aber zwei nur

Vergleich stimmt also nicht. Dazu ist die einschränkende Bemerkung nötig, daß es eben keine Weisheit oder Wissen, $\epsilon\lambda\gamma$, gibt, die mit derselben Naturnotwendigkeit aus der menschlichen Form folgen würden wie das Sehen aus dem Auge. Die sittliche Weisheit ist eben keine $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$. — So zeigt uns diese Stelle, ebenso wie die vorher angeführten, daß die Sittlichkeit des Menschen, sowohl als Entscheidungsvermögen als auch als Wissen, nicht zu seinen „natürlichen“ Funktionen zu zählen sind; wenn auch die Weisheit, wo sie vorhanden ist, nur in Verbindung mit der Form bestehen kann. Daß aber auch selbst die „Natur“ des Menschen von der allgemeinen Natur in wesentlicher Beziehung abweicht, wird ja III 32 erklärt.

²⁷¹ Siehe oben Anm. 209.

²⁷² Siehe Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 369 f., S. 374, Anm. 2. Bei der Gottheit werden besonders die $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ $\xi\lambda\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\kappa\alpha\iota$ abgelehnt, die der תכלית יצאת entsprechen.

²⁷³ Siehe Dieterici, *Die Lehre von der Weltseele*, S. 140: „Die Gelehrten haben ein allgemeines wahres Wort geredet, ‚die Natur schafft nichts Unnützes‘, das heißt, keines der vorhandenen Dinge ist ohne Nutzen und ohne Vorteil.“

²⁷⁴ Siehe Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 322, Anm. 183 und S. 302, Anm. 138. Neben der Formulierung לא ברא שום דבר חסר findet sich, allgemeiner gehalten, auch לא יעבור שיהיה העולם חסר שום ופעל הבורא שלם כמו שראוי לא בתוספת ולא בהקטן ולא יעבור שיהיה העולם חסר שום דבר, כמח שהוא *Mikrokosmos* S. 57, vgl. auch S. 62 u. a. Auch Halevi erwähnt den Ausspruch zweimal. Das eine Mal, *Kusari* I 76, um die in dem Ausspruch irreführende Identifikation von שום mit בורא zurückzuweisen, das andere Mal V 12, ganz allgemein: וזה חכמה לא תחזן דבר להכל וריק.

²⁷⁵ Z. B. *Pol.* 1256 b 20: ἡ φύσις μὴθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην; *de anima* 432 b 21. Vgl. oben Anm. 117.

im Sinne Aristoteles' und für ihn angeführt wurden.²⁷⁶ Wo sich aber Maimonides dem Satz anschließt und ihn für sich anführt, da ist dieser modifiziert im Sinne seiner eigenen Auffassung.

Einmal betont Maimonides, daß die natürlichen Dinge nicht sinnlos seien, schaltet aber ausdrücklich die künstlichen, also den Technikvergleich, aus, offenbar wegen des Nachsatzes, daß bei den natürlichen Schöpfungen ein Zweck anzunehmen ist, auch wenn er für uns nicht ersichtlich ist.²⁷⁷ Ohne also eine Zweckabsicht bei der technischen Tätigkeit bestreiten zu wollen, soll doch der Charakter beider Zweckmäßigkeiten auseinandergehalten werden, da Zweck eben nicht Funktion ist.

²⁷⁶ *Moreh* II 14 (VII); III 13: ואריסטו אומר תמיד בפירוש שהטבע לא יעשה דבר לבטלה.

²⁷⁷ *Moreh* III 25: שאין בענינים הטבעיים כלם דבר ע"צ ההכל, רצוני לומר שכל מה שאינו טלאכותי הם כלם פעולות שבוקש בהם תכלית אחת, אין הפרש בין שגור התכלית ההוא או לא נדע. Den Vergleich mit der Technik für den geordneten Ablauf des Naturgeschehens hat Maimonides wiederholt angewendet, außer den bereits erwähnten Vergleichen in bezug auf die Erzeugung eines Gegenstandes in II 4 und III 19 (vgl. oben Anm. 149), hat er es auch in diesem Sinne formuliert. So III 19: אבל זאת ההנחה הזושה לטלאכת מחשבת (אלתדבור אלטהני) וקוראים "מהני" (oder genauer nach Falquera, *Moreh* Ham. S. 157: mit der Erklärung: שהוא (הטבע sc.) הכם מנהיג משהיה בהמצאת החי oder II 10: לטלאכת האומנות הנעשית בידיים oder III 19 kann der Vergleich gut als nur für die philosophische Anschauung, die bloß eine התחלה annimmt, geltend betrachtet werden, deutlicher noch als II 10, wo das Ganze unter יקאל — יאמר (Munk II 89: dont *on dit*; vgl. übrigens n. 2 daselbst) angeführt wird. Daß Maimonides diese Lehrmeinung in II 10 nicht vertritt, geht ja schon daraus hervor, daß hier auch vom טבע ausgesagt wird, daß er הכם מנהיג ist, während doch III 19, gerade die „Parallelstelle“, als wichtiges Glied in der Ableitung den Satz hat: ואין הטבע בעל שכל והנהגה וזה מוסכם מן הפילוסופים כלם. Ganz klar auch II 7 von den כחות גשמיים als Charakteristikum (vgl. oben Anm. 155). Auf jeden Fall aber geht der Technikvergleich bei Maimonides nur so weit, als es sich um die Vorstellung handelt, nicht um den Zweck. Vom Techniker kann wohl eine Zwecksetzung a minori erschlossen werden, aber der technische Zweck kann mit dem in der Natur waltenden nicht verglichen werden — zunächst schon aus dem Grunde, da letzterer nicht immer ermittelbar ist, aber auch noch aus anderen Gründen. *Schem-Tob*, zu III 13, berührt einen anderen Punkt: ... ואינו דומה מציאות העולם למציאות הדברים מהטלאכה, כי מציאות הדברים מהאומן ... הוא זולת האומן חולת הדבר הנמצא ... אבל העולם ... השם יתעלה הוא עלתו והוא המציאו למציאותו. Darnach hängt also die Unvergleichbarkeit zwischen einem Werk der Technik und der Welt mit der Immanenz des Weltzweckes in Gott zusammen.

Und wie das οὐδὲν μᾶλλον aus der Relativität des Funktionellen herausgehoben, so ist auch der Begriff des Guten für die Schöpfung ein absoluter bei Maimonides. Aristoteles, der nur das relative Gute kennt, kann auch die Komparation von besser und bestes gebrauchen, wobei allerdings die Natur immer „das Beste“ will,²⁸³ wobei jedoch ein logisch notwendiger wesentlicher Zusammenhang zwischen Gott und dem Guten doch nicht zu finden ist.²⁸⁴ Diese Komparation kennt Maimonides nicht. Es gibt nur ein Gutes, das mit dem zweckmäßigen Dasein identisch ist. Gut ist bei ihm nicht ein Wort wie die anderen, sondern ein Terminus, den er hebräisch gebraucht, in Anlehnung an das טוב der biblischen Schöpfungsgeschichte. Der Terminus wird wiederholt behandelt, hauptsächlich im Zusammenhang mit der Teleologie. Es erweisen sich auf den ersten Blick manche Diskrepanzen zwischen den verschiedenen Stellen, wovon zunächst folgende erwähnt sei: Während an einer Stelle die Anwendung des טוב nur für Dinge, die Selbstzweck sind, als berechtigt bezeichnet wird, ist das andere Mal gerade für die Dinge, die dem Zwecke von anderen dienen, sogar das טוב מאד in seinem wahren Sinn in Anwendung gebracht.²⁸⁵ Da Maimonides diesen Terminus niemals ohne besonderen Nachdruck einführt, kann eine Widersprüchlichkeit in seiner Anwendung unmöglich bloß Folge einer Nachlässigkeit sein. Dieser Punkt muß daher näher besehen werden.

Maimonides unterscheidet terminologisch zwischen טוב und טוב מאד. Dies ist klar durchgeführt an den Stellen III 10 und 13, wo beide Termini in einem Zusammenhang erklärt werden, bestätigt sich aber auch durch die anderen. Unter טוב ist zu verstehen das Gute, das dem Dasein zugrundeliegt, ja mit ihm identisch ist.²⁸⁶ Es drückt auch die Selbstzwecklichkeit der

αὐτῶν μάλιστα γίνονται, doch kann dies mit dem teleologischen Gebrauch dieses Satzes nichts gemeinsam haben. Vgl. Theiler *loc. cit.* S. 75, 1.

²⁸³ Vgl. oben Anm. 227.

²⁸⁴ Siehe Zeller *loc. cit.* S. 371, 1: S. 361, 2.

²⁸⁵ Das erstere in *Moreh* II 30, das letztere III 25.

²⁸⁶ *Moreh* III 10: טוב הוא אינו עושה רק מציאות וכל מציאות טובה, während es hier nur prädiiziert wird, ergibt sich die Identität durch die Umkehrung, später: טוב, אחר שהוא מציאות. תהיה אם כן אמת טעות השם כולו טוב, אחר שהוא מציאות. Munk übersetzt das ganz substantivisch: le bien.

Kreaturen aus,²⁸⁷ weshalb am Schöpfungstage derjenigen Dinge, die keinen Selbstzweck haben oder ihn nicht sichtbar haben, nicht **כי טוב** gebraucht wird.²⁸⁸ Ist aber **טוב** Dasein im Gegensatz zum Nichtsein, so bedeutet **טוב מאד** die höhere teleologische Ordnung der Welt und die Kontinuität dieser Zweckmäßigkeit.²⁸⁹ Dieses umfaßt zugleich das Dasein und das Nichtsein, ja gerade der mit der Materialität der Dinge notwendig verbundene Untergang soll darin als ebensolche Wohltat, fürs Ganze gesehen, wie das Dasein ausgedrückt werden.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁷ *Moreh* III 13: ... שיהיה בעבור דבר אחר אלא כל חלק וחלק. וחזו אמרו וירא אלהים כי טוב... והטוב אצלנו יאמר למה שיאות לכונתנו.

²⁸⁸ *Moreh* II 30. Diese Stelle ist sehr aufschlußreich über die Beziehung zwischen **טוב** und **מציאות**. Behandelt wird die Bildung des Firmaments (und Trennung der Gewässer) am zweiten Schöpfungstage, und warum an diesem nicht **כי טוב** gesagt wird. Als erste Erklärung wird die Unsichtbarkeit des Nutzens dieser Schöpfung angegeben; deren wahrer Sinn zu den **מדות החושים** gehört. ואמנם ענין כי טוב שהוא נגלה התועלת וטבואה במציאות זה המציאות (ובינהא מי ויוד הדא אלונד) והתפתה אבל הדבר שנעלם ענינו אשר פשוטו בלתי נמצא כן — אי זה נראה והוא שזה, ואם הוא חלק גדול מאד מן הנמצאות (ואן כאן נזף כבירא נרא מן אלמנטורא) אינו תכלית בטוהת להטשך. Bei Munk, II S. 243, wird das Terminologische an diesen Stellen insoferne verwischt, als er das **הוא אלונד** der ersten und das **אלונד** der zweiten mit „univers“ übersetzt (das erste **ויד** der ersten Stelle mit „existence“), ferner das **אלמנטורא** der zweiten Stelle mit *création*. Dadurch wird die feste Relation zwischen **טוב** und **ויד** gelockert und auch die Bedeutung der Sichtbarkeit des Zweckes geschwächt. Den zweiten Grund sieht auch Munk als einen anderen, verschiedenen vom ersten an: Il faut que je t'en donne encore une autre explication (so auch Ephodi z. St.: והרבו'ל מוסיף עכשו מעם אחר), was aber in der Verbindung (ולא בד לי אן אוידך ביאנא) **וא"א לי מבלתי שאומיך באור** (זור Lesung vgl. Munk, III S. 94 n. 3). Dann weiter: במה שיש בו מן טובו, וזהו אמרו טוב מאד, und das Gebiet des **טוב** vollkommen abgesteckt: es ist die Verbindungsformel, ja die Verbindungsmöglichkeit zwischen dem Wirken Gottes und dem empirischen Dasein. Darum ist sowohl das Manifeste der Zweckmäßigkeit — im Gegensatz zu allem Esoterischen — als auch das Eigenzweckliche Grundbedingung. Die Erörterung III 13 begründet dies, von einer noch prinzipielleren Seite, vom zweiten Momente hier, der Eigenzwecklichkeit, ausgehend.

²⁸⁹ *Moreh* III 13: כלומר החדש מאד, והנה טוב מאד, אמר... ועל הכל (וען אלגט ליה) אמר... וזהו טוב מאד, ולא יספר כלל, והוא אמרו טוב מאד. כל מחדש נאות לכונה (ולא יספק) ולא יספר כלל, והוא אמרו טוב מאד. (Zur Lesung vgl. Munk, III S. 94 n. 3). Dann weiter: במה שיש בו מן טובו, וזהו אמרו טוב מאד.

²⁹⁰ *Moreh* III 25 zweimal. Einmal, Anf.: מעולותיו כלם... שראו להאמינו שאין הרקק באשרנו שכל אלו המעולות מציאותם והעדרם ist. Dann g. E.: וזהו טוב מאד.

Es ist dies die Weltordnung in ihren Zusammenhängen, die Ordnung der Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit.²⁹¹ Nun haben wir bereits oben gesehen,²⁹² daß, obwohl Maimonides die Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge lehrt, er es dennoch so versteht, daß das notwendige Antecedens einer Sache, wenn es auch als solches keinen Eigenzweck hat, sich doch mit dem Zweck der übergeordneten Sache vereinigt und dieser Sache Zweck auch der des Antecedens wird. Für diesen, im übertragenen Sinne gebrauchten, aus dem teleologischen Zusammenhange sich ergebenden Zweck einer Sache gilt nun auch die Formel von טוב טאד — was auch damit begründet wird, daß nicht immer der Zweck gleich bekannt ist.²⁹³ Wenn daher am zweiten Schöpfungstage טוב כי nicht gebraucht wird, da das darin Erschaffene nicht Selbstzweck hat, dafür aber am dritten Tage zweimal טוב כי steht, da sich erst jetzt der Zweck der Schöp-

(וְהָיָה וְעָרְטָהּ) נִשְׁמַךְ אַחֵר הַמִּטָּה וְיֵעָלֶה... וְעַל זֶה הָדַעַת יוֹסֵדָה תּוֹרַת מִשָּׁה רַבֵּנוּ כִּלְהוּ, בּו הַתְּחִלָּה וְיִירָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וְהָיָה טוֹב טָאָד וְבו הַשְׁלִימָה הַצִּדִּים תָּמִיד מִעַל וְאַחֵר וְיִירָא אֱלֹהִים... וְהָיָה טוֹב טָאָד עַד שֶׁבְּמִצִּיאוֹת זֶה הַחוֹסֵר הַשָּׁפֵל לִפְנֵי מֶה שֶׁהוּא עָלָיו מְהוּר. g. E. טָאָד מִי שֶׁמֵּאֲרִינָה אֶלְעָדָם אֲלֵמֹהִים לִלְטִית. (Vom מְהוּרִים לִטּוֹת וְלִרְעוֹת כִּלְהוּ, כִּל זֶה גִּ' טוֹב לִתְהַדְרֵת הַתּוֹרָה מְהוּרִים hat Tibbon das אֶלְעָדָם unübersetzt gelassen und es müßte heißen: וְלֹא מִיֶּשֶׁר ה' מֵאִיר, וְהָיָה טוֹב טָאָד טוֹת: (עַם הַהֶעֱרֵד. Das טוב טאד ist es, das beides, Dasein und Privation, vom Ganzen aus gesehen, einschließt.

²⁹¹ *Moreh* I 54; hier wird die Verbindung von טָאָד und טָאָד im עוֹלָם durchgeföhrt. אֲמֵנָה אִמְרוּ כָל מוֹבִי הוּא רָטוֹ לְהִרְאוֹת אוֹתוֹ הַמִּצִּיאוֹת כּוֹלֵם הַנֶּאֱמָר עֲלֵיהֶם וְיִירָא אֱלֹהִים. אֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וְהָיָה טוֹב טָאָד... וְיָדַע הַמִּהְנִיחַ לָהֶם אֵיךְ הוּא בְּכֻלּוֹ וּבְסֻרָט (כִּיף הוּא אֲלֻמָּה וְאֲלֻמָּעִיל) וְאֵל זֶה הַעֲנִין רָטוֹ בְּאִמְרוֹ בְּכָל בֵּיתוֹ נֶאֱמַן הוּא כְּלוֹשֶׁר שֶׁהוּא הַבֵּין מִצִּיאוֹת עוֹלָמִי מִכָּל הַדִּיעֵי נָא הַדִּיעֵי נָא — ist die einzige dem Menschen gewährte, wenn er auch auf die Erkenntnis des Wesen Gottes — ausgeht. Vgl. auch I 37 über מִיֶּשֶׁר אֵל טָאָד.

²⁹² Siehe oben Anm. 39, 41.

²⁹³ *Moreh* III 25, im Anschlusse an die erste oben (Anm. 290) zitierte Anföh- rung von טוב טאד heißt es הַמַּעֲשֶׂה הַזֶּה הוּא הַכְּרִי הוּא הַמִּכְנִיחַ אוֹ מוֹעִיל טָאָד. Wenn auch Munks, III S. 198, par consequent, für das טָאָד, als Einleitung dieses Satzes sicherlich als Übersetzung eine zu starke Unterstreichung ist, so ist es doch sachlich klar, daß dieser Satz von der allgemeinen Auffassung des טוב טאד logisch durchaus abhängt.

fungen des zweiten Tages zeigte²⁹⁴ — so umfaßt eben das **טוב מאד** beide Schöpfungstage sozusagen, d. h. die Gesamtordnung der Welt.

Es sieht dies beinahe wie die genaue Umkehrung der aristotelischen Auffassung²⁹⁵ aus, indem hier das Nichtsein Mitumfassende als **טוב מאד** bezeichnet wird im Gegensatz zum Dasein, das bloß **טוב** ist. Doch ist es in Wirklichkeit nicht so; Maimonides kann nicht die Graduierung des Aristoteles umkehren, weil er eine solche überhaupt nicht kennt. Das **טוב מאד** heißt auch nicht „besser“; es ist in Wirklichkeit nur eine extensive Erweiterung des **טוב**. Als letztes und absolutes bleibt ja doch das **טוב**. Nur dies wird in seiner Identität mit dem Dasein vom Wesen Gottes notwendig abgeleitet.²⁹⁶ Das **טוב** ist es, das den Weltzweck ausdrückt. Es ist daher begreiflich, daß es immer, so oft dessen Weg in die Welt beschrieben wird, im Zusammenhang mit der Emanation auftritt. Jenes zweckwollende **שפע**, in dem Welterschöpfung und Weltführung sich begegnen — es hat zum Inhalt das **טוב**. Dies wird von Gott ausgesagt, aber auch von den Sphären, aber auch von den untereinander teleologisch zusammenhängenden Dingen.²⁹⁷ Sahen wir früher die wesentliche Verknüpftheit von Willen — kontinuierliche Emanation — Zweck, so kommt jetzt noch dazu das Gute.

²⁹⁴ Siehe Ephodi z. II 30; am zweiten Tag fehlt das **כי טוב** אחר שהטמר — ביום השלישי הניע התכלית ונראה הארץ, אז אמר בו הפסוק **כי טוב** dann aber **אין מכוון מצד עצמו** טוב וזולת הכי טוב הנאמר בסוף היום ההוא. Damit soll erklärt werden die Wendung im Text הארץ **טובה** כדן שתגלה הארץ.

²⁹⁵ Siehe oben Anm. 226.

²⁹⁶ *Moreh* III 10 am Schluß: (מן פעל אלא לאה באלואה) השטוב כלו מפעולת השם בעצם (מן פעל אלא לאה באלואה) Munk, III S. 64 hat, schwächer, de l'action directe de Dieu. Scheyer, III 46, („daß alle Werke Gottes an sich gut seien“) verbindet das בעצם mit den Werken (ähnlich scheint auch Ephodi verstanden zu haben) — doch ist diese Fassung, wo dann das Prädikat bildet, das Gegenteil von der im Original.

²⁹⁷ *Moreh* II 4: תמיד (פאין) שופע והטוב ממנו שופע (פאין) תמיד. II 11: ושהנהגה שופעת (יפיץ) מהבורא ית'... וכן השכלים ישפיעו מהם... טובות ואורים... II 12: וכן הענין במציאות (פי אלונד), שהשפע (אלפיץ) המגיע... להמציא שכלים נפרדים: (אין טא) י. שפע מן השכלים נ"כ להמציא... וכל נפרד תשפע ממנו ונ"כ המצאה אחת (אין טא) 12 g. E. (פיץ אלונד) שפע המציאות, שפע החיים כלומר המציאות. Schließlich III 13: כמו שבארתי לך בטבע שפע הטוב תמיד (מן טבעה אפאצה אלכיר דאימא) מדבר על דבר

Wiederum zeigt sich in der Stellung des Guten eine entscheidende Hinwendung zur Lehre Platons. Doch ist dies nicht der einzige wesentliche Punkt in der maimonischen Teleologie, der, ausgehend von Aristoteles, zu Platon zurückführt. Es kann nicht eine Teilansicht sein, wenn es nicht die ganze Lehre wäre. Die Verbindung der Zweckidee mit der Schöpfung und dem Schöpfer, die sittliche Grundlegung der einheitlichen Teleologie für die einheitliche Welt, kurz, der Zweck als sittliches Weltprinzip — das ist ja alles echt platonisch, und wir können uns die Durchführung von Nachweisen im einzelnen ersparen. Ebenso erläßlich für unsere Aufgabe hier erscheint die Erörterung, inwiefern diese Rückkehr zu Platon von Maimonides bewußt geschehen ist. Auf jeden Fall war es das Judentum, das ihn auf diesen Weg geführt hat.

Wir kommen nun noch zum letzten Punkt. Der Zentralbegriff der aristotelischen Teleologie war die Natur. Das ist der Terminus, der durch das ganze System geht — der allerdings auch seine innere Bedeutungsentwicklung durchgemacht hat. Platon, noch in seiner letzten Periode, wehrt sich entschieden dagegen φύσις, als Mechanismus verstanden, etwa mit Seele oder Gott oder auch Kunst gleichzusetzen.²⁹⁸ Und wenn er den Begriff dann doch zuläßt, so gibt er ihm seine eigene, richtige Bedeutung, wo sie fast mit ψυχή zusammenfällt. Er mußte diese terminologische Operation durchführen, um das Gute gegen die materialistisch-sophistische Entgegenstellung von νόμος — φύσις erfolgreich zu verteidigen.²⁹⁹ Aristoteles

²⁹⁸ Schon *Soph.* 265 c wird der Gegensatz φύσις — θεός in seiner ganzen Schärfe herausgearbeitet: τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ (sc. ζῶα πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ) γεννᾶν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φούσης ἢ μετὰ λόγου τί καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης. Vgl. *Tim.* 48 a, wo für die vernunftlose Natur ἀνάγκη gebraucht wird. Die Hauptpolemik aber gegen die materialistische Naturauffassung ist *Nom.* 889 a ff., da wird zusammengefaßt (c): οὐ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διὰ τινα θεόν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. Welche Polemik, nach Pohlenz (*Hermes* 1918, S. 416 f.) wohl hauptsächlich gegen Demokrit gerichtet war.

²⁹⁹ So gleich *Nom.* 892 b: καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ. Worauf er dann eben die notwendige Verbundenheit der ψυχή mit der φύσις nachweist. Über die ersten Regungen der positiven Beziehung zur φύσις, verbunden mit Gott als ἀγαθός, vgl. meine Schrift, *Struktur und Charakter des plat. Phaidros*, bes. S. 52 ff.

nun, der sich im Anfang dieser spätplatonischen Ansicht angeschlossen haben mag, gebrauchte ursprünglich auch φύσις im Sinne des Bewegungsursprunges³⁰⁰ und konnte so noch methaphorisch Prädikate wie ποιεῖν usw. anwenden; konnte es auch mit Gott parallelisieren — dem allerdings auch nicht besondere systematische Bedeutung beizulegen ist.³⁰¹ Später aber wandelte sich die Stellung der φύσις, nahm verschiedene Bedeutungen an, auch die der Materie,³⁰² um endlich den prävalierenden Sinn von Form-Zweck zu behalten. In diesem Sinne, von φύσις als Zweck, ist die Teleologie gehalten, und der Belegstellen gibt es unzählige.³⁰³ Worauf es uns hier ankommt, ist die Feststellung, daß sich die Wandlung des φύσις-Begriffes in der Richtung der funktionellen Auffassung bewegt hat. Die φύσις ist erweiterte, verallgemeinerte, zum Kriterium erhobene πράξις. (Dies zeigt sich besonders da, wo, wie etwa bei den Sphären, eine besondere πράξις schwerer feststellbar ist.³⁰⁴) In diesem Sinne wurde schließlich auch der

³⁰⁰ Vgl. darüber Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 85 ff.

³⁰¹ Wenn er auch *de coelo* 271 a 33 (*de anima* I 4 Schl.) ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις in einem Atem nennt, so ist die Beziehung der beiden zueinander nicht feststehend. Das κύκλω σῶμα wird wegen seiner ewig gleichbleibenden Bewegung θεῖον genannt, *de coelo* 279 a 32 f. Dann heißt *de part. anim.* 656 a 7 vom Menschengeschlecht μόνον μετέχει τοῦ θεοῦ, wegen seiner Vernunft. (So auch 686 a 27 und *Eth. Nic.* 1177 a 13 f.) Dem entspricht auch der zwischen Tier und Mensch gemachte Unterschied *de div. in somn.* 463 b 14: ἡ γὰρ φύσις δαιμονία ἄλλ' οὐ θεία. Und in diesem Sinne wäre auch *de gen. anim.* 762 a 18 zu verstehen, daß alles irgendwie beseelt sei. Dagegen steht der vielzitierte Ausspruch *Eth. Nic.* 1153 b 32: πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Wozu auch *Pol.* 1326 a 32 f. anzuführen wäre und über das Streben aller Lebewesen am göttlichen teilzunehmen *de anim.* 415 a 26 f., *de gen. anim.* 731 b 31 f.

³⁰² So *Phys.* 193 a 29 als ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστη ὑποκειμένη ὕλη; *Met.* 1014 b 32, 1015 a 7.

³⁰³ *Phys.* 194 a 28: ἡ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. Ferner haben alle Stellen, die Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 424 Anm. 3 für die Teleologie anführt, φύσις zum Subjekt. Bezeichnend auch *de coelo* 291 a 24: ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως. (Vgl. die πρόνοια τοῦ θεοῦ bei Platon *Tim.* 30 c, 44 c.) Als τέλος (= οὐσία) ist auch das ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν zu verstehen, *Phys.* 193 b 13; auch 193 a 30. Ferner *de part. anim.* 687 a 10 φύσις verglichen mit ἀνθρώπος φρόνιμος, *de gen. anim.* 744 b 16 verglichen mit οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός. Siehe ferner die Belegstellen bei Eucken, *Methoden*, S. 88 Anm. 1.

³⁰⁴ Bei den Sternbewegungen löst der Begriff der φύσις die Ursprüngliche der πράξις ab. In *de coelo* 284 a 34 wird vom grausamen Schicksal der Sterne

Begriff der Seele, da sie ja Zweck des Körpers ist, zur Physis³⁰⁵ — also der entgegengesetzte Weg als früher bei Platon gezeigt. Die φύσις aber als Zweck hat dennoch auch ihre ursprüngliche etymologische Bedeutung als Werden nicht verloren.³⁰⁶ Nimmt man nun einerseits φύσις als Zweck-Wesen und wiederum als Werden, gleich der γένεσις, so wird der Satz, daß das Werden vom Wesen bestimmt ist,³⁰⁷ jener Grundsatz der aristotelischen Teleologie, zu einem wenig besagenden Zirkel. Es ist dies nicht bloß eine eristische Konstruktion: die Grundauffassung eines Zweckes als Endpunkt einer Bewegung, als antizipiertes empirisches Resultat, kann zu nichts anderem führen als zum Mithineinziehen des Endpunktes in die Dynamik des zu ihm führenden Weges, so daß sich der Zweck, gerade infolge seiner Immanenz, auflöst.

Dies zeigt sich besonders im Ethischen. Das Kriterium ist wieder die Natur, die aber nur empirisch aus dem Gegebenen ermittelt werden kann;³⁰⁸ die Norm, auch die sittliche, kann nur aus den erfahrungsgemäß bekannten Verhaltensweisen als ideal zu betrachtender maßgebender Vorbilder abzuleiten sein.³⁰⁹ Da aber dieser normgebende ideale Normalmensch

gesprochen, da sie sich nicht nach ihrem Willen, sondern mit dem Äther, infolge ihrer φύσις bewegen. Daß ihnen nach 292 a 20 *πρᾶξις* zugeschrieben wird, ist ein Rest alter platonisierender Anschauung (vgl. Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 373, 1), indem *πρᾶξις καὶ ζωὴ* die Beseeltheit der Himmelskörper bedeuten.

³⁰⁵ *de gen. anim.* 741 a 1 ist die vorher besprochene *θεραπευτικὴ ψυχὴ*, die auch *ἡ γεννώσα* ist, zugleich die φύσις des Lebewesens. Über die Höherstellung des Menschen, infolge seiner geistigen Differenziertheit und die Rolle der φύσις darin, siehe *de part. anim.* 655 b 37 ff.; *hist. anim.* 608 b 6 f., wo es vom Menschen-geschlecht infolge seiner seelischen relativen Vollkommenheit heißt: *τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτελεσμένην*. Vgl. auch Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 425 Anm. 4, S. 479 f. S. 488 Anm. 2.

³⁰⁶ Zu Beginn von *Met. Δ* 4 wird an der Spitze der drei Bedeutungen von φύσις angeführt 1014 b 16: *φύσις λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν γένεσις*. Auch in den anderen zwei klingt wohl noch diese Grundbedeutung mit.

³⁰⁷ Siehe oben Anm. 200.

³⁰⁸ *Eth. Nic.* 1135 a 3 ist die Rede vom *φυσικὸν δίκαιον*; ferner 1099 b 20: *εἰ δ' ἔστιν οὕτω βέλτιον ... εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν*. *de inc. anim.* 704 b 17: *εἰ βέλτιον ᾧδὲ, οὕτως καὶ ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν*. *Phys.* 260 b 22.

³⁰⁹ *Eth. Nic.* 1113 a 31; 1166 a 12: *ἔοικε ... μέτρον ἐκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι*; 1170 a 21: *τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ*. (Vgl. dagegen

wiederum, um ein solcher zu werden, nur so definiert werden kann, daß er das „schlechthin Gute“ annimmt,³¹⁰ so tritt hier der Zirkel wieder auf. Das menschliche Sollen wird auf ein erfahrungsmäßig gegebenes Sein zurückgeführt, dieses aber, um Norm zu werden, muß wiederum sich auf irgendein nicht zu definierendes Sollen zurückführen lassen. In dieser Kreisbewegung ist das $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu\ \kappa\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu$ unauffindbar. Ein $\pi\lambda\alpha\nu\epsilon\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ Wollen wird der Natur — und hier wieder unter Benützung des Technikvergleiches — abgesprochen.³¹¹ Ebenso muß es, berücksichtigt man die Stellung des Willens zum Intellekt in der aristotelischen Psychologie, Gott durchaus abgesprochen werden.³¹² Es gibt also keinen festen, ersten Punkt, von dem aus das sittliche Postulat in die Welt gesetzt werden könnte.

Bei Maimonides hingegen finden wir den Naturbegriff nur an einer Stelle ohne Reservation im Sinne Aristoteles' verwendet³¹³ — dies aber in der frühesten aristotelischen

Platon *Nom.* 716 C: $\delta\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu\ \chi\rho\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\tau\rho\nu\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\ \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\eta\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha.$) *Phys.* 246 a 13: $\acute{\omicron}\tau\alpha\nu\ \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\eta\ \tau\eta\nu\ \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu,\ \tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu.$ $\tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \varphi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu$ *Top.* 142 a 9; 145 a 25. *Pol.* 1254 a 36.

³¹⁰ *Pol.* 1332 a 22: $\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \delta\ \sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma,\ \acute{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}\ \delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}.$ Vgl. *Eth. Nic.* 1157 a 29 f.

³¹¹ Es handelt sich zunächst um die bewußte Tendenz. *Phys.* 199 b 26: $\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \omicron\iota\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota,\ \acute{\epsilon}\tilde{\alpha}\nu\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \tilde{\iota}\delta\omega\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu,\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\omicron\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota.$ (Bei Platon, *Nom.* 897 a wird der Weltseele $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ zugesprochen, vgl. auch *Epin.* 982 b.) Allerdings gibt es auch bei Aristoteles *Pol.* 1254 b 27 sogar ein $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ für die $\varphi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ — doch kann diesem vereinzelt Gebrauch keine prinzipielle Bedeutung beigemessen werden.

³¹² Siehe den ausführlichen Nachweis bei Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 370. Vgl. ferner Siebeck, *Lehre des Aristoteles vom Leben etc.*, S. 16 f., Boehm, *loc. cit.*, S. 101 f. Über die Unvereinbarkeit von Intellekt und Willen in der aristotelischen Ethik (und Psychologie) siehe Eucken, *Über die Methode etc. der aristotelischen Ethik*, S. 22 f.

³¹³ Hauptsächlich *Moreh* II 4, wo שבע von נפש strenge unterschieden wird; und vom נפש לא שבע als Bewegungsprinzip rührt her die Bewegung כתנועת האש למעלה $\text{הישרה למטה או כתנועת האש למעלה}$. Dies entsprechend der aristotelischen Lehre für die Elemente in *de coelo* (vgl. Munk II S. 52 n. 2), wird dann auch für das Lebewesen, schon im übertragenen Sinne, verwendet, wenn sich dies bewegt לא כנוון $\text{הנאות ולברוח מטה שהוא בלתי נאות}$. Dieser Auffassung entspricht auch III 19, wo wohl von einer השבע כנונה die Rede ist, dabei als unbestrittene Lehrmeinung angeführt wird $\text{שבע שיכנון אל זה הענין אשר}$ und dann zusammenfassend: שכל והנהגה בו אין ידועה לו בו . Vgl. oben Anm. 158.

Fassung,³¹⁴ wo φύσις noch ausschließlich den Zug der Elemente nach oben und unten bedeutete. Sonst aber wird der Terminus nie ohne einschränkende Bemerkung gebraucht. In der Darstellung der vernünftigen Planmäßigkeit des Kosmos als Organismus wird nur gesagt, daß diese von manchen auch Natur genannt wird.³¹⁵ Daß aber Maimonides selbst keinesfalls die Natur mit den für ihn wesentlichen Willen und Weisheit identifiziert, geht klar hervor aus der Stelle, wo er das Zurückführen der Weltordnung auf Willen oder Weisheit oder Natur als voneinander verschiedene Parallelen anführt.³¹⁶ Daß wiederum seine Auffassung nicht die dritte war, hat er wiederholt in allen Zusammenhängen dargelegt. Ohne auf die Unveränderlichkeit der Naturordnung verzichten zu können — dies auch, wie oben gezeigt,³¹⁷ aus teleologischen Gründen —, hat er aber der aristotelischen Hypostasierung der Natur die Spitze genommen, indem er diese mit dem göttlichen Willen unlösbar verbindet, und die Vereinbarkeit von Willen und Natur durch die Formel zu erreichen gesucht, Gott wolle nur das Mögliche.³¹⁸ Er geht mit Aristoteles nur auf halbem

³¹⁴ Im Dialog περὶ φιλοσοφίας in der Sammlung von Val. Rose (Fr. 24). Über Stellung der Schrift s. Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 125 ff., zum φύσις-Begriff darin vgl. Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 86.

³¹⁵ *Moreh* I 72 wird zunächst bei den vier Elementen das טבעי als im eigentlichen Sinne verwendet — והם נוסים טחים אין חיים בהם ולא השנה ולא יתנועעו טעצטם — und ausschlaggebend für sie ist der טבעי טקום, welcher Ausdruck (οὐκείος τόπος) in drei Zeilen fünfmal gebraucht wird. Also wiederum טבעי im Gegensatz zu ההשנה. Später wird nur beim הכח הטבעי בנוף החי in Parenthese hinzugefügt והרבה טעמים (worunter unmittelbar Galenus gemeint sein mag, vgl. Munk I S. 363 n. 5; die Ansicht aber ist gut aristotelisch) — womit sich Maimonides offenbar nicht identifiziert. Dieses יקראוהו erinnert an das bereits besprochene (s. Anm. 277) von II 10, wo ja auch ההנהגה von טבעי ausgesagt wird. Zum Sprachgebrauch vgl. auch oben Anm. 83 über אחרים אחרים. Vgl. Halevi, *Kusari* V, 11: הוא אשר ינהיגו הטבע על דברי הפילוסופים ... הנקראת אצלם טבע כי טענה זאת השאלה ... כן רצה ד' או כן גזרה הכתוב או כן נזר *Moreh* III 17 g. E. (Ephodi z. St.: כן נזר הטבע — לוי אייסטו — da ja auch Aristoteles' Providenztheorie, in 'הדעת, sich nach המציאות richtet).

³¹⁷ Siehe oben Anm. 232.

³¹⁸ *Moreh* III 25: Die Notwendigkeit, die im Willen Gottes verankert ist, hat ihr Korrektiv im Möglichen, das aber wiederum von der Weisheit herkommt: שהדברים אשר ירצם השם יעשו בהכרח ואין שם מונע ימנע מהעשות רצונם, אלא שהוא יתע' לא ירצה אלא אפשר ולא כל אפשר אלא מה שגזרה הכתוב להיות כך

Wege mit, indem er die auf dem Wege der Induktion erreichbare Naturordnung nun noch allein vom göttlichen Willen deduzierbar sein läßt.³¹⁹ Deswegen muß er auch, wenn er von der Unveränderlichkeit der Natur spricht, noch

diese Eigentümlichkeit in der Beziehung zwischen Willen und Weisheit insbesondere zum Wesen des Möglichen, das auch an anderer Stelle dieses Kapitels berührt wird, kann hier des näheren nicht eingegangen werden.

³¹⁹ Moreh II 29: ונאמין שזה המציאות לעולם נצחי: על זה הטבע אשר רצהו יתעלה נודה לאייכטו במה שאמר שהעולם שיהיה כזה. Diese „halbe“ Übereinstimmung bezieht sich nicht allein, wie Ephodi z. St. meint, darauf, daß wir das Mögliche der Schöpfung, d. h. daß wir von ihm die Ewigkeit der zukünftigen Dauer (das II 27 als nur zulässig bezeichnet wird: ולא יסמך עלינו דבר מאונתנו בהאמת התפרו) annehmen, aber nicht die Ewigkeit der vergangenen Existenz. Denn, wenn wir auch glauben, daß es eine Welt gab, so ist dies wiederum doch nicht absolut im aristotelischen Sinne, nach der vorher gemachten Reservation; שיש יכולת יתע' לשנותו כלי. Demnach ist also auch die Zukunft nicht in dem absoluten Maß gewährleistet, als bei Aristoteles. Dazu müßte ja auch das פתח וחתלה rein zeitlich verstanden werden, was nicht die Lehrmeinung Maimonides' war (vgl. oben Anm. 180). Das „Kompromiß“ besteht vielmehr wesentlich in der Kombination vom aristotelischen טבע mit unserem רצון. Wie es auch weiter ersichtlich ist, wo er die aristotelische Meinung der Ewigkeit der Welt als Gegensatz anführt, diese aber wiederum auf das Moment der Notwendigkeit zurückführt, diese aber wiederum auf das Moment der Freiheit. Also in der Ablehnung des חוב liegt der Schwerpunkt und in der Begründung der permanenten Naturordnung im רצון; denn dies ist das wesentliche in der Lehre von der Kreation. Vgl. II 20. In diesem Sinne wird der Gedanke des חוב von dem des טבע, soweit er sich auf חוב gründen will, bedroht. Dies deutlicher II 23, wo auch der Zweifel an der Kreation als חסרת יסוד הדת ודבר טהר bezeichnet wird, und dann weiter: ולא תמה מדעת חרש העולם כ"א בטעות וזה: בלתי נמצא בטבע. Klarer wird unsere Stelle durch Heranziehung von III 15 Anf.: למנוע טבע קים קיום עומד אי אפשר שהתנתו כלל וטפני זה לא יתואר השם ביכולת עליו ואין חולק על זה אחד מאנשי העיון כלל. Hier ist unter dem טבע das logisch-mathematische gemeint, das eben absolut ist und dem gegenüber keinerlei Gottesangenommen werden kann. Das Physische hingegen, wovon II 29 die Rede ist, hat wohl auch die Unveränderlichkeit zum Merkmal (wie bei Aristoteles) dies aber nicht absolut, denn hier ist der göttlichen יכולת, wie oben gesehen, noch immer die Möglichkeit des Eingreifens prinzipiell vorbehalten. Im Unterschiede also zwischen dem mathematischen und dem physikalischen Möglichen und Notwendigen, in deren verschiedenen Beziehung zur יכולת — darin liegt der wesentliche Gegensatz zu Aristoteles: die Abhängigkeit des Physischen vom רצון, was, in seiner letzten Konsequenz, den חוב ausmacht. Das ist auch der Sinn von II 19 Einl., wo wohl אפשר gelehrt wird, aber eingeschränkt durch הנמנעות טבע.

hinzufügen, daß sich auch kein Willensakt erneuern würde.³²⁰ Denn die Natur ist nicht bloß durch den Willen entstanden, sondern beharrt noch immer in Abhängigkeit von ihm. Und darum ist, wo reiner Wille tätig war, wie bei der Schöpfung, eine Beweisführung von der Natur aus unmöglich.³²¹ Was also in der Natur als zweckmäßig zu finden ist, kann nicht in ihr und aus ihrem Werden erklärt werden, sondern aus ihrem Ursprung, dem Willen.

Diese unbedingte Unterordnung der Natur unter den Willen war es, die Maimonides ermöglicht hat, das Sein und die Sittlichkeit in ihrem Ursprung zu identifizieren. Er verzichtete auf die schöne Lehre der Präexistenz der Torah, lehrte ihre Kreation ebenso wie die der Welt,³²² nicht weil er am Primat des sittlichen Gebotes zweifelte, sondern gerade um den sittlichen Charakter der gesamten Kreation zu sichern. Darum hängt für ihn die ewige Dauer der Torah, verbunden mit der des jüdischen Volkes, letzten Endes mit der Schöpfungslehre zusammen.³²³ Es ist dies der Zusammenhang, der im Willen hergestellt ist, und der daher beides, die Schöpfungen der Natur und die Gebote, in gleichem Sinne „Werke Gottes“ nennt, da sie aus einem ersten Willensakt (derselbe, der auch die menschliche Freiheit festlegte³²⁴) hervorgingen.³²⁵ Dieser „erste Wille“ korrespondiert mit dem „letz-

³²⁰ *Moreh* II 29: היות קשה בעינינו מאד שישתנה טבע אחר מעשה בראשית או יחדש דיוות אסתקלית sich auf beides, sowohl טבע als auch רצון bezieht (wie auch Tibbon: שהנחנו), ändert nichts an der inneren Abhängigkeit des טבע vom רצון, auch wenn letzterer als nunmehr fix angesehen wird. Einer Änderung im רצון könnte die Unabänderlichkeit der Natur nicht standhalten.

³²¹ So *Moreh* II 23 (vgl. oben Anm. 319) und insbesondere II 17 (s. oben Anm. 173, 233).

³²² *Moreh* I 65: להיות המאמר ההוא אשר שמעו משה רבנו ע"ה השם בראו וחדשו כמו: שברא כל מה שבראו וחדשו קול נברא. Daß aber Maimonides trotz der Betonung des kreatorigen Moments von der herkömmlichen Anschauung über das ברא abweicht, vgl. meine Abhandlung *Proph.* S. 130 Anm. 210.

³²³ *Moreh* II 29: וזה ג"כ הערה על נצחית התורה: dies in Fortsetzung der Auslegung von Jes. LXV, 17—18, wo ברא wiederholt und *ibid.* LXVI, 22, wo עמד, die Dauer, betont wird.

³²⁴ Vgl. oben Anm. 270.

³²⁵ *Moreh* I 66, der Grund, daß die Gesetzestafeln מועשה אלהים genannt werden, ist, ששמיא אותם טבעית לא טלמדות, כי כל הדברים הטבעיים יקראו מעשה ה'. Dann

sich daher an die Menschheit. Das menschliche Individuum ist es, das das der Menschheit aufgegebene Gebot ver-

ergibt, daß das *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה* appositiv steht zu *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה*, was aber der gegebenen Wortstellung widerspricht, weshalb er als die „natürliche“ Wortstellung die annimmt: (i. e. *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה* (i. e. *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה*), um die Apposition vom Subjekt doch nicht so weit entfernt zu haben. Bei Auflösung der Konstruktion wird es nun zu einem Relativsatz, in dem *אֱלֹהִים* das Subjekt wird und *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה* das Objekt, mit dem logischen Schwerpunkt im *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה*. Und so ergibt sich für Munk die Übersetzung: *mais il faut considérer les choses de la nature qui embrassent ces avantages généraux existant dans la loi*. Diese syntaktisch gewaltsame Umstellung wäre nur dann gerechtfertigt, wenn sie zumindest das Inhaltliche mehr klären würde. In Wirklichkeit aber erzeugt eben diese unbegründete Auffassung des *אֱלֹהִים* und der Stellung des *אֱלֹהִים מִצְוָה* die Unklarheit im Inhalt. Nach dem Wortlaut, wie er gegeben ist, handelt es sich um eine Analogie zwischen den Naturdingen und der Torah. Der erste Teil dieser Analogie, d. i. unsere Stelle, lautet: „Man muß betrachten die Naturdinge, deren allgemeinen, bei ihnen (sc. den Naturdingen) vorfindbaren Vorteile in ihnen dauernd enthalten (immanent?) sind.“ (Auch wenn für die Individuen daraus Schaden erwachsen mag.) Ebenso ist es bei der Torah... Nach der Auffassung Munks hingegen ist hier kein Vergleich mit den Naturdingen gegeben, sondern ist gleich hier von den in den Naturdingen enthaltenen, in der Torah existierenden Vorteilen die Rede. So aufgefaßt, wird nicht allein die etwaige Unklarheit in diesem Satze nicht behoben, sondern dieser wirkt noch verwirrend auf das weitere. Denn was soll dann die Fortsetzung bedeuten: *וְלֹא זֶה הַבְּחִינָה נִכְסָה בְּכָל אֵין לְתוֹרָה* — *וּבְחִסּוֹ הָיָה אֲלֵהֶם בְּאֵר אֵין לְתוֹרָה* — *מִחוּץ כּוֹנֵן הַתּוֹרָה לֹא תִשְׁלַם בְּכָל אִישׁ וְאִישׁ* — wenn die Generalität der Torah schon im vorigen Satz enthalten war? Und diesen Satz muß auch Munk, *ibid.*: S. 266 n. 1, als „zweiten Teil“ einer „comparaison entre la loi révélée par Dieu et les lois de la nature“ auffassen. Es ist daher sicher dem Gedankengang des ganzen Kapitels gerechter, wenn man die gegebene Wortstellung und ihren natürlichen Sinn beibehält; dann ist der Vergleich vollständig. Der Grund der Vernachlässigung des empirischen Individuums durch die Torah ist freilich in der ersten Hälfte des Vergleiches mitgegeben: *כִּי הַצּוֹרֵת הַטְּבָעִיּוֹת הַמִּיִּנְיּוֹת לֹא יִתְּנוּ כָּל סֵף שְׂרָאִי בְּכָל אִישׁ וְאִישׁ*. Doch ist hier eben die Hauptabsicht, zu zeigen, wie sehr das Naturmoment auch die Realisierbarkeit des Gebotes mit beeinflusst, nicht aber, wie nach Munks Auffassung der ersten Vergleichshälfte, daß die natürlichen Vorteile im Gebote verankert sind. Das würde hier zu einem Zirkel führen. — Allerdings ist der Naturvergleich nicht bis zu Ende geführt; zunächst durch die spätere Ablehnung des Vergleichs mit der Heilkunst, die ja doch individualistisch vorgehen muß, dann auch durch die Erhebung dieser Unmöglichkeit der individuellen Rücksichtnahme zu einem jener prinzipiellen logisch-mathematischen Unmöglichkeiten, jenes unabänderlichen *נִטְעָן*, das in III 15 behandelt wurde, worauf mit dem gleichen Wortlaut ausdrücklich verwiesen wird: *וְכַבֵּר בְּאֵרנוּ שֶׁלֹּא נִטְעָן טָעָן קִים לֹא יִשְׁתַּנָּה לְעוֹלָם*.

wirklichen kann und soll. Das Individuum wird nicht außerhalb seines natürlichen Genus geboren, kann aber durch Erfüllung des der Gesamtheit auferlegten Endzweckes durch die letzte Vervollkommnung³³³ sich über seine Natur erheben.

Das ist die Sonderstellung des Menschen in der Kreatur, und in dem Sinne ist die Auslegung zu verstehen, wonach Versetzen des Menschen ins Paradies die Erhöhung seines Grades über alles geschaffene Vergängliche bedeutet.³³⁴

Dieser letzte Zweck der Sittlichkeit, dem Menschen aufgegeben, besteht wohl in dem auf der Liebe basierenden Wissen des Endzweckes der Welt — aber er ist damit nicht erschöpft. Dies Wissen muß, wie die *ποίησις* Gottes, eine tätige Wandlung im Menschen, zum Göttlichen hin, herbeiführen. Dieser Gedanke in seinem ganzen Umfang ist in *Moreh* I 54 durchgeführt. Die Einleitung preist das Wissen gegen das bloß werktätige „Fasten und Beten“;³³⁵ das Wissen bezieht sich auf Gott und seine Gesamtgüte — *לכ טובי* — unter der wir, wie bereits gesehen, die kontinuierliche Zweckmäßigkeit der Welt zu verstehen haben (der „letzte Zweck“ im Kosmischen); daran schließt sich an die Hervorhebung der Bedeutung der Handlungsattribute Gottes, die aber wiederum auf den „letzten Zweck“ des Menschen führt, der nun vom Wissen aus über es selbst hinausführt: zur tätigen Angleichung an Gott.³³⁶ Und so erst ist uns der Sinn erschlossen jenes

³³³ Das ist eben der Sinn von *השלמות האחרון* in III 28 im Gegensatz zum *השלמות הראשון* der, wie III 27 dargelegt, zum *שלמות ראשון* gehört, d. h. zum *תקון הנקן* (vgl. oben Anm. 93); von welcher letzterer *שלמות* ausgesagt wird, daß sie *קודמת בטבע ובזמן* ist. Hierher gehört auch der Unterschied von *טבע* und sittlicher *יכולת* in III 19, worüber ausführlich Anm. 270.

³³⁴ *Moreh* II 30; vorher wird vom *הדעת עין הדעת* erklärt, daß ihn Gott dem Menschen nicht zeigte: *שטבע המציאות כן חייב*. Dann wird der *Vers Gen. II 15* ausgelegt: *ויקח ה' אלהים את האדם, ע לה אדמה, ויניחהו בג'ע, הניח לו; לא אמר זה השון להעלותו* (Munk: *et qu'il l'établit dans une certaine position*). *ממקום ולהניחו במקום, אלא העלות מדרגת מציאותו באלו הנמצאות ההוות הנפסדות וישבי*

³³⁵ *Moreh* I 54 Anf.: *מורה על שמי שידע הבורא הוא אשר ימצא חן בעיניו לא מי שיצום*. Vgl. dazu I 18 über die *קריבת מדע כלומר* *השגחה*. *ויתפלל לבר, אבל כל מי שידעו הוא הנרצה המקריב*.

³³⁶ *Ibid.* g. E.: *ען תכלית מעלת האדם ההדמות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת, כלומר שנדרשה*. *אעולתנו כפעולותיו*.

in seiner Zusammensetzung sonst unerklärbaren dreifältigen Satzes, der alle drei Grundmotive — Weltzweck, Menschenzweck, Gotteswille — in Eins zusammenschließt; der Satz in I 69: „Und also ist Gott der letzte Zweck von allem, und der Zweck von allem ist die mögliche Angleichung an seine Vollkommenheit, und so ist zu verstehen sein Wille, der sein Wesen ist.... In dem Sinne sagen wir, er ist der Zweck der Zwecke.“³³⁷

Wir sprachen vorher von drei Fällen: von einer abgelehnten dinglichen Teleologie und von der Setzung eines Zweckes im Kosmischen und Sittlichen. Nun hat sich uns die Zweckmäßigkeit des einheitlichen organischen Kosmos und die des sittlichen Gebotes als in ihrem letzten Ursprung, im kreaturischen Gotteswillen, identisch erwiesen. Und diese Teleologie, nicht natürlich-funktionell, sondern sittlich-postulierend, muß daher von vornherein alle Dinglichkeit ausschließen.

Es bleibt nur noch übrig die in diesem Zusammenhange wesentlich notwendige Klärung des Verhältnisses der Attribute, insbesondere der des Willens und der Weisheit, untereinander und in ihrer Beziehung zur Teleologie. Doch dieser Frage muß, auch aus raumtechnischen Gründen, eine besondere Abhandlung gewidmet werden.

³³⁷ *Moreh* I 69 g. E.: ואם כן הוא ית' תכלית כל דבר האחרון ותכלית הכל גם כן ההדמות בשלמותו כפי היכולת והוא ענין (דו כעני) רצונו אשר הוא עצמו

WAR NACHMAN KROCHMAL HEGELIANER?

Von SIMON RAWIDOWICZ, Berlin

I. DAS PROBLEM

Nachman Krochmal, der Autor des *Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman* ("Guide of the Perplexed of the Time"), ist bekanntlich einer der stärksten Exponenten jüdischer Wissenschaft und jüdischen Denkens. Er, der die Linie von Maimonides, Ibn Esra und Asariah de Rossi fortsetzt, bildet einerseits den Abschluß des jüdischen Denkens des Mittelalters und leitet andererseits die Zeit der neuen jüdischen Wissenschaft ein. Daß auch wir heute dem Stande unserer Wissenschaft gemäß und aus dem Bewußtsein unserer Zeit heraus nicht umhin können, uns mit Krochmals Werk auseinanderzusetzen, ja, daß es auch für uns das sein kann, was es für Steinschneider, Zunz, Graetz, Jost, Frankel, Rosin, Rapoport, A. H. Weiß, I. B. Löwensohn und viele andere war, unterliegt keinem Zweifel.

Wenn wir die Grundlagen des Krochmalschen Denkens und Philosophierens näher untersuchen, so stoßen wir zunächst auf drei wichtige Faktoren, die im Werden und Schaffen Krochmals wirksam waren. Es sind: 1. die jüdische Tradition und die gesamte jüdische kritische Forschung bis zu seiner Zeit; 2. die moderne allgemeine Wissenschaft, wie sie sich seit etwa dem 17. Jahrhundert entwickelt hat; und 3. der deutsche Idealismus, d. h. die Systeme der deutschen Philosophie von Immanuel Kant an bis zu Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Die Quellen des Krochmalschen *M. N. H.* (*Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman*) sind bisher kaum exakt und von einem immanent-kritischen Standpunkte aus untersucht worden. So hat man z. B. auch häufig — um nur beiläufig auf einiges hinzudeuten — die vielen Anregungen, die Krochmal u. a. aus den kritischen Partien des Talmuds und anderen älteren jüdischen Quellen gewonnen hat, ganz übersehen. Und obgleich einige

Forscher ganz allgemein auf die innere Abhängigkeit Krochmals von Maimonides, Ibn Esra, Asariah de Rossi und manchen anderen hingewiesen haben, ist noch nie der Versuch gemacht worden, genauer zu prüfen und festzustellen, welche Resultate diese und andere Beziehungen bei Krochmal gezeitigt haben. Von all diesen Einflüssen auf Krochmal ist nur derjenige Hegels stets in ganz besonderem Maße hervorgehoben worden, ohne daß das Problem, inwieweit Krochmal wirklich Hegelianer war, historisch-genetisch genügend geprüft worden ist. Unseres Erachtens, um es vorwegzunehmen, kann diese Hypothese von Krochmals Hegelianismus bei genauerer geisteswissenschaftlicher Betrachtung, wie aus dem Späteren ersichtlich werden soll, auf keinen Fall aufrechterhalten bleiben. Sie ist schon deshalb abzulehnen, weil sie dazu angetan ist, das Charakteristische an Krochmals Philosophie, sein ganzes Philosophieren in ein falsches Licht zu rücken. Abgesehen davon ist diese These auch sonst zum Schaden Krochmals aufgestellt worden; denn der Zusammenbruch der idealistischen Philosophie in den dreißiger und vierziger Jahren, der Sturz der Hegelschen Philosophie in Deutschland zog auch eine große Mißachtung des „Hegelianers“ N. Krochmals nach sich, und so konnte Krochmal bisher niemals zu der richtigen, ihm gebührenden Geltung kommen.

Wir wollen zunächst einen kurzen historischen Überblick über die Entstehung dieser Hegelianismus-These und ihre Verbreitung geben. Von N. Krochmals Zeitgenossen und Jüngern sind in diesem Punkte die Bezeugungen von M. Letteris und Salomo Jehudah Rapoport,¹ die einen jahrelangen Umgang mit dem Meister gepflegt haben, von besonderem Belang. In seiner Krochmal-Biographie zählt Letteris verschiedene Werke und Autoren auf, die Krochmal in seiner zweiten Periode, in der für die Gestaltung seiner geistigen Persönlichkeit entscheidenden Epoche, beschäftigt haben.² Unter ihnen finden

¹ Graetz bezeichnet Rapoport als den „empfindlichsten und begabtesten“ Jünger Krochmals. Vgl. *Geschichte der Juden*, Leipzig 1900, S. 441.

² Auf das Leben und Werk Nachman Krochmals im allgemeinen kann ich hier nicht eingehen. Es sei mir daher gestattet, auf die Ausführungen, die in meiner hebräisch abgefaßten, 226 Seiten umfassenden Einleitung zu der von mir

wir verschiedene jüdische und nichtjüdische Philosophen: Maimonides, Ibn Esra, Jehuda Halewi, Nachmanides u. a., Spinoza, die Aufklärungsphilosophen Moses Mendelssohn, Garve, Lessing, ganz besonders Kant wie auch die ersten jüdischen Apostel des Kantianismus: Salomo Maimon und Bendavid.³ Aus diesen Angaben Letteris' und auch aus Rapoport's Aussagen,⁴ der Krochmal's Beschäftigung mit Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel besonders hervorhebt, läßt sich nichts entnehmen, was erlauben würde, Krochmal als einen orthodoxen Hegelianer zu bezeichnen.

Der erste, der von einem Hegelianismus Krochmal's sprach, war eigentlich Leopold Zunz. „Um jene Zeit (1826)“ — sagt Zunz in seinem Nekrolog auf Krochmal — „war es, wo er fast zufällig⁵ mit den Schriften Hegels bekannt und ganz hingerissen wurde von dem Tiefsinne dieses Forschers, dessen System er die ‚Philosophie der Philosophien‘ nannte und für näher dem essäischen Judenthum als dem Christenthum verwandt hielt. Ja, es reizten ihn die Werke des genannten Meisters zu dem Versuche, die Grundlage zu dessen Ideen im Judenthume aufzusuchen und die Harmonie zwischen der jüdischen Theologie und der wahren Philosophie, wie sie zu seiner Zeit Maimonides dargestellt, aufs neue zu versuchen, und zwar nach einem Bedürfnisse der heutigen Wissenschaft mit durchzuführender Entwicklung der Erscheinungen des Judenthums.“⁶ In bezug auf diese Worte Zunz' müssen wir uns an die alte talmudische Regel פליגין דבורא halten. Daß Krochmal „fast zufällig“ auf Hegel kam, daß er sich später eifrig mit Hegel wie mit Kant, Fichte, Schelling u. a. befaßt hat, ist zweifellos richtig. Was aber Zunz weiter über Krochmal's Versuch, das Judentum mit Hegel zu „versöhnen“, sagt, ist keine historische Aussage, sondern subjektive nachträgliche Konstruktion. Es

besorgten Neuherausgabe der Krochmal'schen Werke (*N. Krochmal's Werke*, erste vollständige Ausgabe, durchgesehener Text, nebst einer Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register von S. R., Ajanoth, Berlin 1924) dargelegt sind, hinzuweisen.

³ *Zikaron Basefer*, S. 44, 45 ff.

⁴ *Kerem Hemed*, Heft 6, S. 42 ff.

⁵ Von uns gesperrt.

⁶ *Gesammelte Schriften*, 1875, II, S. 155—156.

muß auch darauf hingewiesen werden, daß Zunz — im Gegensatz zu Letteris und Rapoport — nicht als Freund oder Jünger eine Lebensbeschreibung Krochmals, sondern eine allgemeine Würdigung geben will. Es muß streng unterschieden werden zwischen der historischen Bezeugung Zunz', die er im Namen des jüngeren Krochmal macht, und seiner Deutung derselben. Ich kann mich allgemein des Eindruckes nicht erwehren, daß etwas „Apologetisches“ in dieser Zunzschen These lag, als ob Zunz dadurch dem damals in Deutschland noch wenig gekannten Krochmal eine Ehre antun wollte, daß er ihn zum Nachfolger Hegels, zum Jünger des großen sogenannten „preußischen Staatsphilosophen“ zu stempeln versuchte. Vielleicht ist manchem auf diese Weise der Name unseres Philosophen etwas geläufiger geworden, aber gewonnen hat Krochmal dadurch absolut nichts.⁷ Ganz im Gegenteil. Durch diese Hegelianismus-Hypothese ist das Bild des historischen Krochmal, des Mannes, wie er in Wirklichkeit war und was er in Wirklichkeit lehrte, ganz verfälscht worden. Und gerade weil wir den historischen Krochmal suchen, weil wir die wahren Wurzeln der Gedankenkräfte, die ihn bewegten, das Genuine an seinem Werk unter Ausschaltung alles Nebensächlichen, ermitteln wollen, gerade darum dürfen wir uns nicht mit so allgemein gehaltenen Urteilen über Krochmal zufrieden geben, wie sie bisher üblich waren. Wir sind dies der jüdischen Wissenschaft und Krochmals Stellung in der jüdischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft schuldig.

Von Zunz ab begann die Verwirrung in der Beurteilung der Krochmalschen Philosophie. Nur wenige Forscher waren vorsichtig genug, um ohne eine genaue Gegenüberstellung von Krochmal und Hegel sich diese inzwischen üblich gewordene Hypothese nicht ganz zu eigen zu machen. Wir finden diese Vorsicht z. B. Shechter (der Krochmal in eine Reihe mit

⁷ Nebenbei bemerkt, Zunz' Behauptung, daß Krochmal die Hegelsche Philosophie für besonders verwandt mit dem Essäertum hielt, erscheint uns nicht begründet. Wir können uns schlecht vorstellen, in welchen entscheidenden Punkten dieser Zweig des deutschen Idealismus, Hegels philosophisches System, mit dem „praktischen“ Essäertum „verwandt“ sein soll. Abgesehen davon spricht doch Krochmal mehrfach in seinem *M. N. H.* über die Essäer, ohne daß er je den geringsten Hinweis auf diesen angeblichen Zusammenhang gemacht hat.

Rabban Jochanan ben Sakkai, Saadja Gaon und Maimonides stellt), der sich folgendermaßen äußert: "Zunz somewhere remarks that Krochmal was inspired in his work by the study of Hegel, just as Maimonides had been by the study of Aristotle. I give this statement solely on the authority of Zunz, as I myself have never made a study of the works of the German philosopher, and am therefore unable to express an opinion on the question."⁸ Aber diese Vorsicht im Beurteilen unseres Problems hat leider wenig Nachahmung gefunden.

Inwiefern nun Krochmals eigentliche philosophische und wissenschaftliche Einstellung formaliter und materialiter als von Hegel abhängig gekennzeichnet werden darf, dieses Grundproblem unserer Abhandlung wird im folgenden behandelt werden. Zunächst wollen wir aber die Frage nur kurz beantworten: Besitzen wir Aussagen oder irgendwelche Hindeutungen von Krochmal selber, die auf seinen Hegelianismus schließen lassen? Man hat sehr gern und sehr oft die Parallele zwischen dem Verfasser des klassischen *Moreh Nebukim* und dem Autor des *Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman* gezogen, wonach sich Krochmal zu Hegel wie Maimonides zu Aristoteles verhält, als ob Krochmal in dem Maße Hegelianer gewesen wäre, in dem Maimonides Aristoteliker war. Ist aber diese äußerlich wohl plausible Gegenüberstellung im geringsten gerechtfertigt? Könnte man sich Maimonides ohne Aristoteles denken und kann man sich den wirklichen Krochmal mit Hegel vorstellen? Ist der *Moreh Nebukim* ohne wiederholte Bezugnahme auf Aristoteles und den Aristotelismus denkbar? Und wo finden sich die Hindeutungen auf Hegel im *M.N.H.*? Flavius wird hier 35mal, Maimonides 30, Raschi 20 und ebenso werden mehrere Male Nachmanides, Ibn Esra, Asariah de Rossi, Rabbi Jacob Emden, Chajes, Luzatto u. a. erwähnt. Krochmal scheut sich in keiner Weise, die Namen auch nichtjüdischer Denker und Forscher, wie Gesenius, Eichorn u. a., zu erwähnen,⁹ aber nur ein einziges Mal wird auf Hegel hinge-

⁸ N. K. and the "Perplexities of the time," *Studies in Judaism*, II, London 1896, p. 79.

⁹ Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 140, 166 u. a.

wiesen und ohne daß sein Name ausdrücklich genannt wird: „Auch der große deutsche Philosoph, der in unserer Generation lebte, ... hat bemerkt, ...“¹⁰ Dieses „auch“ ist sehr zu beachten. Denn Krochmal spricht an dieser Stelle von Ibn Esra, und Hegels Meinung wird nur herangezogen zur Bekräftigung einer These Ibn Esras. Immer, wenn Krochmal von der neuen deutschen Philosophie spricht, tut er es ganz allgemein. Nie hat er Hegel als Gegensatz zu Kant und Fichte auszuspielen versucht und nie hat er das eigentlich Neue und Epochenmachende am Hegeltum hervorgehoben. Mehrfach hätte Krochmal Gelegenheit gehabt, seinen angeblichen Meister Hegel in den Vordergrund zu rücken, so z. B., wenn er die wichtigsten philosophischen Systeme, wie z. B. das des Plotinos, Proklos, Spinoza u. a., aufzählt, und auch noch an manchen anderen Stellen.¹¹

Auch Krochmals Briefe (zumeist an einzelne seiner Jünger streng vertraulich gerichtet)¹² lassen nichts von seinem Hegelianismus erkennen. Die Tatsache, daß er in einem seiner Briefe den in der Geschichte der Philosophie bekannten Kampf des Antihegelianers Leo gegen die Hegelsche Schule bedauert, daß er die Methoden, mit denen der deutsche Idealismus nach Hegels Tode bekämpft worden ist, mißbilligt, erlaubt uns nicht, besondere Schlüsse zu ziehen. Und in diesem Zusammenhange dürfte es nicht als überflüssig erscheinen, darauf hinzuweisen, daß Krochmal auch nach dem Tode seines angeblichen Meisters nie die Gelegenheit ergriffen hat, um auf irgendeine Weise seine Verehrung für Hegel und seine Abhängigkeit von ihm zu dokumentieren. Auch seine beiden, der Form und dem Inhalte nach klassischen Briefe an seinen Sohn Abraham¹³ — den späteren Freund von Abraham Geiger und Schorr —, der eine drei Jahre vor seinem Tode, der andere in seinem letzten Lebensjahre abgefaßt, Briefe, die ich als das Testament Krochmals bezeichnen möchte, zeigen deutlich, wie weit entfernt

¹⁰ N. K. s. W., S. 290.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, S. 167.

¹² *Ibid.*, S. 444.

¹³ N. K. s. W., S. 449 ff.

sein von der alten jüdischen Tradition und der neueren deutschen Aufklärung herkommendes Moralisieren, seine Postulate des reinen aufklärerischen Glaubens, des gesunden Menschenverstandes und des sittlichen Ideals, wie weit entfernt all dies vom panlogistisch-dialektischen Idealismus Hegels war. Daß aber Krochmal Hegels Philosophie gekannt hat — um dies schon hier beiläufig vorwegzunehmen —, daß er von ihr vielleicht in manchen Punkten sogar beeinflusst worden ist, halten auch wir für möglich. Aber man weiß zu genau, was es hieß, ein „Hegelianer“ zu sein, wie die Hegelianer ihre philosophischen Systeme im Sinne ihres Meisters geschaffen haben, um auch den Autor des *Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman* als Hegelianer zu bezeichnen. Wenn sich auch mehrere Links- oder sogar Rechtshegelianer gegenüber ihrem Meister größere Gedankenfreiheit erlaubten,¹⁴ so gibt es doch auch hier eine Grenze, die niemand überschreiten kann, ohne den eigentlichen Zusammenhang mit dem Hegeltum zu verlieren. Unser Philosoph aber stand immer außerhalb dieser Grenze.

Nach diesen kurz angedeuteten äußerlich-formalen Argumenten wenden wir uns zum Hauptpunkte unseres Problems: Läßt sich das uns vorliegende historische und philosophische „System“ Krochmals als ein hegelianistisches ansprechen? War Krochmal als Historiker, Kritiker und Philosoph Hegelianer?

In seiner Abhandlung über Ibn Esra warnt uns Krochmal eindringlich vor subjektiver Beurteilung, vor übereilem Schließen aus beiläufigen Hindeutungen,¹⁵ und fordert uns zur Untersuchung desjenigen auf, was Ibn Esra mit „klarem Bewußtsein“ und mit Absicht gelehrt hat. Dies mag auch für uns eine Mahnung sein, nichts von außen in Krochmal hineinzutragen. Krochmal selbst, der *M. N. H.*, wie er uns vorliegt, soll das von uns aufgerollte Problem lösen. Die exakte genetisch-kritische Untersuchung zur Beantwortung unserer Frage

¹⁴ Von dem bedeutendsten Führer des Linkshegelianismus und späteren Gegner des Hegeltums überhaupt, Ludwig Feuerbach, und seiner Stellung zu Hegel, Kant, Fichte u. a. handelt mein in Kürze erscheinendes Buch *Ludwig Feuerbach und die deutsche Philosophie* (Berlin, Verlag Reuther & Reichard).

¹⁵ Vgl. *N. K. s. W.*, S. 283.

kann uns nicht nur Aufschlüsse über Krochmals Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaft allein liefern, sondern auch mancherlei Aufklärung über die Auffassung des gesamten jüdischen Denkens seiner Zeit vermitteln.¹⁶

II. KROCHMALS GESCHICHTSPHILOSOPHIE

Der Ausgangspunkt für Krochmals Philosophieren war weder ein Ringen um das Problem des Sittlichen noch um irgendeine rein logische oder erkenntnistheoretische Frage, sondern das Problem des Glaubens, das Problem der jüdischen Religion, des Judentums überhaupt, das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben und Wissen.¹⁷ Aber von vornherein bestand bei Krochmal eine innere Unausgeglichenheit zwischen dem rein Abstrakt-Philosophischen und dem Historischen, zwischen dem Systematischen und dem Kritischen, zwischen metaphysischer Spekulation und historisch-empirischer Betrachtungsweise. Manches auf den ersten Blick Unverständliche und sich Widersprechende im *M. N. H.* — äußerlich methodisch wie auch inhaltlich — würde bei Berücksichtigung dieses Zusammenspiels der heterogenen Motive in ein ganz anderes Licht gerückt werden können. So kam Krochmal nicht zu einem allgemein umfassenden spekulativen System, da er es als seine erste Pflicht betrachtete, Wesen und Geschichte des Judentums kritisch zu durchforschen. Äußerlich betrachtet scheint der Historiker den

¹⁶ Bei der Konfrontierung der Systeme Hegels und Krochmals können wir selbstverständlich nicht auf die Einzelheiten des Hegelschen Systems eingehen. Ebenso können wir hier nicht eine Gesamtdarstellung der Hegelschen Philosophie in extenso geben. Wir müssen uns auf diejenigen prinzipiellen Hauptpunkte — und zwar in möglichst komprimierter Form — beschränken, die für die Beleuchtung unseres Problems unentbehrlich sind, und deswegen können manche Punkte nur allgemein gestreift werden. — Um unsere Abhandlung nicht allzusehr mit Einzelheiten zu belasten, muß von vielen hierhergehörenden Parallelstellen, Exkursen und manchen wörtlichen Quellennachweisen abgesehen werden. In meinem, wie ich hoffe, demnächst erscheinenden Buche über N. Krochmal, sein Leben, Werk und seine Zeit wird man manche weiteren Ergänzungen finden können.

¹⁷ Über den Dualismus von Glauben und Wissen in der deutschen Philosophie siehe Hegel, „Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität“ usw., *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, Bd. II.

Philosophen nach und nach verdrängt zu haben, aber tiefer gesehen hat erst im Historischen das Spekulativ-Philosophische seinen richtigen Ausdruck gefunden. Die Geschichtsphilosophie und die Geschichte sind eigentlich diejenigen Geistesgebiete, auf denen sich Krochmal am meisten mit den allgemeinen philosophischen Systemen seiner Zeit berühren müßte. Wenn irgendwo eine dominierende Abhängigkeit Krochmals von einem philosophischen System nachgewiesen werden könnte, so müßte es hier der Fall sein. Denn gerade bei Hegels großer und tiefer Hinneigung zum Geschichtlichen und der Schöpfung seiner epochemachenden Geistesphilosophie — die, um mit dem italienischen Neuhegelianer Benedetto Croce zu sprechen, das „Lebendige“ an Hegels System ist — wären bei einem Hegelianer doch vorwiegend auf diesem Gebiete die Spuren seines Hegelianismus zu suchen.

Vier Momente sind es, die Krochmals Geschichtsphilosophie bestimmen: die Geselligkeit, die Entwicklung, der Geist, der absolute Geist. In mehr als in einer Hinsicht aber sind die beiden letzten Momente als eines zu betrachten, so daß es eigentlich nur drei sind. Daß der Mensch ein ζῶον πολιτικόν ist, ist eine seit dem Altertum her (Aristoteles) geläufige Ansicht. Keine Gemeinschaft wäre möglich, wirkte nicht der Geselligkeitstrieb im Menschen als die bewegende Kraft. Auch die Geschichtswissenschaft muß daher von dem Geselligkeitstrieb, als von dem familien-, gesellschafts- und staatenbildenden Element, ausgehen. Dieses Geselligkeitsmotiv wirkt seit dem klassischen Altertum in vielen ethischen, politischen und rechtlichen Systemen als dominierender Faktor mit. Aber als Ausgangspunkt auch der Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsphilosophie scheint es doch in der Neuzeit zuerst von dem italienischen Philosophen („Philosophus italicus“) Giambatisto Vico verwendet worden zu sein, um dann durch ihn die späteren Reflexionen über die Geschichte völlig zu beherrschen. In seinem epochemachenden Werke *Principj d'una scienza nuova d'intorno alla commune natura delle nazioni*, das als die Grundlage der modernen Geschichtswissenschaft angesehen werden muß, finden wir den Hinweis auf den Geselligkeitstrieb der menschlichen Natur, mit

dem Krochmals Ausführungen im Abschnitt 7 (oder „Pforte“ 7, denn Krochmal benennt die Abschnitte mit der älteren Bezeichnung שַׁעַר) des *M. N. H.* eine verblüffende Ähnlichkeit aufzuweisen haben.¹⁸ Wir können noch viele andere Anlehnungen Krochmals an Vico nachweisen, so daß daraus auf alle Fälle klar hervorgeht, daß, sei es direkt oder indirekt — über Johann Gottfried Herder u. a. —, Krochmal in der Aufstellung des ersten Momentes in seiner Geschichtsphilosophie von G. Vico abhängig ist. Daß also hierin Krochmal mit dem panlogistischen Idealismus nicht das geringste zu tun hat, erübrigt sich hinzuzufügen.

Was das zweite Moment der Krochmalschen Geschichte anbetrifft, so müßte hier Krochmal Hegelianer sein, wenn er es wollte und seiner philosophischen Einstellung gemäß könnte. Wird doch Hegel von manchen Historikern — und mit Recht, wenn es richtig verstanden wird — als der Philosoph der „Entwicklung“ gekennzeichnet, ist doch dieser Gedanke der Entwicklung metaphysischer Grundgedanke in seinem System. Aber gerade hier, wo Krochmal an die Hegelsche Fassung des Entwicklungsgedankens anknüpfen müßte, zeigt sich deutlich, daß Krochmal seine eigenen Wege geht oder, vorsichtiger ausgedrückt, daß er auf alle Fälle nicht in die Bahnen Hegels einlenkt. Auch der Begriff der Entwicklung hat seine Entwicklung, seine eigene Geschichte, die noch nicht in erschöpfender Weise geschrieben worden ist. Augustinus (354 bis 430) wird im allgemeinen gewissermaßen als der erste Geschichtsphilosoph betrachtet, der den Begriff der Entwicklung

¹⁸ Dieses Werk von Vico ist bereits 1822 ins Deutsche übersetzt worden (also 18 Jahre vor dem Tode Hegels) unter dem Titel: *Grundzüge einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinschaftliche Natur der Völker*, Leipzig. Vgl. ebenda, S. 1, wo Vico auf die Grundtendenz seines Werkes hinweist, die darin bestehe, zu beweisen, „wie Gott den von der inneren Gerechtigkeit durch die Ursünde abgefallenen Menschen durch seine eigenen Bedürfnisse leitet, aus dem irren Zustande tierischer Vereinzelung sich zu einem geselligen Leben und somit erst zum eigentlichen Menschensegen zu erheben, als dessen Grundbedingung eine gesellige Natur ist“. Vgl. hierzu *N. K. u. W.*, S. 34: „Wir sehen, daß es der Wille (עֵצָה) der göttlichen Vorsehung war, das Menschengeschlecht nicht absolut von einander zu trennen wie die anderen Lebewesen, denen die Vereinzelung eigentümlich usw.“

als die Grundlage für seine Geschichtsphilosophie aufgestellt hat. In seinem klassisch gewordenen *De civitate Dei* stellt er Gott an die Spitze der Entwicklungsreihe. Der Mensch und das individuell-gesellschaftliche Geschehen ist nach ihm nur Mittel und Stufe für das Endziel der Entwicklung, die *Civitas terrena* Vorstufe für die *Civitas Dei*. Diese mit dem christlichen Erlösungsgedanken verbundene Entwicklungsidee in ihrer älteren mystischen Form involvierte in sich die Negation des Diesseits, die Mahnung zur Erkenntnis der Minderwertigkeit der Wirklichkeit, den Glauben an ein Jenseits. Gott — als Gegensatz zum Menschen, als das *Ens perfectissimum* und *realissimum* — ist als die innere Triebkraft der gesamten irdischen Entwicklung anzusehen. Das war der *heteronome* oder *theonome* Entwicklungsgedanke im Gegensatz zu dem modernen immanent-autonomen Evolutionismus. Die Entwicklung der Geschichte geht vor sich, getrieben durch ihre eigene autonome Gesetzlichkeit, durch die Notwendigkeit der Bedingungen, der Interessen, Bedürfnisse usw., aber nicht nach einem jenseitigen, von einer höheren Vorsehung ausgearbeiteten Plane.

Aber auch der moderne Entwicklungsgedanke für sich genommen ist kein einheitlicher Begriff. Heinrich Rickert zählt z. B. sieben verschiedene Entwicklungsbegriffe auf.¹⁹ Man könnte von einem anderen Standpunkte aus noch weitere Differenzierungen des Begriffes der Entwicklung konstatieren. Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wortes „Entwicklung“ ist so ungeheuer, daß man nicht zwei Philosophen miteinander identifizieren darf, weil der Entwicklungsgedanke bei beiden eine dominierende Stelle einnimmt. Richtig ist es, daß Krochmal fast der erste originelle jüdische Denker der Neuzeit war, der am historischen Entwicklungsgedanken mit einer besonderen Zähigkeit festgehalten hat. Der Evolutionismus war die Grundlage seines historischen Systems. Das war seine Waffe gegen den starren Traditionalismus, gegen das „Kleben am Buchstaben“ einerseits und gegen die Skepsis und Verachtung des historischen Judentums andererseits. Mit Hilfe des Entwicklungs-

¹⁹ *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, Tübingen 1921, S. 298 ff.

gedankens gelang es Krochmal, das Judentum dem Raume und der Zeit einzuordnen, und diesem Moment verdanken wir die Entstehung der modernen jüdischen Wissenschaft. Es ist ganz unzulässig, Krochmal deshalb zum Hegelianer zu stempeln, weil auch er den Entwicklungsgedanken wegweisend zu handhaben verstanden hat. Bei Hegel ist doch Entwicklung das Produkt der dialektischen Bewegung, Resultat des ewigen, unaufhörlichen Streites der Gegensätze und Widersprüche. Die eigentliche Triebfeder der Entwicklung ist die Negation. Ohne Negation und Privation gibt es keine Entwicklung. Denn — worauf wir später zurückkommen werden — die Gegensätzlichkeit ist nach Hegel gerade dasjenige, was das Wesen der Wirklichkeit ausmacht. Ganz anders bei unserem Philosophen. Entwicklung ist für ihn nicht das, was aus der Heterogenität der Ziele resultiert. Entwicklung ist vielmehr ein Naturgesetz, ein Gesetz wie „alle anderen Gesetze der göttlichen Vorsehung“. Die göttliche Vorsehung hat bestimmt, daß in der allmählich werdenden menschlichen Gesellschaft eine arterhaltende Ordnung zustande kommt. Die Gesellschaftsordnung entsteht auf entwicklungsgeschichtlichem Wege von selbst, aus einer immanenten Notwendigkeit, nicht aus dem Kampf von Geist und Stoff, Subjekt und Objekt oder anderen Urgegensätzen. Nacheinander entstehen auf natürliche Weise, nach erfolgter, den verschiedenen Individuen angemessener Arbeitsteilung, die Rechtsordnung und Rechtsprechung, Gefühle der Liebe und des Mitleids, die moralische Ordnung, dann später in einer sinnvollen sukzessiven Ordnung alle möglichen Arten von Gewerben, zuerst die unmittelbar notwendigen, dann die verschiedenen Künste und zuletzt erwacht in der so allmählich gereiften Gemeinschaft die religiöse Erkenntnis, die als idea innata aufzufassen wäre. Die religiöse Erkenntnis und die allgemeinen metaphysischen Begriffe bilden zusammen die Krönung am ideellen und materiellen Wachstum der Gesellschaft, sie sind die höchste Stufe der Entwicklung.

Betrachtet man dieses hier kurz skizzierte Schema der Entwicklung, wie es im *M.N.H.*²⁰ dargestellt wird, so tritt

²⁰ Vgl. *N. K. s W.*, S. 34 ff.

die Unabhängigkeit von Hegel für jeden Hegelkenner klar zutage. G. Vico²¹ und Herder sind hier die Vorgänger Krochmals und nicht der ganz anders orientierte Hegel, der Schöpfer des panlogistischen Idealismus. Dem Entwicklungsgedanken Krochmals haftet etwas besonders Naturhaftes,²² Biologisch-Historisches an. Entwicklung ist ihm ein Steigen vom Niederen zum Höheren, vom Minderwertigen zum Wertvolleren. Hierin folgt Krochmal Herder, der die Evolution als eine ununterbrochene Wertsteigerung angesehen hat.²³ Entwicklung ist auch innere Entfaltung, Enthüllung der keimhaft angelegten Kräfte. Auch die Periodisierung der jüdischen Geschichte in drei Zyklen, die Krochmal vorgenommen hat und die noch später unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf sich lenken wird, deutet auf eine immanente Entfaltung und auf ein Fortschreiten hin. Die Blüteperiode des zweiten Zyklus z. B. beginnt nicht ab ovo, sondern knüpft an die beiden ersten Perioden des ersten Zyklus an und steigert alle in diesem entstandenen Güter und Werte ins Höhere. Genau so verhält es sich mit der Blüteperiode des dritten Zyklus. Diese Krochmalsche Fassung der Entwicklung steht im schroffsten Gegensatze zu derjenigen Entwicklung, die Entwicklung des Begriffes ist, zu der logisch-dialektischen Entwicklung, die von Haus aus eine Entwicklung a priori ist — zu der Entwicklung im Sinne Hegels. Denn das muß noch einmal betont werden, Hegel war aus seiner ganzen philosophischen Einstellung heraus ein prinzipieller Gegner der naturhaften Auffassung der Entwicklung. „Die Natur“, sagt Hegel, „ist als ein System von Stufen zu betrachten, deren eine aus der anderen notwendig hervorgeht und die nächste Wahrheit derjenigen ist, aus welcher sie resultiert, aber nicht so, daß die eine aus der anderen natür-

²¹ Vgl. zu dieser im Texte ausgeführten Skizze folgende Stelle im genannten Werke von Vico, S. 143: „Die Menschen empfinden zuerst das Notwendige; dann achten sie auf das Nützliche; darauf bemerken sie das Bequeme; weiterhin erfreuen sie sich des Gefälligen; alsdann schweifen sie zum Luxus aus, und zuletzt verfallen sie in wahnsinnigen Mißbrauch der Dinge...“

²² Vgl. z. B. N. K.s W., S. 54 u. a., wo sich Krochmal einiger Analogien aus der Natur bedient, um verschiedene historische Erscheinungen erläutern zu können.

²³ Vgl. Herders S. W. (ed. B. Suphan, Berlin 1877, Bd. XIV, S. 238 u. a.).

lich²⁴ erzeugt würde, sondern in der inneren, den Grund der Natur ausmachenden Idee. Die Metamorphose kommt nur dem Begriffe als solchem zu. Da dessen Veränderung allein Entwicklung ist.“²⁵ Hegel kannte nur die Entwicklung des Begriffes, der immer einer ist, der die verschiedenen Entwicklungsmomente als bloße Durchgangsstufen benutzt.²⁶ Mehr als einmal ergreift Hegel die Gelegenheit, um auf die große Kluft hinzuweisen, die zwischen seinem Entwicklungsgedanken und dem organischen Entwicklungsgedanken, wie er sich dem Stand der geistes- und naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung entsprechend im 18. Jahrhundert herausgearbeitet hat, besteht. „Die Entwicklung“, sagt Hegel, „ist auf diese Weise nicht das harm- und kampflose bloße Hervorgehen, wie die des organischen Lebens, sondern die harte, unwillige Arbeit gegen sich selbst, und ferner ist sie nicht das bloß Formelle des Entwickelns überhaupt, sondern das Hervorbringen eines Zweckes von bestimmtem Inhalte. — Diesen Zweck haben wir von Anfang festgestellt: Es ist der Geist, und zwar nach seinem Wesen, dem Begriffe der Freiheit...“²⁷

Das Charakteristische an der empirischen Auffassung des Entwicklungsgedankens im Gegensatz zur dialektisch-begrifflichen Hegels ist auch darin zu erblicken, daß Krochmal den Entwicklungsgedanken nie als Basis eines metaphysisch-philosophischen Systems benutzt hat. Er diente ihm nur als Grundlage für die streng kritisch orientierte Geschichtswissenschaft. Unter dem Gesichtswinkel der Entwicklung betrachtete er das gesamte Geschehen in der jüdischen Geschichte, das Wesen der Halachah und Aggadah, viele biblische Probleme usw. Hier

²⁴ Gesperrt von Hegel.

²⁵ Gesperrt von mir. Vgl. Hegels *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft im Grundrisse* (ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1911). Vgl. auch die folgenden Ausführungen: „Der dialektische Begriff, der die Stufe fortleitet, ist das Innere derselben. Solcher nebuloser, im Grunde sinnlicher Vorstellungen, wie insbesondere das sogenannte Hervorgehen z. B. der Pflanzen und Tiere aus dem Wasser und dann das Hervorgehen der entwickelteren Tierorganisationen aus den niedrigeren . . . ist, muß sich die denkende Betrachtung entschlagen.“ Ebenda, S. 209—210.

²⁶ Vgl. *Enzyklopädie*, S. 209 ff.

²⁷ Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 132 ff.

blieb er sich selber treu. Lessing z. B. betrachtete die Geschichte als den Erziehungsweg des Menschen zur Vernunft,²⁸ Herder erblickte darin das Vorwärtsschreiten zum Humanismus, Hegel — das Fortschreiten im Bewußtsein der Freiheit.²⁹ Auch hierin folgt also Krochmal Hegel keinesfalls.

Was die beiden letzten Momente der Krochmalschen Geschichtsphilosophie anbetrifft, den Geist und den absoluten Geist, so würde sich einem Hegelianer gerade hier die ergiebigste Gelegenheit bieten, sich ganz im Sinne seines Meisters zu geben. Ist es aber hier der Fall?

Der Begriff des „Geistes“ ist einer der reichhaltigsten Begriffe aller Religionen und der verschiedenartigsten philosophischen Systeme. Seine vollständige, erschöpfende Geschichte wäre beinahe die Gesamtgeschichte des Suchens und Irrens, der Ideen und Systeme des Menschengeschlechtes. Auch die neuere deutsche Philosophie, aus der Krochmal für sein System geschöpft hat, kennt eine Fülle von Auffassungen und Deutungen des Begriffes „Geist“.³⁰ Charakteristisch für die Entwicklung des deutschen Idealismus ist die Tatsache, daß während bei Kant der Begriff des Geistes gar keine Rolle spielt (in der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* wird z. B. das Wort „Geist“ nur zweimal, und zwar beiläufig, gebraucht), dieser bei Hegel zum Zentralbegriff seines Systems erhoben worden ist. Im Unterschiede zur Seele, die als eine sinnvolle Abstraktion aufgefaßt werden kann, ist der Geist für Kant eine sinnlose Negation der Körperlichkeit. Nur in die Ästhetik hat Kant den „Geist“ aufgenommen, dort war er für ihn „das belebende

²⁸ Vgl. *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*, 1870, S. 84 ff.

²⁹ Vgl. *Vorlesungen usw.*, S. 150: „Es gilt in solchem Verfahren des wissenschaftlichen Verstandes gleichfalls, daß das Wesentliche von dem sogenannten Unwesentlichen geschieden und herausgehoben werden müsse. Um dieses aber zu vermögen, muß man das Wesentliche kennen, und dieses, wenn die Weltgeschichte im Ganzen betrachtet werden soll, ist wie früher angegeben worden das Bewußtsein der Freiheit und in der Entwicklung desselben die Bestimmtheiten dieses Bewußtseins. Die Richtung auf diese Kategorien ist die Richtung auf das wahrhaft Wesentliche.“ Ebenda, S. 148, 150.

³⁰ Vgl. Hans Dreyer, *Der Begriff Geist in der deutschen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel*, Berlin 1908 (*Kantstudien*).

Prinzip im Gemüthe“.³¹ Fichte hingegen hat den „Geist“ ins Metaphysische erhoben. Ausgehend von der transzendentalen Apperzeption Kants schuf Fichte seinen monistischen Geistesbegriff. Auch Schiller betrachtet den Geist metaphysisch als die sittliche Einheit des Menschen, aber von einem anderen Standpunkte aus, als einen zusammenfassenden Allgemeinbegriff oder ein ästhetisches Anschauungsmittel. Für Herder ist Geist identisch mit Kraft, Leben; er hat bei ihm einen menschenvereinigenden Charakter, er ist Gemeingeist, Kategorie des historisch-kulturellen Denkens. Wilhelm v. Humboldt betrachtet den Geist als die Harmonie zwischen Sinnlichkeit, Phantasie und Vernunft. Bei Schelling war Geist ein Attribut des Absoluten, dessen anderes, entgegengesetztes Attribut Natur ist. Erst Hegel hat den Geistesbegriff in der Philosophie so heimisch gemacht, daß später Schopenhauer sich polemisch dagegen wandte.³² Geist ist für Hegel das „Allerkonkreteste“, das Substantielle, die Totalität, die unreflektierte Unmittelbarkeit in möglichster Ungetrübtheit durch den Begriff oder die Abstraktion.³³ Ihm ist Geist das Weltprinzip, das in dialektisch-begrifflicher Bewegung die drei Stufen des An-sich, Außer-sich, An- und für-sich durchläuft. Geist ist „die unendliche Subjektivität der Idee“. „Der Geist“, sagt Hegel an einer anderen Stelle, „ist wesentlich Resultat seiner Tätigkeit; seine Tätigkeit ist Hinausgehen über die Unmittelbarkeit, das Negieren derselben und Rückkehr in sich.“³⁴

Was aber unseren Philosophen anbelangt, so war ihm der Begriff des Geistes, lange bevor er Hegel kannte, vertraut. Er kannte sicherlich den Begriff des Geistes aus den verschiedenen Strömungen des Judentums.³⁵ Krochmal ist hier wie auch

³¹ Vgl. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, ed. Vorländer, S. 167.

³² Vgl. *Parerga*, I, S. 185: „Gegen die plumpe Unverschämtheit, mit der die Hegelianer in allen ihren Schriften ohne Umstände und Einführung ein Langes und Breites über den sogenannten ‚Geist‘ reden, wäre die geeignete Sprache: ‚Geist, wer ist denn der Bursche?‘ . . .“ Vgl. auch *Grundprobleme der Ethik*, S. 386 ff.

³³ *Philosophie der Religion*, S. W. XI., S. 13 u. a.

³⁴ *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, Einleitung, S. 50 ff.

³⁵ Die vielfältigen Entwicklungen des Geistesbegriffes im *Judentum* seit der Bibel und durch das ganze Mittelalter hindurch bis in die Neuzeit hinein zu

in manchen anderen Punkten synthetisch vorgegangen, indem er den traditionellen jüdischen Geistesbegriff mit manchen Nuancierungen des deutschen Idealismus zu durchdringen versucht hat. So ließe sich hier teilweise der Einfluß der Geistesauffassungen von Herder und Fichte auf Krochmal nachweisen, aber derjenige Hegels kaum. Zwar finden wir hier bei Krochmal und Hegel eine ähnlich lautende Terminologie, die aber nur eine Ähnlichkeit im Ausdruck ist. Der Geistesbegriff Krochmals kennt die ganze panlogistische Dialektik Hegels ganz und gar nicht. Von der triadischen Entfaltung des Geistes („Hinausgehen“—„Negieren“—„Rückkehr“) wußte Krochmal sehr wenig. Der Geist im allgemeinen ist ihm vielmehr Sinnbild des Idealismus im Gegensatz zum Materialismus, der Geist symbolisiert das Siegen des Guten über das Böse, Geist ist ihm manchmal gleichbedeutend mit dem Ethos,³⁶ mit der sich nie irrenden Ratio, mit der Ewigkeit im Gegensatz zum Zeitlichen und Vergänglichen. Wenn man auch in der sechsten „Pforte“, in der Krochmal über Geist und Religion spricht, einige Hindeutungen auf Berührungspunkte mit Hegel erblicken könnte³⁷ — aber keineswegs auf absolut zuverlässige und entscheidende —, so zeigt sich die Unabhängigkeit Krochmals von Hegel aufs deutlichste überall da, wo Krochmal über den Geist im Zusammenhang mit dem Geschichtlichen spricht. Hier ist ihm der Geist nie etwas Substantielles, keine höhere Einheit, sondern eine Zusammensetzung aller intellektuellen

verfolgen, wäre eine Arbeit für sich und eine sehr lohnende, die viel Licht auf manche Erscheinungen im Judentum werfen könnte.

³⁶ Vgl. *N. K.'s W.*, S. 32 u. a. Hier könnte man Fichtes Einfluß auf Krochmal konstatieren. Vgl. *Fichtes S. W.*, Bd. V, „Appellation an das Publikum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus“.

³⁷ Vgl. J. L. Landau, *N. K., ein Hegelianer*, Berlin 1904, S. 26—32. Der Autor erblickt an vielen Stellen des Krochmalschen Werkes eine Abhängigkeit von Hegel, wo sie tatsächlich kaum nachweisbar ist. So glaubt er z. B., daß Krochmal an einer Stelle nur deswegen eine Bibelstelle zitiert, weil er dazu von Hegel den Hinweis bekommen hat. Eine genaue Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Buche würde uns hier zu weit führen. Unsere prinzipielle Erfassung des Problems, wie sie hier zum Ausdruck kommt, enthebt uns unseres Erachtens einer ins einzelne gehenden Kritik der erwähnten Schrift.

und emotionalen Eigenschaften des Volkes, aller sittlichen Tugenden, des Rechtlichen wie des Ästhetischen usw.³⁸

Zwar spricht Krochmal klar und deutlich vom „Volksgeiste“, woraus manche Forscher eine unmittelbare Anlehnung an Hegel feststellen zu können glaubten. Aber Krochmal selbst betont, daß bei den „neueren Philosophen“ („אחרוני החכמים“) diese Gesamtsumme der Volkseigentümlichkeiten als Volksgeist bezeichnet wird.³⁹ Wohlgemerkt, bei den „neueren Philosophen“ — und nicht ausschließlich bei Hegel. Denn auch in diesem Punkte konnte Krochmal aus seiner philosophischen Einstellung heraus Hegel nicht folgen. Hegel gelangt zu der Aufstellung seines Begriffs des „Volksgeistes“ durch seine spezifisch logistisch-dialektische Methode — ein Weg, den Krochmal nie betreten hat. „Die Entwicklung führt es mit sich,“ sagt Hegel, „daß sie ein Stufengang, eine Reihe weiterer Bestimmungen der Freiheit ist, welche durch den Begriff der Sache, d. i. hier der Natur der sich bewußt werdenden Freiheit, hervorgehen. Die logische und noch mehr die dialektische Natur des Begriffes überhaupt, daß er sich selbst bestimmt, Bestimmungen in sich setzt und dieselben wieder aufhebt und durch dieses Aufheben selbst eine affirmative, und zwar reichere, konkretere Bestimmung gewinnt — diese Notwendigkeit und die notwendige Logik der reinen abstrakten Begriffsbestimmungen wird in der Logik erkannt. Hier haben wir nur dies aufzunehmen, daß jede Stufe als verschieden von der anderen ihr bestimmtes eigentümliches Prinzip hat. Solches Prinzip ist in der Geschichte Bestimmtheit des Geistes eines Volkes. In dieser drückt er als konkret alle Seiten seines Bewußtseins und Wollens, seine ganze Wirklichkeit aus; sie ist das gemeinschaftliche Gepräge seiner Religion, seiner politischen Verfassung, seiner Sittlichkeit, seines Rechtssystems, seiner Sitten, auch seiner Wissenschaft, Kunst und technischer Geschicklichkeit, der Richtung seiner Gewerbstätigkeit...“⁴⁰ Vergleicht man Krochmals Charakteristik des „Volksgeistes“ mit diesen Hegelschen Ausführungen, so ist leicht einzusehen, daß das Gemein-

³⁸ Vgl. *N. K. s. W.*, S. 34.

³⁹ Ebenda, S. 35 ff.

⁴⁰ Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, Einleitung, S. 148—149.

same zwischen Krochmal und Hegel nur in denjenigen Momenten liegt, die Hegel mit der gesamten Philosophie seiner Zeit teilt, dagegen aber Krochmal nichts vom eigentlichen Hegel-tum, von demjenigen, was nur für Hegel allein charakteristisch ist, in seine Auffassung aufgenommen hat. Die Eigenart des Volksgeistes hat Krochmal akzeptiert, aber dieser Geist entfaltet sich nicht auf dem Wege der logischen Trias: These—Antithese—Synthese, nicht dialektisch-begrifflich, sondern sukzessiv, rein empirisch evolutionistisch im Laufe der historischen Entwicklung. Das Volk prägt sich seinen Charakter nicht aus logischer, sondern aus natürlicher, naturhaft-biologischer Notwendigkeit. Abgesehen davon ist der Begriff des „Volksgeistes“ viel älter als die Hegelsche Philosophie. Bereits Montesquieu hat diesen Begriff mit besonderem Nachdruck in die historisch-wissenschaftliche Diskussion geworfen.⁴¹ Und wenn hier Krochmal von einem Philosophen abhängig gewesen sein soll, so wird es wohl eher Fichte als Hegel gewesen sein; und in der Tat ist dieser dialektikfreie „Volksgeist“ Krochmals Fichteschen Ursprungs.⁴² Fichte war derjenige, der dem Atomisierungsgeist der europäischen Aufklärung, der ins Uferlose getriebenen Individualisierung mit aller Wucht entgegentrat.

⁴¹ In Montesquieus *Esprit des lois* finden wir mehrere Definitionen des „Volksgeistes“, die Krochmals Auffassung vom „Volksgeist“ direkt oder indirekt beeinflusst haben mögen. (Vgl. a. a. O., Buch I, XIX u. a. Auf Einzelheiten dürfen wir hier nicht eingehen.) Montesquieus Theorie vom „Volksgeist“ hat auch Herder (vgl. R. Haym, *Herder nach seinem Leben und Wirken*, 1880, I) und die deutsche Romantik sehr stark beeinflusst (vgl. auch Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 1908, S. 245, 267 u. a.). Über Hegels Theorie vom „Volksgeist“ siehe S. Brie, *Der Volksgeist bei Hegel und in der historischen Rechtsschule*, 1909.

⁴² Vgl. z. B. folgende Ausführungen Fichtes: „Die geistige Natur vermochte das Wesen der Menschheit in höchst mannigfaltigen Abstufungen an Einzelnen und an der Einzelheit im großen und ganzen, an Völkern darzustellen. — Nur in den unsichtbaren und den eigenen Augen verborgenen Eigentümlichkeiten der Nationen, als demjenigen, wodurch sie mit der Quelle ursprünglichen Lebens zusammenhängen, liegt die Bürgschaft ihrer gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Würde, Tugend, Verdienstes; werden diese durch Verreibung abgestumpft, so entsteht Abtrennung von der geistigen Natur, aus dieser Flachheit, aus dieser die Verschmelzung aller zu dem gleichmäßigen und einander hängenden Verderben.“ — Auf manche Berührungspunkte zwischen den hierfür in Frage kommenden Ausführungen Krochmals (S. W., S. 34 ff.) und der achten Rede der Fichteschen *Reden an die deutsche Nation* können wir hier leider nicht eingehen.

Er war es, der im Staate die „Nation“ entdeckte. Er bekämpfte den Kosmopolitismus und Rationalismus und drückte so der späteren Wissenschaft und der historischen Forschung das Gepräge auf.⁴³ Der Fichtesche Begriff der „Nation“ läßt sich bei Krochmal nachweisen, dagegen kann von einer Übereinstimmung bei ihm mit dem in der Hegelschen Philosophie zentralen Begriffe des „Staates“ ganz und gar nicht die Rede sein.

Nicht nur in der Erklärung des Werdens des Volksgeistes oder des Volkes zeigt sich Krochmal als völlig unabhängig von Hegel, sondern auch in der Auffassung des Problems des Unterganges eines Volkes, obwohl sich Krochmal hier mit Hegel in manchem berührt. Aber das ist ja gerade das Entscheidende, daß sogar in denjenigen Punkten, in denen Krochmal sich zwar mit Hegel berührt, er doch nicht in seinen Bahnen wandelt. Nach Hegel ist der Untergang eines Volkes folgendermaßen zu verstehen: „Überhaupt liegt das in der Forderung von Gründen; indem solche Gründe, d. h. etwas ganz abstrakt Allgemeines, als Basis für jene Gesetze nicht gefunden wurden, so wird die Vorstellung von der Tugend schwankend, das Absolute gilt nicht mehr als solches, sondern nur, indem es auf Gründen beruht. Damit tritt zugleich die Isolierung der Individuen voneinander und vom Ganzen ein.... Denn das Bewußtsein ist Subjektivität, und diese hat das Bedürfnis in sich, sich zu vereinzeln. So erscheint dann die Eitelkeit, Selbstsucht; so treten die Leidenschaften, eigenen Interessen losgebunden, als Verderben hervor. Dies ist dann nicht der natürliche Tod des Volksgeistes, sondern die Zerrissenheit in sich.“⁴⁴ Auch Krochmal unterscheidet zwischen dem partikularen und universalen Geist. Das Geheimnis der Existenz des Judentums ist sein Verbundensein mit dem Universalgeiste. Nicht ein Volk wird und vergeht, sondern sein Geist. Wenn ein Volk zugrunde geht und von der „Bühne der Geschichte“

⁴³ Vgl. E. Lask, *Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte*, Note 22, 3. Teil, besonders v. S. 240 ff.

⁴⁴ Gesperrt von mir. Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 161.

verschwindet, so wandert der Partikulargeist des betreffenden Volkes zu einem anderen räumlich oder zeitlich benachbarten Volke hinüber. Auch Krochmal scheint über den Untergang des Volkes im Sinne Hegels zu sprechen, aber das genuin Hegelsche, das Charakteristisch-dialektische verschwindet bei ihm auch hier. Die Ursachen, die den Untergang eines Volkes herbeiführen, sind nicht dialektisch-logischer, sondern natürlich-menschlicher Art. Genußsucht, Eitelkeit, Herrschsucht und Aberglaube, das ist bei Krochmal dasjenige, was eine Gemeinschaft zur Auflösung und Selbstvernichtung führt — aber nicht das dem Bewußtsein als Subjektivität innewohnende „Bedürfnis, sich zu vereinzeln“. Hierin begegnen wir wieder dem Vico-Herderschen Einfluß auf Krochmal.⁴⁵ Jene vier Laster sind als natürliche, zeitlich und räumlich bedingte Krankheiten eines Gemeinschaftslebens aufzufassen, als eine physische und psychische Degeneration, die bei den einzelnen Individuen beginnt, um dann die Gesamtheit zu verseuchen. Nach Hegel kann ein Volk nicht mehr bestehen, wenn seine Besonderheit aufgehoben wird: „Wenn also durch den Gedanken bei einem Volke, wie z. B. bei den Athenern, die Besonderheit aufgehoben wird, wenn der Gedanke sich dahin entwickelt, daß das besondere Prinzip dieses Volkes nicht mehr wesentlich ist, so kann dieses Volk nicht mehr existieren; es ist ein anderes Prinzip entstanden. Die Weltgeschichte geht dann zu einem anderen Volke über.“⁴⁶ Dieser Grundgedanke ist mit manchen entscheidenden Abweichungen bei Krochmal wiederzufinden.⁴⁷ Aber Krochmal mußte sich mit aller Wucht gegen ein anderes von Hegel aufgestelltes Gesetz auflehnen: „Ein Volk kann nicht mehrere Stufen durchlaufen, es kann nicht zweimal in der Weltgeschichte Epoche machen. Wenn wahrhafte Interessen im Volke neu entstehen sollten, so müßte der Geist eines Volkes dazu kommen, ein Neues zu wollen. — Woher denn sollte dieses Neue kommen? — Welthistorisch kann ein Volk nur einmal das herrschende sein, weil ihm im Prozesse des

⁴⁵ Vgl. Herder, *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*, S. 65.

⁴⁶ *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 181.

⁴⁷ Vgl. N. K.s W., besonders S. 37.

Geistes nur ein Geschäft übertragen sein kann.“⁴⁸ Krochmals Theorie der Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes und seiner Existenz steht vom Anfang bis zum Schluß im schroffsten Gegensatz zu Hegel. Die Ewigkeit des Judentums, seine Unausrottbarkeit, seine Stellung als „Lehrer vieler Völker“ und manch anderes läßt sich auf keinen Fall mit Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie vereinbaren. Denn nach Krochmal ist das „Geschäft“ des Judentums ein nie endendes, ein von Zeit und Raum völlig Unabhängiges. Hegel andererseits würde nie den theologisch-rationalistisch-historischen Pragmatismus Krochmals decken. Er dürfte z. B. nie zugeben, daß der israelitisch gestempelte Monotheismus die einzige art- und völkererhaltende Kraft in sich birgt. Und daß auch Hegels Anschauung über das Altertum überhaupt, seine Stellung zu dem griechisch-römischen Kulturkreis und zum Mittelalter nie diejenige Krochmals war und sein konnte, bedarf wohl kaum einer besonderen Erwähnung.

Auch die Erörterung über den Platz, den der Begriff des „absoluten Geistes“ in Krochmals System einnimmt, wird deutlich zeigen, daß Krochmal auch in diesem für das Hegelsche System eminent wichtigen Punkte seine eigenen Wege ging.

Für Hegel war Philosophie — die Wissenschaft des Absoluten. Fichte hat zuerst den Begriff des absoluten „Ich“ geschaffen, der die Grundlage für seine „Wissenschaftslehre“ bildete. Dieses „Ich“ setzt — im Gegensatz zum teilbaren „Ich“, zum subjektiven „Ich“ — ein „Nicht-Ich“ entgegen. Schelling erhob dieses in „Ich“ und „Nicht-Ich“ Zerspaltene zur absoluten Identität oder zur Indifferenz. Er erblickt in der absoluten Identität das Ursein, aus dessen Selbstbewußtsein der Urgegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt hervorgeht. Da aber diese Identität nie qualitativ aufgelöst werden kann, so führt dieser Gegensatz nur zu quantitativen Unterschieden. Schelling nennt daher auch alle Dinge „Differenzen“ oder „Potenzen“. Hegel wollte nun die Prinzipien der Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systeme versöhnen: das „Ich“ im Kantisch-Fichteschen Sinn und die absolute Identität im Sinne Schellings,

⁴⁸ Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 162—163.

das „Ich“ als Selbstbewußtsein und das Absolute.⁴⁹ Das Absolute mit dem Selbstbewußtsein zusammengedacht ergibt die Idee des absoluten Geistes, das ist das Resultat jenes Hegelschen Versuches, die Differenz zwischen Fichte und Schelling auszugleichen. Dieser absolute Geist ist Ausgangspunkt und Höhepunkt des Hegelschen philosophischen Systems. Der absolute Geist stellt die Einheit des subjektiven und objektiven Geistes dar, er erlangt seine Entfaltung in der objektiven Form der Anschauung als Kunst, in der subjektiven Form des Gefühls und der Vorstellung, in der Form der Religion und in der subjektiv-objektiven Form des Denkens in der Philosophie. Der absolute Geist ist die „sich selbst wissende Idee oder Weltvernunft“.⁵⁰ Bei Hegel ist das Absolute zuerst ein gewissermaßen unbegrenztes Sein („Omnis determinatio est negatio“ — Spinoza), und erst durch den dialektischen Prozeß erhält der Begriff des Absoluten — durch die Reihen der Setzungen und Entgegensetzungen — seinen „Inhalt“.

Krochmal kam auf eine ganz andere Weise zum „absoluten Geist“. Nicht als Dialektiker, der den subjektiven mit dem objektiven Geist im absoluten Geist versöhnen will. Erwägungen ganz anderer Natur drängten ihn in diese Richtung. Als Mann des Glaubens, als Erbe des historischen Judentums und als Schüler der abendländischen Aufklärung und der Kantischen Philosophie nahm er seinen Weg zum „absoluten Geist“. Die Hegelsche Pointe fehlt auch hier bei Krochmal. Er kennt weder einen subjektiven noch einen objektiven Geist, er kennt nur einen partikularen und universalen Geist. Der partikulare Geist oder die partikularen Geister sind die „Heere des Himmels und der Erde“ („צבאות השמים והארץ“), die „Götzen“ der alten Völker, der universale oder absolute Geist — ist der Gott Israels. Er ist die „Quelle alles geistigen Seins und dessen Resultat“. Dieser „absolute Geist“ trägt die Garantie für die Ewigkeit und Überzeitlichkeit des Judentums in sich. Im Gegensatz zu Hegels „absolutem Geiste“, der vorwiegend christlich gestempelt ist (denn die Trias subjek-

⁴⁹ Vgl. hierzu S. W. Hegels Bd. I, S. 159—269: „Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie.“

⁵⁰ Vgl. *Phänomenologie*, S. 33 ff. u. a.

tiver—objektiver—absoluter Geist entspricht der Dreieinigkeit von Vater, Sohn und Geist), ist Krochmals „absoluter Geist“ extrem monotheistisch gedacht, als Gott des jüdischen Monotheismus. „Absoluter Geist“ ist bei Krochmal kein Resultat, kein Zusammengesetztes. Dieser ist ein Totum, eine Totalität sui generis. Die partikularen Geister (hier nicht die „Götzen“), die an ihm Anteil haben, sind keine mitformenden Teile eines Zusammengefügteten, sondern unvollkommene Abbilder der höchsten Einheit. Der „absolute Geist“ nimmt die partikularen Geister nicht dialektisch-resultierend auf, sondern er ist über sie erhaben, ein völlig in sich ruhendes, unabhängig höheres Wesen. Wenn selbst die partikularen Geister nicht da wären, so wäre doch der „absolute Geist“ allein da. Der „Geist“ ist Produkt des Menschen und der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Der „absolute Geist“ ist in bezug auf den Menschen, den Schöpfer alles historischen Seins, ein Primäres und ein Letztes. Tiefer gesehen ist dieser „absolute Geist“ Krochmals die mittelalterliche „causa prima“ (עלֵה ראשונה) der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie, etwas nuanciert — wenn auch rein terminologisch — in der Richtung des deutschen Idealismus. Dieser hat nichts Gemeinsames mit der logisch-dialektischen Dynamik und auch nichts mit der Schellingschen Indifferenz. Der „absolute Geist“ ist eine in der Geschichte überall wirksame Kraft, ja noch mehr eine die Geschichte mitschaffende Kraft. Was die jüdische Geschichte anbetrifft, so ist der „absolute Geist“ nicht nur „Schutzengel“ des Judentums, sondern auch die Garantie für seine Identität, Einheit und Überzeitlichkeit.

Aus dem Angeführten ist klar ersichtlich, daß, wenn auch Krochmal den „absoluten Geist“ als Grundpfeiler in sein System aufgenommen hat, er deswegen doch nicht zum Hegelianer gestempelt werden kann. Es kommt nicht auf die Terminologie allein an, nicht auf den Gebrauch von gewissen Ausdrücken oder auf die sogenannte „Einbettung“ usw., sondern auf die Inhalte und Ideenzusammenhänge, die hinter der Terminologie stehen. Das allein ist geistesgeschichtlich und begriffsgeschichtlich von Belang. Und von hier aus gesehen könnte man vielleicht sagen, daß die eminent wichtige Stellung, die der Begriff des „absoluten Geistes“ in den philo-

sophischen Systemen Fichtes, Schellings und Hegels eingenommen hat, Krochmal an den originär jüdischen Begriff des „absoluten Geistes“ erinnert hat, daß ihn der deutsche Idealismus ermahnt hat, ein System des religiös-ethischen jüdischen Idealismus zu schaffen. Aber nie hat sich dieser Krochmalsche Idealismus mit dem dialektisch-panlogistischen Idealismus identifizieren können oder wollen.

III. KROCHMAL DER HISTORIKER UND KRITIKER

Wir wenden uns nun denjenigen Gebieten zu, auf welchen Krochmal sich besonders schöpferisch ausgewirkt hat und auf denen er für die jüdische Wissenschaft bleibende Werte schuf. In der jüdischen Geschichte, in der kritischen Analyse der Bibel, der Halachah und der Aggadah u. a. — hier war Krochmal am originellsten, formal-methodologisch wie materialiter, hier hat er der späteren jüdischen Forschung den Weg geebnet.⁵¹ Dessenungeachtet versuchte man, auch den jüdischen Historiker N. Krochmal, den Bibel- und Halachahkritiker, zum Hegelianer zu stempeln.

Verfolgen wir historisch die Entstehung dieser nicht mehr haltbaren Auffassung, so sehen wir, daß sie auf bloßen Mißverständnissen beruht. Den ersten Anlaß für diese Mißdeutung gab die Dreiteilung, in die Krochmal die Universalgeschichte überhaupt und die jüdische Geschichte im besonderen zu periodisieren versuchte: I. Periode der Blüte und des Aufstiegs, II. Periode des Reifens und Beharrens auf der Höhe, III. Periode der Abnahme und des Verfalls. Was die Konstruktion der jüdischen Geschichte anbetrifft, so zerfallen diese drei Hauptperioden in je drei Unterperioden. Infolgedessen bekommen wir hier folgendes Schema:

⁵¹ Wir möchten hier kurz auf S. Shechters Bemerkung hinweisen: "I may assert with the utmost confidence that there is scarcely a single page in Krochmal's book that did not afterwards give birth to some essay or monograph or even elaborate treatise, though their authors were not always very careful about mentioning the source of their inspiration. Thus Krochmal justly deserves the honourable title assigned to him by one of our greatest historians, who terms him the Father of Jewish Science." *Studies in Judaism*, S. 81.

- I. Zyklus: Blüte des Volkes. (Von Abraham dem Patriarchen bis Gedaljahu b. Achikam.)
- a) Blüte. (Von Abraham bis zum Auszug aus Ägypten.)
 - b) Höhe. (Von der Eroberung Kanaans bis zum Tode Salomos.)
 - c) Verfall. (Von der Teilung des Königreiches bis zur Zerstörung des ersten Tempels.)
- II. Zyklus: Höhe. (Vom Babylonischen Exil bis zum Tode Bar-Kochbas und Rabbi Akibas.)
- a) Blüte. (Vom Exil bis zur Eroberung Persiens durch die Griechen.)
 - b) Höhe. (Von der Vorherrschaft der Griechen bis zum Tode Alexander Jannais und dem Bruderstreit.)
 - c) Verfall. (Vom Tode Alexandras bis zu den Verfolgungen durch die Römer.)
- III. Zyklus: Verfall. (Von Rabbi Jehudah Hanassi bis etwa gegen 1700.)
- a) Blüte. (Vom Abschluß der Mischnah bis etwa zum Jahre 1100.)
 - b) Höhe. (Von 1100 bis etwa über 1300.)
 - c) Verfall. (Von da ab bis gegen 1700.)⁵²

Wie Krochmal sich den weiteren Gang der jüdischen Geschichte vorgestellt hat, ob er das 18. Jahrhundert, das Jahrhundert Mendelssohns und der Aufklärung, als die erste Periode, als die Blüteperiode des IV. Zyklus angesehen hat, darüber läßt er uns im unklaren. Da wir hier aber, wie auch im folgenden, von Einzelheiten, mögen sie auch noch so wichtig für uns sein, Abstand nehmen müssen, können wir keineswegs darauf eingehen, wie Krochmal die geschichtlichen Prozesse der Entwicklung des Judentums in den drei schematisch skizzierten Zyklen gesehen und dargestellt hat. Worauf es uns in diesem Zusammenhange ankommt, ist die Tatsache, daß bis in die

⁵² Wir haben dieses Schema hier absichtlich angeführt, da sich manche darin nicht ganz zurechtgefunden haben. Vgl. z. B. Shechter, *Studies in Judaism*, S. 77, wonach der III. Zyklus die Zeitspanne von R. J. Hanassi bis zum spanischen Exil umfassen würde, was, wie hier bereits angedeutet worden ist, nicht zutreffend ist.

Gegenwart hinein diese triadische Periodisierung Krochmals sonderbarer- und irrümlicher Weise als Hegelianismus gekennzeichnet wird.⁵³ Dies zeigt besonders anschaulich, wie groß die Begriffsverwirrung auf diesem Gebiete ist und wie sehr es nottut, all diese Probleme streng kritisch und begriffsgeschichtlich anzufassen. Was hat denn Hegel — der die ganze geschichtliche Entwicklung in einer Trias der These—Antithese—Synthese vor sich gehen läßt — mit dieser Krochmalschen Dreiteilung gemeint? Wären diese beiden Trichotomien parallel, so kämen wir dazu, die I. Periode (Blüte) als Thesis, die II. Periode (Höhe) als Antithesis und die III. Periode (Verfall) als Synthesis zu kennzeichnen. Die Verfallsperiode — die Synthesis! Betrachten wir die Krochmalsche Dreiteilung näher: Ist sie begrifflicher Natur? Ist ihr Ausgangspunkt die Dialektik? Ist es eine logische oder panlogistische Trichotomie? Nein, sie ist eine rein empirische, keine apriorische, sondern eine aposteriorisch-konstatierende und hat weder mit Logik noch mit Dialektik etwas zu tun. Blüte, Höhe und Verfall sind für Krochmal keine Durchgangsstufen einer über aller Empirie sich entfaltenden Vernunft. Es sind rein natürliche Stufen, die man auf natürlichem Wege bei jedem Wesen, das den Gesetzen des Werdens und Vergehens untergeordnet ist, nachweisen könnte. Diese Dreiteilung kennzeichnet nur die immanente Entwicklungstendenz der Geschichte. Sie kann als Analogon zum Leben des Individuums (Jugend, Mannesalter, Greisenalter) oder zum Tage (Morgen, Mittag, Abend) aufgefaßt werden. Diese allegorisch-didaktische Trichotomie wird bereits lange vor Hegel angewandt, und zwar vorwiegend von Vico und Herder.⁵⁴ Von ihnen hat sie Krochmal auch für den Aufbau der jüdischen Geschichte übernommen. Sie ist ihm ein bloßer methodischer Griff, um in die Mannigfaltigkeit des historischen Ge-

⁵³ Vgl. z. B. S. Bernfeld, *Dor Hacham*, 1896, S. 15 ff.; ebenfalls S. Hurwitz, *Ziyun P'nefesh Rabenu Nachman ha Kohen Krochmal*, S. 53 ff.

⁵⁴ Vgl. z. B. Herder, *Auch eine usw.*, S. 47: „Daß kein Volk lange geblieben und bleiben konnte, was es war, daß jedes, wie jede Kunst und Wissenschaft — und was in der Welt nicht? — seine Periode des Wachstums, der Blüte und der Abnahme gehabt...“ Vgl. ebenda, S. 10, 12, 23, 39. Vgl. auch Vico, *Grundzüge usw.*, S. 70 ff.

schehens der Jahrtausende Ordnung und Sinn hineinzubringen, eine Versinnbildlichung, kein an das Werden herangetragener metaphysischer Maßstab, sondern die Veranschaulichung der Innengesetzlichkeit der natürlichen Sukzession des geschichtlichen Geschehens.

Der bedeutende Religionsphilosoph Ernst Troeltsch hat sehr eindrucksvoll und präzise das Wesen der Hegelschen historischen Dialektik dargestellt.⁵⁵ Mit dem Sturze der mathematisch und naturwissenschaftlich orientierten Systeme ging der Stern der Historie auf. Teils im Gegensatz und teils als Ergänzung zu Schellings Naturphilosophie tauchte Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie auf, die nicht der historischen Forschung, sondern dem Suchen nach einer Weltanschauung und Weltbeziehung ihren Ursprung zu verdanken hat; daher ist sie von Haus aus synthetischer und nicht analytischer Natur. Die Hegelsche Dialektik hat verschiedene, teils Leibniz-Spinozistische, teils Kantisch-Fichtesche Elemente in sich aufgenommen: die Leibnizische Lehre von einem aufsteigenden Fortschritt, der den unbewußten Vernunftgehalt in bewußte Einheit überführt, wie auch die stetige Vorwärtsbewegung der Monade, die durch ihre Eigengesetzlichkeit getrieben wird; dann die Kantisch-Fichtesche Auffassung des Fortschrittes als ein Fortschreiten des praktischen, handelnden Willens, der sich und die Vernunft im Gegensatz zur Sinnlichkeit und zum Egoismus durchzusetzen versteht, wie auch den Aufbau der Wissenschaft auf Grund des Selbstbewußtseins der Vernunft und der Einheit der Gegensätze. Im Gegensatz zu der traditionellen Logik, zu der „Seins-Logik“, die von den Erscheinungen nicht loskommen kann, um zur Bewegung vorzudringen, sucht die dynamische Logik das Werden zu verstehen, der Realität der Gegensätze, ihrem Sich-Ineinander-Entwickeln gerecht zu werden. (Über das Problem der Gegensätze werden wir später zu sprechen haben.) Hegel griff in seiner Dialektik diese Logik des Werdens und der Bewegung, die dynamische

⁵⁵ Vgl. *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, I, S. 243—277. Über Hegels Dialektik der Geschichte vgl. ebenso B. Croce, *Lebendiges und Totes in Hegels Philosophie*, 1909, S. 28 ff.

Logik, besonders auf. (Mit diesem Begriff des Werdens geriet Hegel in Gegensatz zum Satze des Widerspruchs und lenkte in die bekannten Bahnen des Nicolaus von Kues und der ihm gleichgesinnten Philosophen ein.) Gerade die Geschichte — die Sphäre des unaufhörlichen Werdens — demonstriert am besten, wieviel die dynamische Logik für sich hat, um wieviel mehr sie der Wirklichkeit gerecht werden kann als die gewöhnliche Logik. Das ganze historische Geschehen wird von Hegel und seiner Schule in den triadischen Fortschritt (Thesis—Antithesis—Synthesis oder: Affirmation, Negation, Negation der Negation oder Reaffirmation) hineingepreßt, den der ununterbrochen bewegte Geist, der stets von der Setzung zur Entgegensetzung, von der Position zu ihrem Gegenteil fortschreitende, seinem dialektischen Charakter und seiner Bewegungseigentümlichkeit gemäß durchzumachen hat. Auch der „Weltgeist“ ist ein sich selbst Bewegender; den Anstoß zur Bewegung erhält er von einer Reihe von Gegensätzen: subjektiv—objektiv, konkret—abstrakt, endlich—unendlich, Freiheit—Unfreiheit u. a. Dies war der leitende Gesichtspunkt des Hegelianismus überhaupt für die Einteilung der Geschichte, die für ihn ein Schauplatz der Dialektik war, aus dem er sich immer das für seine Kontrastierung und Triadisierung Passende aussuchte — also auch das Ausleseprinzip.

Damit sind wir nun am entscheidenden Punkt angelangt. Der Grundunterschied zwischen Krochmal und Hegel, von dem alle anderen Differenzen nur direkte oder indirekte Ableitungen darstellen, besteht darin, daß Krochmals historische Methode genetischer Natur ist und die Hegels — dialektischer Natur. Adolf Trendelenburg, der Erneuerer des Aristotelismus im 19. Jahrhundert, war es, der besonders scharf die dialektische Methode von der genetischen unterschieden hat.⁵⁶ Die dialektische Methode kann nur ge-

⁵⁶ Siehe A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1840, hauptsächlich Kap. II („Die dialektische Methode“), S. 23—99. Man vergleiche ebenfalls Trendelenburgs Streitschrift *Die logische Frage in Hegels System*, Leipzig 1843, in der die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der dialektischen Methode Hegels besonders scharf betont wird. Eine Reihe von Zeitgenossen, wie Kapp, H. Ritter, E. Reinhold, Strümpel, Weiß, F. Exner u. a., teilten den Trendelenburgschen Standpunkt. Über

gebene Begriffe mit den ihnen entgegengesetzten vergleichen, sie in ihre Gegensätze umschlagen lassen, also Begriffe setzen und entgegensetzen. Aber diese Methode ist nicht imstande, die Ursachen und Bedingungen des empirisch-tatsächlichen, historischen Geschehens ausfindig zu machen und sie genetisch zu deuten. Ursache und Wirkung sind gewissermaßen „fremde“ Begriffe für die Hegelsche Dialektik. Ja, eine der Haupttendenzen der Hegelschen Logik der Dynamik angewandt auf die Geschichte, ist doch gerade, die Kausalität durch Dialektik zu ersetzen. In seiner *Philosophie des Rechtes*⁵⁷ sagt Hegel ausdrücklich, daß der historische Ursprung des Staates für die Idee desselben ganz irrelevant ist. So versucht Hegel z. B. auch nie, den historischen Ursprung der Kunst zu erfassen. Beschreiben und Erklären sind nicht Sache dieser dialektischen Methode. Die daraus entstandene Willkürlichkeit des Hegelschen Ausleseprinzips und manche Gewaltkonstruktionen, die dialektisch notwendig, historisch-empirisch aber ganz unzulässig sind, seine Ignorierung derjenigen Tatsachen, die er nicht mit seinem System in Einklang bringen konnte — diese und ähnliche Fehlgriffe der dialektischen Methode sind mehrfach von Hegelkritikern in verschiedenster Weise besonders hervorgehoben worden.⁵⁸ Unser Philosoph hingegen kennt nur die genetische Methode allein. Mehrfach betont er, daß er kein anderes Ziel in seiner Geschichtsschreibung verfolgt als dies, den „Charakter des [jüdischen] Volkes und seines Geistes“ je nach der betreffenden Periode zu ergründen.⁵⁹ Nicht nach logisch-dialektischen Prinzipien soll der „Charakter“ des Geistes des Judentums festgestellt werden, sondern nach rein deskriptiv-empirischen Prin-

den Trendelenburg-Gablerschen Streit um die Methode des Meisters vgl. I. H. Fichte, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, 1843, XI, S. 43 ff. — Über Hegels dialektische Methode siehe Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, III, S. 361 ff.; vgl. auch das II. Kap. meines Buches *L. Feuerbach und die deutsche Philosophie*.

⁵⁷ § 258, Anm.

⁵⁸ Vgl. z. B. P. Barth, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer*, Leipzig 1890. Vgl. ebenfalls die sehr scharfe Kritik der Hegelschen Geschichtsauffassung bei dem Neuhegelianer B. Croce, *Lebendiges und Totes usw.*, S. 108—121.

⁵⁹ Vgl. *N. K. s W.*, S. 71, 50—51, 88 u. a. („תכונת האומה ותכונת הרוחני שבה בזמן זמן“).

zipien der genetischen Methode. Krochmal will lediglich die historischen Tatsachen verstehen, bei ihm besteht kein Zusammenhang zwischen Logik und Geschichte, geschweige denn eine Unterordnung der Geschichte unter die Logik. Selbstverständlich ist Geschichte für ihn auch kein Schauplatz für die Entfaltung der Gesetze des Werdens, die Gesetze der dynamischen Logik.

Auch das Problem der Gegensätzlichkeit — metaphysisch und historisch gesehen — kann uns beweisen, wieweit Krochmal von Hegel entfernt war. Das Problem der Gegensätze ist ein Kardinalproblem in der Philosophie. Nach manchen Richtungen hin versuchten die Philosophen aller Zeiten mit diesem Problem fertig zu werden. Besonders heiß und scharf ist über dieses Problem gegen Ausgang des Mittelalters debattiert worden. Nicolaus Cusanus, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Böhme versuchten, ein jeder auf seine Art, diese Frage zu lösen. Cartesius wollte die beiden Substanzen Denken und Ausdehnung, *cogitatio* und *extensio*, in Gott aussöhnen. Spinoza hat sie als Einheit in der allumfassenden Substanz vereinigen wollen. Für Leibniz waren die Gegensätze „Verdunkelungen“ der realiter bestehenden logischen Kontinuität, und er suchte seine Zuflucht bei einem philosophischen Optimismus. Die Popularphilosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts — abgesehen von wenigen Ausnahmen — erblickte in Gott die Lösung aller Widersprüche, den Sammelpunkt aller Antithesen. Für Kant z. B. bedeuten die Gegensätze den Streit zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, Sinnlichkeit und autonomer Sittlichkeit. Hegels Fassung des Problems der Gegensätze ist ganz anders ausgefallen: er kennt kein Zusammenfallen der Gegensätze in ein Drittes, Höheres, das unbekannt ist, keine ruhende Schellingsche Identität, sondern die Einheit und die Verschiedenheit bestehen beide zugleich, die Gegensätze sind real. Für ihn macht also die Gegensätzlichkeit das Wesen der Wirklichkeit aus, die Gegensätze sind die treibenden Kräfte des historischen Geschehens, Bedingungen für das Werden, ja, die lebendigen Ausdrucksformen eben dieses Werdens.

Ganz anders Krochmal. Darin ist er Wolfianer, Schüler der jüdisch-mittelalterlichen Philosophie und der Mendelssohn'schen Aufklärungsphilosophie zugleich. Krochmal will das Problem der Gegensätze durch ein Zurückführen derselben auf den Ursprung lösen. Geht man den jeweiligen Gegensätzen auf den Grund, so erweisen sie sich immer als bloße Scheingegensätze. Gegensätze sind bloße Abweichungen vom Geraden, als Extreme sind sie nur „schädlich“ und „gefährlich“. Die „Antinomien“, die Krochmal in der vierten „Pforte“ entwickelt, sind vorwiegend religiös-traditioneller und nicht logisch-metaphysischer Natur. Wer hier eine Anlehnung an Hegels Dialektik erblicken will,⁶⁰ scheint den wirklichen Tatbestand ganz außer acht zu lassen. Charakteristisch ist die Jeruschalmi-Stelle, die Krochmal als Motto der zweiten Pforte des *M. N. H.* voranschickt: „Diese Thora gleicht zwei Pfaden: der eine ein Feuerweg, der andere ein Schneeweg. Geht man den ersten — verbrennt man im Feuer, geht man den andern — erfriert man im Schnee. Was tun? Die Mitte einschlagen.“⁶¹ Während Hegel, der Dialektiker, um die Gegensätze ringt, um die Setzung der Entgegengesetzten, müht sich Krochmal allein um die kompromißmäßige Versöhnung. Um mit Krochmal zu sprechen: Hegel sucht die „zwei Pfade“, Krochmal aber sucht die „Mitte“, sie ist sein Ideal. Hegel erfreut sich am Kampf der Gegensätze (den Krochmal als bloße „Verwirrung“ — מְבֻרָבָה — betrachtet), an dem Heraklitischen „alles fließt“, dieser ewige Kampf ist ihm keine „Krankheit“, keine „Verwirrung“. Hegel lebt von den zwei Pfaden, von dem „Feuer“ und dem „Schnee“. Sein ganzes Philosophieren nährt sich von der Dynamik des Werdens, vom stetigen Kampf der Extreme, die Krochmal nie zugesagt haben.⁶²

⁶⁰ Vgl. J. L. Landau, *N. K. usw.*, S. 25.

⁶¹ Talmud Jeruschalmi, Hagigah, II. Kap., Halachah I, ed. Wilno, S. 9 a; gemeint ist dort „מַעֲשֵׂה מִרְכָּבָה“.

⁶² In der vierten „Pforte“ des *M. N. H.* widerspricht sich K. selber, indem er einerseits von Extremen spricht, von denen ein jedes an sich „schädlich“ und „gefährlich“ ist, andererseits von solchen, die nur in ihrer Entgegensetzung „Verwirrung“ anstiften müssen, aber von denen jedes an sich weder „schädlich“ noch „gefährlich“ ist. Das Durcheinanderbringen dieser verschiedenen Arten der Extreme

Ebenso — um zu einem weiteren Punkt überzugehen — kann David Neumarks Ansicht, wonach Krochmal, den Fußstapfen Hegels folgend, sein historisches System auf der Annahme aufgebaut hat, daß man die Ordnung des historischen Geschehens nach apriorischen Ideen feststellen könnte, nicht akzeptiert werden.⁶³ Krochmal kannte weder ein a priori in seiner Geschichtsschreibung noch in seinen wissenschaftlichen Forschungen überhaupt, er war durch und durch aposteriorischer Geschichtsschreiber. Noch Asariah de Rossi, der Begründer der kritisch-jüdischen Geschichtsschreibung, entschuldigte die historischen Ungenauigkeiten „unserer Weisen“, ihre Gleichgültigkeit in bezug auf die Geschichte mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß erstens die Juden überhaupt keine Geschichte brauchten, denn alles wäre schon in der Thora angedeutet, und daß zweitens die Beschreibung des Verflorenen an sich gegenstandslos und irrelevant für sie gewesen sei, denn *מאי דהוה דהוה*.⁶⁴ Gerade mit diesem *מאי דהוה דהוה* wollte Krochmal endlich kategorisch aufräumen. Er will die Dinge sehen, wie sie waren. Geschichtsforschung ist für ihn vorwiegend Analyse, Zergliederung des historischen Geschehens, dessen Klärung und Ergründung. Krochmal strebt danach, zu einer geschichtlichen Synthese zu gelangen, aber nicht auf Kosten der empirisch-historischen Tatsächlichkeit. Wenn er auch die Totalität des historischen Prozesses erfassen will, so ist er doch immer auf der Hut, nicht die geringsten Einzelheiten außer acht zu lassen. Krochmal vergewaltigt nie die Tatsachen, damit das allgemeine, apriorische Prinzip recht behalten kann. Er hat nie aus einem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang nur diejenigen Tatsachen ausgewählt, die in sein vorgefaßtes System hineinpaßten. Hegel dagegen glaubt, der Historiker müsse nur einen Teil der geschichtlichen Tatsachen berücksichtigen, er müsse nur diejenigen Tatsachen als historisch behandeln, die Durchgangsstufen und -momente für die dialektische Entfaltung des

hindert auch, die richtige Lösung zu finden. Diese und manche ähnlichen Widersprüche im *M. N. H.* haben wir in einem anderen Zusammenhange ganz ausführlich behandelt.

⁶³ Vgl. R. Nachman Krochmal, *Hashiloah*, XV, 1905, S. 268—272.

⁶⁴ Vgl. *Me'or 'enayim, imre binah*, Kap. 27, S. 254 ff.

Geistes sind und die direkte Beziehung auf den Staat haben.⁶⁵ Alle anderen Tatsachen sind nach Hegel nur ein „Ballast“ der Geschichte, eine überflüssige Stoffüberbürdung, die der Geschichtsforschung nur hinderlich sein kann. Er hält es daher für richtiger, diesen ganzen „Rest“ der Geschichte — und dieser „Reststoff“ ist die überwiegende Mehrheit der Mannigfaltigkeit des historischen Geschehens — den Romanschriftstellern und Künstlern als Stoff für ihr Fabulieren und Dichten zu überlassen. Auf Grund dieser Hegelschen Auffassung haben bekanntlich manche seiner Jünger (wie z. B. der Hegelianer Eduard Gans) eine Reihe von Unterscheidungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte vorgenommen, wie zwischen Geschichte und Nicht-Geschichte, wichtigen und unwichtigen Tatsachen, innerlich notwendigen Tatsachen und überflüssigen Äußerlichkeiten, großen und kleinen Perioden, wichtigen und unwichtigen Völkern. Und sehr zutreffend hat der italienische Neu-Hegelianer B. Croce gesagt: „Bevor Hegel Daten der Tatsachen aufsucht, weiß er schon, welche es sein müssen; er kennt sie im voraus, wie man die philosophischen Wahrheiten kennt, die der Geist in seinem universalen Sein findet, und er nimmt sie nicht aus den Tatsachen“, denn Hegels Geschichte ist eine „fix und fertige Geschichte, die nur noch mit Namen und Daten bekleidet zu werden braucht“.⁶⁶ Von Hegel, der in mehr als einer Hinsicht

⁶⁵ Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, S. 146: „Erst im Staate mit dem Bewußtsein von Gesetzen sind klare Taten vorhanden und mit ihnen die Klarheit eines Bewußtseins über sie, welche die Fähigkeit und das Bedürfnis gibt, sie so aufzubewahren.“ Vgl. ebenda, S. 150, über Hegels Apriorismus: „Dies zu leisten [die bestimmten Besonderheiten als das eigentümliche Prinzip eines Volkes ausmachend zu erweisen] setzt nicht nur eine geübte Abstraktion, sondern auch schon eine vertraute Bekanntschaft mit den Ideen voraus; man muß mit dem Kreise dessen, worin die Prinzipien fallen, wenn man es so nennen will, a priori vertraut sein.“ Ebenfalls S. 137: „Dieses alles (die Gegensätze und die Versöhnung zwischen dem subjektiven und objektiven Geist) nun ist das Apriorische der Geschichte, dem die Erfahrung entsprechen muß.“

⁶⁶ Vgl. *Lebendiges und Totes usw.*, S. 114—115. Gesperrt von mir. E. Troeltsch versucht zwar Hegels Apriorismus in Schutz zu nehmen (*Der Historismus usw.*, S. 253, 265 ff.). Dieser scharfsinnige Versuch scheint mir aber doch die unzähligen „Sünden“ Hegels in bezug auf die empirische Geschichte nicht ganz aus der Welt schaffen zu können. Übrigens gibt Troeltsch selber im Laufe seiner Abhandlung zu, daß Hegels Dialektik „der Komplexität, der materiellen Bedingtheit und den

der Geschichtswissenschaft neuen Schwung verliehen hat, ist allzusehr bekannt, welche geringschätzig und feindliche Haltung er den Historikern von Fach gegenüber eingenommen hat, wieviel Ironie und überhebliche Verachtung er den Forschern entgegenbrachte, die sich rein deskriptiv und genetisch auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte betätigt haben. Diese Ironie galt nicht allein den Männern dieses Gebietes, sondern zum Teil auch der Geschichte, der materialen Geschichtsforschung selber. Denn die Idee der Hegelschen Geschichtsphilosophie hebt gewissermaßen die Selbständigkeit der Geschichtsschreibung zugunsten der reinen Philosophie auf. Die Philosophie der Geschichte verneint direkt die Geschichte; sie ist für Hegel die „denkende Betrachtung der Geschichte“, woraus zu ersehen ist, wie schon B. Croce angedeutet hat, daß die Geschichte als solche entweder kein „Gedanke“ oder aber ein „unvollkommener Gedanke“ ist. Daß Krochmals Einstellung zur empirischen Geschichtsschreibung ganz andere Art war, brauchen wir kaum zu erwähnen. Wie freute sich z. B. Krochmal, daß er es noch erlebt hat, Männer in seinem Zeitalter zu sehen, die sich der Erforschung der jüdischen Wissenschaft widmeten, die sich der empirischen Kritik und sachlichen Arbeit auf dem Gebiete des Judentums zuwandten.⁶⁷

Auch über den Nutzen der Geschichtsforschung überhaupt gehen die Ansichten Krochmals und Hegels völlig auseinander. Nach Krochmal ist das Ziel der Historiographie ein rein didaktisches.⁶⁸ Diese seine Auffassung kommt der allgemeinen Auffassung über den Sinn der Geschichte sehr nahe, nach der man Geschichte treibt, um durch die Vergangenheit die Gegenwart zu verstehen und die Zukunft vorausszusehen. Hegel aber mußte von der hohen Warte des panlogistischen Idealismus alle diese didaktischen Tendenzen und pädagogischen Sinndeutungen völlig ablehnen. Das einzige, was man nach Hegel

wirklichen und mannigfaltigen Interessen des geschichtlichen Lebens nicht gerecht wird“, daß diese gewaltsame monistische Tendenz alles „verwischt“ (ebenda, S. 266, 275). Aber das ist nicht die Schuld des Monismus allein, ja hieran ist der Apriorismus der „Hauptschuldige“.

⁶⁷ Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 248 u. a.

⁶⁸ Vgl. ebenda, S. 112, 167.

aus der Geschichte lernen könnte, wäre, daß niemand aus der Geschichte je irgend etwas gelernt hat.⁶⁹

Was also die großen metaphysischen Probleme wie auch die Methoden des Forschens anbetrifft, ist Krochmal darin nicht im geringsten als Hegelianer zu bezeichnen. Sehen wir nun von der Krochmalschen Geschichtsschreibung ab und wenden uns seinen Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Bibelkritik, der Halachah und Aggadah zu. Selbstverständlich können wir hier in diesem Zusammenhange auf die Methodik und die Resultate dieses Krochmalschen Schaffens nicht eingehen.⁷⁰ Daß diese Forschungen Krochmals aber bahnbrechend und wegweisend für die spätere Generation der jüdischen Forscher geworden ist, könnte man vielleicht hier nur kurz angedeutet aus dem Munde des Verfassers des *Dor dor wedorshaw*, A. H. Weiß, entnehmen, der in seiner Autobiographie den bleibenden Eindruck, den der *M. N. H.* auf die Ausbildung seiner Halachah-Forschung gemacht hat, besonders hervorhebt.⁷¹ Daß ferner seine bibelkritischen Untersuchungen noch bis auf den heutigen Tag ihre Aktualität nicht verloren haben, ist eine feststehende Tatsache. Der Bibelkritiker Steuernagel⁷² und manche anderen Bibelkritiker greifen in vielen Punkten auf Krochmal zurück. Aber all dies würde uns in einem anderen Zusammenhange viel mehr interessieren. Worauf es uns hier ankommt, ist doch nur die Feststellung, ob in der Krönung des *M. N. H.*, der Bibel-, Halachah- und Aggadah-Kritik, irgendeine Abhängigkeit von Hegel nachzuweisen wäre. Schon die Frage allein scheint mir gerade in diesem Falle absolut unzulässig. Aber wir waren gezwungen sie aufzuwerfen, weil es immer wieder Forscher gibt, die ohne irgendwelche Grundlagen von Hegelschen Einfluß in Krochmals Abhandlungen

⁶⁹ Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 179.

⁷⁰ Vgl. hierfür unsere genannte Einleitung zu Krochmals sämtlichen Werken von S. 99 bis 159.

⁷¹ Vgl. A. H. Weiß, *Zikronotai*, Warschau, S. 123. Vgl. auch S. Shechter, *Studies in Judaism*: "He it was who taught Jewish scholars how to submit the ancient Rabbinic records to the test of criticism and the way in which they might be utilised for the purpose of historical studies..."

⁷² Vgl. *Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Tübingen 1912, S. 720.

über Bibel, Halachah und Aggadah sprechen.⁷³ Aber was hat denn eigentlich Krochmals Anlehnung an Ibn Esra in bezug auf das Jesaja-Problem, sein Aufsuchen der verschiedenen „Hallel“ in den Psalmen, seine Forschungen über Kohelet, Esra, Daniel u. a. mit metaphysischen Problemen überhaupt und mit Hegels Philosophie insbesondere zu tun? Was hat die grandiose Halachah-„Pforte“ („Pforte“ 13), die methodisch wie inhaltlich eine Glanzleistung Krochmals ist, die die Richtlinien für eine weitere, streng historisch sachliche Behandlungsweise geliefert hat, mit dem panlogistischen Idealismus gemeinsam? Was könnte Krochmals sehr scharfsinniger Versuch über den Sinn und Wert der Aggadah, die Klassifizierung der verschiedenen Gattungen derselben, die Unterscheidung zwischen Aggadah und Aggad'ta (אגדה) usw. mit einer dynamischen Dialektik überhaupt zu tun haben? Was die Bibel, Halachah, Aggadah, Philos Philosophie, das Essäer-Problem usw. anbelangt, so war Krochmal da ein streng empirischer Historiker, der, geleitet von der Liebe zur Wahrheit, mit vielen feststehenden Ansichten gebrochen und eine Bresche in die Mauer der kritiklos überlieferten und unantastbaren Grundsätze geschlagen hat. Es besteht also nicht der geringste Zusammenhang zwischen Hegels Philosophie oder irgendeinem anderen metaphysischen System und Krochmals Ausführungen auf den obengenannten Gebieten. Wenn man hier nach Einflüssen fahndet, so kann man sie nur bei Maimonides, Ibn Esra, Asaria de Rossi einerseits und bei der neueren historisch-kritischen Schule andererseits suchen. Nur diesen Einflüssen haben Krochmals genannte Abhandlungen ihren Ausgangspunkt und teilweise auch ihre weitere Gestaltung zu verdanken.

IV. DER FRAGMENTARISCHE VERSUCH DER LOGIK

Überblicken wir kurz zusammenfassend den gesamten *M. N. H.*, so sehen wir: Die ersten vier „Pforten“, die gewissermaßen die Einleitung zum Krochmalschen Werke bilden,

⁷³ Vgl. z. B. Soloweitschik-Rubaschow, *Toldot bikoret hamikra*, S. 150, wonach Krochmal als „frommer Schüler Hegels“ an die Deutung der Bibelprobleme herangegangen sein soll.

weisen gar keine Spur des Hegelschen Einflusses auf. Im Gegenteil, in der Behandlung des Problems der Gegensätzlichkeit steht Krochmal, wie bereits oben angedeutet, im schroffsten Gegensatz zu Hegel. Die fünfte „Pforte“ — „Die Absicht und das Ziel“ —, die sich mit dem Problem der teleologischen Naturerklärung befaßt, knüpft teils an Maimonides' Auseinandersetzung mit Galenus,⁷⁴ teils an Kants *Kritik der Urteilkraft* an.⁷⁵ Die kurze sechste religionsphilosophische „Pforte“ erinnert zwar in einigen ihrer Ausdrücke an Hegel, aber die hier betonte Gleichheit zwischen Religion und Religionsphilosophie, zwischen dem „Gebildeten“ („משכילים“) und Gläubigen ist in dieser Nuancierung nicht Hegelschen (Hegel hat doch bekanntlich die Religion mit der Philosophie gleichgesetzt, denn was die erste in Vorstellungen erfaßt, denkt die andere in Begriffen), sondern Wolffschen und Kantischen Ursprungs. Analog dem von Hegel für seine Trias gebrauchten Verbum „Aufheben“ — im dreifachen Sinne des conservare, negare und elevare — spricht Krochmal andeutungsweise vom hebräischen Verb אכל, das auch die dreifache Bedeutung der Affirmation, Negation und Negation der Negation besitzen soll. Aber Krochmal beruft sich in diesem Zusammenhange nicht auf Hegel, sondern auf den *Moreh Nebukim* des Maimonides. Über die geschichtsphilosophische „Pforte“ (7) („Völker und ihre Götter“) haben wir bereits gesprochen. Die „Pforten“ 8 bis 10 stellen eine Skizzierung der gesamten jüdischen Geschichte dar, die wir oben kurz analysiert haben. „Pforte“ 11 dient als Ergänzung zu den drei letzteren. Hier wird auf viele bibelkritische wie auch auf verschiedene historische Probleme eingegangen. Daß auch diese nicht den entferntesten Zusammenhang mit Hegel haben, erübrigt sich wohl besonders zu erwähnen. In der zwölften „Pforte“, die die alexandrinisch-philonische Philosophie analysiert — unter besonderer Verwertung des Werkes von A. F. Dähne: *Geschichtliche Darstellung der Jüdisch-Alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie* und des Buches von A. Neander: *Genetische Entwicklung*

⁷⁴ Vgl. Maimonides, *Pirke Mošeh*, Ma'amar 25, ed. Lemberg, 1804, S. 54.

⁷⁵ Von einer genaueren Besprechung des Zusammenhanges dieser „Pforte“ mit Kant muß hier leider wegen Raummangels abgesehen werden.

der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme —, und für sie eine Reihe entsprechender Stellen aus dem Talmud und den Midraschim anführt, hätte Krochmal eigentlich eine Anlehnung an Hegel suchen können. Denn Krochmals Interesse für die Gnostiker könnte überhaupt dem Einfluß Hegels zugeschrieben werden. Bestand doch eine der originellsten Leistungen Hegels auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie darin, daß er die alexandrinische Philosophie wieder zu Ehren gebracht hat, im Gegensatz zu den meisten Historikern seiner Zeit, die in ihr nur Eklektizismus sahen, daß er sich sehr eifrig mit dem Neuplatonismus befaßte (wofür er von manchen als der „deutsche Proklos“ bezeichnet worden ist, von anderen auch als der „deutsche Aristoteles“), und daß er ebenfalls eine positive Stellung zu Philo einnahm.⁷⁶ Aber Krochmals Ausführungen in diesem Abschnitt lassen nichts in dieser Richtung erkennen. Krochmal interessierten in diesem Zusammenhang keine allgemeinen metaphysischen Probleme. Er befaßt sich hier lediglich mit Philo als dem jüdischen Religionsphilosophen, mit Philo als dem Bibelkritiker, mit den Berührungspunkten zwischen Philo und den Essäern. Krochmal hat einige Auszüge — nach Dähne — aus Philos Werken in diesen Abschnitt mit aufgenommen, diese sind aber nicht allgemein metaphysischer, sondern rein ethischer Natur. Wenn Krochmal durch eine Anregung auf das Philo-Problem aufmerksam geworden sein sollte, so ist es sicher durch seinen großen Vorgänger Asariah de Rossi geschehen, der sich in seinem *Me'or Enayim* sehr ausführlich mit Philo befaßt und dessen Ausführungen sich sogar teilweise bei Krochmal mit manchen Abweichungen wieder auffinden lassen.⁷⁷ Auch die beiden folgenden „Pforten“ — die 13., die Halachah-„Pforte“, und die 14., die Aggadah-„Pforte“ — sind bereits kurz erörtert worden. In der 15. „Pforte“, in der von der Kabbalah und verschiedenen früheren und späteren gnostischen Systemen die Rede ist, tritt Krochmal als der alte aufklärerische Rationalist

⁷⁶ Vgl. Bäumler, *Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1923, S. 35.

⁷⁷ Von dem Verhältnis zwischen Krochmal und Asariah de Rossi handelt ein besonderes Kapitel in unserem bereits oben erwähnten Buche über Krochmal. Vgl. meinen Aufsatz in *Ha'olam*, 1927, Nr. 6 ff.

auf, der sich mit dem Hegeltum sicherlich sehr wenig berührt. Der einzige Vorwurf, den Krochmal den Gnostikern wie auch den Anhängern der Sekte des Sabbatai-Zwi macht, ist der, daß sie den Weg der klaren, einsichtsvollen, sich selbst begrenzenden Vernunft verlassen haben. Abgesehen davon bestand auch hier Krochmals Interesse hauptsächlich darin, gewisse Talmudstellen mit der Geschichte dieser Sekten in Zusammenhang zu bringen, da Krochmal überhaupt vor allem Wege zeigen wollte, wie man die ältere jüdische Literatur für die moderne wissenschaftliche Forschung verwerten kann, was bereits oben angedeutet worden ist. Die 17. „Pforte“ — „Die Weisheit des Armen“ — ist völlig der Erläuterung der Gedankenwelt des Ibn Esra gewidmet, mit der man sich in einer besonderen Abhandlung beschäftigen müßte.⁷⁸ Denn Krochmal war es, der zuerst darauf hingewiesen hat, daß man den Philosophen Ibn Esra viel höher einschätzen müsse, als es bisher üblich war, und der mit seinem Zeitgenossen Samuel David Luzatto einen harten und schweren Kampf um die Ehrenrettung Abraham Ibn Esras geführt hat, der entscheidend geworden ist für das Verständnis der Religionsphilosophie Ibn Esras; er ist der erste, der es gewagt hat, von einem System Ibn Esras zu sprechen, und versucht hat — lange vor Rosin, Steinschneider u. a. — dieses System des Ibn Esra zu rekonstruieren.

Nun aber kommen wir zu einer „Pforte“, die aus dem bisher gezeichneten Rahmen herausfällt, und zwar ist es die aus nicht ganz 15 Seiten bestehende 16. „Pforte“, die betitelt wird: „Definitionen und Grundlagen zu einer Religionsphilo-

⁷⁸ Siehe unsere Abhandlung „Rabbi Abraham Ibn Esra usw.“ in *Hashiloah*, Jerusalem 1925, Heft 2—3. David Rosins Abhandlung „Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Esras“, die nach seinem Tode von David Kaufmann in der *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* (1898—1899) veröffentlicht worden ist, hat Krochmals Untersuchungen auf diesem Gebiete sehr viel zu verdanken, wenn auch der Verfasser aus unerklärlichen Gründen nicht ein einziges Mal Krochmals Namen erwähnt. Siehe z. B. *MGWJ.*, 1898, S. 200, 204, 205, 243, 248, 252, 358, 396—397, 400, 447, 449, 450—453, 455, 481, 492, 497, 499; 1899, S. 30, 132, 170, 172—173, 175, 180—181, 231—232, 235. Vgl. dazu die entsprechenden Stellen in Krochmals *Hokmat hamiskén*. Hingegen nimmt Steinschneider in seinen Arbeiten über Abraham Ibn Esra (*Abraham Ibn Esra als Mathematiker* u. a.) Bezug auf Krochmal.

sophie, geschöpft aus der philosophischen Logik.“⁷⁹ Wenn man nun diesen Abschnitt überhaupt als „Pforte“ bezeichnet, so ist das übertrieben; denn die uns vorliegende „Pforte“ ist ein bloßes Fragment, das entweder Krochmal durch seinen frühzeitigen Tod nicht beenden konnte, oder das er als unbefriedigenden Versuch noch vorher vernachlässigt hat. Was in diesem Fragment vorgetragen wird, sind die Anfänge der Hegelschen Logik, die in die Lehre von Sein, Wesen und Begriff zerfällt. (Auf die weitere Einteilung und die verschiedenen Kategorien dieser drei Hauptteile können wir hier leider nicht eingehen.) Krochmal ist hier nicht einmal mit der Darstellung der Grundlagen der Hegelschen Logik fertig geworden; er hat nur einige Kategorien vom Sein und vom Wesen behandelt, aber auch diese nicht vollständig. — Daß Hegels Logik einen großen Reiz für Krochmal haben mußte, unterliegt keinem Zweifel. Die „traditionelle“ Logik hat die Männer der Religion und die Mystiker nie ganz befriedigen können. Das rationale Erkennen stellt Relationen im Bereiche des Gegebenen fest, aber es kann nie zum Unendlichen vordringen. Der Satz des Widerspruches, von Aristoteles her als einer der unumstößlichen Grundsätze der Logik bezeichnet, ist nur ein Hindernis, wenn man der Veränderung, der Dynamik des Werdens gerecht werden will, wovon bereits die Rede war. Der Satz des Widerspruches kann ungeheuer große Dienste im Endlichen leisten, aber er kann nichts anfangen mit dem Unendlichen, denn hier finden wir A und Non-A zugleich. Daher rangen die Mystiker aller Zeiten um eine höhere Logik, um eine „göttliche“ Logik, die nicht auf dem Satze des Widerspruches aufgebaut ist. Diese religiöse Logik hat das Unendliche zu ihrem Ausgangspunkt; sie basiert auf dem Prinzip der *coincidentia oppositorum*, der Einheit der Gegensätze des Nicolaus von Kues und Giordano Bruno. Wenn man nun aus dem Unendlichen ein Bestimmtes, ein Endliches (A) herausgreift, so kann man doch nicht umhin, zu gleicher Zeit auch alles andere (Non-A) mitzusetzen. Auf diese Weise wird die Unselbständigkeit des A ganz klar de-

⁷⁹ Vgl. *N. K. S. W.*, S. 272—283.

monstriert, so daß, wenn man A setzt, man Non-A mitsetzen muß, wenn man A denkt, man Non-A mitdenken muß. Diese „höhere“ Logik fand ihren prägnantesten Ausdruck in Hegels Philosophie, der diese Dialektik (zu der er seitens der Dynamik des Werdens wie seitens des Gedankens der Unendlichkeit getrieben worden ist) am virtuosesten gehandhabt hat.

Für Krochmal, den Religionsphilosophen, war die Aufstellung einer solchen „höheren“ Logik von eminenter Bedeutung. Sicherlich war für ihn der Begriff des Unendlichen das Ziel seines logischen Denkens, er bedeutete ihm viel mehr als das ganze Rüstzeug der gesamten Logik, als die Reflexion über die Quantität, das Zählen und Rechnen, das extensive und intensive Quantum usw.⁸⁰ Das Problem des Verhältnisses von Glauben und Wissen, Gott und Welt sollte von hier aus angefaßt und gelöst werden. Diese religiöse Logik mit ihrem Prinzip des Unendlichen schien Krochmal wahrscheinlich sehr geeignet, die Philosophie des Ibn Esra und der Kabbalah⁸¹ in ein ganz neues Licht zu rücken. An einer Stelle spricht Krochmal davon, daß die neuere „Philosophie der Logik“ ein sehr geeigneter Schlüssel für die Attributenpartien und manche anderen „dunklen“ Abschnitte des *Moreh Nebukim* wäre.⁸² Der deutsche Idealismus, nicht nur Hegels allein, sondern auch Schellings, in dessen Naturphilosophie Krochmal Berührungspunkte mit Ibn Esra feststellen zu wollen schien, war nur ein „Mittel“ zur Erläuterung mancher metaphysischer Grundanschauungen einiger jüdischer Denker des Mittelalters. Aber wollten wir mehr darüber sagen, so hieße das, den Boden der kritisch-historischen Betrachtungsweise verlassen. Diese „Pforte“ ist nicht nur Fragment geblieben, sondern sie ist auch völlig ungeordnet, nicht durchgearbeitet, mit einer Fülle von Wiederholungen und Unklarheiten, wie ich das an anderer

⁸⁰ Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 274 u. a.

⁸¹ Die von A. H. Weiß in die Welt gesetzte Meinung (*Zikronotai* a. a. O., S. 123), der zufolge Krochmal ein Gegner der *Kabbalah* ist (eine Ansicht, die sich dann bei den meisten späteren Historikern wiederfindet), entbehrt jeder Grundlage. Die Frage über Krochmals Stellung zur Kabbalah haben wir in einem anderen Zusammenhang behandelt. Vgl. meinen Aufsatz in *Ha'olam*, 1927, Nr. 9 ff.

⁸² *N. K.s W.*, S. 274, 282.

Stelle nachgewiesen habe. Wir wissen nicht, was aus diesem „Fragment“ unter Krochmals Händen geworden wäre, inwiefern Krochmal auf der Grundlage der Hegelschen Logik seine weitere Religionsphilosophie aufgebaut hätte. Vielleicht wäre es nur ein äußerliches Anlehnen an Hegel geblieben. Es ist nicht völlig ausgeschlossen, daß, wie auf dem Gebiete der Geschichtsphilosophie und Geschichte, Krochmal auch auf dem Gebiete der Religionsphilosophie seine eigenen Wege gegangen wäre.

Und daß Krochmal die meisten Hegelschen religionsphilosophischen Anschauungen nicht teilen konnte, beweist schon eine ganz oberflächliche Betrachtung einiger religionsphilosophischer Sätze Hegels. Hegel kennt drei Stufen der historischen Entwicklung der Religion: a) Naturreligion des Orients (Gott — Natursubstanz); b) die jüdische Religion (Religion der Erhabenheit), griechische Religion (Religion der Schönheit), römische Religion (Religion der Zweckmäßigkeit). In all diesen Religionen wird Gott als Subjekt angeschaut; c) die absolute Religion, die Gott als dreieinigen Geist vorstellt. a) und b) akzeptiert Krochmal teilweise, wenn auch anders nuanciert, dagegen kann Krochmal doch mit c) absolut nichts zu tun haben. Abgesehen davon weicht er doch jeder Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum aus. Nach Hegel expliziert sich die göttliche Idee in drei Formen: 1. Gott in seiner eigenen Idee, das Reich des Vaters. 2. Die ewige Idee Gottes im Elemente des Bewußtseins und Vorstellens, das Reich des Sohnes. 3. Der Prozeß der Versöhnung, das Reich des Geistes.⁸³ Hat auch Krochmal diese drei Explikationen mitmachen können? Es erübrigt sich wohl, die Kluft zwischen Krochmals und Hegels Religionsphilosophie⁸⁴ weiter darzutun. Man braucht übrigens nur etwas in Hegels Jugendschriften⁸⁵ nachzulesen,

⁸³ Vgl. *Phänomenologie* (S. W., 1832), S. 561 ff.; ebenfalls *Enzyklopädie*, ed. Lasson, S. 480 ff.

⁸⁴ Über Hegels Gottesbegriff vgl. aus der Fülle der Hegel-Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts u. a. besonders Carl Schwarz, *Das Wesen der Religion*, Halle 1847, S. 130 ff., Ludwig Nowak, *Die speculative Religionswissenschaft im encyclopädischen Organismus ihrer besonderen Disciplin*, Darmstadt 1847, und *Mythologie und Offenbarung* von demselben Verfasser.

⁸⁵ *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, herausgegeben von H. Nohl, 1907.

in denen er auch über den „Geist des Judentums“ manches sagt, um sich davon zu überzeugen, wie himmelweit entfernt Krochmal von Hegel in der Gesamtauffassung des Judentums war.⁸⁶

Zu ganz anderen Resultaten müßte Krochmal kommen, wenn er Hegelianer wäre, ganz anders müßte dann der *M. N. H.* aussehen. Ein richtiger Hegelianer — um nur einige Beispiele aus einer ungeheuren Fülle hier anzuführen — war z. B. ein Mann wie Christian Kapp, der auf der Grundlage der Hegelschen Logik eine besondere Geschichtsphilosophie aufgebaut hat, in der der Orient das Prinzip des Seins repräsentiert, die Griechen und Römer — das Prinzip des Wesens, die neue Zeit — das Prinzip des Begriffes (analog der Hegelschen Dreiteilung der Logik in Sein, Wesen und Begriff).⁸⁷ Ein Hegelianer war ebenso z. B. A. v. Cieszkowski, der gleichfalls die Hegelsche Trias in die Geschichte hineingetragen hat und sie folgendermaßen einteilte: die Antike — Reich der Kunst, die moderne Welt — Reich der Philosophie, die Zukunft — Reich der Sittlichkeit.⁸⁸ Aber auch jüdische Hegelianer gab es, (die ohne Hegels Auffassung vom Judentum zu akzeptieren, doch seine philosophische Methode übernommen haben), und die Geschichte des Hegelianismus im Judentum könnte uns ein sehr lehrreiches Bild eines überaus wichtigen Zeitabschnittes des jüdischen Denkens liefern. Ein jüdischer Hegelianer war z. B. — wir können da gleich in der Familie Krochmals bleiben — der Sohn unseres Philosophen, Abraham Krochmal. Schon auf den ersten Abschnitt des Buches Genesis versucht Abraham Krochmal das Hegelsche dialektische Schema anzuwenden. „Tag“ (יום) — „Nacht“ (לילה) — „Tag“ (יום) des fünften Verses des ersten Kapitels der Genesis sind für Abraham Krochmal identisch mit dem dialektischen Dreitakt These—Antithese—Synthese. Auch seine Stellungnahme zu dem Problem der Gegensätze steht unter Hegelschem Einfluß, nicht wie

⁸⁶ Vgl. besonders *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, S. 243—260, über Noah und Nimrod (die nach Hegel beide in die jüdische Geschichte hineingehören); S. 247 über Abraham, S. 252 über die mosaische Gesetzgebung und den Sabbat; S. 260 über „das große Trauerspiel des jüdischen Volkes“ und viele andere Stellen.

⁸⁷ Vgl. *Das concrete Allgemeine der Weltgeschichte*, Erl. 1826.

⁸⁸ Vgl. *Prolegomena zur Historosophie*, Berlin 1838.

bei seinem Vater. Ja, Abraham Krochmal versucht manchmal, gewalttätig das Hegeltum in das Judentum hineinzuinterpretieren, so schließt z. B. Abraham Krochmal aus Rabbi Jochanans Liebe zu Resh Lakish, der gegen jede von ihm geäußerte halachische Ansicht 24 Einwände zu machen pflegte,⁸⁹ daß „unsere Weisen“ das Problem der Gegensätzlichkeit bejaht hatten, daß sie die dialektischen Gegensätze als für die Wirklichkeit notwendig gehalten haben.⁹⁰ Abraham Krochmal spricht vom „Ich“, vom „absoluten Geist“, von Logik und Dialektik wie ein orthodoxer Hegelianer. Ein jüdischer Hegelianer — um auf noch einen kurz hinzuweisen — war auch Samuel Hirsch, der Autor des Buches *Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden oder das Prinzip der jüdischen Religionsanschauung und sein Verhältnis zum Heidentum, Christentum und zur absoluten Philosophie*.⁹¹ War denn aber Nachman Krochmal ein Hegelianer dieser Art? Hat denn Krochmal z. B. jemals versucht nachzuweisen (um noch auf eines der vielen Beispiele hinzuweisen), daß die Zahl der uns bekannten Kometen logisch notwendig und demzufolge auch unveränderlich ist, so wie es Hegel getan hat, der dann auch nach der Aufstellung dieser Hypothese durch eine neue Entdeckung Lügen gestraft wurde?

Man könnte Krochmal z. B. als Viconianer, Lessingianer, Herderianer, Fichteianer bezeichnen — auf Grund der verschiedenen Berührungspunkte, die wir oben kurz streifend angeführt haben. Aber vor allem müßte er doch als Kantianer bezeichnet werden. Denn abgesehen von der fünften „Pforte“ — „Die Absicht und das Ziel“ —, in der sich Krochmal ganz offensichtlich in den Bahnen der *Kritik der Urteilskraft* Kants bewegt, finden sich bei Krochmal noch an anderen Stellen eine Reihe von Entlehnungen aus Kants philosophischen Werken, die mindestens auf einen ebenso starken Einfluß von

⁸⁹ Vgl. Baba mezia, 84 a.

⁹⁰ Vgl. *Da'at elohim ba'arez*, S. 84, 85 ff. (Eine wissenschaftliche Edition der Gesamtwerke Abr. Krochmals, über den eine besondere Abhandlung erscheinen soll, wird von uns vorbereitet.)

⁹¹ Leipzig 1842. Vgl. z. B. Kap. 3 „Die aktive Religiosität“; § 41 „Abraham“; § 47 „Die absolute Religiosität Abrahams“, S. 514 ff.

Kant schließen lassen wie auf denjenigen von Hegel — wenn nicht auf einen viel intensiveren. Ich will hier nur beiläufig noch z. B. darauf hinweisen, daß Krochmals Aufzählung (in der ersten „Pforte“ des *M.N.H.*) der drei Schäden: Schwärmerei, Aberglaube und Werkheiligkeit und deren Analyse⁹² teilweise wörtlich von Kant her stammt.⁹³ Wenn man aber so vorgeht, wird man nie zu einer gerechten Auffassung eines Denkers gelangen können. Das Hegelsche Element — so dürfen wir wohl auf Grund des bisher Ausgeführten kurz zusammenfassend sagen — wirkte neben den Einflüssen des Judentums, der Aufklärung und des deutschen Idealismus, vorwiegend Herders und Kants, mitformend auf die Gestaltung der späteren Krochmalschen Ideenwelt. Dieser Einfluß war aber durch die anderen Einwirkungen und durch Krochmals Originalität so „neutralisiert“ und in Schranken gehalten, daß von einem Hegelianismus bei Krochmal nicht die Rede sein kann. Wohlverstanden, bei dem uns vorliegenden Krochmal — aber wir wissen nicht, wie Krochmal weiter philosophiert hätte, wenn er nicht im 55. Lebensjahre abberufen worden wäre. Wir können nicht mit Sicherheit behaupten, was er im zweiten Teile des *M.N.H.* — denn dieser vorliegende *M.N.H.* ist nur ein Teil und meines Erachtens wahrscheinlich der erste Teil des geplanten, nicht fertig gewordenen Krochmalschen Lebenswerkes — gelehrt hätte. Auf das ungewisse Feld der vagen Vermutungen wollen wir uns aber nicht begeben. Der *Moreh Nebuke Hazman*, die Krochmalschen Briefe, das ist das einzige, was für die Lösung unseres Problems in Betracht kommen kann.

Und — um am Schluß noch einen bereits oben beiläufig berührten Punkt zu erwähnen — wie steht es mit der von vielen Krochmal zugeschriebenen Tendenz der „Versöhnung“ des Judentums mit dem Hegeltum?⁹⁴ Krochmal selbst spricht lediglich von seinem Ideal der Harmonisierung der Vernunft

⁹² Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 7—9.

⁹³ Vgl. *Kants S. W.* (Cassirer-Ausgabe), Bd. 2, 1912: „Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen“, S. 294.

⁹⁴ Vgl. Zunz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, S. 151 ff.; Mieses, „Das Judentum der Vergangenheit“, *Hamizpeh*, Heft 3, S. 2 u. a.

mit der mündlichen und schriftlichen Lehre.⁹⁵ Für Krochmal handelt es sich vorwiegend um die historisch-kritische Beleuchtung der jüdischen Tradition, um die Sicherstellung des Judentums auf einer festen und kritisch fundierten Basis. Für diese seine Lebensaufgabe brauchte er Hegel wirklich nicht. Um dieses Ideal hat er jahrelang gerungen, bevor er Hegel überhaupt kannte. — Wir deuteten bereits oben auf die so oft gezogene Parallele zwischen dem Aristoteliker Maimonides und dem „Hegelianer“ Krochmal hin. Abgesehen davon, daß sie an sich historisch nicht zutrifft, lag es doch bei Maimonides ganz anders. Maimonides wollte bekanntlich Glaube und Wissen aussöhnen, die Offenbarung mit der Vernunft harmonisieren. Aristoteles war für diesen mittelalterlichen Kreis gewissermaßen die Vernunft, die Philosophie, die Wissenschaft. Judentum und Aristotelismus waren die gegebenen Gegensätze, daher auch die Notwendigkeit der Auseinandersetzung und der Versöhnungstendenz. Das trifft aber nicht für Krochmals historische Situation zu. Fehlte doch bei Krochmal der ganze mittelalterliche Rahmen, eine Komponente, die für das hier behandelte Problem von eminenter Bedeutung ist. Man könnte vielleicht manche isolierten Probleme oder Erscheinungen im Judentum mittels verschiedener philosophischer Systeme der neueren Zeit erklären oder deuten. Aber wie könnte man in der Neuzeit das Gesamtjudentum auf ein ganz extrem logisch-dialektisches System, wie es das Hegels ist, aufbauen, ohne das Judentum zu vergewaltigen? Zwar hat sich Krochmal innerlich sehr nahe verwandt mit Maimonides gefühlt, weist er doch stets auf diese Verwandtschaft hin.⁹⁶ Aber daraus ist nicht zu schließen, daß die genannte Parallelisierung, durch die Krochmals Hegelianismus betont werden soll, irgendwie gerechtfertigt ist.

Hingegen wäre die Gegenüberstellung der beiden Philosophen Maimonides und Krochmal an sich wohl am Platze, nur kann hier nicht darauf eingegangen werden. Andeutungsweise sei hier aber gesagt, daß Krochmal nicht nur im Prinzip

⁹⁵ Vgl. *N. K. s W.*, S. 202, 209 u. a.: „שכל כונתנו והנחתנו ... ולעשות שלום בין השכל ... ובין שתי התורות ... לצורך ולברר דברי אמונה ... בבחינה שבליט ...“

⁹⁶ *N. K. s W.*, S. 209 und in vielen anderen Stellen.

des Sittlichen über Maimonides⁹⁷ hinausgegangen ist, indem er das Prinzip der Aristotelischen „Mitte“ — μέσότης — ablehnte, sondern auch im Grundproblem des Judentums. Krochmal genügt es nicht zu beweisen, daß das Judentum mit der Vernunft identisch ist, es genügt ihm nicht, das Judentum auf der Basis der Vernunft zu fundieren, es muß auf der Grundlage der Wahrheit aufgebaut werden. Nicht auf der Basis einer abstrakt-metaphysischen Vernunft, sondern auf der Grundlage einer wirklichkeitsdurchdrungenen historisch-realen Wahrheit. Das Judentum muß nicht nur vernünftig sein, nicht nur der Vernunft entsprechen, sondern auch kritisch-wahr sein, d. h. mit den Kategorien des historisch-kritischen Denkens übereinstimmen. In dieser Richtung wäre dann Krochmals Eigenleistung zu suchen.

⁹⁷ Vgl. *Mishneh Torah, Sefer Hamada, Hilkot De'ot*, Berlin 1922, S. 22 ff.; siehe ebenfalls a. a. O., Note 157, S. 90 ff.

DIVINE HELP AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

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THAT the idea of divine help has been the very nerve and fiber of Judaism is a truth so palpable as to be a truism. For this reason, the considerations advanced in the present essay should justify its inclusion in a volume devoted to Jewish studies even though the treatment adopted may be psychological and sociological rather than philological. Quotations from Hebrew literature will be few and allusions to Jewish history will be scant. Yet where has the thought of divine help received more striking expression than in Hebrew literature and where have the experiences illustrative of divine help received more thrilling exemplification than in Jewish history?

Moreover, in an age and among a people with whom scientific advance and institutional changes have led to a discard of many ancestral convictions, it can hardly be a matter of indifference how far and in what sense, that divine help so copiously affirmed by the fathers can still be predicated intelligently and conscientiously.

Nor need the citation of non-Jewish writers call for any apology in a publication which would not hesitate to cite Wellhausen, Cheyne, Haupt, Stade, Nowack, Duhm or Marti in the Biblical field, Wuensche, Herford, Fiebig, Holzman, the elder Delitzsch, Baer or Billerbeck in the Talmudic field and Schürer, Hausrath, Ewald, Niese and Moore in the historical field.

The present study, as already indicated, belongs to the domain of psychology as readily as to that of sociology. The sociological analysis of our second part needs as its basis the psychological analysis of the first part. We shall take the affirmation of divine help as it is familiarly voiced and shall

first inquire: "Precisely what do the affirmants mean?" We shall discover that here, as so often elsewhere, the apparently simple is bewilderingly complex. The help of God means a diversity of things not only among different people and on different occasions but also within one and the same mind upon one and the same occasion. As the meanings of divine help vary, the sociological implications of those meanings vary; not the least important of these variations being the status of these several meanings as topics of controversy. Theological dispute, we shall find, concerns not all of the meanings but only some of them. Seemingly a proposition upon which theist and atheist hopelessly divide, "God helps" is in reality an intricate bundle of propositions some of which are challenged by the atheist and some of which are no more subject to difference of opinion than the proposition "Water freezing becomes ice" or "The sun is more luminous than the moon."

PART ONE

PSYCHOLOGICAL BEARINGS

I. THE NOUN "HELP"

Among the things referred to by affirmations of divine help are certain events or occurrences which are taken to be manifestations of such help—recovery from sickness, rain terminating a spell of drought, escape from danger, victory in war, enhancement of finances, acquisition of friends, the worsting of enemies, reconciliation with opponents, the abatement of mental turmoil, progress in ethical endeavor or whatever other happenings, physical or psychical, have prompted people to say, "God helped."

It must be noticed that the need involved is always one ranking exaltedly in a hierarchy of needs. The needs that figure in affirmations of divine help are never the trivial but always the important ones. No one ever says: "God helped me smoke that cigar," "God helped me tip my hat," "God helped me pass the dessert," "God helped me powder my nose." Yet, how promptly those absurd words would cease

to be absurd in the mouth of one long afflicted with paralysis and suddenly cured! The occasion has then ceased to be trivial and has become momentous.

We smile at the athlete who claims that God did help him or will help him to victory. Prof. Pratt, in one of his books on the psychology of religion, amuses the reader with the story of a woman who, on the morning of a day on which she was to give a reception, found herself with a disfiguring cold in the head but who, thanks to God's help, was well enough in the afternoon to make a good facial impression by the time the guests had assembled. The old Sunday School teacher who forgot to bring the large package of application blanks and had on hand only the 101 blanks contained in the smaller package and then ascribed it to providential dispensation that exactly 101 persons applied in the matter requiring the blanks, may seem queer to the sophisticated listener. Yet that listener himself needs only a situation which is to him as important as that registration was to the old Sunday School teacher and he will himself perhaps predicate divine help. It is said that *in extremis* even atheists sometimes "call upon the Lord."

This circumstance of need characterized by extraordinary urgency should account for the pronounced rôle played by the factor of unexpectedness in most affirmations of divine help. Not the expected recovery but the unexpected, not the expected financial assistance but the unexpected, not the expected vindication but the unexpected is likely to be attributed to divine help. "The Lord of heaven and earth, out of darkness, out of silence, by ways that thou understandest not, shall redeem thy soul" says the poet, Edward Carpenter, "to one in trouble." This may probably be accounted for by observing that the very lack of knowledge which occasions the need will also occasion the unexpectedness of the help.

Nor is help something purely negative. Most salutary experiences are an advance as well as a deliverance, an attainment of higher good as well as the restoration of a prior good. Out of misfortune comes wisdom. Financial reverses may spur to financial reorganisation not merely recovering

the loss but securing a stability not previously enjoyed. Sickness may prompt measures which not only cure but actually induce a level of health higher than that which preceded the sickness. A political upheaval may not only pass away but also pass *into* arrangements marking an improvement upon the earlier period of tranquility. Sociologists remind us of the stimulating rôle in social progress played by social crisis. One emerges from adversity not merely into one's former well-being but into a more estimable well-being. "They that came up through great tribulation stood nearest the throne of God." With characteristic unexpectedness, the very troubles calling for help can be part of the process of producing the help.

II. THE ADJECTIVE "DIVINE"

Among the affirmations of divine help, there may be discriminated at least three different senses in which the adjective "divine" is applied:

- (1) "Divine" refers to the alleged cause of the salutary events and means "supernatural."
- (2) "Divine" refers to the ideal which is advanced toward realization in the salutary turn of events and means "valuable, important, significant."
- (3) "Divine" refers to the psychological expedients employed to bring about the favorable turn of events—hope, prayer, aspiration, &c.—and means "religious."¹

It is generally assumed that, except among the intellectual *élite*, the first use of the adjective prevails exclusively. But is this assumption correct? What if scrutiny were to show that, on the whole, idealistic elements exceed the supernatural in the commonly prevalent God conceptions? There are many indications that, even with the "common" people, the word "God" means a supreme ideal or means that more extensively than it means a first cause or any kind of cause. The following

¹ That the divergent meanings of religion are legion will be overlooked at no point in this paper. Religion is not a thing but a history. The word will be used for any point in that changing continuum which reaches back to magic and totemism and forward to Emerson and Felix Adler.

are some of the facts that can be adduced to substantiate this view:

I.

First we must draw the distinction between the God of worship and the God of customary theology—a distinction which should impress even the casual observer. A loving Father is one thing; a First Cause is something much different. The theological God who contrives miracles is hardly the same as the saint's "Light Within." Contrast also the moods involved—in the one case, a God in Whom we trust; in the other, a God about Whom we debate: in the one case, a God "Whom alone we will serve in reverence"; in the other, a God of argument and disputation. Is it not precarious to apply to the one meaning of "God" reflections pertinent to the other?

Or contrast the hymn books of any church with its theological books and both with its prayer books which occupy a kind of way station between hymns and theology. In the hymn books, God is "Love Divine," "Sun of my soul," "Rock of Ages," "A Fortress strong," "A Banner high," "My Light and my Salvation," "The King of Love," &c. How different from a "First Cause," a "Great Hypothesis," an "Underlying Substance" or whatever else the theological phraseology may be?² Even the "Creator" of the hymn books can hardly be the same as the "Creator" of the theological books. In a context in which "Rock," "Banner," "Light," "Fortress," are obviously figurative, "Creator" can hardly be otherwise than figurative. The metaphorical character of hymnology alone forms a significant contrast to theology with its literalisms.

The usual non-theological sense of the word "God" is, in brief, what the philosophers call evaluative as contrasted with descriptive. It is a usage which serves not to communicate

² "The Scholastic philosophers describe the deity as 'Ens a se extra et supra omne genus, necessarium, unum infinite, perfectum, simplex, immutabile, immensum, eternum, intelligens.'"—Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, New York, 1926, p. 558. Durant adds waggishly, "This is magnificent; what deity would not be proud of such a definition?" The Scholastics, like many who preceded and many who followed them were unconscious of the fact that their language was evaluative and consequently fraught with bearings different from those of language that is descriptive.

something but to indicate something in the user's state of mind. As such, the word refers not to a thing but to the excellence of things, the blessedness of things, the ideal embodied or approached in things rather than the source or cause of things.³

2.

Historically, the gods have always been invented and invoked for what they could supposedly do. In situations involving the gods, various types of important, tangible benefits such as crops, health, herds, victories have been the vital concern. People never invent *faineant* gods.⁴ The gods themselves are less important than these ulterior values with which they are associated. The gods, regarded as causal factors, amount to certain hypotheses touching the ceremonial means of securing these values.

We can even admit a certain effectiveness in these ceremonial expedients: not, to be sure, the physical effectiveness ascribed to them but a psychological effectiveness which, though unintended and unnamed, may have been sufficiently pronounced to buttress the belief in physical effectiveness. There are modern parallels to this phenomenon. Thus a familiar hymn has the words:

³ The distinction receives extensive treatment in Royce, *The World and the Individual*, and more recently in Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (London, 1925). On the one hand there is, according to Ogden and Richards, "the use of words to express or excite feelings or attitudes" and, on the other, the use of words for purposes of statement, that is, "the recording, the support, the organisation and the communication of references" (p. 257). The terms "symbolic" and "emotive" employed by Ogden and Richards are, though marking essentially the same contrast, not so well suited to the present discussion as the older expressions "descriptive" and "evaluative." Emotiveness is, after all, not something peculiar to words but is also characteristic of non-verbal situations. "Symbolic" is especially inept because of its customary use for the very opposite of what Ogden and Richards mean by "symbolic." Issue is taken, however, only with the nomenclature of Ogden and Richards. Their discussion elucidates the distinction involved most adequately.

⁴ The gods of Epicureanism, non-participant in human affairs, represent not an invention but a criticism. Epicureanism is a philosophy challenging the popular religion whose gods were originally and persistently concerned with the affairs of men.

"I love to tell the story
Because I know it's true;
It satisfies my longings
As nothing else will do."

That the longings are satisfied by the story, there is no occasion to deny. The error lies, of course, in the use for non-emotional, i. e. for historical purposes of a story whose effectiveness is purely of the psychological type. Similarly, in primitive times, the psychological effectiveness of various rituals and beliefs may long have blinded their devotees to their ineffectiveness on the physical plane.

Anthropologists tell us that men once worshipped their ancestors, sometimes in the guise of totem animals. Some worshipped stones; some the luminaries. Crude as these beliefs may have been, they are not devoid of a certain selective aspect. Ancestors, stones and luminaries could never have been chosen as objects of worship had they been entirely without an emotional appeal, an appeal which, in its turn, must have emanated from certain actual benefits or injuries associated with ancestors, stones and luminaries.

Thus, even in primitive times, the essence of divinity must have been less a matter of causation than a matter of value, importance, significance, in a word, a matter of relation to some momentous good.

The same point of emphasis is betrayed in the familiar modern arguments about the moral and civic interests at stake in the maintenance of religion. These arguments, whether valid or not, also stress effects rather than causes—effects regarded as fraught with a high degree of value, importance, urgency.⁵

⁵ "The idea that man needs salvation depends, in fact, upon two simple ideas whereof the main idea is constituted. The first is the idea that there is some end or aim of human life which is more important than all other aims, so that by comparison with this aim, all else is secondary and subsidiary; and perhaps relatively unimportant, or even vain and empty. The other idea is this: that man as he now is, or as he naturally is, is in great danger of so missing this highest aim as to render his whole life a senseless failure by virtue of this coming short of his true goal."—Josiah Royce, *Sources of Religious Insight*,

Would we then be entirely wrong in asserting that the phraseology about a supernatural cause is largely a matter of faulty expression? Are not instances extremely common in which a person, meaning one thing, says something else owing to an imperfect comprehension of his own mental bearings?

We may, in this connection, well take admonition from a notable recent work on the subject of meaning from which the following passages may be culled:

"In all discussion we shall find that what is said is only in part determined by the things to which the speaker is referring. Often without a clear consciousness of the fact people have preoccupations which determine their use of words. Unless we are aware of their purposes and interests at the moment we shall not know what they are talking about."⁶

"We only know for certain what is said when we know why it is said."⁷

"The meaning of A is that to which the mental process interpreting A is adapted. This is the most important sense in which words have meaning."⁸

3.

Closely relevant here is what has already been noted about a hierarchy of needs which corresponds to a hierarchy of values. How extensively religion discriminates between the sacred and the profane, the more important and the less important, the higher and the lower! Religion does not, like every day life, content itself with saying that one thing is better than another. It goes beyond this and says that one set

New York, 1912. "It is no new thing to say that what men call religion is, at its focal points, a reaction, solemn or joyous, in which the individual or the group concentrates attention upon something so important that it is, for the consciousness of the moment, life itself." George Albert Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago, 1916, p. 69. Also pages 70 and 89 on religion as importance.

⁶ Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 193 foot note.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

of interests or one set of tastes is better than another.⁹ Such comparisons plainly invoke or come nearer than every day life to invoking an ideal which is ulterior to all other ideals—a supreme ideal, as we must say for want of any better terminology.¹⁰

4.

The tendency of religion to become spiritualized or, as President Hall says, "inwardized" fully accords with this interpretation. In religious contexts, the word "spiritual" is, like the word "God," an evaluative term. Spiritual good, the good of the soul, &c. with which God gets to be identified is only another way of saying the highest good, the superlative satisfaction, the ampler embodiment of the supreme ideal. We shall be misled if we take the word "spiritual" in the sense of "mental" or "emotional." Give the word that sense and all satisfaction becomes spiritual. The satisfactions that issue from the most degrading indulgences would then be spiritual: all satisfactions involve "mind" and emotions. "Spiritual" in the religious sense is not the opposite of material but the opposite of inferior, less satisfying, less acceptable, less approximate to the supreme ideal.¹¹

⁹ Prof. Coe reminds us that "human desires come thus to include the desire to have desires," *op. cit.*, p. 67, and that "purposes, as contrasted with impulses, and the increasing organisation of life through ideas are achievements. They require redirection of old desires," p. 221.

¹⁰ The inadequacy lies in the fact that the language of our discussion is descriptive while that to which reference is made is something emotive—something of a nature that requires evaluative language and that finds its consummate expression not in language at all but in art and in conduct.

¹¹ The use of a generic term for eulogistic purposes is a common linguistic phenomenon. "Social" which means descriptively any relation between human beings, gets to mean evaluatively the desirable or satisfactory relations. "Christian" which means primarily the adherent of a certain creed is, often to the irritation of non-Christians, used to designate the exemplary type among those adherents.

"Nature might stand up

And say to all the world *This was a man!*" (*Julius Caesar* V, 5)

The word "man" in this context obviously does not signify merely an adult human male but an excellent specimen of that genus. Similarly the word "spiritual" which, in some connections, means the emotions and volitions or even the cognitions comes, in religious contexts, to mean the highest type of such manifestations.

The notable literary outbursts of spirituality will sustain these conclusions:

With Thee is the fountain of life,
In Thy light shall we see light.
As the hart panteth after the water brooks,
So panteth my soul after Thee, O God.
My good is not beyond Thee.
Whom have I in heaven but Thee?
And beside Thee I desire none upon earth.
My soul longeth for God, for the living God.
The Lord is my light and my salvation.
My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God.
O that I knew where I might find Him!
Seek ye the Lord while He may be found.
Thy love it is my heart desires...
Thou art all my soul's delight.
Thou hast made us for Thee, O Lord, and restless
is our heart until it find its rest in Thee.

One would have to be blinded by the prepossession that "God" never means anything except a supernatural cause in order to miss seeing in passages such as these the predominance of the idealistic over the causal-supernaturalistic implications of deity. God ceases here to be the alleged means toward an end and becomes Himself the end. God is no longer the supernatural origin but the idealistic goal. Similar utterances are countless in the literature of religion, particularly, as already noted, in the hymns and prayers. Here again we see the error of the assumption that people are always successful in formulating the contents of their own minds and that when they assert that their God is a cause, they necessarily mean what they say or mean it exclusively. We might profit by imitating the physicians who regard it almost as matter of course that a patient's ailment is not located where the patient thinks it is.

5.

Yet another specimen of religious phraseology will go to strengthen our conclusion. This is the use of the adjective "personal" as connected with the deity. A purely causal deity might as well be impersonal. Nothing is so typical of the mechanical i. e. the impersonal as the cause-effect relation.

However, the word "personal" has a number of meanings. One meaning is "corporeal"—having a body like a man or like a totem animal. This, unquestionably, is the sense in which the deity has at times been understood to be personal.

Yet "personal" does not always mean "corporeal." Of this, we are reminded by an eminent sociologist. Says Prof. Cooley:

"Facial expression, tone of voice, and the like, the sensible nucleus of personal and social ideas, serve as the handle, so to speak, of such ideas, the principal substance of which is drawn from the region of inner imagination and sentiment. The personality of a friend as it lives in my mind and forms there a part of the society in which I live, is simply a group or system of thoughts associated with the symbols that stand for him... And his presence does not consist in the pressure of his flesh upon a neighboring chair, but in the thought clustering about some symbol of him, whether the latter be his tangible presence or something else."¹²

The historical tendency of religion has been, while retaining divine personality, to repudiate divine corporeality. "Personal" has come to mean "manlike" in an ethical and not in a physical sense. God, while not having hands, feet and eyes, does presumably have love, justice and mercy,—be it observed, evaluative terms, all of them.

¹² Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), p. 81. At a later point in this same volume (p. 281) occurs this reflection: "The ideal persons of religion are not fundamentally different psychologically or sociologically, from other persons... The fact that they have attached to them no visible or tangible material body, similar to that of other persons, is indeed an important fact, but rather from the psychological point of view; mentally and socially regarded it is of one sort with other personal ideas, no less a verifiable fact, and no more or less inscrutable."

Still does not even such a conception preclude identification of deity with supreme value? Is not such a deity likewise a causal instrument rather than the ideal finality?

The reply is: Not necessarily and not altogether. People can *mean* supreme value even though they say: "just, loving, merciful God." It is extremely common for two closely related things to appear as merged into one—like the sight of both eyes, the colors of a composite, the taste of a mixture, the vibrations forming one sound.¹³ Analogously, the supreme ideal becomes fused with the paramount way of realizing that ideal. The ideal may not literally possess the qualities love, justice and mercy. But the path toward the ideal lies through the human relations exemplifying love, justice and mercy.¹⁴ Phrasing it otherwise: God is related to certain human qualities—related, however, not as object to attribute but as end to means. Popular theologizing can not but confuse the two relations. And yet, while language may allude to the inapplicable relation, devoutness utilises the real one; just as people may digest their food perfectly though their theories regarding digestion may be entirely unscientific.

Language is, after all, not man's only way of responding to his environment.¹⁵ "The flower is red," we say. We mean that the light emanating from the flower is red. "I hear the bell," we say. What we do hear is the air vibrations proceeding from the bell. "I see the sun." We do not see the sun but the aura surrounding the sun. "The sun is setting." No, it is the earth that is rotating. "The picture is on the screen." The picture is really in the stereopticon. Countless instances can illustrate how our meaning may be correct even though our wording be incorrect. That is why the meanings of words must be sought not in the words themselves but

¹³ To the same class of phenomena belong the various "complexes" and constellations of associations: loving the flag because loving the country symbolized by the flag, hating a dogma because hating the person who espouses the dogma, fearing a horse because fearing the parent associated with the horse, &c.

¹⁴ This point will concern us extensively in the second part of this paper.

¹⁵ Perhaps the latest word on this subject is by John B. Watson in *Behaviorism* (New York, 1925), especially pages 130, 131, 213.

in the total reaction accompanying the words. Again let us recall Ogden and Richards:

"A symbol refers... not necessarily to what it... is intended by the user to refer to." "In all discussion we shall find that what is said is only in part determined by the things to which the speaker is referring. Often without a clear consciousness of the fact people have preoccupations which determine their use of words. Unless we are aware of their purposes and interests at the moment, we shall not know what they are talking about." "We only know for certain what is said when we know why it is said." "The meaning of A is that to which the mental process interpreting A is adapted. This is the most important sense in which words have meaning."¹⁶

An endeavor to make language conform more exactly to the reality can be discerned in the tendency of theological affirmations to substitute abstract nouns for adjectives. "God is love," "God is truth," "God is justice," are modes of expression which come somewhat nearer to saying that God is *the value realized when human interactions exemplify* love, truth or justice. So closely intertwined are the human interactions on the one hand and the superlative value on the other that they inevitably appear to coalesce.

Nor have we yet exhausted the meanings of the word "personal." We have considered its descriptive applications. But, like "God," "spiritual" and much other religious usage, the word has also its evaluative sense. Personal can mean "significant," "impressive," "important." Human beings do not become persons (in this sense) until they become significant. A human being may have a body and still lack personality. Human beings are persons in so far as they are the embodiment of some ideal. The supreme person is the surpreme ideal and human beings are persons in so far as they partake of the supreme ideal. God, we might say, is not a person (in the

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pages 201, 229, 193 foot note, 325 respectively.

sense of exalted value) because He resembles men but men are persons because they resemble God.

Personality is somehow related to the Kantian ends in themselves. Kant, it will be recalled, would have us treat our fellow men not as mere means but as ends. The supreme ideal is necessarily such an end in itself. A cause is a means toward an end. In short, the prepossession among theists for the personality of God adds to the indications that supreme ideal rather than supreme cause is the real even if imperfectly articulated meaning.

6.

The very controversies on this point between science and theology prove that a cause can not be all that people mean when a divine cause is what they profess to mean. If the sole purpose of affirming God were to account causally for phenomena, why the protracted quarreling with science when science comes with its manifestly superior account of causation? If causes are the object of search, why not an invariable welcome for the improved methods of the scientific men? The fact is that we have here again what the psychoanalysts call a "displacement." People say "cause" when they mean or partly mean that value which chances to be associated with and consequently confused with cause. The confusion results from a tendency described by Prof. Dewey:

"From the standpoint of control and utilization, the tendency to assign superior reality to causes is explicable. A 'cause' is not merely an antecedent; it is that antecedent which if manipulated regulates the occurrence of the consequent. That is why the sun rather than night is the causal condition of the day. Knowing that consequences will take care of themselves if conditions can be had and managed, an ineradicable natural pragmatism indulges in a cheap and short conversion, and conceives the cause as intrinsically more primary and necessary. This practical tendency is increased by the fact that time is a softener and dignifier; present troubles lose their acuteness when they

are no longer present. Old times are proverbially the good old times, and history begins with a Garden of Paradise or a Golden Age. Good, being congenial, is held to be normal; and what is suffered is a deviation, creating the problem of evil. Thus the earlier gets moral dignity as well as practical superiority."

Elsewhere, Dewey speaks of "the common philosophic fallacy of converting an eventual function into an antecedent force or cause."¹⁷

7.

The identical characteristic of the God idea is manifest also in the various other attempts to defend theism such as that of harmonizing the old beliefs with modern science or, as in the instance of this paper, that of unreservedly accepting the positions and the consequences of science, definitely abandoning supernaturalism, and identifying theism with that idealism to which science and art as well as religion jointly subscribe. Why do we trouble to talk about God at all? And why are people so easily satisfied with fragile and inconclusive arguments in this connection? Why their toleration of glaring inconsistencies? Why their naïve addiction to flimsy rationalizations? How, in short, account for the persistent desire to conserve theism, if theism is nothing but a superannuated theory of causation? The truth is that not the supernatural causation which science has invalidated but an idealism the renunciation of which would be a bewildering self contradiction is the real point involved. As the invisible part of an iceberg greatly exceeds the visible part, so are the inarticulate idealistic meanings of "God," more than the articulate causal ones.

8.

Our contention gains further strength when we look into the validity of the claim that people "believe" in God. "Believe" can mean:

¹⁷ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 109. *Ibid.*, p. 308. Also Felix Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*, which speaks of "the superstition of causality." "The prejudice of causality is probably ineradicable, just as the illusion that the sun revolves around the earth persists" (p. 141).

- a) Affirming the existence of something.
- b) Affirming one's approval of or loyalty to something.

An example of the first sense is: "Some astronomers believe in the canals on Mars." An example of the second is: "I believe in the policies of Mr. Coolidge." In the Old Testament and perhaps largely in the New, "believe" carries the second sense, while current theology both professional and amateur takes the word in its first sense.

Now, it is precisely to the most devout that God is conspicuously other than an object of belief in the first sense. Belief, in this sense, implies less than absolute certainty. As James showed in his famous essay, it involves the taking of chances. It embraces the possibility of disbelief on the part of others and eventually on the part of the believer himself. It is the acceptance of a conclusion on less than clinching evidence. It is the adoption of a hypothesis which, like any hypothesis, is subject to supercession by a better one.

But when people commit themselves to "The Rock of Ages," "The Everlasting Arms," "The Eternal Refuge" can they mean anything so uncertain? Certainty is the very essence of their attitude. For religious fervor, the alternative to certainty is atheism; *tertium non datur*. Something absolutely certain must be found to which to attach the word "God" or the word must remain unattached. People no longer worship ancestors, stones and planets because these objects do not satisfy the needs that a God is expected to satisfy. Anything uncertain, hypothetical, debatable, similarly can not satisfy the needs of those who need a "Rock That is high." People may rightly use the word "believe" in their less religious moments when nothing of consequence is at stake. But, in times of tremendous earnestness, the word can only carry the Biblical significance of loyalty, steadfastness, approval. How inept, at such times, is "believing" with the import of "favoring a certain hypothesis"!

And there is an absolute certainty. The very need of distinguishing between certain and uncertain, true and false, satisfactory and objectionable can be denied only at the cost of denying that one is denying. *That need is the irrefragible*

certainty.¹⁸ That need presupposes a criterion (though not necessarily a clearly articulated criterion), a supreme ideal, a *summum bonum*, an ultimate reference hovering over all trends, judgments and discriminations. Men may have infused many meanings into the word "God." The supreme ideal is surely one of those meanings—a meaning which can exist even if dimly and confusedly, in minds hospitable to other and incompatible meanings. That supreme ideal, the goal of all longing and striving, approximation to which constitutes goodness, truth and beauty, recession from which constitutes evil, falsehood and ugliness; that ideal which is itself not a cause but in our advance toward which we are obliged to study and utilise causation; which is not a matter of belief but toward which all believing and disbelieving are alike a groping; which is neither subjective nor objective but the occasion for the entire discrimination between subjective and objective; which is the incentive and direction of science no less than of religion—that supreme ideal is one of the meanings in fact one of the most vital meanings of the "common man's" God.

9.

Finally we should notice that, as soon as the word "God" becomes divested of its idealistic implications, the result is atheism. An atheist is merely a person for whom the word "God" has lost or has never acquired any idealistic implications. The modern atheist usually associates the word with anti-scientific world views or with distasteful ecclesiastical or economic policies. The purely supernatural (and consequently non-existent) God is thus an atheistic rather than a theistic concept. The God of the theist is supernatural only incidentally and by misinterpretation. Essentially the God of the theist is not a supernatural cause but a supreme ideal.

The question often arises regarding the permissibility of using the word "God" to mean "supreme ideal," considering

¹⁸ "Values are values, things having certain intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are."—Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

the fact that people do use the word in the causal supernaturalistic sense. In rejoinder it must be borne in mind that the problem of what constitutes the "right" to use a given word in a given way is by no means simple. Words have arisen and their meanings have multiplied because people have thus desired. Why then should not the mere desire to use a given word for a given object constitute the "right" to such usage? Why should desire which is right in the one case be wrong in the other?

Desires, be it remembered, are not spontaneously generated. There must be something in the old meaning of a word which begets the desire to extend the word's application. Ogden and Richards surmise that it may depend upon emotive qualities.¹⁹ The "right" of an object to be called by a certain name may well be grounded upon the sheer ability of the object to get itself called by that name.

It may be argued that, inasmuch as the word "God" has so frequently meant a supernatural cause, misunderstanding may arise if a different sense is intended. But the danger of being misunderstood is one against which it is necessary to be on guard no matter what the word used or what the subject discussed. Precautions against misunderstanding are imperative always. In gatherings such as those for prayer and inspiration where the word "God" rarely possesses other than its evaluative sense, what peril can there be in employing its evaluative sense? On the other hand, in theological discussions, where the causative sense is likely to prevail, the evaluative use of the term may need express asseveration.

To abandon the term entirely is to be deprived of the finest evaluative expedient that language possesses. The word serves to identify the aspirations of all the myriads living and dead who have used it. And the identification of aspiration, as we shall notice later, is an extraordinary social device for strengthening aspiration. The word should, of course, be abandoned when addressing people for whom it has lost its favorable connotation. In the presence of the atheist, the word had best be omitted except under circumstances per-

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

mitting the elucidation of its evaluative import and favoring the conciliation of atheistic or agnostic idealism with that of the theist.

When, therefore, people affirm divine help, the adjective "divine" does not necessarily or exclusively designate the source of the help. It indicates rather the significance, the importance, the value of the help; in short, the relation both of the need for the help and of the help itself to a supreme ideal.²⁰

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPEDIENTS

The additional sense in which help can be divine is something entirely psychological. As stated above: "Divine" refers to the psychological expedients employed to bring about the favorable turn of events—hope, prayer, aspiration, &c.²¹

Art, science and every day life are, no less than religion, an outreaching for a goal, an attempt to win satisfactions by winning higher satisfactions. The unique thing about religion is its aptitude for being explicit about the ultimate goal. Art, science and every day life presuppose the supreme ideal but content themselves with presupposing. Religion goes beyond this inarticulate presupposing. Religion is, in some unique way, concerned with the goal itself. The benefit of religion is the benefit inherent in the fact that the consciousness of the ultimate aim will enhance the pursuit of that aim. We go better when we know whither we are going. We seek better when we know what we are seeking. In biological evolution, intelligence has supervened upon automatism because intelligence which implies activity with an end in view surmounts difficulties to which automatism succumbs. Similarly, to realize that it is a supreme ideal that

²⁰ Prof. Adler and his associates of the Ethical Culture Movement have a predilection for the adjective "divine" though shying at the affirmative use of the noun "God." This may be due to the fact that the more reserved use of the bisyllabic Latin adjective makes it less suggestive of the causal supernatural than the more commonly employed Anglo-Saxon monosyllabic noun.

²¹ *Supra* page 586.

we are striving after will predispose us to side-step many an obstacle.

But this conscious or almost conscious reference to an ultimate goal, while the distinctive feature of religion, is not its only feature. Religion has many additional expedients, among them a rich repertoire of imagery. Religion familiarly lays under contribution the resources of the various arts—music, drama (including ritual), pictorial and plastic representations, architecture, as well as poetry, fiction and mythology. Religion also has its wealth of impressive phraseology, “Heavenly Father,” “Rock of Ages,” “King of Kings,” “Everlasting Light” and the like, the power of which lies in the capacity of imagery to influence the emotions and the will.

By imagery is meant those elements of experience which are detached from the rigid time-space order which we call the outer or objective world. It is made up largely of memories, among them the so-called unconscious memories of Psychoanalysis, these memories possessing an unlimited fluidity, being amenable to any number and kind of displacements going on “inside the head.”²²

Now images are instruments precisely like knives, drugs, locomotives and electric currents. Like any instrument they are good or bad according to the purpose for which they are used and according to their suitability for that purpose. Many images are serviceable for handling the so-called outer world, those experiences belonging to the objective time-space order. The various formulae of the sciences belong to this class of images—the earth that is round, the electric current which requires a closed circuit, the stress to be borne by a

²² By this admittedly crude definition of imagery, no prejudice is intended against Behaviorism or any other school of Psychology which may employ different interpretative language. We may as readily say “verbal conditioning” or “retinal stimulation” (Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 213). The phenomenon itself is under consideration: the interpretative positions respectively adopted by the several schools of Psychology will not effect our conclusions. Indeed a better word than “imagery” appears to be needed. The salient thing is not the image but certain forms of mentation to which the image is but accessory. The point is treated in Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 148–151, 157, 328.

bridge not yet built, the organs of some paleolithic monster—all of these are uses of imagery by which external events are to be controlled. Then there is a class of imagery which is impotent for the control of external events but highly effective for the control of the emotions and volitions—for visceral rather than manual responses, if the Behaviorist so prefers.²³ Art derives its material from imagery of this type.

Falsehood results when imagery which is suitable for affective-volitional control is used as though it were also suitable for external control. Myth used as though it were history and fancy used as though it were fact give results much akin to those that might be expected if a lily were used as though it were a furnace or a jewel as though it were a shovel. Bosanquet has put it: "Everything is Real so long as we do not take it for what it is not." A myth is never false so long as it is taken as a myth and not mistaken for history. Drama is not false so long as it is understood to be drama but becomes hopelessly deceptive for the child visiting the theater for the first time and confusing dramatic incident with life off stage.

The imagery of religion can not possibly be false as long as it fulfills its function of affective-volitional control.²⁴ The moment the same imagery gets to be used for other purposes, the result is all of the theological missteps over which atheism gloats and on which scepticism thrives.

Much religious imagery has the distinction of having consistently escaped misuse. "Rock of Ages" has not, since the days of stone worship, given rise to the supposition that the deity is a lapidary specimen nor has "The Lord is my shepherd" misled any one into insisting that the deity is a cattle breeder. Less fortunate has been the phrase "Heavenly Father." In Christianity, at least, it has created the burdensome need of defending the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. The affective-volitional benefits of the word "Creator" have been obtained perhaps at the greatest cost of all. The use of

²³ Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

²⁴ "So far as words are used emotively, no question as to their truth in the strict sense can directly arise." Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

the word "Creator" for other than affective-volitional purposes has saddled the ages with the task of "reconciling" science and Genesis or of combatting science in the interests of Genesis.

Some writers, particularly of the psychoanalytic schools, have a way of stressing the father image as though it were the sole specimen in the repertoire of religion.²⁵ The rock image descending from the days of stone worship, the light image from the days of sun worship, the shepherd image from the days of pastoral life, the king image from the days of monarch worship are perhaps no less affective for stirring the emotions than the father image surviving from the days of ancestor worship.

Yet this oversight is trivial compared with another. There should be no overlooking the fact that imagery by itself does not constitute religion. Art also and even psychoneuroses revel in imagery. The vital thing about religious imagery is that it is *religious*. It is imagery used for a unique purpose, the purpose namely of creating situations which are judged to embody the utmost value. Even when harmfully or ineffectively applied, the imagery of religion is applied with the intent of infusing into life the presence of the supreme ideal.

This then is the sense in which God is a Heavenly Father: the father image can be used for creating affective-volitional states which are highly conformable to ultimate ideals.

Some psychologists regard the father image as nothing but a device for awakening certain infantile attitudes of trust

²⁵ Sigmund Freud, *Leonardo da Vinci*, Translated by A. A. Brill, New York, 1916, p. 57; C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, Translated by Beatrice M. Hinkle, New York, 1916, p. 254; Georges Berguer, *Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus*, New York, 1923, pp. 40, 247; Johann Kinkel, "The Problem of the Psychological Foundation of the Origin of Religion," *Imago*, Vol. 8, No. 1; Everett Dean Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*, New York, 1924, p. 127; Cavendish Moxon, "Religion in the Light of Psychoanalysis," *Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1; Pierre Bovet, *Le Sentiment Religieux et la Psychologie de l'Enfant*, p. 25; Chas. Baudouin, *Studies in Psychoanalysis*, Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, London, 1922, p. 420; Ernest Jones, *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis*, London, 1923, p. 426.

and of freedom from care—attitudes persisting into adult life but none the less infantile. But is this all that there is to the father image? Why only infantile tendencies? Why not also parental? “Heavenly Father” calls to mind not only the trust which we, as infants, felt toward our parents but also the trust which we, as parents, awaken in our children. And, not only that. Into the web of association, why may not affection for all childhood enter and, still farther expanding, why may not all altruistic sentiments have a part in the father complex, sometimes fainter, sometimes stronger? Everything reported by Kropotkin and by Nasmyth²⁶ on the subject of mutual aid—habits, sentiments, traditions, customs of mutual aid—may, by a familiar psychological process, share in the father image.

The psychoanalytic writers have also much to say about the rôle of sex in religion. Speaking psychoanalytically, this can only mean that certain associations or complexes of associations having to do with the procreative process are identical with certain ones that appear in the religious. Or, speaking behavioristically, we would have to say that procreation and religion have certain neural reflexes or combinations of reflexes in common.

Points of identity, however, do not exclude points of difference. Roses contain nitrogen: refuse also contains nitrogen. Yet it hardly follows that roses and refuse are the same thing. The most crucial difference in the world is that of purpose or function. Religion, at least in its more attractive registers, uses sex associations as it does everything else, for the purpose of realizing the supreme good. Religion quotes: “I have loved thee with an everlasting love,” “Thy love it is my heart desires,” “Let me to Thy bosom fly.”²⁷ Shall we say that there is no difference between these attitudes and those of libertinism? All the distance from zenith to nadir lies between sex responses functioning toward one end and sex responses tending toward another.

²⁶ Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid as a Factor in Evolution*; George Nasmyth, *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory*, New York, 1916.

²⁷ A striking passage in Sutta 54a asserts that divine love is like sexual love.

God is then a helper in the sense that the thought of God with its attendant imagery has the effect of dispelling undesirable states of mind and substituting desirable ones.

The world must have known long before the advent of Psychoanalysis what a compelling rôle memory plays in human life. Most, perhaps all of our emotions are due less to the prevailing situation than to the memories aroused by that situation—often unconscious memories as the psychoanalyst would say (unverbalized responses as the behaviorist prefers to say).²⁸ Not our present predicaments but our memories are the chief object of our hostilities and fears. Our failure to notice this belongs to life's dominant illusions. The bigot, for instance, who directs his shafts at new ideas has his quarrel in reality not with the new ideas but with certain earlier experiences, possibly forgotten childhood experiences, which those new ideas resuscitate. The cardinal task of religion is to substitute solacing and edifying memories for torturing and degrading ones.

Even hope, though it refers to the future, achieves in the present by utilizing the past. *Now, this very moment*, I possess the desirable state of mind owing to the mental suggestions which my hopes afford. But what is mental suggestion if not a process based on memory? Gratifying experiences of the past are imaginatively revived wherever hope can be said to function. Before condemning the otherworldliness of some religions, it may be well to inquire how far the otherworld imagery is indispensable as a device for crowding out foul memories and substituting fair ones.

PART TWO

SOCIOLOGICAL BEARINGS

Having analysed the meaning of the affirmations regarding divine help, we proceed now to consider the social factors which those several elements of meaning involve.

²⁸ Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 130, 190, 205.

We shall let an outstanding sociologist provide us with this definition of the word "social": "of or pertaining to a group of individuals who carry on a common life by means of mental interaction."²⁹ The question then before us is: What actions of human beings upon one another can we find displayed in those situations to which people refer when they affirm divine help?

Since we have thus far considered divine help affirmations from the standpoint of needs, causes, gradations of value, and expedients, let us observe a parallel procedure now that we are probing into the related social interactions.

I. NEEDS

The needs which are the occasion for the help receiving the appraisal "divine" can be social in at least five different ways:³⁰

(1) Many if not most human troubles consist of unhappy relations between human persons. Poverty, oppression, war, strife, humiliation, neglect, contempt, envy, physical or financial injury, tyranny, insults, lawlessness—the entire gamut of woes which men inflict upon one another and which led Schopenhauer to exclaim, "*Homo homini lupus*," belong to this category. How inveterately all utopian literature assumes that when social maladjustments will have ceased, all maladjustments will have ceased! Then "will the threshing reach unto the vintage and the vintage unto the sowing,"³¹ then "the earth shall answer the grain and the new wine

²⁹ Charles Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, foot note p. 7. For this reference I am indebted to my friend, Prof. Eubank of the University of Cincinnati.

³⁰ Prof. Eubank advises reference to the "four wishes" of W. I. Thomas, *The Persistence of Primary Group Norms in Present Day Society*. These wishes are (1) Security, (2) New Experience, (3) Recognition, (4) Response. Prof. Eubank points out that my numbers 2 and 3 belong by "sympathetic identification" to the desire for security and that my number 4 is essentially a desire for response and number 5 a form of the desire for recognition. Prof. Eubank farther suggests comparison with the "sixfold interest" of Albion W. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 425 ff. These interests are: (1) Health, (2) Wealth, (3) Knowledge, (4) Beauty, (5) Sociability, (6) Righteousness.

³¹ Leviticus 26. 5.

and the oil.”³² Utopias are strikingly free of droughts, storms, floods, infections—all bold psychological testimony to the dominance of social troubles in the catalogue of human miseries.

(2) Needs may furthermore be social in the sense that human beings, by sympathetic identification, partake of one another's sorrows. The illness of a dear one can be a greater tribulation than our own, the knowledge of another's anguish more poignant than our own. This appropriation of others' reverses attains its maximum within the family circle yet readily spreads beyond the family into the broader domains of neighborhood, community, nation and the world. The sinking of the Titanic, the burning of the Iroquois theater, the earthquake in Japan, the famines in China and Russia can harrow the souls of millions who will never look upon the slightest physical vestige of those disasters. From every human calamity the suffering, transmuted into the type called mental, radiates over vast areas. This obviously is a sense in which some of our acutest needs are social.

(3) Likewise social are those needs which we commonly designate as moral—the struggle with the surge of primitive impulse, otherwise called “the battle with temptation,” the travail, often futile, to carry out in conduct the requirements of accepted moral standards. In so far as moral standards are matters of social inculcation and utility, these needs also must be listed as social. It should be added that not only our own moral success but also that of others can be with us a matter of ardent concern.

(4) Furthermore, companionship has its place in the list of human needs. Loneliness can be a dire scourge. Protracted periods of solitary confinement are said to have had insanity as their result.

(5) Account must finally be taken of Prof. Cooley's reflection: “In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self . . . appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the

³² Hosea 1. 24.

attitude toward this attributed to that other mind.”³³ The good opinion of others, crudely stated, is thus among our needs. Real or supposed lack of that good opinion can be agony. The battlefield is not the only place where death is preferred to social disparagement.

Any or all of these needs can acquire transcendent importance and their satisfaction become a matter of such extraordinary value as to evoke the characterization “divine.”

II. CAUSES

The causative factors in a vast amount of help which is momentous enough to be regarded as divine are other human beings. “*Nihil homini homine utilior*” says Spinoza. Help which is divine as to its importance can thus be social as to its cause. We have already noticed the psychological “displacement” which precipitates the impression that the cause is divine.

We can not maintain, of course, that *all* important help is socially caused. Biological, meteorological and psychological factors falling outside of the social domain are constantly operative in the healing of sickness, the saving of crops, and the relief of depression. Still, the rôle played by human beings in most instances of human deliverance is enormous. Very often, biological, meteorological and psychological factors are socially supplemented. The physician and the weather prognosticator, the agricultural consultant, the engineer, the experimenter, the psychiatrist, even the artist, without whose direction we might have missed finding sunsets and landscapes glorious, represent social augmentations of extra-social boons. In the last analysis, our very bodies, with their organs of sense and sensibility responsive to nature’s blights and blessings, are social products.

Where the needs are of the five social types listed above, the help must necessarily be social. On social predicaments, how can any but social agents operate, whatever may be the indirect effect of such non-social factors as floods, storms,

³³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 151, 152. Also the discussion of the Social Self by William James in *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1899, Vol. I, pp. 293-296.

crops, fire, droughts, rain, sunshine, landscapes and sunsets in the production of human amenities, enmities and conciliations.

Everything which falls within the domain of mutual aid, so notably celebrated by Kropotkin and Nasmyth, applies in this connection. Three types of mutual aid require discrimination:

- (1) Aid against the hostile forces of nature outside of human life.
- (2) Aid against hostile human beings.
- (3) Spiritual aid.

(1) The volumes of Kropotkin and Nasmyth deal largely with the aid of the first type. Men rush to one another's rescue from hunger, flood, fire, wild beasts, exposure and disease—not only men but infra-human forms of animal life down to the tiniest insect.

(2) No less important for our purpose is the second type of mutual aid where men rescue men from men. This phenomenon must be invoked to explain some outstanding specimens of religious parlance such as the assertions which put God, the helper, on one side and man, the foe, on the other.

“If it had not been the Lord Who was on our side,
When men rose up against us;
Then they had swallowed us up alive,
When their wrath was kindled against us.”³⁴

“They compassed me about; yea, they compassed me about:
In the name of the Lord I will cut them off.”³⁵

Yet, even here our thesis holds that the divinity really meant lies not in the cause but in the value of the help and that the cause of the help, even in the face of formidable human hostility, is still something human.

It was, after all, not “men” that “rose up against me” but a restricted group of men—the group to which I do not

³⁴ Psalm 124. 2, 3.

³⁵ Psalm 118. 11.

belong arrayed against the group to which I do belong. Exegetically, of course, the "me" in the Biblical passages quoted happens to be the group, that is, the nation or the faithful faction of the nation and not any individual. Yet, even taking the passages homiletically and acknowledging their adequacy as expressions of individual experience to which they have doubtless been applied countless times, we still have a social causation for the rescue from social hostility. My enemies are before me but elsewhere are my friends. They will rescue me if they can. Even if they fail to rescue me, the thought of them is a spiritual factor of great beneficence—as we shall notice presently. Edith Cavel may be in the hands of her foes. Yet, beyond her foes is the wider circle of her own. It is for them that she is struggling and suffering. It is from them that she derives the spiritual help pending the arrival of the physical help which will save her cause although too tardy to save her life. Theirs are the hymns and prayers and the religious tropes which comfort her last hours. "They that are with us are more than they that are with them." Elisha may have referred to the gleaming angels on the surrounding heights. But even without the mythical angels, his words would have been true. Social presence is something vaster than physical presence. Social presence is unbounded in time or space. The remotest regions and the remotest generations can belong to it. Beyond the hostile Syrian cordon, is the infinite and eternal social situation wherein Elisha has the victory.

Nor are human friends, when foes overwhelm, altogether absent even physically. How many a foe is a potential friend! Pocahontas need not have been Captain Smith's only protagonist in that dreadful hour. Song and story are fond of the theme. It is not impossible for enemies to become admirers and even helpers. What we noticed at the outset about unexpectedness finds striking illustration in the devious ways of social interaction.

(3) The third type of aid which we must consider is the spiritual which has already obtained some incidental illustration. What do we mean by the spiritual? In a previous

connection, we have asserted that spiritual is an evaluative term, a eulogistic appraisal of situations highly approximative to the highest ideal. We declined to identify the spiritual with the emotional or volitional because emotional and volitional aspects belong also to situations which do not merit that encomium. Still, there is a sense of the word "spiritual" in which affective-volitional experiences do have a dominating place. That place appears to be this: The spiritual is the important. The important elicits closer scrutiny than the unimportant. Affective-volitional factors which are ignored or lightly heeded in unimportant situations gain their due measure of attention when the significant situations arise. This capacity of momentous situations to win closer scrutiny than the non-momentous will account for the rôle played by the "soul," the "heart," the "inner life," &c.—or their behavioristic equivalents—in conjunction with spirituality.

Spirituality, of course, does not and can not dispense with "outer" elements. There can be no response except there be a situation to which to respond: there can be no volition without something to be willed. The "outer" is as inseparable from spirituality as the "inner" and the "inner" as inseparable from the *unspiritual* as the "outer." The difference is apparently due to the amount of attention elicited by affective-volitional occurrences in situations of high value and of low value respectively.

The correctness or incorrectness of this explanation however need not effect the salient point which is the part that fellow human beings assume in generating that "inner life of the soul." Can anything even remotely approach in its potency the influence which human beings exert upon one another? Here belong example, impression, imitation, suggestion, congeniality, persuasion—phenomena, in their turn no doubt, reducible to the associations, conscious or unconscious, of Psychoanalysis and the conditioned responses of Behaviorism.

How enormous this potency is becomes revealed in the frequency with which people "find God" in their human relations.

“World, how it walled about
 Life with disgrace!
 Till God’s own smile came out;
 That was thy face!”³⁶

“In thine eyes, my darling,” said a dying man to his wife, “have I beheld the Eternal.”³⁷ Who has not seen in the face of a beloved child the face of God? How commonly is the voice of an inspiring prophet, teacher or companion the voice of God! These statements are indeed misleading if the word “God” is taken in its causal sense. But they are literally true when the word carries its usual non-theological sense of value, high value, supreme, superlative value. This is the sense in which God is the comforter of sorrow, a strengthener against temptation, a cleanser of the heart and the essence of that moral rehabilitation which is traditionally called the forgiveness of sin. The circumstance that human contacts can be shown to have been operative in the causation of these benefits does not make them a whit less divine so far as their value is concerned.

And, in its spiritual ranges, mutual aid is how signally mutual! Each aids the other by becoming an object of aid for the other and eliciting from that other the proclivity for aiding.³⁸ Herein lies the sense in which irrefutably “God is love,” love being that relation in which human beings supremely influence one another toward that state in which supreme values are approximated if not realised. The joy of service, the comfort of self-effacement, the peace that comes with humility, and the blessedness of self-renunciation belong here, the individual, like Sir Galahad, finding himself by losing himself. Here also is exemplified the great doctrine of the intrinsic and indefeasible worth of the individual. The highest good of others is the highest good of each and this is what

³⁶ Robert Browning, “The Two Poets of Croisic.”

³⁷ Coe, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³⁸ Felix Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 171: “The category of interdependence implies that the lines of energy between A and B cross, so that A is subject to B’s influence, B subject to A’s influence simultaneously. The simultaneity of the relation distinguishes the category of interdependence from that of causality.”

the intrinsic worth of the individual implies. In vain will any highest good be sought by any one person which is not at the same time the highest good of everyone else.

III. GRADATIONS OF VALUE

The very gradation of good into higher and lower which we have found to be so distinctly inseparable from religion is deeply saturated with social presuppositions. The mere fact that the good is matter of discussion, argument and debate betrays this character. Both the attack and the defence of any line of conduct start from the assumption that the good to be sought is the good of all and not merely a good which, benefitting one, excludes another. Anything is bad which fails to realise this assumption; anything is good which does realise it.

By far the most frequent use of the words "good" and "bad" is that of relative positions in the line of social interaction. "Bad" is that which is being socially transcended, supplemented, corrected, left behind. "Good" is the prospective outcome of such transcending, supplementing and correcting. "Bad" is an earlier stage of the same journey whereof "good" is a later stage. At any given time, the earlier stage is represented by some persons and tendencies and the later stage by others.

Genetically viewed it is plain why this should be so. The individual is *ipso facto* a member of that larger unit, the race. The individual's activities can be understood only as phases of racial activity. The preservation of the individual is of moment because upon it depends the preservation of the race. When the preservation of the race calls for the sacrifice of the individual, then the sacrifice of the individual becomes of moment whether gloriously on the battle field or ignominiously on the gallows. Social pressure tends incessantly to make the mental habits of the individual reflect the interests of the race. To this proposition everything thus far said regarding mutual aid is but the corollary.³⁹

³⁹ Coe, *op. cit.*, p. 39: "The justification, not to say necessity, for recognizing a simply social function of mind exists not alone in the social presuppositions of several recognized values but also in a long series of genetic studies which, from one angle after another, have revealed the fundamentally social nature of consciousness."

Behind this racial character of the individual may perhaps be traced the ultimate mystery of the one and the many. Individuals are the many whereof the race is the one. This brings us to the farthest bounds of human thought, the mystery of the one and the many, the eternal and insoluble, bidding the mind of man: "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." In this sense, the good becomes linked with the infinite and the ineffable.

IV. EXPEDIENTS

We have already enumerated among the senses in which help can be divine the circumstance that it is at times something psychological obtained through various religious practices such as prayer, ritual, meditation, hope, trust.⁴⁰ These religious expedients possess the quality appraised as divine:

- a) when they really help,
- b) when the help is important and significant.

From the days of the ancient prophets to the days of modern anti-clericalism, these religious usages have had the defect of being resorted to long after changing conditions had deprived them of their effectiveness. Still their frequent futility does not gainsay the possibility of their being beneficial on occasion. In a world where most evils and the roots of still more evils lie in the emotions and the will, anything which creates a salutary state of the emotions and the will has every qualification for the encomium "divine."

⁴⁰ It would be customary to add "faith" but this we shall have to forego because of the misleading character of the word. The word is used in two distinct senses which have been hopelessly confused. One sense is that of the utilisation of certain mental (the Behaviorist would say "verbal") representations whose effect is deemed to be emotionally and volitionally helpful. The other sense of "faith" is that of a mental attitude in which the difference between evidence and lack of evidence is ignored, almost justifying the witticism ascribed to the school boy who is reported to have said: "Faith is when you believe what you know ain't true." Faith in the second sense is virtually the opposite of faith in the first sense. Erasure of the difference between evidence and lack of evidence produces emotions and volitions which can not be desirable.

In a previous connection, we have compared the use of imagery in religion with its use in art. We have also considered some specimens of imagery such as that involving the father experience and that involving the sex experience. We must now draw the distinction between the earlier associations of imagery and later associations.

Thus, expressions such as "Heavenly Father" have an impressiveness whose origin lies in the first years of life. The psychology of religion, whatever the school, has the function of tracing such origins. Yet these initial experiences are not the only ones contributing to the associational content of religious phrases. Much to their associational enrichment, there have been, subsequent to childhood, innumerable occasions upon which these phrases have been used. They may have been spoken by a beloved mother,⁴¹ teacher, prophet or friend. They may have become glorified through entrancing music or aureoled in masterpieces of art. We may well question whether infantile associations are necessarily more potent than those arising at a later date.

With certain phrases, the associational content is in a state of constant growth. Expressions like "God bless you," "God will take care of you," "God give thee peace," "Holy Spirit," "The peace that passeth understanding"⁴² have served so perennially to vocalize affection and good will as to have become a special vocabulary of affection and good will. The beloved persons not only by whom but also to whom these words are spoken augment their associational

⁴¹ The immense rôle played in religion by filial respect has a bearing upon this point. Religion is still identified with piety, that is *pietas*, filial devotion. In Judaism as elsewhere numerous usages are avowedly observed for no other reason than that of honoring parents or even remoter ancestors. Some anthropologists would have us understand that ancestor worship constituted the beginning or an early stage of some or of all religions.

⁴² "The peace of God that passeth understanding" admits of being understood in terms of social psychology. Various human contacts, memories, expectations, artistic and literary achievements have been psychologically instrumental in producing that peace. The peace is "of God" in the sense of its being wholesome, excellent, desirable, an exceptional embodiment of value. A more accurate phrasing would be "passeth expectation."

wealth. The power of this love and friendship is surely not less than that of infantile recollection or sex reminiscence.

Along these lines also the attempt can be made to account for the reputed efficacy of prayer that one person offers in behalf of another. Prayer is the manifestation of one's interest in that other, of that good will, appreciation, esteem—of that understanding, at least, which we have already listed among the urgent social needs. "Pray for me" denotes: "Take an interest in me. Be concerned about me. Influence me helpfully." The benefit of the prayer lies in the beneficence of the one who offers the prayer while the God addressed in the prayer is that supreme good which, through it all, is being visaged and approached.

Conversely, when the associations are repellent, religious phraseology becomes hateful and atheism is the result. Atheism, as we have seen, differs from theism only in the matter of nomenclature. A tyrannical parent, a bigoted teacher, a reactionary church, a mawkish or superstitious congregation can render any set of phrases obnoxious and provocative of dissent.

Finally, it should be noticed how extensively the phraseology of religion refers to inanimate objects: light, tower, fortress, rock, sea, &c. Unless we can trace these figures back to the days of fetichism when inanimate objects were anthropomorphised, we may have to regard these phrases as being without a primary social basis. By virtue of their religious appropriation and repeated usage they become social in a secondary way.

Thus help, which is divine as to its value, can be social as to its expedients in addition to being social as to its cause.

CONCLUSION

JEWISH BEARINGS

As we began with a reflection on the Jewish bearings of our theme, it may be well to end with a similar reflection. That the God of Jewish tradition is a causative God can not be denied. Still it is significant that Theology which is responsible for the causal conception plays, in Jewish tradition,

a rôle much inferior to that of worship; and in worship, as we have seen, causation is, if broached at all, hardly more than a symbol of value. Have we not, in the preceding pages, had occasion to quote Jewish liturgic phrases when illustrating the evaluative conception of Deity?

Even in Jewish Theology, the age-long struggle against anthropomorphism may in a measure have been due to a perception, however dim, that causative categories fail to compass the Divine. A causal God must needs be an anthropomorphic God: such a vast part of observable causation is human, Divine causation could hardly be other than quasi-human. The Jewish insurgency against anthropomorphism which reaches its climax in Maimonides but which has often been traced through the Targumim back into the Massoretic text and possibly into still earlier manifestations is by no means unrelated to a feeling that, not causation but value is the meaning of Divinity.

Passages can, in fact, be quoted in which the idea that the causally human can be evaluatively divine is almost explicit. There is, for instance, the passage in Leviticus Rabba 34, 2 to the effect that the benevolent person, as it were, deprives God of the merit of giving bread to all flesh.⁴³ There is also the passage in Leviticus Rabba 34, 16 to the effect that as a "repairer of the breach" the benevolent person is God's surrogate.⁴⁴

Likewise how significant in this connection are the famous utterances in Abot chapter 3, paragraphs 3 and 7, asserting the presence of the Divine where human beings assemble under exalted conditions!

Nor is the conception of human beings who, like the prophets, function as messengers of God, without kinship with these views. The Shebet Musar 2, 5 has the pregnant phrase: "He imparteth unto His creatures some of the mercy which is His."⁴⁵ Human mercy is here identified with divine

⁴³ Leviticus Rabba 34. 2 quoting Psalms 136. 25 and 145. 15: נותן לחם לכל בשר. בא זה וחטף לו את המצוה.

⁴⁴ Leviticus Rabba 34. 16 quoting Isaiah 58. 12: וקורא לך גודר פריץ. ר' אבין בשם: עשרת אתה וגדרת אותה חייך שאני מעלה עליך וגו' ר' ברכיה אמר. אמר הק"ב. הפרצה הזו היה עלי לגודרה. עשרת אתה וגדרת אותה חייך שאני מעלה עליך וגו'.

⁴⁵ Shebet Musar 2. 5: נותן לבריות מרחמיו.

mercy—which is all but saying that something which is in some ways human is, at the same time, divine evaluatively.

Then there are the Jewish affirmations that friendship is divine⁴⁶ and, above all, the vast amount said about the sacred implications of charity. Again and again is God represented in the Bible, the Midrash, the Talmud and the Ethical Writers either as enjoining charity or as rewarding charity or as both. This, to be sure, is not a clear cut assertion that charity is the causative where the divine is the evaluative. Yet, in view of what has already been said about psychological “displacements” can these charity teachings be dismissed as altogether irrelevant? How readily can “God is the commander of benevolence,” “God is the rewarder of benevolence” be displacements for “God is the value to be realized through benevolence”? Considering the doctrinal background of Jewish charity teachings, could there have been any greater approximation to our doctrine of social cause, divine value?

Indeed a momentous practical inference follows. If the traditional declarations about the divinity of benevolence are to mean anything in modern terms they must mean the negation of what an ultra-progressive Jew of today calls provisionalism in social service. He writes:

“There are two fallacies that affect the social reform movements of today. The substitution of power for right is one. What I venture to call the fallacy of provisionalism is the second. This is the fallacy of the opportunist movements. ‘Lead the laboring classes provisionally up to the level of sufficiency, or of decent existence, and then we shall see.’ But man does not act without ends, and unless we define the ultimate end, we give license to the proximate ends. In other words we simply cannot act provisionally. We cannot ignore our spiritual nature without offending against it. We may start with the idea of serving

⁴⁶ Jerushalmi Berakot I 3c and IV 7d: השוכן בבית הזה ימע בנינים אהוב ואהבה: ושלום ורעות. שלום ורעות: שתשכן בפורינו אהבה ואהבה ושלום ורעות.

it, but without explicit definition of it we shall presently find ourselves disgraced in all sorts of idolatries."⁴⁷

If we are right in our contention that the dominant meaning of God is supreme value, it follows that the Jewish linkage of benevolence and God calls for the realization through benevolence of supreme values and not merely proximate ones. The mere feeding, clothing and sheltering of the body is a counterfeit benevolence. Benevolence must create or, at least aim to create a strengthened, a harmonious and a beautified personality in each of the parties involved. Provisionalistic social service or reform is as much out of keeping with the spirit of traditional Judaism as it is with the spirit of the ultra-modernized Jew from whom quotation has just been made.

The great Midrash on benevolence, Leviticus Rabba, actually states, 34, 16, that peace between the suffering individual on the one hand and God on the other is one of the most significant possibilities of benevolence.⁴⁸ We need not overlook its essential *naïveté* in order to credit this passage with at least some dim perception that spiritual goals to benevolence are of profound importance.

Not trivial values, then, but superlative ones must be sought in social work if we are to translate into modern reactions the ancestral view that charity is divine. Trivial values are not divine. Only exalted values are divine. That the soul and not merely the flesh must be the aim of all social endeavor is thus a conviction in which the teachings of the past and the insights of the present strikingly coincide.

⁴⁷ Felix Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*, London and New York, 1918, p. 53.

⁴⁸ Leviticus Rabba 34. 16: מה אני מה ואני מה. העני הזה יושב ובתריעם. א"ר יהודה ב"ר סימון. העני הזה יושב ובתריעם. מה אני מה ואני מה. ועפרת אתה ונתת לו חיך שאני מעלה פלוני הוא ישן על מטתו ואני ישן כאן פלוני ישן בביתו ואני כאן. עליך כאילו עשית שלום ביני לבינו

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